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NOTES 
 
There is a persistent debate on whether ‘Burma’ or ‘Myanmar’ is appropriate to be 
used as the name of the country. This debate is often linked with the user’s stance 
toward the country’s domestic political problem and thus has been a source of headache 
for many academics and observers. This thesis uses ‘Myanmar’ simply in line with the 
official usage of the Japanese government, which is the main analytical object of this 
thesis, without any prejudice regarding the correctness of any other usages. This thesis 
uses ‘Myanmar people’ when referring to the aggregate of the people in Myanmar. Also, 
this thesis basically uses the current names of the cities and regions: for example 
Yangon rather than Rangoon. Direct quotations, references and parts of proper nouns 
are exceptions.  
 
In terms of the names of Japanese individuals, this thesis writes the surname first in 
line with Japanese common usage. As Myanmar people do not have a surname this 
thesis writes the individual’s first name only except in cases in which the individual is 
commonly called by a popular name. For example, this thesis uses ‘Aung San Suu Kyi’, 
which is a popular name combining her father’s name Aung San with her own name 
Suu Kyi.  
 
While the author is an official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of the 
Government of Japan, none of the contents of this thesis represent the official stance of 
the Government of Japan. This thesis is purely an academic work based on the author’s 
own interest and responsibility.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis engages in the debates on Japan’s foreign policy objectives and direction 
in the post-Cold War era by examining the case of Japan’s Myanmar policy with a 
particular focus on the question as to why Japan maintained its engagement policy line, 
although shifting to a more critical one, toward the Myanmar military government 
which was established in 1988. This thesis employs the analytical framework of 
neoclassical realism, recognizing international structure as the primary determinant of a 
state’s foreign policy while at the same time shedding light on domestic level factors, 
namely policy-makers’ perceptions, the government’s resource mobilization and the 
domestic policy-making system as intervening variables that incorporate international 
structural incentives into a state’s actual conduct of foreign policy.  
 
In conclusion, the empirical study reveals that Japan adhered to an engagement 
policy primarily because of Japanese policy-makers’ perceptions that it was the most 
practical and effective policy to promote Myanmar’s political and economic 
development, which would eventually contribute to regional stability and progress. This 
indicates a persistent feature of Japan’s foreign policy which can be described as 
‘problem-driven pragmatism’, or Japan’s behavioural pattern of taking actions in 
response to concrete problems and pursuing practical problem-solving for bringing 
about incremental and pragmatic improvements in the problems by making necessary 
compromises with structural pressures and existing systems.  
 
This thesis makes a distinctive contribution from three aspects: providing new 
empirical evidence which fills the gap in conventional debates on Japan’s Myanmar 
policy objectives; proposing ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a new model of Japan’s 
foreign policy which addresses the shortcomings of existing arguments; and, affirming 
the applicability and efficacy of neoclassical realism for foreign policy analysis with the 
implication that it is necessary to examine multiple foreign policy agendas and  
multi-dimensional international structure in comprehending the critical tradeoffs that a 
state often faces.
1Introduction 
 
This thesis engages in the debates on Japan’s foreign policy objectives and 
direction in the post-Cold War era. Japan’s foreign policy debates in the post-Cold War 
era became focused on changing aspects of Japan’s foreign policy caused by transitions 
in the international structural environment and in domestic policy-making (Samuels, 
2007; Shinoda, 2006; Green, 2001). These debates tended to focus on transitions in 
Japan’s foreign and security policy vis-à-vis the U.S., the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and North Korea, which were deeply linked with Japan’s urgent security interests 
or the regional power balance. In some areas, however, Japan’s foreign policy 
apparently shows persistent continuity despite international and domestic transitions. 
This thesis is an attempt to put forward a consistent explanation regarding the 
development of Japan’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era in order to answer the 
following questions: as a whole, how and why has Japan’s foreign policy been, or not 
been, transformed in the post-Cold War era? Can existing arguments in Japan’s foreign 
policy studies put forward a plausible explanation for such a development in Japan’s 
foreign policy?  
 
This thesis argues that Japan’s foreign policy reveals a persistent characteristic 
of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’, which refers to Japan’s behavioural pattern to pursue 
practical problem-solving in response to the development of particular problems. In 
doing so, Japan tends to attempt to make gradual and pragmatic improvements in the 
problems in parallel with making necessary compromises with structural pressures and 
existing systems. This nonetheless does not argue that Japan is simply reactive to 
structural pressures. Rather, Japan identifies the foreign policy problems and examines 
the tradeoffs among foreign policy options imposed by multi-dimensional international 
structure based on its relatively coherent set of perceptions: Japan generally has a 
2conservative assessment of the international and local political structure while at the 
same time having an evolutionary perspective on international economic development 
and multilateral frameworks. Japan actually reflects these perceptions into its responses 
to the development of foreign policy problems, in many cases in a low-key and 
risk-averse manner.  
 
Debates on post-war Japan’s foreign policy have focused on its peculiarity in 
maintaining a low-profile and risk-averse foreign policy even after becoming the second 
largest economy in the world. In the post-war era, Japan’s basic policy prioritized 
economic development and the construction of friendly foreign relationships in a 
low-risk and low-profile manner by preserving a close and comprehensive partnership 
with the U.S. Japan’s basic foreign policy orientation during the Cold War era has often 
been represented by the Yoshida doctrine, which is characterized by a light armament 
and economy-first policy, the separation of politics and the economy, international 
non-interventionism, and a priority placed on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.1 In 
explaining such a peculiar feature of Japan’s foreign policy, Calder emphasizes the 
extensive impact of foreign pressures due to Japan’s fragmented policy-making and 
proposed a ‘reactive state’ model (Calder, 1988);2 while Heginbotham and Samuels 
explained Japan’s coherent strategy to pursue techno-economic interests by suggesting a 
‘mercantile realism’ model (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998); and, Katzenstein focuses 
on Japan’s domestic norms as the source of Japan’s security policy (Katzenstein, 1996). 
Hook takes a middle ground position, describing the characteristic of Japan’s foreign 
policy as ‘quiet diplomacy’, or “a range of consistently low-risk and low-profile 
international initiatives” in which a reactive tendency and rapid policy initiatives coexist 
 
1 Although Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, who set out the foundation of this orientation right after 
the Second World War, did not intend to keep this position as the basic policy orientation for a long 
period, it gradually became institutionalized into the domestic political system as the principle policy 
orientation.   
2 This model sparked a reactive-proactive debate in Japan’s foreign policy studies. On this debate, 
for example, see Potter and Sudo (2003). Miyashita and Sato examine and rebut the ‘reactive state’ 
model by arguing that Japan takes U.S. pressure into account based on its own preferences. See 
Miyashita and Sato (eds) (2001). 
3(Hook, et al., 2005: 75-78).3
In the post-Cold War era, Japan’s incremental shifts in its foreign and security 
policy began to be highlighted. By recognizing the impact of the changing strategic 
environment surrounding Japan, Green points out Japan’s gradual but steady realist turn, 
which he called ‘reluctant realism’, especially in its Asian policy (Green, 2001); while 
Berger focuses on Japan’s optimal adaptation to international conditions based on 
pragmatic liberalism, describing it as an ‘adaptive state’ (Berger, 2007: 262-268).4
Samuels highlights the diversification of domestic discourses on Japan’s ‘grand 
strategy’ caused by the post-Cold War transitions in international structure (Samuels, 
2007: 1-9). Shinoda examines the transition in Japan’s domestic policy-making system, 
insisting on the emergence of Kantei-led5 security policy-making as an essential change 
in Japan’s foreign policy (Shinoda, 2006).  
 
Despite showing a more or less similar tendency, Japan’s foreign policy toward 
Southeast Asia revealed relatively proactive and autonomous features on some 
occasions. Those denying the lack of strategic consideration in Japan’s foreign policy 
regard such features as evidence that Japan has its own perceptions or preferences, at 
least in its policy toward Southeast Asia, which has been assumed to be a strategically 
vital region for Japan (Miyagi, 2004; Sudo, 2002; Hirata, 2001). Recent historical 
research on Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asia during the Cold War era also 
points out Japan’s unique perception of the regional political structure in Southeast Asia, 
such as Prime Minister Ikeda’s anti-communism strategy toward Indonesia and 
 
3 According to Hook, while showing a reactive tendency in such cases as Japan’s response to the 
Gulf War and the setting up of normalization talks with the PRC, the Japanese government 
occasionally showed prompt and proactive decision-making, for example to ensure its oil supply 
from Middle Eastern countries in response to the oil crisis in 1973 (Hook, et al., 2005: 76). 
4 Berger portrays Japan’s general policy orientation as one of liberalization and opening-up of its 
economy and a positive commitment to international institutions on both economic and security 
issues (Berger, 2007: 267-268). 
5 The Kantei idiomatically refers to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretariat (CS, Naikaku 
Kanb8). 
4Myanmar (Yoshitsugu, 2009; Hatano, and Sato, 2007). On the other hand, those 
emphasizing Japan’s reactive and immobile behavioural pattern recognize Japan’s 
Southeast Asian policy as almost a dependent variable of the U.S. Asian policy. Sato, for 
example, claims that Japan’s policy toward Southeast Asia as a whole has been basically 
in line with the U.S. strategy toward Asia, discounting its proactive features as just 
sporadic (Sato, 2006). From this perspective, Japan’s proactive approaches toward 
Southeast Asia in high-politics issues in the post-Cold War era, such as its mediation 
role in Cambodia, are recognized as a new tendency in Japan’s foreign policy. Green 
notes that post-Cold War Japan’s proactive policies in Asia are Japan’s realistic response 
to the transformations of international structure, such as the declining commitment of 
the U.S. to Asia or the PRC’s increasing presence in Southeast Asia (Green, 2001).  
 
An essential question underlying this series of debates is whether Japan’s 
foreign policy has been primarily determined by international structure or domestic 
factors. After all, however, most arguments take both international and domestic factors 
into account, explicitly or implicitly, in explaining Japan’s foreign policy. It is, hence, 
more meaningful to focus on the way that such international and domestic factors 
interact with each other in formulating Japan’s foreign policy. This question is 
particularly important in understanding post-Cold War Japan’s foreign policy because, 
while Japan has arguably experienced significant changes in both the international 
structural environment and domestic policy-making in the post-Cold War era, it has not 
yet been comprehensively explained how such changes in international and domestic 
factors have linked with each other and formulated Japan’s foreign policy direction. It is 
therefore necessary for Japan’s foreign policy studies to bridge the gap among existing 
arguments, both in Japan’s foreign policy in general and in its Southeast Asian policy in 
particular, so as to comprehend post-war Japan’s foreign policy direction and its 
development in the post-Cold War era.  
 
5In conclusion, this thesis argues that international structure sets the primary 
constraints on Japan’s foreign policy while domestic factors including policy-makers’ 
perceptions, the government’s resource mobilization and the domestic policy-making 
system have substantial impacts on Japan’s choices of particular foreign policy direction 
within the tradeoffs that Japanese policy-makers are facing. This thesis also argues that 
Japan has a behavioural pattern in the conduct of foreign policy, in that the Japanese 
government has a tendency to be motivated by concrete problems and to pursue 
practical problem-solving by making necessary compromises with structural pressure 
imposed by multiple dimensions of international structure. This is the major reason that 
Japan’s foreign policy is often recognized as ‘non-strategic’ or ‘pragmatic’ while being 
motivated by its certain conception of national interests.  
 
This thesis can also be understood as an attempt to explain Japan’s ‘pragmatic’ 
foreign policy. Many scholars have pointed out Japan’s ‘pragmatism’ in explaining 
Japan’s foreign policy, which seems to be that of ‘non-strategic’ behaviours from a 
structural realist perspective; yet in many cases the same scholars do not give a precise 
meaning for pragmatism. The ‘comprehensive security’ argument, for example, attempts 
to explain Japan’s original conception of security which covers not only traditional 
inter-governmental security but also economic and other dimensions of security (Akaha, 
1991). The ‘mercantile realism’ argument is another example explaining Japan’s 
‘pragmatism’ by pointing out Japan’s priority of techno-economic interests, which is 
apparently inconsistent with the premise of structural realism but still rational enough to 
ensure Japan’s pragmatic interests (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998). This thesis will 
explain Japan’s ‘pragmatism’ by revealing the way that Japan’s basic perceptions of 
multiple agendas and multiple dimensions of international structure actually shaped 
Japan’s ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy.  
 
This thesis derives a model of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ from an empirical 
6case study of Japan’s Myanmar policy. In the case study, this thesis addresses the 
question as to why the Japanese government maintained its engagement policy line, 
although gradually shifting to a more critical version, toward the Myanmar military 
government, which faced strong international criticism due to its infringement of the 
value of democracy and human rights since Myanmar’s domestic political turmoil from 
1988 to 1990, despite the transformations of the international structural environment 
and domestic factors in the post-Cold War era. This thesis argues that it is primarily 
because of Japanese policy-makers’ perceptions that an engagement approach was the 
only practical and the most effective policy line in promoting Myanmar’s postcolonial 
nation-building and development, which would eventually contribute to regional 
stability and progress. The Japanese government has therefore been seeking incremental 
and pragmatic solutions to the Myanmar problem together with the maintenance of 
regional political stability by often making necessary compromises with structural 
constraints.  
 
The underlying factors that had sustained Japan’s pre-1988 friendship 
engagement, including weak structural pressures, domestic policy-making inertia, 
pro-engagement domestic actors’ support as well as policy-makers’ expectations about 
the Myanmar government’s goodwill to follow the Asian developmental state model, 
had been significantly eroded by the early 2000s. This led to shift the mode of Japan’s 
engagement policy to a more critical one in accordance with transitions in 
policy-makers’ perceptions, the government’s relationships with domestic actors and the 
domestic policy-making system. Especially in the early 2000s, the Japanese government 
somewhat actively committed to critical engagement, rather than reorienting to a 
sanctions approach or an unconditional support approach, based on its conservative 
assessment of international political structure and local power configurations as well as 
its identification of national interests in Southeast Asian regional political and economic 
development.   
7Japan and Myanmar have a shared history rooted in Japan’s active involvement 
in the process toward Myanmar’s independence before and during the Asia Pacific War. 
In the post-war era, following the war reparations agreement in 1954 and the 
‘quasi-reparations’ (jun-baish8) agreement in 1963, and in parallel with the expansion 
of Japan’s overall Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget, Japan began to 
increase its ODA disbursement to Myanmar. This resulted in Japan becoming 
Myanmar’s most important donor by the late 1970s. In August 1988, after a serious 
economic downturn, there emerged an extensive public movement against the Ne Win 
military regime in Myanmar, resulting in the so-called ‘8888 Uprising’.6 Subsequently, 
having seized power by a coup within the military in September 1988, the new military 
government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC),7 has been in power for 
more than two decades. The SPDC ignored the result of a landslide victory at the 1990 
general election by the National League for Democracy (NLD)8 led by Aung San Suu 
Kyi.9 This resulted in the Myanmar problem being recognized as one of the most 
controversial issues of democracy and human rights protection in international society, 
especially in Western countries.  
 
6 The ‘8888 Uprising’ was a widespread anti-government public demonstration in Myanmar that 
occurred from 8 August 1988. Although there had already been an anti-government demonstration 
by university students in Yangon in March 1988, the scale of the ‘8888 Uprising’ became so large 
that the Ne Win regime could not simply crack down. On the ‘8888 Uprising’, see Sakuma (1993: 
110-143). Also, as a record of the ‘8888 Uprising’ and its aftermath in Yangon written by a Japanese 
official at the Japanese Embassy in Myanmar, see Fujita (1989). 
7 The new military government was initially named the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), which was abolished and reconstituted as the SPDC in 1997. This thesis will use the 
SPDC to refer to both the SLORC and the SPDC in order to avoid terminological confusion by 
considering their substantial organizational continuity.  
8 The NLD was established by anti-government leaders including Chairman Aung Gyi, 
Vice-Chairman Tin Oo and General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi on 24 September 1988. Aung Gyi 
later opted out of the NLD and formed another party because of opposition from Tin Oo and others 
on expelling communists from the NLD. The NLD became popular through the name of Aung San 
Suu Kyi who vigorously complained against the Ne Win regime at the time of the ‘8888 Uprising’. 
9 Aung San Suu Kyi is Myanmar’s independence hero Aung San’s daughter. Having been abroad 
since 1960 when her mother was appointed as Myanmar’s Ambassador to India, she studied at the 
University of Oxford in the UK and later married Michael Aris, a British scholar of Tibetan studies. 
On returning to Myanmar to take care of her sick mother in April 1988, she suddenly became very 
popular as an anti-government leader, especially since her speech at the Shwe Dagon Pagoda on 26 
August 1988, which reportedly gathered hundreds of thousands of people. 
8During the two decades since the ‘8888 Uprising’, Japan’s basic stance toward 
the Myanmar problem has shown minimal change, at least in observing actual policy 
implementation. By maintaining direct contact with Myanmar political leaders, 
including both SPDC and NLD members, the Japanese government repeatedly 
encouraged Myanmar’s political and economic reforms through bilateral talks, official 
statements, policy dialogues and other means. At the same time, Japan has continued to 
provide economic assistance for humanitarian purposes and on-going yen loan projects 
on a case-by-case basis since February 1989, yet without agreeing any new yen loans 
and substantially decreasing the amount of ODA disbursement compared to the 
pre-1988 period. Still, Japan has occasionally attempted to provide, and in some cases 
actually provided, larger economic assistance for politically controversial projects, 
especially from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This caused repeated criticisms 
against Japan’s engagement policy line, not only from the U.S. and other Western 
governments, which have promoted economic sanctions, but also from anti-SPDC 
groups in Japan and outside.   
 
Within Japan’s foreign policy studies, Japan’s Myanmar policy remains an 
understudied area in spite of its significance in Japan’s strategy toward Southeast Asia. 
Most previous research has been carried out by regional study scholars as part of 
Myanmar studies, in many cases focusing largely on Japan’s ODA disbursement to 
Myanmar (Kudo, 2007; 1997a; Nemoto, 2007; Holliday, 2005; Steinberg, 2001; 1993; 
SaitJ, 1992). Only recently have some scholars of Japan’s diplomatic history begun to 
focus on Japan’s anti-communist strategy toward Myanmar in the 1960s by utilizing 
recently disclosed diplomatic archives (Yoshitsugu, 2009; Hatano and Sato, 2007). 
Hence, there are only a small number of previous studies on post-1988 Japan’s policy 
toward Myanmar from the perspective of Japan’s foreign policy analysis, which mostly 
remain as partial or hypothetical arguments without being fully substantiated by 
9first-hand evidence (Dalpino, 2007; Pongyelar, 2007; Seekins, 2007; 1999a; 1999b; 
Strefford, 2006; 2005; Green, 2001: 179-192). Others focus more on Japan’s foreign aid 
policy, taking Japan’s ODA provision to Myanmar as a case of Japan’s foreign aid 
policy-making (Sugishita, 1999: 402-409; Orr, 1990: 85-86), or examine Japan’s foreign 
aid objectives in relation to the values of democracy and human rights, which was 
declared as one of four ODA principles in the 1992 ODA Charter (Strefford, 2007; 
Watanabe, 2001: 78-80; Arase, 1993: 946).  
 
There is a substantial gap in understanding of the determinants of Japan’s 
Myanmar policy amongst these scholars. One of the main issues is whether the Japanese 
government held any coherent objectives in its Myanmar policy or not. There seem to 
be strikingly different perspectives on this issue, even concerning Japan’s war 
reparations and economic assistance toward Myanmar before 1988. Those who deny 
that the Japanese government had coherent objectives regard the main reason for 
Japan’s massive amount of foreign aid to Myanmar during the Cold War era as either a 
result of shared history and personal ties among political and business leaders in both 
countries (Nemoto, 2007), or it was a result of domestic special interests and 
rent-seeking activities regarding individual ODA projects (Seekins, 2007; Strefford, 
2005; SaitJ, 1992). The characteristics of Japan’s ODA policy-making such as weak 
administrative capacity, poor evaluation mechanisms and fragmented decision-making 
power are also raised as supporting factors in explaining Japan’s aid to Myanmar 
(Seekins, 2007; 1992; Steinberg, 1993). In contrast, recent historical research focuses on 
Prime Minister Ikeda’s anti-communism strategy in agreeing on war reparations 
renegotiation in the early 1960s and concludes that it was to prevent Myanmar from 
being drawn into the PRC’s sphere of influence (Yoshitsugu, 2009; Hatano and Sato, 
2007). Kudo also notes the changing objectives of Japan’s economic assistance to 
Myanmar from mercantile interests to broader foreign policy goals by the 1970s at the 
latest (Kudo, 1997a).  
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These different perspectives have led to differences in understanding about 
Japan’s post-1988 foreign policy toward Myanmar. The advocates of a lack of coherent 
objectives regard Japan’s post-1988 engagement policy as a result of preserving the 
pre-1988 structure (Nemoto, 2007; Strefford, 2005), or of the constraining effect of 
Myanmar’s accumulated debt as a burden of the pre-1988 policy (Strefford, 2006). On 
the other hand, by assuming Japan’s shift to a more realistic perspective, Green 
considers Japan’s nuanced engagement as a product of international political concerns, 
regarding it as an attempt to strengthen the strategic partnership with ASEAN to 
counterbalance the PRC (Green, 2001: 179-192); or part of a balance-of-threat strategy 
to gain other countries’ confidence as an honest broker (Holliday, 2005). Others employ 
mixed approaches, considering the effects of U.S. pressure, the PRC’s increasing 
presence, and domestic special interests as key factors in Japan’s policy-making 
(Pongyelar, 2007; Seekins, 2007). Japan’s identity as a democratic country (Pangyelar, 
2007), domestic competition between the pro-SPDC coalition and the pro-democracy 
coalition (Seekins, 2007), and the emerging roles of humanitarian NGOs (Dalpino, 
2007) are also raised as factors to be taken into account.  
 
These gaps in understanding about Japan’s objectives in its Myanmar policy 
stem from what those scholars assume are the Japanese government’s primary concerns. 
Green’s ‘reluctant realism’ focuses on Japan’s increasingly realistic responses to 
international political relations, yet fails to explain the continuity of Japan’s engagement 
policy since the Cold War era. ‘Mercantile realism’, on the other hand, looks at Japan’s 
primary interest in international economic relations and its implications for security 
issues, yet fails to give a plausible explanation for Japan’s Myanmar policy so far. The 
scholars of Myanmar studies tend to focus on bilateral relationships and assume the 
primacy of special interests in ODA provision or special relationships among political 
and business elites, paying little attention to Japan’s foreign political and economic 
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strategy at the macro level. Using substantial empirical evidence, this thesis reveals that 
the Japanese government recognizes Myanmar as a postcolonial country in the process 
of nation-building and development, considering that Japan should respect Myanmar’s 
state sovereignty and encourage its political leaders’ efforts, which could result in 
promoting regional political stability and economic development as well as establishing 
Japan’s international political standing without causing bilateral frictions. Based on this 
perception, the Japanese government has been taking action in response to the 
development of the Myanmar problem in order to pursue incremental and pragmatic 
solutions by making necessary compromises with structural pressures.  
 
There are four rationales in using Japan’s foreign policy toward Myanmar as a 
case study in this thesis. Firstly, Myanmar shares a significant place in post-war Japan’s 
foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, even if Myanmar’s relative importance within 
Japan’s foreign policy agendas has shifted from time to time. The Myanmar problem 
has by no means been a security threat to Japan, nor has it had a critical impact on the 
global power balance or on Japan’s economic security. The Japanese government, 
nonetheless, has recognized Myanmar’s significance because of several factors: its 
regional geopolitical location, economic and natural resources potential, and the 
Japan-Myanmar bilateral friendship. Myanmar is also important because of its place 
within international political agendas, including the Cold War confrontation, the 
North-South problem as well as postcolonial countries’ nation-building, and 
development and democratization in East Asia. Especially since the ‘8888 Uprising’, 
Myanmar has become internationally recognized as posing one of the most 
controversial problems for democratization and human rights protection in Southeast 
Asia. This has made the Myanmar problem a major regional political issue which, since 
the late 1990s, has required the involvement of Japan’s senior political leaders in the 
policy-making process. Japan’s Myanmar policy, therefore, could be considered as an 
indicative case in understanding the transitions in Japan’s international strategic 
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environment, its foreign policy objectives toward Southeast Asia, as well as the role of 
domestic policy-making in the conduct of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.  
 
The second rationale for focusing on Myanmar is that the Myanmar problem in 
the post-Cold War era consisted of multiple agendas which posed several policy options 
to the Japanese government. Since the 1990s, the Myanmar problem has been placed 
within the structure of regional power politics, international economic relations, 
non-traditional security issues, as well as international politics and values. This has 
meant that the multiple agendas of the Myanmar problem, without any default 
hierarchical priority, offer tradeoffs and options to other governments’ policy-makers in 
deciding Myanmar policy. Accordingly, whereas the U.S. and other Western 
governments internationally politicized Myanmar by highlighting Myanmar’s domestic 
mass movements with a focus on Aung San Suu Kyi as the icon of the democracy 
movement, neighbouring governments tended to be concerned about regional political 
stability, pragmatic political and economic interests, or the spillover effects of 
non-traditional security issues. By analyzing Japan’s policy toward Myanmar, therefore, 
it is possible to uncover what Japan’s foreign policy priorities were, particularly toward 
Southeast Asia, in the post-Cold War era.  
 
Thirdly, this empirical study provides key evidence for academic debate within 
Japan’s foreign policy studies because Japan’s Myanmar policy apparently cannot be 
fully explained by existing arguments within the field. The Japanese government, on the 
one hand, has found few substantial economic interests in Myanmar since the 1960s 
despite arguments consistently put forward by many Japanese policy-makers and 
business circles that Myanmar has significant future prospects. On the other hand, the 
Japanese government has been persistently attempting to engage Myanmar in spite of 
U.S. pressure to join the Western governments’ sanctions policy, even if Japan’s 
engagement was occasionally affected and modified by U.S. influence. This means that 
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neither the ‘mercantile realism’ model nor the ‘reactive state’ model fit this empirical 
case very well. Furthermore, as Green himself admitted, there is not sufficient evidence 
that the China factor has been a direct and primary reason for Japan to engage with 
Myanmar in the post-Cold War era, even if it is presumably an indirect reason (Green, 
2001: 179-192). It is therefore meaningful for Japan’s foreign policy studies to analyze 
Japan’s objectives in its Myanmar policy and to examine how far such objectives can be 
generalized into Japan’s grand strategy and, more specifically, its strategy toward 
Southeast Asia.  
 
Finally, Japan’s policy toward Myanmar is not an exceptional case. Insightful 
implications can be extracted because the tradeoffs that the Japanese government has 
faced in the conduct of its Myanmar policy are largely common to other cases within 
Japan’s foreign policy. These tradeoffs include the choice between partnership with the 
U.S. or the promotion of an Asian way; the encouragement of gradual change in 
Myanmar or more radical change; conducting its autonomous policy regardless of the 
international repercussions or advocating certain sets of values in order to gain 
international prestige; and, choosing low-risk policy options or taking the risk of being 
criticized both internationally and domestically. These choices are related to 
conventional questions of Japan’s foreign policy: Asia or the West? Pragmatism or 
idealism? Autonomy or prestige? Or, to be a system rider or a system creator? Japan’s 
Myanmar policy is, therefore, appropriate to show Japan’s priority in foreign policy 
objectives by examining Japanese government’s perceptions and actual behaviour.  
 
This thesis conducts an empirical case study and draws the argument of 
‘problem-driven pragmatism’ from the perspective of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical 
realism regards international structure as the primary determinant of a state’s foreign 
policy and assumes that such structural pressures are transmitted into actual foreign 
policy by a state’s domestic factors (Taliaferro, et al., 2009; Rose, 1998). Thus, practical 
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restrictions on policy-makers’ rational responses to structural pressures, such as 
policy-makers’ perceptions, the government’s resource mobilization and the domestic 
policy-making system, are presumed to have an impact on a state’s conduct of foreign 
policy. By employing the framework of neoclassical realism, this thesis can shed light 
on both international and domestic factors in order to bridge the gap between the 
debates on Japan’s international structural environment and the ones on Japan’s 
domestic policy-making. As a result of the case study, this thesis reveals that the 
Japanese government has actually been behaving within the constraints of international 
structure whilst at the same time deciding its actual conduct of foreign policy based on 
policy-makers’ perceptions of multiple agendas of concern and tradeoffs imposed by 
multiple dimensions of international structure. 
 
In so doing, this thesis also tests the applicability of using a neoclassical 
realism framework to analyse Japan’s foreign policy, thereby providing insights into the 
efficacy and limitations of such a framework on foreign policy analysis in general. The 
conclusion of this thesis is that the framework of neoclassical realism is effective in 
analyzing Japan’s foreign policy, and presumably a state’s foreign policy in general. 
Besides, this thesis suggests that, in operationalizing the framework, it is necessary to 
shed light on multiple agendas and multiple dimensions of international structure in 
order to highlight the tradeoffs that a state often faces in its actual conduct of foreign 
policy. 
 
This study employs semi-structured interviews and archival research as 
primary research methods in creating an empirical case study. As the key focus of this 
thesis is on Japan’s foreign policy-making in which various policy-making actors 
participate from different strategic perspectives, it is essential to collect first-hand 
evidence of each policy-making actor’s perceptions, objectives and actual behaviour by 
conducting face-to-face interviews with them. Official documents, public statements, 
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white papers and other materials disclosed or published by the government and 
government-related institutions will also be investigated as key evidence. Other data 
and materials including statistics, journals and newspapers, web resources, as well as 
academic and non-academic books and articles will be utilized as necessary to 
supplement the above evidence.   
 
This thesis makes distinctive contributions in three academic fields: Japan’s 
Myanmar policy debate, Japan’s foreign policy analysis, particularly on Southeast Asian 
policy, as well as foreign policy analysis theories. Firstly, this thesis puts forward a 
hypothetical explanation of Japan’s foreign policy toward Myanmar based on first-hand 
empirical evidence. Whilst previous studies on Japan’s Myanmar policy either simply 
discount the Japanese government’s coherent policy objectives or focus too much on 
international political considerations, this study points out Japan’s multi-dimensional 
perceptions of the East Asian regional structure and how its pragmatic objectives toward 
the Myanmar problem stemmed from its emphasis on regional political stability and 
gradual development. This thesis also has a distinctive feature in examining Japan’s 
policy-making process and actors in a comprehensive manner. As a whole, this thesis 
provides new evidence which was missing from previous empirical studies, filling the 
gap on academic debates on Japan’s foreign policy toward Myanmar. 
 
Secondly, this thesis contributes to Japan’s foreign policy analysis by revealing 
Japan’s unique and persistent perception of a multi-dimensional international structure 
as well as the distinctive setting of political and economic objectives in Japan’s foreign 
policy, especially toward Southeast Asia. It is highly likely that such objectives were 
often pursued in an ambiguous and opportunistic manner in a compromise between 
constraining factors such as the development of the Myanmar problem and the costs and 
benefits given by international structure. Yet, in contradiction to the premise of the 
‘reactive state’ model, such factors have never fundamentally altered Japan’s policy 
16 
 
orientation. Besides, Japan’s Myanmar policy was not primarily motivated by 
mercantile interest, which is assumed by the ‘mercantile realism’ model, at least since 
the 1960s. In addition, the ‘reluctant realism’ model does not give a plausible 
explanation for this case study in two aspects. Firstly, Japan held balance-of-power 
considerations even during the Cold War era, when conducting its anti-communism 
strategy against the PRC in the early 1960s. Secondly, while the Japanese government 
increasingly became concerned about the PRC’s influence in Southeast Asia, especially 
from the late 1990s, its initial and primary motivation in Myanmar policy was not to 
counterbalance the PRC. In other words, the Japanese government would have 
conducted an engagement policy even if the PRC had not expanded its presence in the 
region. This thesis, therefore, proposes ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a model to 
present new insight for Japan’s foreign policy analysis.  
 
The third contribution this thesis makes to the academic field is to draw 
theoretical implications with regard to the efficacy and applicability of neoclassical 
realism for analyzing a state’s foreign policy. As it is an emerging theory of foreign 
policy analysis, neoclassical realism has not yet been fully tested through a sufficient 
number of empirical case studies. So far, the analytical framework of neoclassical 
realism has been mostly utilized for examining a state’s ‘grand strategy’ or its foreign 
policy toward traditional security and other high-politics issues. When considering that 
a wider range of foreign policy agendas have become politicized in current international 
relations, however, it is worth examining whether neoclassical realism is a workable 
analytical framework and, if so, how it should be operationalized in examining a state’s 
policy toward general foreign policy agendas. While the theoretical argument of this 
thesis is drawn by a single case study rather than concrete hypotheses substantiated by a 
number of empirical case studies, this study can still provide an insight into the efficacy 
and applicability of neoclassical realism for a state’s policy toward general foreign 
policy agendas, particularly in relation to Japan’s foreign policy analysis.    
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As it is based mainly on qualitative research through a single case study, this 
thesis has a limitation in that the plausibility of any hypotheses drawn need to be tested 
through future research on related cases to Japan’s foreign policy. Japan’s realistic 
assessment of societal and transnational structure could be observed in its policy toward 
the domestic agendas of, for example, Iran or Cambodia or other postcolonial Asian 
countries without urgent traditional security interests; while Japan’s responses to 
emerging international political and economic structures could be examined through 
other cases of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy since the late 1990s. Future empirical 
studies on these cases would contribute to further development of Japan’s foreign policy 
debate.  
 
This thesis consists of six main chapters. In the first chapter, the existing 
literature on Japan’s foreign policy studies will be reviewed in detail. Accordingly, 
neoclassical realism will be proposed as the theoretical framework of this thesis, 
followed by a section on the operationalization of neoclassical realism in order to fit the 
framework into the case of Japan’s policy toward Myanmar. In the following four 
chapters, the empirical case study will be demonstrated. The second chapter will 
examine Japan’s pre-1988 Myanmar policy in order to present Japan’s default policy 
orientation toward Myanmar before the ‘8888 Uprising’. The third chapter will cover 
the period from 1988 to 1996, when Japan responded to Myanmar’s domestic political 
turmoil in a low-key manner. The fourth chapter will examine Japan’s somewhat 
proactive Myanmar policy with senior leaders’ commitments from 1997 to 2004. 
Japan’s policy toward Myanmar from 2005 to 2008, the period after losing short-term 
prospects for political and economic development in Myanmar, will be analyzed in the 
fifth chapter. The concluding chapter will summarize the empirical findings and 
implications for Japan’s foreign policy analysis, discuss theoretical reflections on the 
empirical study, and make suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 1 
Japan’s Foreign Policy and Neoclassical Realism 
 
1. Overview 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to propose ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as 
a new model of Japan’s foreign policy in order to address the shortcomings of major 
conventional arguments about Japan’s foreign policy. In so doing, this chapter firstly 
reviews academic debates within Japan’s foreign policy studies with particular interest 
in their development in the post-Cold War era. One of the major focuses of Japan’s 
foreign policy debates is how to explain Japan’s somewhat peculiar responses to 
structural pressures, which are generally considered to have had a substantial impact on 
the conduct of Japan’s foreign policy. Some explain them as a variation of realism 
primarily from structural analyses while others regard them as Japan’s originality in the 
conduct of foreign policy by carrying out domestic level analyses. Given the crucial role 
of international structure the analytical focus should be placed on the dynamic process 
that Japan perceives of transitions in international structure and how it actually responds 
to them. This thesis proposes ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a hypothetical 
explanation of such a dynamic process, in which structural and domestic factors interact 
with each other.  
 
The model of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ is based on neoclassical realism, an 
emerging theory of foreign policy analysis which regards international structure as the 
primary determinant of a state’s foreign policy yet at the same time sheds light on 
domestic factors which could prevent the state from responding rationally to structural 
pressures. In sum, this chapter places this thesis in the context of current academic 
debates on Japan’s foreign policy as well as explains and operationalizes the framework 
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of neoclassical realism in the context of Japan’s foreign policy analysis in order to set 
up a foundation for the empirical study in the following chapters.   
 
2. Debates on Japan’s Foreign Policy 
 
Japan’s foreign policy debates, to some extent in parallel with debates 
concerning foreign policy analysis theories, involve the question as to whether a state’s 
foreign policy is primarily determined by international or domestic factors. In the end, 
most arguments, at least implicitly, admit both international and domestic factors matter 
to Japan’s foreign policy. It is hence more significant to ask how such international and 
domestic factors interact with each other in formulating Japan’s foreign policy. This 
question is particularly important in comprehending Japan’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy because, while Japan arguably experienced significant changes in the 
international structural environment and domestic policy-making in the post-Cold War 
era, it has not yet been fully explained how such changes in international and domestic 
factors link with each other and formulated Japan’s foreign policy direction. 
 
In terms of international structure, Japan’s foreign policy during the Cold War 
era was more or less influenced by the U.S. as the most significant partner under the 
Cold War structure. Calder’s ‘reactive state’ model, thus, pays particular attention to the 
significance of structural factors, emphasizing the extensive impact of U.S. pressure on 
Japan’s foreign policy-making (Calder, 1988). Miyashita counters the ‘reactive state’ 
model by emphasizing Japan’s own policy choices based on its preferences, yet without 
denying the substantial influence of U.S. power and policy on Japan’s foreign 
policy-making as a whole (Miyashita, 1999). In other words, U.S. power and policy is 
generally considered as the critical factor in explaining Japan’s foreign policy within the 
Cold War structure, even if there are different views on the way it influenced the 
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conduct of Japan’s foreign policy.  
 
The collapse of the Cold War structure made it necessary to examine the 
resulting changes in the international strategic environment surrounding Japan and its 
impact on Japan’s foreign policy. Three major issues are often discussed as the crucial 
transitions that Japan experienced within post-Cold War international structure: the 
relationship with the U.S.; the rise of the PRC; and, the emergence of regional 
frameworks centred on ASEAN. Firstly, there was the issue as to how far and in which 
direction the changing Japan-U.S. relationship shaped Japan’s foreign policy as it 
became necessary for Japan to review its partnership with the U.S. because of its 
concern about emerging differences in strategic objectives from the U.S. after the end of 
the Cold War. In fact, whilst experiencing some friction and adjustments in the bilateral 
relationship during the 1990s, Japan sought to strengthen its ties with the U.S. and retain 
U.S. commitment to East Asia, especially after 9/11. According to Kliman, this 
transition made Japan recognize the further necessity to fulfil demands from the U.S. in 
such cases as U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kliman, 2006). 
Hughes and Krauss, on the other hand, point out that it was possible for Japan to retain 
U.S. support for its own policy agenda, particularly the North Korean abduction issue, 
in return for giving assistance to the U.S. (Hughes and Krauss, 2007). 
 
Secondly, Japan’s response to the rise of the PRC became an issue of intense 
debate. Facing a newly emerging security and political environment in East Asia, Japan 
realized the necessity of dealing with the PRC’s growing presence and increasing 
uncertainty in regard to North Korea, especially from the mid-1990s (Samuels, 2007: 
135-157; Green, 2001). However, the arguments on how far and what sort of impact the 
PRC’s presence made on Japan’s foreign policy have not yet reached a consensus. 
Green describes Japan’s position as a hesitant realist turn, while admitting it is a relative 
one, arguing that “Japan’s fundamental thinking on China shifted from a faith in 
21 
 
economic interdependence to a reluctant realism”, and that Tokyo began to seek “to use 
multilateral and bilateral security networks to balance, and even contain, Chinese 
influence” (Green, 2001: 77-79). Mochizuki claims that the Japanese government, while 
moving away from ‘friendship diplomacy’, perceived both threats and common interests 
with the PRC, especially in functional issues, leading to its mixed approach of 
engagement and balancing (Mochizuki, 2007). Whereas scholars point out Japan’s 
moderate balancing act with the PRC or hedging between Asia and the U.S. (Wan, 
2001; Twomey, 2000), the extent to which the shift in power configuration surrounding 
Japan, including the relationship with the U.S. and the PRC, has transformed Japan’s 
objectives and indeed shaped the direction of its foreign policy still needs to be further 
examined. 
 
Thirdly, the impact of emerging regional cooperation and integration centred 
on ASEAN on Japan’s foreign policy became another discussion issue. In the post-Cold 
War era, there emerged inter-governmental movements toward the formation of regional 
cooperation frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3 and 
the East Asia Summit (EAS).10 These movements coincided with deepening economic 
and social interdependence in East Asia in parallel with rapid region-wide economic 
growth, which created certain mutual interests among governments in the region. Whilst 
Japan was more or less committed to these regional movements, there is some 
difference of opinion among scholars as to the determinants of Japan’s responses. Green 
insists that Japan committed itself to Southeast Asian affairs in order to engage in 
competition with the PRC and to establish an independent identity from the U.S. (Green, 
2001: 167-192). Berger, on the other hand, proposes the emergence of common 
pragmatic interests, regional institutions and Japan’s own liberal norms as the primary 
determinants of Japan’s foreign policy, including East Asian policy (Berger, 2007: 
262-268). Given that the development of the East Asia regional order in the post-Cold 
 
10 These movements were in many cases coordinated and facilitated by ASEAN as the region-wide 
political framework whose members included all ten Southeast Asian countries in the 1990s. 
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War era can be understood as a complex and multi-dimensional process (Pempel, 2006: 
239-240), therefore, it is essential for scholars of Japan’s foreign policy studies to 
further examine which dimensions and factors of international structure actually 
influenced Japan’s foreign policy direction in order to deepen the debate on the 
transitions in international structure connected to Japan and their impact on Japan’s 
foreign policy. 
 
In the post-Cold War era domestic level factors also became an issue of 
academic debate due to substantial changes in Japan’s domestic policy-making system 
and in the actors involved in it. An essential difference in the arguments on Japan’s 
foreign policy exists in their assumptions about Japan’s policy-making: the ‘reactive 
state’ model regards Japan’s policy-making system as fragmented and paralyzed while 
‘mercantile realism’ and ‘reluctant realism’ models assume a rational and coherent 
setting of national interests shared by Japanese policy-makers. Calder’s ‘reactive state’ 
model has a distinctive feature in arguing that Japan’s policy-making system has a 
fragmented and paralyzed nature and thus reveals pragmatic flexibility to U.S. pressure 
(Calder, 1988). 11  This argument clearly denies Japan’s rational perception of 
international structure and its strategic pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  
 
Miyashita, in contrast, insists that, even when Japan apparently changes its 
policy by taking U.S. pressure into account, it is not a result of fragmented 
policy-making but of its own policy choices based on a coherent set of preferences 
(Miyashita, 1999: 727-728). Heginbotham and Samuels also assume Japan’s rationality 
in its external behaviour, applying a ‘mercantile realism’ model to Japan’s unique set of 
national interests and Tokyo’s strategic pursuit of them (Heginbotham and Samuels, 
1998: 190-201). According to Heginbotham and Samuels, Japan strategically pursues its 
 
11 According to Calder, Japan carried out economic deregulation in the domestic market and 
arranged international agreements on trade and financial issues because of strong demands from the 
U.S., especially in the 1980s (Calder, 1988: 519-526). 
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techno-economic interests as a primary foreign policy objective, which can be regarded 
as a rational set of national interests despite the premise of conventional realism which 
assumes the primacy of security interests in a state’s foreign policy (Heginbotham and 
Samuels, 1998: 190-201). Green’s ‘reluctant realism’ model also assumes a shared 
setting of national interests among Japanese policy-makers, who gradually increased 
their attention to security issues and balance-of-power considerations in response to 
international structural transitions in the post-Cold War era, becoming more sensitive to 
relative power gains as well as eager to behave proactively in Asia (Green, 2001: 1-10).  
 
Having once described Japan as a ‘mercantile realism’ country, Samuels 
recently focuses on the diversification from the Yoshida doctrine of Japan’s foreign 
policy discourses since the 1990s. Samuels points out the emergence of four positions as 
alternatives to the previously dominant Yoshida doctrine: ‘neoautonomists’ insisting on 
national strength and a more autonomous foreign policy; ‘normal nation-alists’ 
emphasising national strength, the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the 
necessity to use the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) for settling international disputes; 
‘middle power internationalists’ advocating the priority of non-military power and 
legitimacy given by international institutions; and, ‘pacifists’ championing an unarmed 
neutrality policy to withhold autonomy (Samuels, 2007: 109-132). In his conclusion, 
Samuels argues that Japan is still in search of a strategic consensus within the 
policy-making circle which will constitute the core of Japan’s foreign policy direction. 
It, however, remains unclear what kind of political dynamics among these domestic 
discourses, which are advocated by different political camps with unequal political 
power, has emerged and how such a diversification of discourses has actually shaped the 
conduct of Japan’s foreign policy within the policy-making system. Given the 
coexistence of different discourses within Japan’s policy-making circle, it is important 
to examine how actual foreign policy is formulated among different political camps; 
through the Prime Minister’s leadership, political bargaining and rent-seeking, 
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bureaucratic coordination or through something else. 
 
In parallel with the above-mentioned debate on Japan’s perceptions and 
objectives, there has been a debate on the effectiveness of Japan’s policy-making system. 
Japan was under the one party dominant system of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
the so-called 1955 system, from 1955 to the early 1990s. While Johnson’s milestone 
research on Japan’s policy-making system in early periods focused on the power and 
unique role of Japan’s bureaucracy in initiating and coordinating the policy-making 
process (Johnson, 1982), scholars began to point out the pluralisation of interests and 
policy-making power within a one party dominant system (Muramatsu and Krauss, 
1987; Pempel, 1987). In this system, the Prime Minister was vulnerable to faction 
leaders or powerful politicians in the LDP, whereas the bureaucracy was generally in a 
position to initiate and coordinate policy-making even if it did not always succeed in 
achieving its objectives.   
 
Further debates on the transitions of Japan’s policy-making system and their 
influence on Japan’s foreign policy have continued since the 1990s. Shinoda, for 
instance, demonstrates the emergence of a policy-making process initiated by the Kantei 
in the making of security policy since the 1990s, which was not only a result of 
changing international structure but also of the transformation of domestic actors 
(Shinoda, 2006). Great attention has been paid to Prime Minister Koizumi’s exercise of 
Kantei-led policy-making for symbolic issues, even though it is considered that many 
other issues remained in the hands of the vertically divided administration (Tanaka, 
2007: 310-311). Although the feasibility of Prime Ministers pushing forward their own 
political agenda still depends on the stability of their domestic power base, a new 
political dynamic has become an emerging issue of discussion concerning Japan’s 
foreign policy-making. Nonetheless, it still remains unclear who actually sets the 
foreign policy agenda, chooses policy-making procedures, provides policy options and 
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makes decisions in such a process, and how far this new political dynamic impacts on 
Japan’s policy-making system as a whole.  
 
In combination with the issue of Japan’s policy-making system, the 
government’s relationship with domestic actors has recently been a focus of attention. 
Traditionally, the Japanese government’s close relationship with the LDP and the 
business sector was seen by academics as an essential factor in Japan’s foreign 
policy-making under the 1955 system. The Japanese government could enjoy a 
relatively stable and predictable domestic policy-making process because of close and 
intensive policy coordination within the so-called ‘iron triangle’ consisting of 
mainstream politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders. Japan’s foreign policy was 
thus mostly decided and implemented within this closed circle and the general public 
was neither much informed about nor interested in foreign policy-making except for 
symbolic cases such as the anti-nuclear movement and public movements against the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Although the power balance within the ‘iron triangle’ 
shifted from time to time, the government could in most cases manage its foreign policy 
capabilities by coordinating relationships with mainstream politicians and business 
leaders. Yet, as Muramatsu and Krauss noted, Japan’s policy-making system 
increasingly involved serious conflicts of opinions and interests among a wider range of 
domestic actors, which has made it more difficult for bureaucrats to effectively 
coordinate the policy-making process since the 1980s (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 
549-550).  
 
In addition to these changes, the collapse of the 1955 system seriously shook 
the traditional policy-making system, increasingly attracting academic interest in the 
process in which Japan’s domestic actors and the mode of their interactions have been 
transformed since the 1990s. The government’s relationship with the Diet, political 
parties and individual politicians is one of the key issues in this respect. Until the 1990s, 
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as the LDP’s internal decision-making process and its members’ formal and informal 
activities were generally more crucial than formal Diet sessions under the 1955 system, 
the Diet and non-mainstream politicians could only exert a minor influence on Japan’s 
policy-making (Iio, 2007). Bureaucrats usually coordinated the overall foreign policy 
direction while mainstream politicians, individually or collectively, often retained a 
certain influence on the policy-making process, in some cases by carrying out 
rent-seeking activities. There were, nonetheless, conscious efforts through a series of 
political reforms from the late 1980s to strengthen the power of the Prime Minister and 
the cabinet, to make Diet sessions more meaningful, and to restrict excessive 
rent-seeking activities of politicians (Iio, 2007), the results of which need to be 
examined in detail.  
 
Another issue in Japan’s policy-making system debates is the government’s 
relationship with the business sector. Despite the close government-business 
coordination under the 1955 system that a ‘mercantile realism’ model implies, the 
government’s relationship with the business sector also underwent rapid changes from 
the 1990s. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, from the 1990s, the business sector 
was a target of political and administrative reform, such as restrictions on private 
contacts between bureaucrats and business people, and the revision of the Political 
Funds Control Law which strengthened restrictions on political donations from 
individual companies to individual politicians. Secondly, the diversification of business 
interests and the government’s deregulation policies transformed the structure of power 
and interests between the government and the business sector. In foreign economic 
policy, scholars point out Japan’s strategic shift from a mercantilist policy to a more 
cooperative one in line with factors such as structural change of the domestic economy 
and industries and the development of international economic regimes (Kohno, 2007: 
29-32; Kojo, 2007). Still, some signs emerged of the exploration of new 
government-business cooperation, which could be observed in Japan’s Free Trade 
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Agreement (FTA) strategy or government-business missions dispatched to develop 
relations with emerging market countries. It is therefore necessary to further analyse the 
government’s domestic resource mobilization in relation to the Diet and politicians as 
well as the business sector in order to understand Japan’s foreign policy-making in the 
post-Cold War era.  
 
The government’s relationships with other domestic actors including NGOs 
and the media and the influence of public opinion also became important issues. Hughes, 
for example, states that Japan’s sanctions policy toward North Korea was enabled by 
support and pressure from a domestic coalition including smaller societal actors who 
successfully mobilized domestic public opinion (Hughes, 2006). Dalpino also suggests 
that the Japanese government began to utilize humanitarian NGOs as 
‘quasi-nongovernmental organizations’ which enabled it to circumvent international 
criticism in implementing humanitarian assistance toward Myanmar (Dalpino, 2007). 
These arguments indicate the emergence of new patterns in the way that the Japanese 
government could use domestic resources. Shinoda points out that Koizumi’s ability to 
mobilize public opinion was an essential factor in enabling him to carry out top-down 
policy-making (Shinoda, 2006: 174-176). These arguments indicate that there are some 
cases of foreign policy-making in which the role of NGOs, the media and public 
opinion cannot be neglected in comprehending the conduct of Japan’s foreign policy, 
even if they were still limited on the whole.  
 
This section has reviewed the debates on Japan’s foreign policy from the 
perspectives of both international structural transitions and domestic political changes. 
In the end, it is undeniable, as Samuels states and most arguments implicitly admit, that 
both international and domestic factors matter to Japan’s foreign policy (Samuels, 2007: 
4). Then, how can we connect these debates about international and domestic levels 
with each other so as to understand Japan’s foreign policy as a whole? In order to 
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answer this question, the way in which international and domestic factors interact with 
each other in formulating Japan’s foreign policy need to be examined. The next section 
will suggest employing neoclassical realism as an analytical framework for this thesis 
because it proposes a theoretically consistent explanation of a state’s foreign policy by 
integrating both international and domestic factors.   
 
3. Neoclassical Realism 
 
In analyzing Japan’s Myanmar policy, this thesis employs the theoretical 
framework of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism regards international structure 
as the primary determinant of a state’s foreign policy as it sets the structural costs and 
benefits for a state’s policy-makers while recognizing that such structural pressures are 
transmitted into a state’s foreign policy through domestic policy-making which involves 
practical constraints on policy-makers’ rational responses to international structure. The 
primary reason for employing this framework is that neoclassical realism illuminates the 
linkage between international structure and a state’s domestic level factors, analyzing 
the impact of international structure on a state’s foreign policy which is connected, often 
imperfectly, by a state’s policy-making function. This analytical focus of neoclassical 
realism will enable this thesis to provide a theoretically informed and comprehensive 
explanation of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy by integrating both an international 
level and domestic level analysis. This section describes neoclassical realism in more 
detail and distinguishes it from other research programs in foreign policy analysis.  
 
Neoclassical realism has been an emerging theory of foreign policy analysis 
since the late 1990s. Its basic assumption is that “the scope and ambition of a country’s 
foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and 
specifically by its relative power capabilities”, whereas “the impact of such power 
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capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must 
be translated through intervening variables at the unit level” (Rose, 1998: 146). From 
the perspective of neoclassical realism, international structure is not a direct determinant 
that automatically shapes a state’s foreign policy which can be assumed as the only 
rational response to structural pressures. Neoclassical realism can also be described as a 
theory on the functions of the state, which aims to reveal the functional impediments 
that a state inherently faces in transforming structural pressures into the actual conduct 
of foreign policy. By making this basic assumption, neoclassical realists focus on the 
ways that a state’s policy-makers perceive the costs and benefits imposed by 
international structure, set a state’s foreign policy objectives, mobilize domestic material 
and non-material support and address differences of opinion amongst themselves within 
the foreign policy-making system.  
 
By making a two-step analysis consisting of structure level analysis and unit 
level analysis, neoclassical realism examines the one-way cause-and-effect linkage from 
international structure to a state’s foreign policy via its domestic policy-making. In 
addition, by stressing the function of both independent and intervening variables, 
neoclassical realism holds “a distinct methodological preference—for theoretically 
informed narratives, ideally supplemented by explicit counterfactual analysis, that trace 
the ways different factors combine to yield particular foreign policies” (Rose, 1998: 
153). This does not mean that neoclassical realism abandons its pursuit of providing 
theoretically consistent explanations. Ripsman hypothetically proposes a matrix of four 
possible worlds distinguished by “the clarity of the international system regarding 
threats, opportunities, and the national interest; and the degree of information it 
provides on how best to respond to these structural conditions” (Ripsman et al., 2009: 
282-283) (see Table 1). Ripsman argues that the coverage of neoclassical realism is: (1) 
a state’s dysfunctional behaviour in the world with clear information on threats as well 
as policy responses (World 1); and, (2) a state’s policy choices in the world with clear 
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information on threats but unclear information on policy responses (World 2); other 
cases can be explained using structural realism, institutionalism or innenpolitik theories. 
Although this argument needs to be examined further, neoclassical realism should be 
regarded as a theoretical framework with which to analyze a state’s foreign policy based 
on certain theoretical premises rather than a versatile theory of foreign policy analysis. 
 
Neoclassical realism is a research program aimed at providing a plausible 
theoretical explanation of a state’s foreign policy. It is distinguishable from other 
international relations (IR) theories of foreign policy analysis that are primarily focused 
on either the international or domestic level. On the one hand, a major trend of IR 
theories has been their strong focus on the international structure level after Waltz’s 
suggestion of the primacy of international structural analysis. Waltz, the founding father 
of neo-realism, proposed three separate levels of analysis in examining international 
relations: the individual level, the state level and the international structure level (Waltz, 
1959). From this analytical perspective, Waltz and other neo-realists concentrated on a 
structural analysis of the international system by assuming that a state’s external 
behaviours are rational responses to systemic pressures generated by the international 
distribution of power (Waltz, 1979). An intensive debate between neo-realism and 
neo-liberalism on the dynamics of the international system was triggered when Keohane 
and Nye proposed ‘complex interdependence’, an ideal type of international system 
which integrated liberal traditions of interdependence theory and international structural 
analysis (Keohane and Nye, 1989). In essence, however, these research programs could 
be regarded as explorations to construct benchmark ideal types of international system 
rather than to explain actual trends of international relations or a state’s foreign policy 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989: 249).  
 
Neoclassical realism can be distinguished from these research programs not 
only by its focus on the state level but also by its research objectives. By analytically 
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separating structural and unit levels, neo-realists elaborate the ideal models of 
international structure by assuming the state as a rational and monolithic actor so as to 
maintain theoretical parsimony, even though many neo-realists recognize the variety of 
domestic attributions of states or the complex interactions between international 
structure and states. Neoclassical realists accept the separation of analytical levels and 
the primacy of structural factors in attempting to “explain the likely diplomatic, 
economic, and military responses of particular states to systemic imperatives” although 
they recognize that neoclassical realism “cannot explain the systemic consequences of 
those responses” (Taliaferro, et al., 2009: 21). In this regard, neoclassical realism can 
also be understood as a complementary research program to theories focusing on the 
structural level in terms of providing explanations about various patterns of state 
behaviours, which can contribute to understanding the dynamics of international 
relations more comprehensively.  
 
At the same time, neoclassical realism is distinguishable from the classical 
realism of Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Wolfers among others in its appreciation of 
international structural analysis and its adherence to the methodologies of social science 
(Taliaferro, et al., 2009: 16). Consisting of a wide range of insightful texts, classical 
realism has not yet developed into a coherent research program that can provide a 
parsimonious explanation of a state’s foreign policy despite sharing some essential 
conceptions with neoclassical realism, including the distinction of state power from 
national power and the practical impediments which a state’s leaders face.  
 
Neoclassical realism can also be distinguished from foreign policy analysis 
theories focusing on the domestic level, or innenpolitik theories. Firstly, neoclassical 
realists regard the state as the institution primarily in charge of the conduct of foreign 
policy in which the foreign policy executive plays a proactive role based on its 
conception of national interest. This shows a clear contrast to the liberal conception of 
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the state that assumes a highly pluralistic policy-making system which is reactive and 
accommodative to the interests of domestic individuals and private groups (Moravcsik, 
1997). What is more, whereas innenpolitik theories emphasize the primacy, or at least 
the independent role, of domestic factors, neoclassical realism maintains the primacy of 
international structure in shaping a state’s foreign policy. In this regard, even though 
neoclassical realism pays attention to domestic factors, such factors are assumed to play 
only an intervening role in transmitting systemic pressures into the conduct of foreign 
policy.  
 
Meanwhile, there are other theoretical perspectives which attempt to combine 
international and domestic level analysis. The ‘two-level games’ model is one such 
perspective in which Putnam introduces the concepts of game theory in explaining a 
government’s behaviour in international negotiations. This model focuses on a 
government’s bargaining process, which consists of international bargaining with other 
governments and internal bargaining with domestic actors (Putnam, 1988). This model 
is usually regarded as a compatible framework to liberal theories due to its emphasis on 
a government’s reactive role in mediating other governments’ demands and domestic 
actors’ interests. Neoclassical realism can be distinguished from this model by its 
emphasis on the primacy of international structure and policy-makers’ distinctive role in 
perceiving international structure, setting national interests and mobilizing domestic 
capabilities; even if it does similarly assume that policy-makers deal with two-level 
pressures from international structure and domestic actors (Taliaferro, et al., 2009: 7).12 
Another theoretical perspective that combines international factors and 
domestic ones is ‘analytical eclecticism’ proposed by Katzenstein. According to 
Katzenstein and Sil, ‘analytical eclecticism’ is an attempt to explore “new combinations 
 
12 Lobell, for example, points out the necessity for policy-makers to deal with both international 
level threats and domestic level threats by suggesting a complex threat identification model (Lobell, 
2009: 46-56).  
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of assumptions, concepts, interpretations, and methods embedded in explanatory 
sketches generated by competing research traditions” (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004: 265). 
In doing so, it employs and combines two or more IR research traditions for the purpose 
of solving academic problems in international affairs which are simply too complex in 
nature to explain from just a single theoretical perspective. The ultimate goal of 
‘analytical eclecticism’, therefore, is not the development of specific paradigms or 
research programs but rather the problematization of issues that have never been 
identified as research problems. This is clearly a different standpoint from neoclassical 
realism, which attempts to put forward theoretically consistent explanations of a state’s 
foreign policy based on the theoretical premises of the realist tradition rather than to 
identify new research problems.  
 
While having a different academic tradition, neoclassical realism could be 
benefitted from utilizing some concepts of foreign policy analysis (FPA). FPA 
developed in the post-war era following Richard Snyder’s proposal for a research 
program on foreign policy decision-making in order to explain the behaviours of 
various states with strikingly different attributions (Hudson, 2008). Involving a wide 
range of pre-theoretical conceptions and arguments, FPA has a number of conceptions 
which are relevant to neoclassical realism analysis. Allison, for instance, applies three 
models of foreign policy-making to U.S. and USSR responses to the Cuban missile 
crisis. The three models are: the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Behaviour 
Model, and the Governmental Politics Model (Allison, 2008). By proposing different 
conceptions of a state’s policy-making process, these partial models provide useful 
analytical tools to examine a state’s foreign policy from multiple perspectives. As 
neoclassical realism, by relaxing the assumption of complete rationality in a state’s 
foreign policy, explores intervening variables in the domestic policy-making process, so 
could the achievements of FPA be utilized as tools to examine domestic variables such 
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as policy-makers’ perceptions and the dysfunctions of the policy-making system.13 
To sum up, to make up for the shortcomings of neo-realism and innenpolitik 
theories in analyzing a state’s foreign policy this thesis will employ the framework of 
neoclassical realism in analysing Japan’s Myanmar policy. This will help give a 
plausible and theoretically consistent explanation of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy direction. In so doing, this thesis will also test the applicability of the framework 
of neoclassical realism to Japan’s foreign policy analysis and indicate the efficacy and 
limitations of the framework of neoclassical realism as a theory of general foreign 
policy analysis.   
 
4. Operationalizing Neoclassical Realism 
 
This thesis applies the framework of neoclassical realism to the case of Japan’s 
Myanmar policy. Japan’s Myanmar policy is a very important case because, despite the 
changes in international and domestic factors since the ‘8888 Uprising’, the Japanese 
government has shown persistent adherence to an engagement policy line although the 
mode of engagement has shifted from time to time. By examining the influences of both 
international and domestic factors on the making of Japan’s Myanmar policy from a 
neoclassical realist perspective, therefore, this thesis explains how and why Japan’s 
foreign policy, particularly its Southeast Asian policy, has been, or has not been, 
transformed in the post-Cold War era.   
 
It is firstly necessary to operationalize the framework of neoclassical realism 
 
13 Another example of FPA research that can potentially contribute to neoclassical realist analysis is 
its attempts to capture policy-makers’ cognitive and psychological processes and their impact on a 
state’s foreign policy-making. It reveals some cognitive and psychological factors frequently 
preventing policy-makers from making rational policies anticipated by the rational choice model, 
including policy-makers’ preference for simplicity, desire for consistency, poor estimations 
stemming from deterministic tendencies, and aversion to loss (Stein, 2008: 104-109). 
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by making clear its concepts in regard to Japan’s foreign policy and Myanmar policy. 
While most previous studies employing the framework of neoclassical realism focus on 
a state’s ‘grand strategy’ or policy toward traditional security and other high politics 
issues, many scholars of Japan’s foreign policy studies admit that Japan’s foreign policy 
cannot be fully explained by assuming the primacy of traditional security concerns 
(Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Akaha, 1991). More specifically 
in the case of Japan’s Myanmar policy, since the ‘8888 Uprising’ the Myanmar problem 
has not been a direct security issue for Japan but consists of multiple foreign policy 
agendas. These include Myanmar’s international political and economic relations, 
democratic legitimacy, human rights protection, nation-building and domestic 
insurgencies, and other non-traditional security issues. This does not mean that 
neoclassical realism is irrelevant for an analysis of Japan foreign policy but rather 
indicates the necessity to operationalize it in an appropriate manner for analyzing 
Japan’s foreign policy. This section, thus, firstly discusses the application of 
neoclassical realism to an analysis of international structure behind Japan’s Myanmar 
policy; this is the independent variable of neoclassical realism. This is then followed by 
a domestic level analysis consisting of three intervening variables: policy-makers’ 
perceptions; the government’s relationships with domestic actors; and, the domestic 
policy-making system.  
 
(1) Analyzing International Structure 
 
In analyzing Japan’s foreign policy from the perspective of neoclassical realism, 
an international level analysis needs to be conducted first so as to examine the primary 
determinant of Japan’s foreign policy direction. In so doing, it is necessary for this 
thesis to consider how to apply the framework of neoclassical realism, which has been 
mostly utilized for analyzing a state’s ‘grand strategy’ or policy toward traditional 
security and other high politics issues, to an analysis of a state’s policy regarding its 
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general foreign policy agenda. As mentioned above, many Japan foreign policy scholars 
admit that Japan’s foreign policy cannot be fully explained by simply assuming the 
primacy of security interests, even if some point out Japan’s growing attention to 
security issues and balance-of-power considerations. Specifically in the case of Japan’s 
Myanmar policy, the Myanmar problem is not a direct traditional security agenda for 
post-war Japan but consists of multiple issues including conventional international 
political and economic relations, domestic democratic legitimacy, human rights 
protection, nation-building and domestic insurgencies, and other non-traditional security 
issues. In such a case, it is firstly necessary to identify the concerned foreign policy 
agenda rather than just focusing on a security and high politics agenda which 
automatically gives secondary significance to other issues.  
 
After identifying the concerned foreign policy agenda, an analysis of 
international structure needs to be conducted. This thesis defines international structure 
as the power and policies of states and relevant non-state actors. Most realists have 
traditionally considered the concept of power as military capability which takes 
economic and other resources into account in that they can ultimately be converted into 
military capability. In contemporary international politics, however, the use of military 
power or the conquest of other nations has become increasingly difficult for states, 
especially for developed countries, due to the invention of nuclear weapons, the rise of 
nationalism, a decreasing societal acceptance of war, and increasing concerns for 
economic objectives (Nye, 2002: 5-7). This by no means suggests that all states actually 
deny the primacy of military power. It can be, however, rightfully argued that the 
primacy of military power is not necessarily relevant in general foreign policy agendas, 
particularly the ones which are not directly linked with urgent security interests. If so, it 
is analytically advantageous to employ a wider definition of power in analyzing 
international structure so as to understand the whole picture of the external setting of a 
state’s responses toward a foreign policy agenda of concern.  
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This leads to the necessity to analyze multiple dimensions of international 
structure. Nye portrays today’s international structure as “a complex three-dimensional 
chess game” (Nye, 2002: 35-40). In this conception, the top chessboard of 
politico-military power games is largely dominated by the U.S., whereas the middle 
chessboard of economic games reveals a multipolar structure of three big powers: the 
U.S., Europe and Japan, and other emerging powers. The bottom chessboard is the field 
of societal and transnational relations with a fragmented power structure in which many 
cross-border activities are out of governmental control. States, thus, need to pursue their 
policy objectives by simultaneously playing on all three chessboards. In such 
multi-dimensional international structure, the concerned foreign policy agenda and 
related actors’ reactions to it sets out the chessboards in which actual political games are 
played. After 9/11, for example, whilst al-Qaeda was an actor on the bottom chessboard 
in which the U.S. had limited power, the U.S.-led military action against the Taliban 
made it into a foreign policy agenda on both the top and the bottom chessboards. After 
winning on the top chessboard by eliminating the Taliban administration, the U.S. could 
not achieve its policy objective to exterminate al-Qaeda on the bottom chessboard. The 
international structure setting up the costs and benefits of a state’s foreign policy, hence, 
is constructed as a result of other actors’ power, their identification of a foreign policy 
agenda and their responses to it. This conception regards states as the main actors, 
especially in terms of politico-military structure, but requires taking non-state actors’ 
power and policies into account, particularly if they play a substantial role in the setting 
of the foreign policy process and associated agendas or have considerable power in 
societal and transnational structure. This thesis, therefore, firstly examines the 
concerned foreign policy agenda, followed by an examination of the power and policies 
of other states and relevant non-state actors which sets out the multi-dimensional 
international structure behind Japan’s Myanmar policy.  
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Since the ‘8888 Uprising’, the Myanmar problem has consisted of multiple 
foreign policy agenda items among which other states and relevant non-state actors set 
different policy priorities. In general terms, Myanmar’s geopolitical position at the 
juncture of the PRC, India, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean as well as its economic 
potential with rich human and natural resources has a potentially large impact on 
international political and economic relations. Other states with an interest in Myanmar 
therefore need to deal with Myanmar’s foreign and economic policy. However, until the 
late 1980s, only a limited number of states had seriously taken into account Myanmar’s 
foreign and economic policy. This was because the Ne Win regime maintained an 
isolationist foreign policy and interventionist economic policy which had little impact 
on international political and economic structure. It was the development of the 
Myanmar problem after the ‘8888 Uprising’ and the SPDC’s subsequent policy change 
that meant many other governments came to recognize Myanmar’s foreign and 
economic policy as a significant foreign policy agenda.    
 
Myanmar’s various domestic agendas, at the same time, had various 
international and transnational implications. Myanmar’s domestic political turmoil from 
1988 to 1990 exposed to international society the Myanmar government’s obvious 
infringements of the values of democracy and human rights, and became the trigger for 
Myanmar’s lack of democratic legitimacy and human rights protection to be recognized 
as internationally important foreign policy agendas by Western governments and other 
actors. On the other hand, since independence, the Myanmar government had faced 
serious difficulties in nation-building and achieving domestic stability because of the 
insurgency activities of various groups. Hence, some countries, especially in Asia, 
emphasized the agenda of domestic insurgencies, and advocated the necessity for the 
Myanmar government to pursue domestic stability and development by employing an 
authoritarian rule within a transitional process. There were also other agenda items in 
Myanmar that had international and transnational implications, including narcotics 
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trafficking, migration and refugees, and other non-traditional security issues.    
 
In examining international political and economic structure, the power and 
policies of the U.S., the EU, the PRC, ASEAN and its members, as well as the UN will 
be analyzed as key actors which have had a significant influence on the setting of 
international structure behind Japan’s Myanmar policy. Other less significant actors, 
including India, Russia and North Korea, are also taken into account when necessary in 
examining international structure in certain periods. The U.S. was arguably the most 
important partner for post-war Japan in its conduct of foreign policy. In the post-Cold 
War era, however, Japan reconsidered its relationship with the U.S. in regard to its 
foreign policy agenda due to transformations in Japan’s strategic environment, 
especially in East Asia, as well as shifts in U.S. policy toward East Asia. Having carried 
out a somewhat autonomous policy even in the Cold War era, Japan began making 
proactive foreign policy initiatives in East Asia after the collapse of the Cold War 
structure, even if these were still sporadic (Hirata, 2001). Japan consciously pursued a 
different, or even conflicting, approach toward Myanmar from the U.S., although there 
were internal differences of opinion among Japanese policy-makers on the management 
of the Japan-U.S. relationship with regard to Myanmar. But all things considered, U.S. 
power and policy was arguably the dominant structural factor in setting the international 
structure surrounding Japan’s Myanmar policy.       
 
Whilst the EU and Japan did not have so many vital interests in their direct 
relationships, some EU members had a significant influence on Southeast Asian 
countries as former colonial powers, donor countries and economic partners. In addition, 
the EU and ASEAN began to have inter-regional dialogues including the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM), which is the meeting between the EU and ASEAN+3 formed in 
March 1996. In dealing with the Myanmar problem, the EU was generally critical of the 
Myanmar government’s lack of democratic legitimacy and its infringement of human 
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rights, so it employed a sanctions approach in line with the U.S., although it preferred 
more targeted sanctions. The Myanmar problem also became an issue of conflict 
between EU and Asian countries, including Japan, when it was discussed at the ASEAN 
Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) and when the EU refused to allow Myanmar’s 
attendance at the ASEM.   
 
ASEAN promoted its expansion and integration as the regional political 
framework overarching all Southeast Asian countries in the post-Cold War era, even if 
its members’ leaders were internationally and domestically vulnerable in general. Japan 
began to recognize ASEAN’s strategic significance in its foreign relations under the 
Cold War structure and therefore made conscious efforts to construct cooperative 
relationships with ASEAN and its members. Especially since Myanmar’s accession, 
ASEAN realized the necessity of addressing the Myanmar problem as a crucial internal 
agenda. This made many Japanese policy-makers recognize that ASEAN and its 
members were important partners in dealing with the Myanmar problem. At the same 
time, ASEAN’s development as the credible regional political framework was seen as 
being in Japan’s vital strategic interest by many Japanese policy-makers. Despite its 
weakness in material power, therefore, ASEAN had a significant influence on the 
making of Japan’s Myanmar policy.    
 
The PRC was the most significant country in East Asia for Japan, not only in 
terms of risks but also opportunities. While Japanese policy-makers recognized China as 
a potential economic partner right after the Second World War, the Cold War 
confrontation in East Asia and the PRC’s communist direction made Japan unable to 
strengthen bilateral economic ties. The PRC’s domestic and international communist 
movements were also recognized as a serious risk for regional political stability by 
many Japanese policy-makers. Although the PRC’s shift to a reform and opening-up 
policy from the 1970s enabled Japan to improve the bilateral political and economic 
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relationship, Japanese policy-makers began to perceive both threats and opportunities in 
the PRC’s economic development and growing presence in East Asia, especially after 
the late 1990s. Although there were slightly different perceptions among them, 
particularly from the late 1990s, many Japanese policy-makers certainly considered the 
PRC’s growing presence in Southeast Asia and its strengthening ties with the Myanmar 
government as significant factors to be taken into account in Myanmar policy-making.    
 
The UN played an essential role in the Myanmar problem, particularly from 
Japan’s perspective. On the one hand, in addition to specialized agencies’ involvement 
in Myanmar’s human rights, refugee and other issues, the UN Secretary-General and the 
special envoy to Myanmar began to play a mediation role from the late 1990s. On the 
other hand, the UN Security Council became a field for an international political game 
over Myanmar due to U.S. efforts to discuss the Myanmar problem at the Council from 
2005. Myanmar’s human rights situation was also frequently raised at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, later succeeded by the UN Human Rights Council in 
2006. Japan was generally supportive of the UN playing a mediation role and regarded 
it as working in a complementary way to Japan’s engagement approach. However, 
Japan had difficulty in dealing with the international political game at the UN Security 
Council because of its ambivalent position within the game. In the end, while not being 
a state, the UN had a certain impact on other states’ policies toward the Myanmar 
problem and the setting of international structure behind Japan’s Myanmar policy.   
 
In analyzing societal and transnational structure surrounding the Myanmar 
problem, the Myanmar government, the democracy camp and ethnic minority groups 
will be examined as key actors, particularly in relation to Myanmar’s domestic agendas. 
From 1962 to 1988, Myanmar was governed by the Ne Win military regime, formally 
under the one-party rule of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). After the 
military coup in the wake of the ‘8888 Uprising’, younger military officers established 
42 
 
the SPDC, staying in power for more than two decades. After succeeding the original 
Chairman Saw Maung in April 1992, Than Shwe gradually consolidated his power 
within the SPDC, which had a somewhat fragmented power structure and internal 
differences of opinion, at least until the early 2000s. Whilst it maintained dominant 
material capabilities in relation to other domestic actors, the SPDC’s political legitimacy 
was weak due to its ignoring of the result of the 1990 general election as well as its 
imperfect, if gradually strengthening, control over the territory because of the presence 
of ethnic minority groups, especially in border areas.  
 
The democracy camp, on the other hand, emerged as a significant actor after 
the ‘8888 Uprising’. Whereas the ‘8888 Uprising’ was a less organized movement of 
students and the general public, the NLD became the main focus of anti-military 
government protest and won a landslide victory at the 1990 general election. As the 
daughter of Myanmar’s independence hero Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi suddenly 
became recognized as the leader of Myanmar’s democracy movement not only within 
Myanmar but also by international society. Due to SPDC oppression of the democracy 
camp after the ‘8888 Uprising’, many Myanmar students and activists became refugees 
or foreign residents, establishing organizations and transnational networks acting for 
Myanmar’s democratization in cooperation with supporters, especially those in Western 
countries. Although it was materially weak the democracy camp had democratic 
political legitimacy as well as foreign support, particularly from Western countries.    
 
Since Myanmar’s independence, a number of ethnic minority groups carried 
out insurgency activities against the government for a long period. After taking power, 
by using both a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, the SPDC put intensive effort into 
concluding ceasefire agreements with these groups as well as to involve them in the 
process to formulate a new constitution. All major ethnic minority groups bar the Karen 
National Union (KNU) had agreed on a ceasefire with the SPDC by the late 1990s, 
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though many of them remained ambivalent in their relationship with the SPDC. The 
activities of ethnic minority groups are thus recognized as a significant factor in 
Myanmar’s domestic politics.   
 
(2) Analyzing Domestic Factors 
 
After conducting an international level analysis, it is necessary to examine how 
a state responds to structural pressures by conducting a domestic level analysis in order 
to explain a state’s foreign policy from a neoclassical realism perspective. In examining 
the structure and actors of a state’s foreign policy-making, neoclassical realists focus on 
the state’s foreign policy executive, consisting of the head of government as well as the 
ministers and government officials in charge of foreign policy-making (Ripsman, et al., 
2009: 280-281). The foreign policy executive is distinct from other actors in several 
respects: holding privileged access to official and confidential information on 
international affairs; retaining foreign policy tools including military capability and 
national budgets; and, supposedly representing the national interest as the only 
legitimate actor in inter-governmental relationships. On the other hand, policy-makers 
need to deal with practical impediments in the conduct of foreign policy. These include 
imperfect information and cognition in perceiving international structure which can 
result in differences of perception among policy-makers, potential conflicts and 
compromises within the policy-making system, and potential difficulties in mobilizing 
domestic material and non-material support. For neoclassical realists, therefore, in order 
to comprehend a state’s external behaviour it is crucial to examine the impact of these 
impediments on the foreign policy executive in deciding and implementing foreign 
policy. 
 
This thesis employs three domestic level variables which are commonly 
suggested by neoclassical realists: policy-makers’ perceptions, the government’s 
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resource mobilization, and the domestic policy-making system. Policy-makers’ 
perceptions of international structure, the first variable, matter primarily because 
policy-makers need to decide a state’s foreign policy based on their understanding of 
international structure; an understanding which is formed by limited information that 
they can gather. Taliaferro and his co-researchers mention that “systemic incentives and 
threats, at least in the short run, are rarely unambiguous”, and therefore “there is often 
not a single, optimal response to such incentives” (Taliaferro et al., 2009: 28-29). In 
other words, policy-makers in many cases need to deal with insufficient information 
about international structure and uncertainty in predicting policy outcomes. 
Policy-makers are, hence, required to decide foreign policy based on their perceptions 
of structural pressures as well as their calculations of other states’ possible reactions and 
resulting power trends in the future. This can lead to misperceptions of international 
structure and miscalculations of other states’ responses, resulting in inadequate 
responses to structural pressures. Also, it is often the case that different policy-makers 
focus on different dimensions of international structure and have different policy 
priorities in dealing with tradeoffs in the costs and benefits imposed by international 
structure. 
 
Amongst neoclassical realists, Christensen points out the importance of 
perceptions and misperceptions of policy-makers in comprehending the issues of 
balance-of-power and security dilemmas in the alliance policies of European great 
powers in the nineteenth and twentieth century (Christensen, 1997). Other scholars 
explaining a state’s foreign policy from a neoclassical realism perspective also employ 
policy-makers’ perceptions or threat assessments as a variable in their research (Lobell, 
2009; Wohlforth, 1994/95). Policy-makers’ perceptions have also been analyzed as a 
significant variable by FPA scholars. Jervis argues that “it is often impossible to explain 
crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about 
the world and their images of others” (Jervis, 1976: 28). He thus suggests an 
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examination of policy-makers’ perceptions by questioning how policy-maker’s 
perceptions are derived from the information they possess (Jervis, 1976: 7). From the 
perspective of neoclassical realism, nonetheless, such policy-makers’ perceptions 
function only as a prism to transform international structural conditions into actual 
choices of foreign policy direction rather than independently determining a state’s 
foreign policy. 
 
Then, who are the policy-makers to be analyzed in Japan’s foreign 
policy-making? This thesis regards the Prime Minister and relevant cabinet members 
and three main ministries, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)14 and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), as the 
policy-makers playing a dominant role in Japan’s foreign policy-making, particularly 
regarding Myanmar. This thesis examines their perceptions of foreign policy agendas 
and surrounding international structure. In principle, the Prime Minister, relevant 
cabinet members, and ministries hold an institutional mandate and stake in the conduct 
of foreign policy. Also, except for policies which need legislative or budgetary 
procedures, the government has certain institutional autonomy in relation to the Diet in 
implementing its foreign policy, although it is necessary to report back to Diet 
committees. In actual terms, though they are generally less autonomous vis-à-vis the 
ruling party and bureaucracy and usually less proactive in foreign policy-making 
because they have relatively little expertise or interest, Japan’s Prime Ministers and 
cabinet members sometimes undertake significant initiatives in certain foreign policy 
areas. The bureaucracy plays an essential practical role in Japan’s foreign policy-making 
because other domestic actors generally pay less attention to international affairs due to 
a lack of information and special knowledge or interest.  
 
The Prime Minister and relevant cabinet members institutionally hold the 
 
14 METI was renamed the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 2001. This thesis 
uses METI when referring to both MITI and METI in order to avoid terminological confusion. 
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primary mandate for the conduct of foreign policy and, in the post-war era, actually 
utilized their political authority to undertake initiatives in a few foreign policy issues of 
their interest. Yet, they have shown a general tendency to follow the bureaucrats’ 
bottom-up policy coordination rather than lead foreign policy-making, mainly due to 
insufficient numbers of specialist staff and vulnerability to LDP factional politics as 
well as the bureaucrats’ capability of policy coordination and strong loyalty to their 
ministries. However, as a result of political and administrative reforms since the 
mid-1980s, including the strengthening of the Kantei’s policy-making function, the 
Prime Minister and relevant cabinet members have had more chances to undertake 
initiatives in foreign policy-making in a top-down manner (Hook, et al., 2005: 53-56). 
 
MOFA is primarily in charge of managing day-to-day diplomatic relationships 
with other governments. In spite of the expanding activities of the Japanese government 
overseas, however, MOFA retains relatively limited influence within the government 
due to insufficient staff and budgets as well as its weak position within domestic politics. 
Also, there are certain structuralized conflicts of opinion within MOFA, typically 
observed between the most powerful bureau in MOFA, the North American Affairs 
Bureau (NAAB), which generally prioritizes the alliance with the U.S., and the Asian 
and Oceanian Affairs Bureau (AOAB) (known as the Asian Affairs Bureau (AAB) until 
2001), which is the second most powerful bureau and has a tendency to promote 
relationships with East Asia (Hook, et al., 2005: 47-49). In Japan’s Myanmar policy, 
MOFA was in a position to coordinate the policy-making process throughout the period, 
even if on some occasions it was necessary to accommodate the demands of other 
domestic actors with a stake and interest in Myanmar. The AOAB and the Japanese 
Embassy in Myanmar are primarily in charge of the bilateral relationship whereas 
executive officials were deeply involved in Myanmar policy-making when the 
Myanmar problem became politicized internationally and domestically.    
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METI is the agency for the promotion and facilitation of economic and 
business activities. It tends toward a proactive foreign economic policy, including ODA 
policy, in extending cross-border trade and business interests as well as securing energy 
and natural resource supplies. METI’s domestic power rests largely on its close 
relationship with the business sector, even if the diversification of domestic business 
interests has transformed the style of such government-business cooperation to some 
extent. Whilst recognizing the significance of the U.S. market and the U.S.-led 
international economic system, METI has a tendency to pursue its pragmatic interests 
with less concern about U.S. intentions (Hook, et al., 2005: 51-52). METI is interested 
in Myanmar policy primarily from the viewpoints of Myanmar’s economic potential 
and natural resources, Japanese companies’ business opportunities, Japan’s ODA policy, 
and its promotion of economic reforms and liberalization in Southeast Asia.   
 
MOF is responsible for budgetary and financial policy, retaining a stronger 
position in relation to other ministries because of its power concerning budgetary 
allocation. MOF’s traditional primary policy concerns have been domestic fiscal 
discipline and macroeconomic stability, and hence it holds a generally defensive stance 
toward ODA policy from the perspective of Japan’s budgetary constraints and recipient 
countries’ fiscal discipline. Yet, in accordance with the growing activities of the 
Japanese financial sector abroad and the liberalization of Japan’s economic and 
financial system, MOF, especially the International Bureau, increasingly became aware 
of the necessity to carry out a proactive international financial and monetary policy 
including ODA provision. By taking advantage of its strong position within the 
government, MOF tends to push forward its foreign financial and monetary policies by 
eliminating other actors’ interventions. MOF, nonetheless, remained generally defensive 
in Myanmar policy-making because of Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem since the 
late 1980s. This became a burden for the credibility of Japan’s ODA policy, especially 
within the context of developed countries’ coordination of debt cancellation at the G7 
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and other international forums.   
 
The second domestic level variable that this thesis employs is domestic 
resource mobilization, which is closely linked with the concept of state power. Despite 
neo-realism’s assumption regarding state power as national power, neoclassical realists 
point out that in practice a state’s policy-makers cannot necessarily mobilize enough 
domestic policy resources in conducting foreign policy. Zakaria notes the importance of 
state scope in analyzing a state’s behaviours of expansion and non-expansion; that is a 
state’s ability to extract domestic capabilities and the strength of its decision-making 
power (Zakaria, 1998: 38-39). Similarly, in examining a state’s inefficient balancing 
behaviours, Schweller employs government or regime vulnerability and social cohesion 
as intervening variables which restrict a state’s capability to carry out an optimal 
balancing policy (Schweller, 2004: 168-181). Dueck claims that, despite the U.S. 
President’s ability to decide on military interventions based on national interests, 
domestic political constraints, especially the President’s relations with Congress and 
public opinion, have shaped the form and timing of U.S. military interventions (Dueck, 
2009: 147-148). In sum, policy-makers in many cases need to mobilize domestic 
material and non-material support for the conduct of foreign policy by utilizing such 
measures as public statements, formal and informal coordination with domestic actors 
as well as promotion and regulation measures; all of which can result in modifications 
to the original policy plan.  
 
This thesis, thus, examines the Japanese government’s relationships with 
domestic actors in the conduct of foreign policy in order to comprehend from whom and 
how the government could retain material and non-material support among domestic 
actors. In doing so, the thesis focuses on domestic actors’ behaviours and interests as 
well as the way that policy-makers interact and compromise with them. This is because 
these factors can affect the form and timing of a state’s conduct of foreign policy. To 
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understand the fundamental conditions underlying the government’s necessity to 
mobilize domestic resources, it is also necessary to pay attention to the government’s 
retaining capabilities and basic flexibility in utilizing these resources; factors which can 
affect to what degree policy-makers are structurally vulnerable to domestic actors. This 
leads to the question as to which domestic actors in Japan’s foreign policy-making 
should be analyzed. The major domestic actors potentially influencing Japan’s 
Myanmar policy examined in this thesis are: the Diet and politicians, the business sector, 
NGOs, as well as the media and public opinion.  
 
The Diet has three formal functions in foreign policy-making: to pass domestic 
laws and ratify treaties; to approve the government budget; and, to receive government 
reports on foreign policy. Thus, if certain foreign policy requires legislation or 
ratification or is deeply related to budgetary allocation, the Diet’s potential influence on 
foreign policy-making becomes greater. The Japanese government, however, did not 
pass any legislation regarding Myanmar policy, although it was necessary to deal with 
the Diet in relation to the budget for ODA disbursement. Instead, the government’s 
relation with the Diet in regard to Myanmar policy mostly concerned reports and 
discussions at Diet committees.   
 
Politicians also have various informal influences on foreign policy-making. It 
is necessary to examine such influences at three levels: at the political party level; 
through Diet member leagues (giin renmei); and, at the individual politician level. At the 
political party level, as the LDP has been the dominant ruling party under the 1955 
system, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the largest opposition party 
during that period, could never take over the ruling position although it continuously 
attracted some public support. Until the 1980s, in terms of ODA policy, both the LDP 
and the SDPJ were basically supportive of increasing foreign assistance, even if they 
had different perspectives on its use or ultimate goal (Orr, 1990: 21-22). The LDP 
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discussed and investigated foreign aid policy in its Policy Research Council, in most 
cases approving the government’s policy except in the case of scandals (Orr, 1990: 22). 
 
The collapse of the 1955 system in the early 1990s, however, became the 
beginning of a complex process of political party realignment in Japan. The most 
significant change was that the LDP was no longer the dominant ruling party. After 
forming in 1996 and then reconstituting itself in 1998 by integrating smaller opposition 
parties, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became the largest opposition party, and as 
a result of the 2007 election the largest party in the House of Councillors. As of the end 
of 2008, the end of the period of this thesis’s empirical study, the LDP and New 
Komeito (New Clean Government Party) had formed a coalition government. The DPJ, 
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the People’s 
New Party (PNP), and the New Party Nippon (NPN) were the major opposition parties. 
In 1998, Myanmar policy became an issue of party politics under the LDP-SDP-New 
Party Sakigake (NPS) coalition government when the LDP initiated a decision to 
provide yen loans for the Yangon airport project while the SDP and the NPS resisted it. 
The SDP was also highly critical of the government’s engagement policy whilst some 
DPJ members continuously acted to solve the Myanmar problem from a somewhat 
critical view of government policy. Other parties did not necessarily have a clear stance 
regarding the Myanmar problem.     
 
At the same time, politicians formed Diet member leagues for the purpose of 
promoting specific policy objectives or bilateral political exchanges. In the latter case, 
they are usually called Diet members’ friendship leagues (y=k8 giin renmei). Many of 
these leagues are bipartisan groups that often attempt to increase economic assistance to 
the subject country yet in many cases they have little substantial influence (Orr, 1990: 
23). Although it is exceptional to have more than one league for a particular bilateral 
relationship, there emerged four Diet members’ leagues concerned with the 
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Japan-Myanmar relationship: the Japan-Myanmar Parliamentarians’ Friendship League 
(JMPFL); the Japan-Myanmar Parliamentarians’ Exchange Promotion League 
(JMPEPL); the Parliamentarians’ League to Support the Myanmar Government 
(PLSMG); and, the Diet Members’ League in Support of Democracy in Myanmar 
(DMLSDM). The three former leagues were basically supportive of the government’s 
engagement policy while the last one was generally critical of government policy in 
cooperation with the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC, or idiomatically 
called Rengo) and other domestic pro-democracy organizations.   
 
At the individual politician level, those politicians who have a special 
knowledge and interest in a specific policy area are usually called ‘zoku giin’ or policy 
tribe. In terms of foreign aid policy, ‘enjo zoku’ (foreign aid policy tribe) continuously 
attempted to promote economic assistance provision and thereby to reflect their special 
interests in foreign aid policy-making. In most cases, the role of ‘zoku giin’ is a 
coordination of interests or political rent-seeking at the micro level rather than the 
formulation of foreign policy direction at the macro level (Orr, 1990: 63). In the 
Japan-Myanmar relationship, there were not only such rent-seekers in the 
decision-making of ODA disbursement but there were also politicians who had a 
personal attachment to Myanmar or personal connections with Myanmar’s political 
leaders stemming from the historical bilateral relationship. In many cases they belonged 
to Diet member leagues and acted both collectively and individually. At the same time, 
there also emerged some pro-democracy politicians acting from a critical viewpoint 
against the government’s engagement policy in accordance with the politicization of the 
Myanmar problem.     
 
The business sector retains a significant influence on the government through 
various channels; its personal and financial connections with politicians, its various ties 
with bureaucrats including business leaders’ participation in governmental committees 
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or study groups, and the impact of transnational business activities on 
inter-governmental relationships. The opinions of the business community, or ‘zaikai’, 
are usually represented by three major economic organizations: the Japan Business 
Federation (JBF, or idiomatically called Keidanren); 15  the Japan Committee for 
Economic Development (D8y=kai); and, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(JCCI, or Sh8k8 Kaigi-sho). Keidanren has the strongest voice with a membership of 
1,632 in October 2008, comprised of 1,315 companies, 130 industrial associations and 
47 regional employers’ associations. Keidanren has some interests in Myanmar 
especially because of a Myanmar boom in the business sector during the 1990s as a 
result of which it launched the Myanmar study group which later became the 
Japan-Myanmar Economic Committee. This issued a report in the mid-1990s with 
policy recommendations to both the Japanese government and the SPDC.  
 
In addition to this, many individual companies, including construction, 
manufacturing, trading and consultancy companies have for a long time been interested 
in the Myanmar economy, participating in ODA-related and other businesses or seeking 
business opportunities in Myanmar. Many of those companies which had been operating 
in Myanmar since the pre-1988 period were members of the Japan-Burma Association 
(JBA), the oldest Myanmar lobby organization founded in 1933 and later called the 
Japan-Myanmar Association (JMA). When the JBA sent a petition urging the 
recognition of the new military government and the resumption of ODA provision to 
MOFA on 25 January 1989, the names of 12 major companies were written on the 
petition (Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan, 1990: 23-25; Asahi Shimbun, 16 
March 1989).16 
15 The current Keidanren was formed as a result of the integration of the Japan Federation of 
Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations 
(Nikkeiren).  
16 The 12 companies were Daimaru, Inc., Kajima Corp., Kanematsu Corp., Kinsho-Mataichi Corp., 
Mitsui and Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Corp., Mitsubishi Oil Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., 
Nippon Koei Co., Ltd., Nissho Iwai Corp., Sumitomo Corp., and Tomen Corp.  
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A number of Japanese companies also began to seek business opportunities in 
Myanmar in response to the SPDC’s shift to an economic liberalization policy in the 
early 1990s. When the SPDC released Aung San Suu Kyi in 1995, for instance, 
executives of Mitsubishi Corp., Itochu Corp., Marubeni Corp., Mitsui and Co., Ltd., and 
Sumitomo Corp. visited Myanmar and signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
SPDC (Pongyelar, 2007: 13; Saito, T., 1995: 55). A wide range of business opportunities 
were actually sought by Japanese companies during this period: Daiwa Securities Co., 
Ltd. assisted the setting-up of the first securities exchange in Myanmar; All Nippon 
Airways Co., Ltd. opened direct flights between Osaka and Yangon; and, Mitsui and Co., 
Ltd., and Nippon Oil Corp. participated in gas projects in Myanmar (Seekins, 2007: 
116-119). Myanmar’s economic downturn and the SPDC’s return to an interventionist 
economic policy, however, made many Japanese companies retreat from business 
opportunities in Myanmar. These moves within the business sector had various 
influences on the Japanese government in the form of support, pressure and policy 
needs.   
 
The activities of Japanese NGOs have increased and broadened especially 
since the 1990s. These activities were to some extent enhanced by the Law to Promote 
Specified Nonprofit Activities in 1998.17 Japanese NGOs acting in the Japan-Myanmar 
relationship can be categorized into three: bilateral friendship NGOs; pro-democracy 
advocacy NGOs; and, humanitarian assistance NGOs. Within the Japan-Myanmar 
relationship, similar to other traditional bilateral relationships, there were some 
traditional bilateral friendship NGOs aiming at promoting bilateral economic and social 
exchanges. In many cases these NGOs had deep ties with Japanese private companies, 
politicians, and bureaucrats and conducted lobbying activities for the government and 
powerful politicians. The JMA is the oldest Myanmar lobby organization in Japan, 
being openly business-oriented with many corporate members since its foundation in 
 
17 This law enabled NGOs to conduct more stable operations by ensuring their legal status. 
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1933 and headed by politicians or former bureaucrats. Despite its lobbying activities, 
including the petition to the government on 25 January 1989 mentioned above, the 
JMA’s corporate members decreased in number from 36 in late 1988 to around 20 in 
July 2007, presumably because short-term business opportunities in Myanmar 
decreased from the late 1990s (Pongyelar, 2007: 16-17).  
 
Another example of a Myanmar lobby group is the Japan-Burma Cultural 
Association, which later became the Japan-Myanmar Cultural Association. This was 
established in 1974 by around 2,000 war veterans that had been sent to Myanmar during 
the Second World War. After expanding its members to include war veteran descendants, 
business people, intellectuals and members of the general public, it became known as 
the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association in 1997. This was the result of an initiative 
by Tsukamoto Koichi, a war veteran and the owner of Wacoal Corp., to broaden the 
group’s activities to promote a bilateral economic and social relationship and to lobby 
the government (Pongyelar, 2007: 17). Four other organizations were also established 
after the late 1990s, namely the Myanmar Economic and Management Institute (MEMI, 
Myanm> S8g8 Kenky=sho), the Asian Maternal Children Welfare Association 
(AMCWA), the Consultant’s for Myanmar (TCM), and the Japan-Myanmar Tourism 
Promotion Committee formed the Meeting of Myanmar Related Group for the purpose 
of improving information exchange (Pongyelar, 2007: 17-18). These bilateral friendship 
NGOs were generally supportive of the government’s engagement policy, in some cases 
closely cooperating with the government and positively acting for the government’s 
ODA provision to Myanmar.  
 
Pro-democracy advocacy NGOs, which were critical of the SPDC and Japan’s 
engagement policy, also increased in number from the 1990s, conducting information 
provision and lobbying the government and politicians. Many such NGOs were 
originally small groups of Myanmar residents and refugees in Japan, but some of them 
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gradually strengthened cooperation with each other and established the Burma Office 
Japan (BOJ) in 2000. The People’s Forum on Burma (PFB), which was established by 
both Myanmar residents and their supporters in Japan in 1996, became a platform for 
the activities of pro-democracy advocacy NGOs in Japan (Nemoto, 2007: 106-107; 
Dalpino, 2007: 225). Rengo, which has deep ties with many politicians including DPJ 
and SDP members, also took a pro-democracy position and provided support for these 
NGOs when, for example, making petitions for DMLSDM members (Maung and 
Shigeta, 2004: 134-137).  
 
Similarly, there emerged a growing number of NGOs implementing 
humanitarian assistance projects in Myanmar. These groups included Bridge Asia Japan 
(BAJ), the Organization for Industrial, Spiritual, and Cultural Advancement (OISCA) 
International, and the Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC). Dalpino notes that the 
Japanese government, similar to Western governments, began to utilize these 
humanitarian assistance NGOs as “quasi-nongovernmental organizations” for 
implementing ODA projects which could then circumvent international criticism 
(Dalpino, 2007: 225-226). The Sasakawa Foundation’s activities were distinctive 
among Japanese NGOs in terms of not only carrying out various assistance programs in 
Myanmar, but also occasionally attempting to promote Myanmar’s domestic political 
reconciliation as well as trying to improve the Japan-Myanmar relationship by, for 
instance, setting up trips to Myanmar for former Prime Ministers.  
 
The media and public opinion have a less direct influence on the government’s 
foreign policy-making in general, yet they still have some significance in shaping 
domestic debates on foreign policy direction and sometimes affecting overall support 
for the administration and politicians. Amongst the Japanese media, five major daily 
newspapers, namely the Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei), and Sankei Shimbun, have a far greater circulation than that in 
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other developed states, even if that circulation is decreasing. In general terms, these 
daily newspapers are regarded as having certain political inclinations: the Asahi and 
Mainichi tend to be more liberal whereas the Yomiuri, Nikkei and Sankei are generally 
pro-conservative. Especially since the mid-1990s, there emerged certain differences of 
opinion between the newspapers regarding Japan’s Myanmar policy and the debate on 
Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy direction and Asian policy. While the Asahi and 
Mainichi became highly critical of the government’s ODA disbursement and 
engagement policy toward Myanmar because of their ineffectiveness and 
inappropriateness since the late 1980s, the Yomiuri and Sankei were generally 
encouraging of the government’s policy from the perspective of Japan’s strategic 
interest in supporting the SPDC. In the early 1990s, the Asahi and Mainichi often 
portrayed Aung San Suu Kyi as Myanmar’s tragic heroine fighting against the evil 
military government, even more so than Western newspapers such as the New York 
Times (Seekins, 2007: 110).  
 
Japan’s public opinion paid only sporadic attention to the Myanmar problem in 
response to occasional news reports on incidents in Myanmar. Even so, the Japanese 
general public tended to be generally critical of the government’s engagement policy 
toward the SPDC from the 1990s. This was partly because Japanese TV networks, 
including NHK (Nippon H8s8 Ky8kai, or Japan Broadcasting Corporation), Japan’s sole 
public broadcaster, and TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting System) made programs depicting 
Aung San Suu Kyi as Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader against the military 
government (Seekins, 2007: 109-110). The image of Myanmar as a country under a 
military government’s oppressive rule was confirmed and strengthened by occasional 
news reports including ones covering the mass movement in 2007 which resulted in the 
shooting death of Japanese journalist Nagai Kenji. Such public opinion gradually 
increased its indirect but unignorable pressure on the government and other actors 
supporting a friendly engagement policy.   
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The third and final domestic level variable that this thesis employs is the 
domestic policy-making system, which can affect the prudence of a state’s conduct of 
foreign policy. Sterling-Folker suggests that a state’s foreign policy can be influenced 
by internal political competition among different domestic groups which pursue their 
own policy objectives based on different perceptions of international structure and aim 
at retaining control of the decision-making process (Sterling-Folker, 2009). Similarly, 
Schweller points out that a low degree of elite consensus and cohesion may prevent a 
state from carrying out rational balancing behaviours (Schweller, 2004). In other words, 
given that neoclassical realism admits the possibility that policy-makers will have 
different perceptions of international structure and different policy objectives 
concerning a foreign policy agenda, it is necessary to examine the policy-making 
system in which a state’s foreign policy is decided as a result of policy-makers’ 
interactions. From an analytical perspective, it is necessary to investigate the mode of 
interactions among domestic policy-makers holding a stake and interest in the foreign 
policy agenda. In doing so, it is important to pay attention to the policy-making system 
in which a specific foreign policy is decided and to the distribution of power among 
domestic policy-makers. It is also necessary to examine who initiates policy-making, 
sets the foreign policy agenda, chooses the policy-making procedure, proposes policy 
options and ultimately decides foreign policy within the policy-making process.  
 
Japan’s policy-making system under the 1955 system can be characterized as 
an elitist system based on close and exclusive relationships among the LDP, the 
bureaucracy and the business sector; although scholars of Japan’s domestic politics do 
not necessarily agree on the distribution and status of policy-making power among these 
three elements. Johnson’s research on METI points out the unique and crucial role of 
bureaucrats in planning and implementing economic and industrial policy in the 
post-war era (Johnson, 1982). This research identifies key features of Japan’s 
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policy-making system as the intensive coordination between the government and the 
business sector as well as the bureaucrats’ primacy over politicians in policy-making. In 
contrast, Muramatsu and Krauss, although admitting the important role of bureaucrats, 
claim that the post-war political consensus on a conservative policy line was the basic 
policy direction which enabled bureaucrats to implement a coherent economic and 
industrial policy in the 1960s (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987). More significantly, they 
demonstrate the emergence of a more varied policy-making system, which they call 
‘patterned pluralism’, as a result of the diversification of domestic interests and other 
factors in the 1980s. Under this system, policy-making conflicts are “pluralist in that 
many diverse actors whose alliances may shift participate, but patterned in that the 
shifting coalitions occur within the framework of one-party dominance and of a 
bureaucracy that procedurally structures the types of possible alliances and 
policymaking patterns” (Muramatsu and Krauss, 1987: 542-543).  
 
This pluralisation of the policy-making system in the 1980s allowed the 
business sector to behave more autonomously, and undercut the hegemonic power of the 
bureaucracy. As a result the LDP and its members, especially the emerging policy tribes, 
increased their influence within policy-making (Pempel, 1987). Iio describes Japan’s 
governance model in this period as ‘kanry8 naikaku sei’ (bureaucracy cabinet system) 
whereby each minister simply represented the position of their own ministry and the 
LDP consciously distinguished the responsibility of the Prime Minister and the cabinet 
from that of the LDP through the notion of ‘the separation of powers’ (Iio, 2007). 
Despite adopting a parliamentary cabinet system the Prime Minister and the cabinet 
were highly vulnerable to LDP mainstream factions and, therefore, the bureaucracy, 
who usually undertook policy-making initiatives, needed to accommodate political 
demands from these LDP faction leaders and policy tribes in return for retaining their 
political support.  
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Within such a system, until the 1980s, Japan’s policy-making on foreign aid 
was mostly carried out within the bureaucracy, especially among four ministries directly 
in charge of ODA policy-making. This was usually called the ‘four-ministry system’ 
(yon sh8ch8 taisei), consisting of MOF, METI, MOFA and the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA). MOF basically regarded foreign aid as a budget issue concerning 
national budget constraints and the cost-effectiveness of aid programs including the 
fiscal discipline of recipient countries. METI had a tendency to prioritise the promotion 
of domestic industry development, the creation of Japan’s foreign markets, and the 
securing of a natural resource supply from abroad. MOFA was more sensitive to 
international pressures and likely to utilize ODA for diplomatic leverage against 
developing as well as developed countries. The EPA’s position was often ambiguous and 
less influential than the other three ministries, but generally supportive of increasing and 
improving ODA projects. As a whole, Japan’s aid policy was shaped as a result of 
intensive bargaining, which was usually opaque from outside, among these ministries 
motivated by bureaucratic interests (Orr, 1990: 3).  
 
Whereas Japan’s foreign policy-making was still relatively dependent on the 
bureaucracy and not many Diet members showed an interest in foreign policy, the 
expansion of the ODA budget from the late 1970s led to the creation of ‘enjo zoku’ 
(foreign aid policy tribe), who sought out rent-seeking opportunities within foreign aid 
policy-making connected to specific aid programs or recipient countries (Orr, 1990). In 
this regard, while not recognized as policy-makers, individual Diet members had a 
potential influence on foreign policy-making at some specific times, even if they did not 
have the power to shape the overall foreign policy direction. From the 1990s, Japan’s 
policy-making system experienced further transformations through a mixed process. On 
the one hand, the LDP factions’ power and bureaucrats’ coordination remained, or were 
even strengthened, in foreign policy-making due to the frequent replacement of the 
Prime Minister and cabinet members after the collapse of the 1955 system. This meant 
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that bureaucrats largely initiated foreign policy-making and coordinated with the ruling 
party members, including policy tribes, for the purpose of the smooth implementation of 
policy. On the other hand, there were certain political movements to integrate foreign 
policy-making power into the role of the Prime Minister and the cabinet and to weaken 
the relationship between bureaucrats and policy tribes. Amongst various political and 
administrative reforms carried out since the mid-1980s, the Kantei’s strengthened power 
and capacity is highlighted as an institutional change that enabled proactive and decisive 
foreign policy-making to take place in some cases (Shinoda, 2006).  
 
Japan’s Myanmar policy-making was, at least to some extent, influenced by 
these transitions in Japan’s policy-making system. After increasing ODA provision to 
Myanmar in the 1970s in accordance with the expansion of the overall ODA budget, 
which was originally decided by senior political leaders, by the 1980s the Japanese 
government began ODA policy-making in a business-as-usual manner, which Seekins 
calls a ‘kokunaika’ (domesticization) process (Seekins, 1992:247). Japan’s drastic 
decrease of ODA to Myanmar in response to the ‘8888 Uprising’ transformed the 
interests and behaviour of domestic actors. In addition, from the late 1990s, some senior 
political leaders including Hashimoto, Obuchi and Koizumi began to participate in 
Myanmar policy-making more proactively. It is, thus, necessary to examine the way that 
these factors affected Japan’s Myanmar policy-making and ultimately the Japanese 
government’s conduct of Myanmar policy.    
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the recent debates on Japan’s foreign policy studies, 
highlighting the influence of both international and domestic factors on Japan’s foreign 
policy direction, especially in the Cold War era. It revealed the necessity for a 
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comprehensive explanation of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy transitions to 
integrate international and domestic level analyses. Accordingly, this chapter proposes 
neoclassical realism as the most appropriate analytical framework for this thesis to shed 
light on the linkage between international and domestic factors. Whereas neoclassical 
realism basically maintains the assumption of neo-realism in recognizing the primary 
significance of international structural pressures, it also highlights the practical 
impediments which a state’s policy-makers have to deal with. This chapter, then, 
discusses the operationalization of neoclassical realism, pointing out the necessity to 
examine multiple foreign policy agenda concerns and multi-dimensional international 
structure. It also proposes three intervening variables: policy-makers’ perceptions; the 
government’s resource mobilization; and, the domestic policy-making system. Based on 
these foundations, the empirical study of Japan’s Myanmar policy will be conducted in 
the following four chapters, which cover the four periods respectively: pre-1988; 
1988-1996; 1997-2004; and, 2005-2008.  
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(Table 1: Neoclassical realism and the four worlds) 
 
Clear information on threats Unclear information on threats
Clear information on 
policy responses 
World 1 
Consistent with realism. 
Domestic actors normally 
affect only the style or 
timing of policy. 
Neoclassical realism is useful 
only to explain 
dysfunctional behaviour. 
World 4 
Inconsistent with realism. 
Domestic actors can help 
determine national 
interests, but policy 
responses are largely 
determined by international 
institutions. 
Neoclassical realism is not 
useful for explaining the 
behaviour of states. 
Unclear information 
on policy responses 
World 2 
Consistent with realism. 
Domestic actors can affect 
not only the style or timing 
of policy, but also the 
nature of policy responses 
to international challenges. 
Neoclassical realism is useful 
to explain foreign policy 
choices of states. 
World 3 
Inconsistent with realism. 
Domestic actors help 
determine national interests 
and policy responses to 
them. 
Innenpolitik theories are more 
useful than neoclassical 
realism in explaining the 
behaviour of states. 
(Ripsman, et al., 2009: 283) 
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(Table 2: Roles of each actor in Japan’s foreign policy-making process) 
 
The Cabinet 
and 
Bureaucracy 
Kantei 
In some cases conducting Prime Ministerial 
top-down style policy-making 
MOFA 
Managing day-to-day diplomatic relationships 
Generally coordinating foreign policy-making 
METI 
Planning international trade policy / Promoting and 
facilitating economic and business activities 
MOF 
Planning international financial and monetary 
policy / Considering budgetary constraints as well 
as macroeconomic stability 
The Diet and 
Politicians 
Political Parties 
The LDP and ruling coalition: Influencing formally 
and informally the Prime Minister and the cabinet 
The DPJ and opposition: Monitoring the 
government’s policy through Diet debates etc. 
Diet Members’ 
Leagues 
Lobbying the government / Sending missions 
abroad / Cooperating with other state’s politicians 
etc. 
Individual 
Politicians 
Taking advantage of ties with bureaucrats, the 
business sector and other state’s leaders 
The Business 
Sector 
Business 
Organizations 
Lobbying the government or politicians / Making 
surveys and policy recommendations / Sending 
missions abroad etc. 
Individual 
Companies 
Solely or collectively lobbying the government or 
politicians etc. 
NGOs 
Lobbying  
Lobbying the government or politicians, in many 
cases by utilizing ties with politicians and 
former-bureaucrats etc. / In some cases facilitating 
informal diplomacy 
Information 
Transmission and 
Advocacy  
Providing information on international affairs / 
Appealing to the media or public opinion 
Project 
Implementation 
Implementing humanitarian assistance etc. / 
Occasionally coordinating projects with the 
government  
Media and 
Public 
Opinion 
 
Some influence on the power of the Prime Minister 
and the cabinet as well as the perceptions of other 
actors 
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Chapter 2 
The Pre-1988 Period: Default Friendship Engagement  
 
1. Overview 
 
Having examined the debates on Japan’s foreign policy, particularly in the 
post-Cold War era, as well as introduced the framework of neoclassical realism in the 
previous chapter in order to set up the foundation of the empirical study of Japan’s 
Myanmar policy, this thesis begins the actual case study from this chapter. While the 
main focus of this thesis’s empirical study is the period after 1988, this chapter 
demonstrates Japan’s default friendship engagement toward Myanmar in the pre-1988 
period so as to review the context of Japan’s Myanmar policy in the post-Cold War era. 
At the same time, this chapter provides an alternative perspective for Japan’s pre-1988 
Myanmar policy, which has traditionally been regarded as a product of ‘special 
relationship’ or ‘special interests’, or assumed as a result of a ‘mercantile realism’ 
direction. 
 
The pre-1988 period was when the Japanese government maintained a close 
relationship with Myanmar’s military regime called the Revolutionary Council, which 
was established in 1962; and particularly with General Ne Win who was a member of 
the ‘Thirty Comrades’. The historical relationship between Japan and Myanmar has its 
roots in Japan’s active engagement in the process of Myanmar’s independence 
movement against the British colonial rule in the pre-war era. This resulted in the 
construction of historical personal ties between political and business elites in both 
countries. Having achieved independence after the Second World War, however, 
Myanmar was trapped in the difficulties of postcolonial nation-building and political 
and economic development. Myanmar’s location at the frontline of the Cold War 
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confrontation in Southeast Asia made it a country of some significance in terms of the 
international strategies of the major powers at the beginning of the post-war era; but Ne 
Win’s isolationist foreign policy and interventionist economic policy decreased its 
political presence in the international arena, especially from the 1960s onwards. The 
agendas of domestic economic development and political stability became more 
significant policy issues for the Myanmar government. At the economic level, the Ne 
Win regime’s failure in economic management made the Myanmar economy so 
stagnated that Ne Win could not help but accept a status as the ‘Least among the Less 
Developed Countries’ (LLDC) at the UN in 1987. At the same time, at the domestic 
level, Myanmar was socially unstable because of its unsuccessful nation-building 
policies and the continuous insurgency activities of ethnic minorities and other groups.  
 
Foreign governments generally paid little attention to Myanmar, especially 
after Ne Win took power because of its isolationist foreign policy and Myanmar’s 
decreasing international strategic significance. The U.S. became increasingly indifferent 
to Myanmar due to the receding Cold War confrontation in East Asia as well as Ne 
Win’s isolationist foreign policy and interventionist economic policy under the slogan of 
the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’. On the other hand, the PRC gradually improved its 
relationship with the Ne Win regime as part of its ‘good-neighbour’ policy, in parallel 
with a reduction in its historical support for the White Flag Communist Party (WFCP) 
which had been committed to insurgency activities against the Myanmar government 
since the late 1970s. In international economic relations, the Ne Win regime had also 
been largely isolated because of its interventionist economic policy during the pre-1988 
period although it accepted foreign aid in the late 1970s, especially from Japan and West 
Germany, which were countries that Ne Win regarded as politically less problematic 
than others. In terms of societal and transnational structures, the Myanmar military 
government was highly vulnerable to domestic insurgency activities despite its 
authoritarian rule, and was continuously aware of the risk of losing national unity and 
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its control over domestic society.   
 
In the early part of the post-war era, the Japanese government concentrated on 
pursuing core policy objectives, including the recovery of normal diplomatic 
relationships with Asian countries and economic reconstruction. In doing so it 
recognized its decrease in power and vulnerable position in international relations. At 
the same time, the Japanese government retained its original perception of international 
structure in East Asia in the post-war era, acknowledging that many Southeast Asian 
countries were in the process of postcolonial nation-building and that Japan should 
support and encourage those countries’ efforts for domestic political and economic 
development, which in turn would contribute to preserve regional political stability. In 
the process to become the only developed country in East Asia, the Japanese 
government attempted to pragmatically balance this perception with the various 
international structural pressures that the Japanese government had faced since the 
1960s. The Japanese government found that it was increasingly necessary to deal with 
two major international structural factors: the U.S. and other Western governments’ 
pressure to contribute to their Cold War strategy in East Asia; and regional development 
issues in relationships with Southeast Asian countries, which were often linked with the 
North-South problem and Japan’s own historical issues.  
 
In deciding to renegotiate war reparations in the early 1960s, the Japanese 
government recognized the necessity to respond to the Ne Win regime’s demands, at 
least partly in order to maintain regional political stability as well as to contribute to 
Myanmar’s political and economic development. Japan’s expansion of economic 
assistance to Myanmar from the late 1970s in response to the Ne Win regime’s call for 
international assistance in the mid-1970s appeared to coincide with Japan’s policy shift 
toward Southeast Asia. After concluding the war reparations agreement, the Japanese 
government found it necessary to support the Ne Win regime’s efforts to achieve 
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domestic stability and development in order to deal with regional development issues in 
East Asia and prevent Myanmar from joining the communist bloc. The Japanese 
government responded with the Fukuda Doctrine and subsequent expansion of 
economic assistance, which were regarded by many Japanese policy-makers as Japan’s 
contribution to deal with the two major international structural factors.  
 
The Japanese government’s policy resources had expanded to a large extent in 
accordance with Japan’s rapid economic growth since the 1950s. This made the 
Japanese government more capable of pursuing a proactive foreign policy based on its 
own perceptions and allocation of increasing policy resources rather than concentrating 
on minimal policy objectives. Until the early 1970s, both Japanese policy-making actors 
and domestic actors were cautious about increasing the ODA budget; but the 
quantitative expansion of ODA after Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 announcement to 
double Japan’s foreign aid began to gain general support from a wide range of domestic 
actors, even though its impact and efficacy were not adequately assessed and evaluated. 
Specifically in the case of Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar, some mainstream 
politicians and Japanese companies provided continuous support for war reparations 
and ODA projects without any domestic actors raising serious questions about it.   
 
Japan’s critical Myanmar policy-making during the Cold War era; namely the 
decisions regarding war reparations in 1954, the war reparations renegotiation in 1962, 
and the ODA expansion in the late 1970s, seemed to be carried out by, or at least based 
on, the decisions of senior political leaders. In accordance with the expansion of the 
foreign aid budget, however, Japan’s ODA policy-making system became a 
structuralized organizational process managed by administrative coordination. This 
presumably involved domestic actors’ rent-seeking activities from the late 1970s. 
During this period, Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar was not effectively 
assessed or evaluated despite its poor performance in terms of its contribution to 
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Myanmar’s economic growth.   
 
2. The Japan-Myanmar Relationship before the Cold War Era 
 
Before analyzing Japan’s Myanmar policy in the pre-1988 period, this section 
briefly overviews the pre-war history of Japan and Myanmar which formed the 
foundation for the post-war bilateral relationship. Myanmar had been under British 
colonial rule since the defeat of the Konbaung dynasty, the last monarchy in lowland 
Myanmar, during the third war against the British Indian army in 1886. The UK had 
employed a ‘divide and rule’ political system and a ‘laissez faire’ economic policy in 
implementing its colonial rule over Myanmar. By introducing a ‘divide and rule’ 
political system, the UK substantially transformed the traditional system in central and 
southern Myanmar, which was regarded not only as a supply base for food and natural 
resources but also as a destination for Indian labour and capital. At the same time it 
established a more indirect form of rule in the ‘Frontier Areas’ based on more traditional 
social systems (Taylor, 2007: 74-75). This created a political division between the ethnic 
majority, which the British colonial authority called ‘Burma Proper’, who mainly lived 
in lowland Myanmar, and other ethnic minorities including the Shans, Karens, Karenni, 
Kachins, Chins, Nagas and Wa, who mostly lived in the hill areas along the country’s 
border, or the ‘Frontier Areas’. The UK encouraged ethnic minorities to join the colonial 
army and police mainly due to its distrust of Burma Proper, resulting in deepening 
social cleavages alongside ethnic differences.  
 
Through the ‘laissez faire’ economic policy, on the other hand, the British 
colonial authority set up a business-friendly legal system with limited public spending 
for infrastructure development. This caused a large number of foreigners, mostly Hindu 
and Muslim Indians and some Chinese and Europeans, to seek economic benefits in 
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Myanmar. More than 50 percent of the residents of Yangon were from India, and they 
made up the majority of office workers in big companies as well as civil servants.18 
Smaller numbers of Chinese formed a significant part of the business community in 
Myanmar as well. Besides, the colonial authority’s liberal economic policy required 
farmers to develop their farmland by borrowing money from Indian Chettiars and other 
moneylenders. By the early twentieth century, because of the low prices of agricultural 
products, which were frequently artificially created, many farmers forfeited their 
farmland which they had used as collateral and became peasants or lower class 
labourers. In fact by 1937, more than a quarter of lowland Myanmar’s fertile lands 
consisted of large Chettiar estates (Seekins, 2007: 8).19 
It was in the early twentieth century that Myanmar’s independence movement 
against the British colonial rule surged, particularly among Burma Proper in central 
Myanmar. By the late 1930s, two influential political groups emerged: the Rangoon 
University Students’ Union (RUSU) led by Aung San and U Nu, and the Thakin Party, 
or Dobama Asiayone (‘We Burmans Association’), which was initiated by young urban 
intellectuals. 20 21  The Thakin Party members played a leading role in grassroots 
movements in Myanmar, leading to the establishment of the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB), the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) and other political organizations.22 
Japan had become aware of Myanmar’s strategic significance since the 
 
18 It was nonetheless also true that many immigrants from the Indian subcontinent remained as part 
of the lower class workforce.  
19 Nonetheless, Myanmar’s general living standards under colonial rule were higher than in most 
other parts of Asia in the pre-war era, mainly due to its plentiful natural resources as well as a 
sufficient supply of foods and other necessities. Myanmar was also considered as a relatively 
advanced civil society in Asia particularly because of the existence of various non-governmental 
associations, a freer media and the University of Rangoon (Seekins, 2007: 5). 
20 Aung San and U Nu had also joined the Thakin Party by the end of the 1930s. 
21 Most young nationalists in Myanmar at this period were apparently influenced by Marxism in 
their ideology, but in fact pragmatically combined it with a variety of other ideological trends 
(Sakuma, 1993: 52-56). 
22 Mainly due to differences of opinions among those nationalists, however, the Thakin Party had 
increasingly become a party only in name.  
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establishment of the so-called Burma Road; the military logistics route used by the 
Allies in support of the Kuomintang Party in China led by Chiang Kaishek since 
January 1939. In order to strengthen its intelligence activities in Myanmar, the Japanese 
government began to make secret contact with Myanmar political activists through 
governmental and private intelligence agents. After being dispatched by the Japanese 
government in June 1940, Colonel Suzuki Keiji played a critical role in such 
intelligence activities. He recognized the young Thakin Party leader Aung San as a key 
figure among Myanmar’s political activists, and at a meeting in Tokyo in November 
1940, Suzuki persuaded Aung San and his followers to organize an anti-colonial army 
with Japan’s material and technical support.23 From April to October 1941, 30 young 
activists who were later called the ‘Thirty Comrades’ went to Japanese occupied Hainan 
Island to undergo tough military training from the Minami Kikan, the secret intelligence 
agency organized by Suzuki.  
 
After the beginning of the Asia-Pacific War at Pearl Harbour on 8 December 
1941, Colonel Suzuki persuaded the Nanpo Gun (Japanese Southern Area Army) to 
organize a Myanmar army with the Thirty Comrades at its core. This led to the 
establishment of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in Bangkok on 28 December. 
The Japanese military, in cooperation with the BIA, subsequently began to combat the 
British colonial forces and pushed them out of Myanmar by May 1942. After that, 
despite the Myanmar nationalists’ desire for independence, the Japanese military 
attempted to retain control over Myanmar’s resources, holding a tight grip on the new 
Ba Maw administration even after Japan’s declaration of Myanmar’s ‘independence’ in 
1943.24 Responding to this situation, Aung San, the leader of the Burma National Army 
 
23 Because he was wanted by the British colonial authority due to his political activities in Myanmar, 
Aung San had escaped from Myanmar to China. He initially contacted Chinese communists at Amoy 
in China to retain their support for Myanmar’s independence movement, but this ended in vain. 
Upon learning about this, Colonel Suzuki ordered the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) to take 
Aung San from Amoy to Tokyo in order to persuade him to organize an independence movement by 
accepting Japan’s support. 
24 The Japanese military also unravelled the Minami Kikan and reorganized the BIA into the Burma 
Defence Army (BDA) for this purpose. 
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(BNA)25 at that time, secretly strengthened his contacts with underground political 
organizations in Myanmar. In August 1944, this resulted in the establishment of the 
Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) involving the CPB and the PRP. Aung San and the 
BNA began to revolt against the Japanese military on 27 March 1945, when the British 
Commonwealth forces re-penetrated into Myanmar. After the retreat of the Japanese 
military, the AFO was transformed into the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League 
(AFPFL). It included the BNA and communists and socialists as well as minority 
groups and became Myanmar’s governing body. While the Churchill administration 
initially attempted to return Myanmar back to the pre-war system, Clement Attlee 
finally accepted the AFPFL’s demand for Myanmar’s independence, which was 
achieved in January 1948.  
 
The Asia-Pacific War left a huge impact on both Japanese and Myanmar 
society. For Japanese troops, Myanmar was one of the most disastrous battlefields in the 
Asia-Pacific War. During the war period, more than 320,000 Japanese soldiers were 
dispatched to Myanmar and over 185,000 died from combat, disease, and starvation 
(Seekins, 2007: 13; Tanabe and Nemoto, 2003: 58-60). In the post-war era, this resulted 
in many Japanese war veterans and their relatives repeatedly visiting Myanmar to 
console the souls of the war dead. It is also noteworthy that there remain many 
anecdotal stories of Japanese soldiers receiving warm-hearted help and support from 
Myanmar people during the Asia-Pacific War. In the post-war era, many war veterans 
maintained their personal friendships with Myanmar people and supported the activities 
of non-governmental organizations promoting bilateral economic and cultural 
exchanges in cooperation with other sympathetic people (Tanabe and Nemoto, 2003: 
58-60; Sakuma, 1994: 172-174). 
 
The bilateral historical relationship which lasted until the end of the 
 
25 The BNA was the army renamed from the BDA.  
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Asia-Pacific War also had various kinds of impact on Myanmar’s politics and society. 
At the political level, the fact that many post-war Myanmar leaders, including the Thirty 
Comrades, underwent Japanese military training as well as received material and 
technical support for their independence movement became the foundation of bilateral 
political ties in the post-war era. On the other hand, many observers also point out 
negative aspects of the Japan-Myanmar history. Seekins notes that, having initially 
welcomed the Japanese military as liberators against the British Empire, Myanmar 
people became disillusioned by the boorish and arrogant behaviour of Japanese troops 
and the Kempeitai, which attempted to expose British spies and communists (Seekins, 
2007: 12-13). According to Tanabe, Myanmar’s history textbooks describe the Japanese 
occupation era as a time when the fascist Japanese military utilized Myanmar people as 
forced labourers, depriving them of food and access to natural resources and so on 
(Tanabe, 1996: 164-166). In particular with regard to the construction of the 
Thai-Burma Railway, or the so-called ‘railway of death’ which runs through 
mountainous jungle, 178,000 Myanmar people were forced to work without sufficient 
food, shelter or medical care, and 80,000 people never returned (Tanabe, 1996: 
164-166).  
 
3. Foreign Policy Agenda 
 
Having achieved its independence in January 1948, Myanmar entered 
international relations as a newly independent country in Southeast Asia. While 
Myanmar was generally a minor actor in global and regional political relations during 
this period, there were several issues concerning Myanmar which other governments 
found it necessary to deal with. The major agenda items in Myanmar’s foreign relations 
had arguably been the Cold War and the relationship with the major powers including 
the U.S. and the PRC. The major economic-level agenda item had been the post-war 
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reconstruction of the domestic economic system, which had been dominated by both 
foreign people and capital in the pre-war era. At the domestic level, the Myanmar 
government’s primary policy objective had been the achievement of postcolonial 
nation-building and domestic political stability. The Myanmar government faced 
substantial difficulties in integrating domestic society and establishing a stable political 
system, especially concerning its relations with ethnic minorities and other 
anti-governmental groups, and it remained highly vulnerable to domestic insurgency 
activities. Myanmar’s nation-building and development was, in fact, largely unachieved 
during this period, and they remained as its major domestic goals. In presenting these 
challenges to Myanmar which held significant international implications, this section 
provides the basis of analyzing the international structure which shaped Japan’s 
Myanmar policy.   
 
Although post-war Myanmar had initially been governed under a federal 
democratic system, Ne Win took power from the AFPFL’s U Nu administration by a 
military coup d’état in March 1962, and in doing so established an authoritarian military 
regime. In spite of the U Nu administration’s efforts in postcolonial nation-building, the 
AFPFL was not able to establish a stable power base due to increasing domestic 
political instability and the insurgency activities of ethnic minorities and communists. 
Recognizing the division of the AFPFL in 1958 as a serious political crisis, Ne Win 
organized a caretaker government for election administration from 1958 to 1960 
(Sakuma, 1993: 176). However, as the renewed U Nu administration still could not 
restore domestic political stability, Ne Win finally took power by a military coup. Ne 
Win stayed in power until 1988 by retaining the military’s material capability.26 Ne 
Win’s military regime dealt with the challenges mentioned above through a substantially 
different combination of foreign, economic and domestic policies to the U Nu 
administration. Whilst the U Nu administration pursued a non-aligned foreign policy, a 
 
26 Still, Ne Win carried out a cosmetic power transfer from a military government to a civilian one 
in 1974. 
74 
 
moderate socialist economic policy and the maintenance of a federal democratic system, 
the Ne Win regime promoted an isolationist foreign policy, an interventionist economic 
policy under the slogan of the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, and a coercive domestic 
policy for political stability.  
 
In foreign relations, the AFPFL government employed a non-aligned foreign 
policy, or one of positive neutralism, which aimed at building friendly relationships with 
any countries regardless of ideological differences. In other words, Myanmar did not 
commit to either of the Cold War blocs nor accept any foreign aid with political strings 
attached; but rather hedged against the major powers in the intensifying Cold War 
confrontation in East Asia. Myanmar was a member of the Colombo Group, together 
with India, Ceylon, Pakistan and Indonesia, which advocated neutralism or 
anti-neocolonialism and initiated the Bandung Conference in April 1955, a meeting of 
Asian and African (AA) countries arguing for peaceful conflict resolution, regional 
economic cooperation and so on.  
 
In contrast, the Ne Win regime promoted an isolationist foreign policy so as to 
eliminate foreign influences, and it regarded the major powers’ interventions as threats 
to Myanmar’s domestic stability and national unity.27 The Ne Win regime not only 
refused substantial economic assistance from major countries including the U.S., the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the PRC, but for a long time even 
hesitated to participate in ASEAN. Myanmar’s relationship with the PRC worsened 
during the Cultural Revolution when the PRC eagerly supported the WFCP, despite 
maintaining its formal inter-governmental relationship. Myanmar’s relationship with the 
 
27 The memory of British colonial rule, which gave preferable status to ethnic minorities and 
allowed Chinese and Indian residents to dominate business and the economy, is often raised as a 
major source of Ne Win’s scepticism against foreign influence. In addition, according to Kumada, 
Ne Win’s coup was motivated at least partly by his observation that U Nu might make a compromise 
with the Shan State Army, which attempted to be independent from Myanmar and to join the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as being implicitly suggested by Thailand and U.S. 
agencies (Kumada, 2003). 
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U.S. also deteriorated as Ne Win strongly suspected that the U Nu-organized 
Parliamentary Democracy Party’s (PDP) anti-Ne Win demonstrations and guerrilla 
activities were at least partly supported by the Western bloc, especially by the U.S. 
(Kumada, 2001: 12). While successfully maintaining its isolationist foreign policy 
direction until the late 1980s, the Ne Win regime revealed a somewhat open attitude 
toward international assistance when it experienced serious economic difficulties in the 
early 1970s, and decided to accept economic assistance from Japan and West Germany 
as it considered them as politically less problematic countries.28 
At the economic level, the AFPFL government initially attempted to construct 
a socialistic system by promoting the nationalization of all big companies. As Burma 
Proper’s nationalism was at least partly inspired by the pre-war economic system that 
had been dominated by foreigners under British colonial rule, the AFPFL government 
attempted to prevent Indian, Chinese or British businesses from regaining a dominant 
position in the Myanmar economy. Given Myanmar’s insufficient financial and human 
resources, however, the U Nu administration found it difficult to develop the economy 
without introducing any foreign capital or technology. Thus, the AFPFL government 
soon modified its economic policy to a more moderate socialist direction including the 
suspension of nationalization and the introduction of foreign capital. Yet, such a policy 
shift, in the end, could not attract enough foreign money to achieve Myanmar’s 
industrialization.  
 
The Ne Win regime, on the other hand, propagated the discourse of the 
‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, implementing an interventionist economic policy from 
when it took power in 1962.29 Due to serious economic difficulties in the early 1970s, 
 
28 Ne Win also decided on Myanmar’s first attendance of the Ministerial Conference for Economic 
Development of South-East Asia (MCEDSEA) held in October 1973, which was set up by Japan in 
1966. 
29 This included restrictions on the entry of foreigners, the nationalization of private companies, and 
the suspension of foreign capital inflows and so on, which resulted in accelerating Myanmar’s 
economic stagnation. 
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nonetheless, Ne Win decided to make a minor modification to his economic policy. 
Having called for foreign assistance equivalent to US$2 billion in late 1976, Ne Win 
accepted assistance particularly from Japan and West Germany, which he regarded as 
politically less problematic countries. Thanks to increased foreign aid and 
improvements in agricultural production, the Ne Win administration achieved modest 
success in expanding the domestic economy, at least on the surface, from the mid-1970s 
to the early 1980s (Nemoto and SaitJ, 1994: 240-250).  
 
However, the Myanmar economy stagnated again in the early 1980s as the 
domestic expansion of agricultural production reached its short-term limits, while at the 
same time there was a substantial downturn in international commodity prices, which 
made it difficult for Myanmar to earn necessary foreign currency (Steinberg, 1993: 
144-148). In addition, the appreciation of the Japanese yen and the West German 
deutsche mark around this period contributed to Myanmar’s foreign debt 
accumulation.30 Although the Japanese government, especially within MOF, began to 
worry about Myanmar’s economic situation, Japan’s economic assistance continued 
until the late 1980s, even though the amount peaked in the mid-1980s. The Ne Win 
regime maintained its interventionist economic policy until 1988, making Myanmar an 
even less significant country in international economic relations despite its abundant 
economic potential. 
 
At the domestic level, postcolonial nation-building and domestic political 
stability had been the Myanmar government’s primary policy objective throughout this 
period. The major obstacles that prevented the Myanmar government from achieving 
these objectives were the ethnic minority issue and domestic insurgencies. Ethnic 
division in Myanmar had been structuralized under British colonial rule and even 
 
30 Somewhat ironically, in accordance with Myanmar’s mounting economic and debt crisis, Japan’s 
ODA became an indispensable capital inflow for Ne Win to maintain his regime (Seekins, 2007: 
79-84). 
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deepened as a result of the battle of the BIA at the time of Japan’s intrusion; this mostly 
consisted of Burma Proper against the British colonial army, which employed many 
ethnic minorities (Seekins, 2007: 25-28). Understanding the difficulty in settling the 
issue of ethnic minorities, Aung San and ethnic minority leaders held the Panglong 
Conference in February 1947, agreeing that the new government would employ a 
quasi-federal system. Although Aung San was assassinated in July 1947, the new Prime 
Minister U Nu employed a federal system based on parliamentary democracy as the 
basic political system of newly independent Myanmar. The ethnic minority problem, 
however, could not be settled because some ethnic minority groups brought firearms 
back to their territories and committed armed attacks against the AFPFL.  
 
In addition, a split emerged within the AFPFL. Amongst the various 
nationalistic activists there were certain differences of opinion, especially between the 
CPB led by Thakin Soe and the PRP, later renamed the Socialist Party, led by U Nu. 
Firstly in February 1946, as a result of an internal conflict within the CPB, Thakin Soe 
broke away from the AFPFL and organized the Red Flag Communist Party (RFCP) to 
begin an underground armed struggle. In addition to this, although it stayed within the 
AFPFL, the WFCP, the majority of the former CPB led by Thakin Than Tun and Thein 
Pe, continuously criticized U Nu’s policy direction during independence negotiations 
with the UK. Finally, in March 1948, right after Myanmar’s independence, the WFCP 
also committed itself to armed struggle against the AFPFL government. Because many 
other ethnic minority groups coincidentally started anti-government revolts, Myanmar 
was almost in a state of civil war.   
 
After the establishment of the military government, Ne Win began to carry out 
a more coercive strategy against domestic insurgency groups. The Ne Win regime 
achieved some success in decreasing domestic insurgency activities because of its direct 
utilization of material capabilities and because foreign support for domestic insurgency 
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groups declined. It was, however, unable to eliminate such activities completely, 
especially in the mountainous jungles in the border areas of Myanmar. In other words, 
Myanmar’s postcolonial nation-building and domestic political stabilization remained as 
an unachieved objective for the Myanmar government.  
 
4. International Structure 
 
During this period, in terms of ideology-based friend-foe relationships, the 
Cold War in East Asia had arguably been the major structural factor that shaped 
international political relations surrounding Myanmar. At the same time, there had been 
certain movements among newly independent countries to politicize the North-South 
problem in the process of postcolonial nation-building and development. The Cold War 
confrontation, nonetheless, had been easing in East Asia especially since U.S. President 
Nixon’s sudden visit to Beijing in 1972. Thereafter, many East Asian governments 
pursued pragmatic economic development rather than ideology, resulting in the 
emergence of the politics of development in the region. The rapid economic growth of 
those East Asian countries gradually decreased the political tension of the North-South 
problem in the region. While having certain significance in the Cold War confrontation 
in Southeast Asia, primarily due to its location, Myanmar became a less significant 
country in international politics not only because of the transformation of the Cold War 
structure but also due to Ne Win’s isolationist foreign policy. In terms of international 
economic structure, Myanmar was recognized as an unsuccessful case of economic 
development in contrast to the rapid economic growth in other parts of the region. In 
terms of societal and transnational structure, Myanmar’s unachieved nation-building 
remained as a risk for regional political stability, even if Ne Win’s authoritarian rule had 
covered up Myanmar’s domestic instability. While it generally played a minor 
international role, the Myanmar government had certainly been influenced by other 
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governments’ policies toward its agenda. Such interactions over Myanmar’s agenda 
within global and regional power configurations formed the international structural 
setting for Japan’s Myanmar policy.  
 
The U.S. generally held little interest in Myanmar except in the context of its 
Cold War strategy in East Asia. Through this strategy, the U.S. had taken a rigidly 
ideological approach toward the growing decolonization movements in Southeast Asia, 
based on a conviction that those movements should be checked if they would benefit the 
communist bloc. This was because the U.S. considered that it was unable to distinguish 
nationalists from communists in the process of decolonization (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 
12-15). U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles propagated the ‘domino theory’, 
warning of the risk that a communization domino would emerge in Asia if the Viet Minh 
made Vietnam into a communist country. Such an ideology-based confrontation 
intensified when the U.S. did enter the Vietnam War in 1959. However, U.S. President 
Richard Nixon’s sudden visit to the PRC in 1972 and the subsequent normalization of 
U.S.-China relations led to a lessening of Cold War tensions in East Asia.31 This in turn 
made the U.S. less engaged in regional political relations in East Asia. 
 
In relation to Myanmar, the U.S. seemed to adopt an ambivalent policy in the 
early stages of the post-war era, attempting to maintain its relationship with the newly 
independent Myanmar government whilst at the same time providing support for the 
activities of Kuomintang remnants who had escaped from the Chinese territory to 
northern Myanmar so as to continue armed struggle against the PRC authority. Such 
assistance was presumably for the purpose of promoting the Cold War strategy of 
 
31 This contributed to the ceasefire of the Vietnam War in 1975. Such transformation of the East 
Asian international structure was also accelerated by Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy 
in 1978, followed by the PRC’s reconciliation efforts with neighbouring countries. Paradoxically, the 
Third Indochina Conflict, including the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 and Vietnam’s intervention 
into the long-lasting Cambodian Civil War in 1978, which exposed complex friend-foe relationships 
throughout the Indochina Peninsula, reflected a gradual melting away, if not complete break up in 
the 1970s, of the Cold War structure of a rigid bipolar system in Southeast Asia. 
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containing communist activities in the Indochina Peninsula. This was presumably 
initiated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon separately from the 
State Department’s official diplomacy (Kumada, 2001). The Myanmar government 
responded by raising this Kuomintang issue at the UN in 1953 while at the same time 
refusing a U.S. offer of grant aid. 
 
After the establishment of Ne Win’s military regime, the U.S. seemed to 
remain sceptical toward Myanmar due to Ne Win’s socialism-oriented propaganda and 
apparently xenophobic attitude to the U.S. and other powers, even if it recognized the 
benefits of keeping Myanmar away from the communist bloc. Moreover, from the early 
1970s, the improvements in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship made the U.S. even 
less interested in Myanmar. The UK, as the former-colonial power, also became 
sceptical about Myanmar’s policy direction under the Ne Win regime; West Germany, 
on the other hand, began to provide more economic assistance to Myanmar after Ne 
Win’s call for more international support in 1976.   
 
The PRC and the USSR distanced themselves from the U Nu administration 
due to their sympathies for the WFCP. Since the mid-1950s, the PRC had strengthened 
its ties with the WFCP, providing material support for anti-government insurgency 
activities as a part of its strategy to support communist revolutionary movements in 
other countries. At the same time, the PRC attempted to improve its relationship with 
the Myanmar government, especially around the early 1960s, when it recognized that 
the U Nu administration’s difficulty in preserving domestic political stability was an 
opportunity to increase its influence over Myanmar. In 1960, U Nu and Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai concluded a treaty of friendship and nonaggression as well as a 
border agreement. In addition, Zhou Enlai visited Myanmar in 1961 to sign an 
agreement on economic and technical cooperation in which the PRC pledged to provide 
an US$84 million interest-free loan. This resulted in many Chinese engineers working 
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in Myanmar (Sakuma, 1993: 178-179). While such a close relationship between 
Myanmar and the PRC was short-lived, mainly due to Ne Win’s isolationist foreign 
policy, the PRC gradually decreased its material assistance to the WFCP in accordance 
with its shift to a ‘good-neighbour’ policy in the late 1970s, and sought to improve its 
relationship with the Ne Win regime. This made the formal Myanmar-China bilateral 
relationship more stable despite the Ne Win regime’s persistent scepticism toward the 
PRC.   
 
During this period, the international political structure had been largely shaped 
by the Cold War in terms of ideology-based friend-foe relationships in East Asia. These 
relationships were structuralized by the late 1940s.32 Although it adopted a non-aligned 
foreign policy, Myanmar had been substantially influenced by the Cold War strategies 
of the U.S. and the PRC because of its strategic significance. The receding Cold War 
confrontation in East Asia from the early 1970s, nonetheless, clearly decreased 
Myanmar’s strategic significance for the major powers. Within such a structural 
environment, Ne Win’s isolationist foreign policy had largely decoupled Myanmar from 
the international political structure despite its economic dependence on foreign 
assistance until the late 1980s.  
 
In terms of international economic structure, the development issue had been a 
major agenda of global and regional economic relations. It was occasionally politicised 
as an international conflict between Northern developed countries and Southern 
developing countries. Many newly independent countries recognized the necessity of 
ensuring political autonomy from their former imperial powers while at the same time 
achieving economic stability and growth, often with foreign assistance.33 The major 
 
32 The Korean Peninsula was divided into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and 
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, and the PRC was established in October 1949. The Cold War 
rivalry became a hot war after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which resulted in stalemate 
in 1953. In 1946, the Viet Minh led by the communist Ho Chi Minh began to fight for Vietnam’s 
independence against the French. 
33 At the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, for example, developing 
82 
 
powers were aware of the necessity to respond to the development issue as part of an 
economic system competition between the East and the West, and committed funds for 
economic assistance to developing countries. Whilst the North-South problem as a 
source of international political friction gradually receded in East Asia as many East 
Asian countries began to achieve rapid economic growth, the development issue 
continued to be a significant part of the global and regional political agenda. This led to 
a debate on burden sharing among Western developed countries, including Japan, in 
accordance with the decline of U.S. hegemony from the 1970s. 
 
Within such an international economic structure, the Ne Win regime 
successfully minimized Myanmar’s foreign economic relations by implementing an 
interventionist economic policy. Yet, from the late 1970s, the Myanmar economy 
became increasingly dependent on foreign aid, most of which was provided by Japan 
and West Germany. Myanmar’s economic stagnation and accumulated debt problem, in 
contrast to the rapid economic growth of many other Southeast Asian countries, were 
serious cases of failure in economic development, even if they did not attract much 
international attention until the late 1980s.   
 
In terms of societal and transnational structure, the Ne Win regime remained 
highly vulnerable to insurgency activities of ethnic minority and other anti-government 
groups, in spite of its military superiority. Many of those anti-government groups 
appeared to be sustained by transnational material support including the PRC’s 
continuous support for the WFCP. In fact, Ne Win always suspected that foreign 
governments supported these domestic anti-government groups, which legitimized his 
isolationist foreign policy as a necessary measure to minimize and eliminate such 
foreign interventions.   
 
countries made strong demands against developed countries concerning primary commodity and 
preferential tariff issues. 
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5. Policy-Makers’ Perceptions 
 
With the international structural setting described above as background, the 
Japanese government conducted its Myanmar policy based on its own perceptions of 
Myanmar’s agendas, international structure and its own policy objectives. Japanese 
policy-makers’ basic understanding of Myanmar’s agendas was that Myanmar political 
leaders had a strong nationalistic desire for postcolonial nation-building and 
development which primarily determined their foreign, economic and domestic policies. 
This understanding was consistent with Japanese policy-makers’ general perceptions of 
newly independent East Asian countries. At the same time, the Japanese government’s 
actual policy toward Myanmar was influenced by its perceptions of the transitions in 
Myanmar’s agendas and international structural pressures. In the early stages of the 
post-war era, the Japanese government was aware of its scarce power and the difficult 
position it held in international relations as a result of the Asia-Pacific War. Given such 
a severe international structural environment, the Japanese government primarily 
focused on minimal foreign policy objectives; namely the recovery of normal foreign 
relationships and the reconstruction of the domestic economy. In accordance with its 
expanding policy capabilities, however, the Japanese government increasingly 
incorporated its own perceptions of international structure, including the Cold War 
structure and the North-South problem in East Asia, into its Myanmar policy.  
 
During the Cold War era, the Japanese government appeared to hold its own 
original perceptions of the nature of the regional political structure in East Asia. 
Essentially, many Japanese policy-makers did not share the U.S. government’s rigidly 
ideological perception and approach toward East Asian countries. From the perspective 
of the Japanese government, post-war decolonization movements in Southeast Asia had 
basically been regarded as local political leaders’ expressions of a nationalistic desire 
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for self-determination and nation-building rather than movements of communist 
solidarity (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 12-15). Still, Japanese policy-makers at the same 
time admitted that these decolonization movements had an affinity for communist 
ideology and that there was a possibility that the Eastern bloc would extend its influence 
over the region using communist ideology and material support. The Japanese 
government, hence, recognized that it was necessary to support the efforts of Southeast 
Asian political leaders for nation-building and development so as to prevent the 
expansion of communism in the region (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 1-17).  
 
Having recognized its weak international power and position, post-war Japan 
initially focused on minimal foreign policy objectives toward Southeast Asia, including 
Myanmar, namely the recovery of international confidence in Japan and the 
achievement of economic growth. The recovery and maintenance of such international 
confidence was crucial for the Japanese government because, being the aggressor 
country in the Asia-Pacific War, it was necessary for Japan to re-enter the international 
community by normalizing its foreign relations as quickly as possible. As Myanmar 
refused to participate in the multilateral San Francisco Peace Treaty of 8 September 
1951, post-war bilateral normalization and war reparations were certainly the most 
urgent concern for Japan’s Myanmar policy at the early stages of the post-war era.34 
After an initial agreement on 4 November 1954, both governments finally exchanged 
the ratification instrument on a bilateral peace treaty as well as the official document on 
war reparations in Tokyo in April 1955.35 It was the first war reparation agreement that 
 
34 Japan needed to engage in bilateral normalization talks with many Southeast Asia countries which 
opted out of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the multilateral peace treaty for the Asia-Pacific War. 
Myanmar refused to join the San Francisco Peace Treaty because of the lack of agreement on 
receiving war reparations partly by service reparations (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 17-19). It was also 
because Prime Minister U Nu considered that, on the one hand, it was unfavourable for his 
non-aligned neutral policy direction not to have Eastern countries’ participation and, on the other 
hand, bilateral negotiation would give him a free hand from the U.S., which aimed at decreasing 
Japan’s burden in its Cold War strategy (Seekins, 2007: 55). 
35 Before agreeing on war reparations, Japan had already set up an overseas office in Yangon in 
November 1951, upgrading it into a consulate-general in accordance with Myanmar’s April 1952 
declaration to end the state of war. This was followed by the establishment of Myanmar’s 
consulate-general in Tokyo in May 1953. 
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Japan reached with any Asian country, and was considered as a milestone in post-war 
Japan’s re-entry into international society. Japan’s commitment to Myanmar came to 
US$200 million of war reparations and US$50 million of economic cooperation from 
1955 to 1965.36 
The Japanese government, at the same time, placed a high priority on economic 
recovery and growth in its post-war strategy due to the serious deterioration of the 
domestic economy, and it recognized the urgent necessity to strengthen its economic 
relationships with neighbouring countries and retain security assurance and economic 
assistance from the U.S. Japan’s initial idea to construct close economic ties with 
Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula, however, was difficult to implement because 
of the communization of China and North Korea, although the Japanese government did 
not give up seeking opportunities to construct a pragmatic trade relationship with the 
PRC (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 1-6; Iokibe, 2006: 93-97). The Japanese government 
began to develop a policy plan to link domestic economic recovery with Southeast 
Asia’s development, which was also regarded as a policy consistent with the U.S. Cold 
War strategy of preventing the communization domino effect in Asia (Hatano and Sato, 
2007: 6-41). After that, the Japanese government increasingly recognized Southeast 
Asian countries as essential economic partners within the Cold War structure.  
 
The Japanese government had recognized Myanmar as a significant country in 
the early stages of the post-war era. Even before finalizing the official end to the state of 
war and establishing a formal diplomatic relationship, Japan and Myanmar resumed a 
bilateral trade relationship, particularly in response to Japan’s urgent need for food 
imports. Japan’s serious dearth of food in its war-shattered economy led to increases in 
Myanmar’s rice exports to Japan, which came to 70,000 tons in 1949 and rose to 
 
36 This consisted of US$20 million annually for goods and services from the Japanese government 
and US$5 million annually for technical assistance and investment in joint ventures between the 
Japanese private sector and Myanmar’s public and private sectors. 
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300,000 tons in 1954.37 Nonetheless, Myanmar’s rice exports to Japan dropped sharply 
in the latter half of the 1950s. Myanmar complained about Japan’s shrinking rice 
imports in 1960, but Japan accepted only a limited compromise due to the recovery of 
its domestic agricultural production as well as an agricultural protection policy initiated 
by the LDP (Seekins, 2007: 56). 
 
Whilst Myanmar’s abundant natural resources and economic potential had 
occasionally attracted Japanese policy-makers’ attention,38 economic interests at the 
macro level did not appear to be Japan’s primary policy objective toward Myanmar 
from the 1960s. Having been twice provided economic assistance by Japan for appraisal 
explorations of offshore oilfields in the early 1970s, in 1979, Myanmar committed to an 
oil export contract of one million barrels. Myanmar, however, could only export 50,000 
kilolitres in 1979 and 60,000 kilolitres in 1980, which was negligible compared to the 
more than 250 million kilolitres of Japan’s overall oil imports (MOFA, 1980 and 1983). 
This was followed by Myanmar’s own domestic oil supply shortage in 1982. In the end, 
Myanmar never became a substantial supplier of natural resources to Japan despite its 
potential; it only exported a small amount of teak, pulses and other materials.  
 
Once Ne Win took trade under state control and promoted the nationalization 
of domestic industries under the slogan of the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’, it became 
even more difficult for Japan to increase its trade and investment with Myanmar due to 
severe restrictions on private economic activities. For example, Japan’s trade 
relationship with Myanmar in 1977, right before Japan’s rapid expansion of ODA 
disbursement, was US$67 million of exports and US$31 million of imports; both figures 
 
37 According to Tanabe and Nemoto, on some occasions Myanmar sold rice to Japan for a cheaper 
price without even bidding (Tanabe and Nemoto, 2003: 61-63).  
38 When refusing Myanmar’s demands for war reparations renegotiations, for example, the Japanese 
Ambassador to Myanmar, Hara Kaoru, was of the opinion that, given the military’s influence over 
the administration regardless of the result of the 1960 election, a compromise on the renegotiations 
issue would be a necessary and wise decision to gain a beneficial solution to this issue and to 
improve the prospects of developing a future trade relationship (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 81-81). 
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were much less than 10% of those with any individual ASEAN5 country (MOFA, 1978). 
Despite some increase in Japan’s exports since 1978, mostly thanks to expanding ODA 
disbursement, there were almost no synergetic effects with private-based trade and 
investment activities; activities which could be observed in many other Southeast Asian 
countries. In short, from the 1960s, Japan’s economic interests in Myanmar at the macro 
level were too scarce to be regarded as major policy objectives, even if some Japanese 
policy-makers and businesspeople held expectations for Myanmar’s economic and 
natural resources development in the future.  
 
An alternative explanation is that the Japanese government started to 
incorporate its original perceptions of international structure in East Asia from around 
this period. From its own perspective toward the postcolonial nation-building process in 
Southeast Asia, the Japanese government took a somewhat autonomous policy approach 
toward Indonesia in the late 1950s and 1960s as well as in the Indochina Peninsula from 
the late 1960s to the early 1970s (Hatano and Sato, 2007; Miyagi, 2004; Hirata, 2001). 
The Japanese government seemed to be conducting these policies by combining its 
original perceptions with two strategic objectives regarding Southeast Asia: contributing 
to the U.S. Cold War strategy as a member of the Western bloc, and promoting 
friendship with Southeast Asian countries by supporting their political leaders’ efforts 
for nation-building and development regardless of their ideology.  
 
Japan’s Myanmar policy objectives also shifted from minimal objectives to 
broader foreign policy goals (Kudo, 1997a: 277-279). When the war reparations 
renegotiation based on an ‘equity clause’ in the 1954 agreement became a bilateral 
agenda, the Japanese government recognized Myanmar’s strategic significance within 
the Cold War structure.39 Initially, the Japanese government had responded negatively 
 
39 The ‘equity clause’ required a re-examination of the war reparations agreement, if necessary, 
when Japan’s war reparations agreements with other countries became apparent. Japan’s agreement 
with the Philippines in 1956 was for US$550 million of goods and services and a US$250 million 
economic development loan. Its agreement with Indonesia in 1958 was for US$223.08 million of 
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to Myanmar’s demand for renegotiation in 1959, claiming that the 1954 agreement was 
fair and equitable. In March 1960, despite being willing to compromise, as an 
alternative to renegotiation, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke only made an informal 
offer to provide low-interest loan assistance to U Nu, who was Prime Minister designate 
at that time. Ne Win’s caretaker government reacted firmly, prohibiting Japanese 
imports and threatening to void the visas of Japanese businesspeople in Myanmar. 
Around this period, the Myanmar government also moved closer to the PRC so as to 
retain foreign support in dealing with domestic political and economic instability.  
 
The Asian Affairs Bureau of MOFA, hence, advocated an early resolution of 
the renegotiation issue as it considered that Myanmar might seek assistance from 
communist countries (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 84-85). Coming into power in July 1960, 
Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato embarked on supporting Myanmar in order to prevent an 
expansion of the PRC’s influence. It is likely that Ikeda recognized that it was Japan’s 
responsibility as a member of the Western bloc to prevent the expansion of communist 
influence in the region. From this viewpoint, Ikeda focused not only on Indonesia, 
which Japan had actively supported since Kishi’s period, but also on Myanmar in its 
strategy toward Southeast Asia. In observing Myanmar’s worsening relationship with 
the U.S. and improving relationship with the PRC, Ikeda seemed to recognize Myanmar 
as ‘China’s target’ in expanding its sphere of influence at that time (Hatano and Sato, 
2007: 80-82).40 Recognizing Ne Win’s coup d’état in March 1962 as a chance to change 
the situation, the Japanese government, therefore, moved to strengthen ties with 
Myanmar’s new military regime.  
 
goods and services, which resulted in a total of US$400 million when it included trade debt 
write-offs, as well as a further US$400 million economic development loan. 
40 Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi also mentioned to U.S. Secretary of State Rusk that Japan 
would provide as much economic assistance as possible because economic poverty in continental 
Southeast Asia would pave the way for communist penetration once it was linked with nationalistic 
emotions (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 86). 
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When Brigadier Aung Gyi visited Japan in January 1963, 41  Japan and 
Myanmar concluded the war reparations renegotiation with a commitment by Japan for 
US$140 million of additional grant aid between 1965 and 1977, which was the so-called 
‘quasi-reparations’ (jun-baish8), as well as a US$30 million economic development 
loan. After that, the Japanese government deepened its relationship with the military 
regime and, according to Steinberg, probably sustained the regime by 
‘quasi-reparations’ provision at the time of Myanmar’s economic downturn in the 
mid-1960s (Steinberg, 2001: 256). In addition, the Japanese government began to 
disburse ODA, budgeting 10.8 billion yen for the first yen loan in FY1968. As a whole, 
Japan’s Myanmar policy in the context of the Cold War strategy had aimed for two 
effects: ODA provision had been, on the one hand, a direct political tool for Japan to 
keep the Myanmar government away from the communist bloc, and on the other hand, 
it was assumed that it would decrease Myanmar’s social vulnerability against 
communist intrusion by supporting political and economic development. 
 
International structural transitions in East Asia from the 1970s provided 
another opportunity for the Japanese government to reconsider its Southeast Asian 
policy, including Myanmar policy, in response to changing structural pressures. Whilst 
the Cold War confrontation in East Asia eased in the 1970s, the Japanese government 
became more and more involved in the North-South problem in East Asia in accordance 
with its growing economic power and activities in the region. Japan’s rapid economic 
growth caused friction, not only with developing Asian countries, some of which linked 
 
41 Brigadier Aung Gyi was second in command of the military government and Minister of Trade 
and Industry in this period. Although the Japanese government recognized him as a key figure in the 
Ne Win regime, he was suddenly ousted on 7 February 1963, right before the Myanmar 
government’s announcement of a new economic policy based on the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ on 
16 February. Steinberg suspected that Aung Gyi’s obsequious statement at the negotiations with 
Japan might have angered Ne Win and pointed out the possible conflict of opinions in economic 
policy direction between them as another probable reason for his removal (Steinberg, 1993: 142). In 
Japan, Aung Gyi mentioned that ‘We (the Burmese) have come here as a younger brother would to 
an older brother to consult a certain family problem’, making the Japan side somewhat surprised 
because these were terms used by pre-war Japan in explaining the concept of the East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
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Japan’s economic advance with its pre-war imperialism, but also with the U.S. and other 
Western developed countries, which insisted that Japan should share the burden for 
maintaining international economic order. Accordingly, the Japanese government began 
to seriously consider its responsibility for regional development issues.  
 
Japan faced strong demands from developing countries about primary 
commodity and preferential tariff issues at the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Asian countries in particular criticized Japan’s 
reluctant attitude toward the negotiations and removed Japan from the list of AA 
countries, making Tokyo aware of the necessity to reconsider its policy regarding the 
North-South problem (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 148-150). Even after being criticized at 
UNCTAD, the Japanese government, especially MOF, still did not want to expand its 
economic assistance under the Sato administration’s balanced budget policy line. In July 
1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, hence, made a critical statement to Finance 
Minister Fukuda Takeo, mentioning that it was Japan’s responsibility as a leading 
country in Asia to show a strong interest in the peace and stability of the region (Hatano 
and Sato, 2007: 148-152). Accordingly, the Japanese government moved to organize the 
Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of South-East Asia (MCEDSEA), 
the first multilateral conference set up by post-war Japan, in order to discuss the issues 
of regional economic development. Although Japan could not successfully persuade Ne 
Win to participate in the conference at that time because of his reluctance to join 
multilateral negotiations, Japan’s initiative reflected its motivation to address the 
North-South political confrontation by promoting economic cooperation with Southeast 
Asia, including Myanmar (Hatano and Sato, 2007: 153-157).  
 
Anti-Japanese demonstrations in Indonesia and Thailand during Prime Minister 
Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Southeast Asia in January 1974 became another turning point 
in Japan’s foreign policy toward Southeast Asian countries. Responding to this, Prime 
91 
 
Minister Fukuda Takeo proposed the Fukuda Doctrine during his visit to Southeast 
Asian countries in August 1977, expressing Japan’s basic principles for the relationship 
between Japan and Southeast Asia.42 Subsequently, the Japanese government sharply 
increased its ODA after Fukuda’s 1977 announcement to double Japan’s foreign aid. In 
doing so, the Japanese government released the Medium-Term Target of ODA to set out 
the targets of quantitative expansion of ODA in 1978, which was revised four times 
until 1993. In sum, the Japanese government became aware of the necessity to regain 
the confidence of Southeast Asian countries, and tried to do so by showing a friendly 
attitude and committing itself to address bilateral economic and social problems. At the 
same time, these actions were symbolic of Japan’s desire to share the burden of global 
development with the U.S. and other developed Western countries. The Japanese 
government’s White Paper on International Trade 1978, for example, discussed the 
North-South problem and Japan’s relationship with developing countries, pointing out 
that there had been growing voices from developing and developed countries for Japan 
to behave responsibly in terms of economic cooperation from the viewpoint of 
harmonious development of the world economy (METI, 1978). The Japanese 
government, whose national security depended heavily on the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty, also regarded the construction of peaceful and friendly foreign relations as a 
preferable policy direction in order to improve Japan’s security environment. 
 
As Ne Win’s call for foreign assistance coincided with Japan’s growing 
awareness of its international responsibilities, the Japanese government decided to 
increase its economic assistance to Myanmar since, according to Dalpino, it had played 
“a central role” in the Aid Burma Consultative Group in Tokyo in November 1976 
(Dalpino, 2007: 218).43 Japan’s ODA to Myanmar totalled US$1.94 billion in grants 
 
42 The Fukuda Doctrine demonstrated Japan’s three basic principles: (1) Japan will contribute to the 
peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia and not become a great military power; (2) Japan will make 
best efforts to build ‘heart-to-heart’ relationships with Southeast Asian countries and become an 
equal partner of ASEAN; (3) Japan will also try to construct a relationship of mutual understanding 
with Indochina nations and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the whole of Southeast Asia.  
43 The Aid Burma Consultative Group was organized by the World Bank and consisted of ten donor 
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and loans between 1970 and 1988, which was two thirds of Myanmar’s total bilateral 
ODA from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries (Seekins, 
2007: 62-63). Japan was clearly the most important donor to Myanmar, and Myanmar 
was constantly ranked in the top ten recipient countries of Japan’s ODA from 1978 to 
1988, and was often in the top five (Kudo, 2007: 5). These figures indicate that through 
its economic assistance policy during this period the Japanese government gave a high 
priority to Myanmar under Ne Win’s rule.  
 
It seems likely that the Japanese government connected its economic assistance 
to Myanmar with its overall policy on Southeast Asia when considering that Myanmar 
was a destination country in Prime Minister Fukuda’s 1977 visit to Southeast Asia 
during which he proposed the Fukuda Doctrine. Steinberg noted that Japan disbursed 
economic assistance to Myanmar due to feeling a “self-perceived obligation to provide 
foreign assistance to less-developed nations because it was a member of the 
industrialized world,” and that “Japan wanted to meet its social responsibility and gain 
the respect of other such nations” (Steinberg, 2001: 254). Japan’s self-perceived 
obligation was not only toward developing Asian countries but also toward the U.S. and 
other Western countries, which had been exerting pressure for Japan to share the burden 
for Western-led international political order and development. 44  The Japanese 
government under international pressure for burden sharing found it easier to expand 
economic assistance to Myanmar, which had been generally accommodative to Japan’s 
preferences in implementing aid projects. 
 
It can also be argued that in providing economic assistance, the Japanese 
 
countries and multilateral aid agencies. It was also called the Burma Aid Group. 
44 The Japanese government, especially MOFA, might also have been motivated to play a mediation 
role between Myanmar and the U.S. during the Cold War era. According to Orr, in the early 1980s, 
Japanese officials in Yangon actively encouraged their U.S. counterparts to initiate and increase 
bilateral aid programs, and even attempted to persuade the Myanmar government to admit the U.S. 
Agency for International Development to join a large irrigation project, to which Japan was going to 
contribute (Orr, 1990: 134). 
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government prioritized regional political stability and bilateral friendship under the 
name of non-intervention.45 One of the primary motivations behind Japan’s foreign aid 
had been to restore the confidence of Asian countries in Japan, many of which held 
traumatic memories of foreign intervention, and the Japanese government had been very 
sensitive not to have its intentions for foreign aid be suspected (Seekins, 2007:72). This 
was to some extent a reflection of a general domestic preference for Japan to avoid 
involvement in international political friction. The Japanese government also regarded 
foreign aid as an essential policy measure to achieve regional political stability, one of 
Japan’s primary policy objectives toward East Asia. ODA disbursement had even been 
perceived by some Japanese politicians as a necessary cost to maintain the political 
stability of authoritarian regimes in Asia, and a way to avert their eyes from the 
unfavourable domestic problems of these regimes (Orr, 1990: 25). This was particularly 
the case regarding Myanmar as it seemed to be a safer stance for Tokyo to avoid 
unnecessary friction with the Myanmar government given that Ne Win was extremely 
sensitive to foreign intervention and showed a negative attitude toward any conditions 
on a donor country’s aid.  
 
6. Resource Mobilization 
 
Until the late 1980s, it was relatively easy for the Japanese government to earn 
the support of domestic actors for its Myanmar policy. With regard to its ODA 
expansion policy in the late 1970s, the Japanese government was never critically 
challenged by any domestic actor concerning either its overall policy direction or its 
specific policy toward Myanmar. Many domestic actors were generally supportive of 
 
45 In economic terms, the Japanese government seemed to justify its foreign aid by ‘gap theory’, 
explaining that economic assistance would contribute to developing countries’ economic growth by 
bridging the gap between the amount of necessary investment and actual insufficiency of foreign 
currencies stemming from the export-import gap and scarce domestic savings (METI, 1978). This 
theory allowed the Japanese government to be indifferent to the quality of ODA projects as far as 
quantitative targets were achieved. 
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ODA expansion as Japan’s contribution to international society during this period, and 
had neither sufficient information nor the capability to conduct an appropriate 
assessment and evaluation of actual ODA projects. This enabled the Japanese 
government to keep extending economic assistance to Myanmar in cooperation with 
pro-Myanmar politicians and Japanese companies participating in ODA projects.   
 
(1) The Diet and Politicians 
 
Although it has the official mandate to approve budget bills, the Diet held a 
limited influence on the allocation and assessment of the ODA budget. This was 
primarily due to informal coordination among bureaucrats and mainstream politicians 
and Diet members’ general indifference to foreign policy (Seekins, 2007: 72). The 
JMPFL46 was a platform for pro-Myanmar Diet members, consisting of around 60 Diet 
members in the early 1990s including Watanabe Michio,47 Yamaguchi (Otaka) Yoshiko 
and Chairman Ozawa Tatsuo (Seekins, 1992: 255). Some influential politicians 
including Prime Minister Kishi, his adopted son Abe Shintaro48, and Watanabe Michio 
appeared to have a personal interest in Myanmar (Seekins, 2007: 68). Also, some 
JMPFL members presumably supported economic assistance to Myanmar for political 
leverage or special interests regarding bilateral ODA provision. Orr indicates that some 
politicians such as Abe and Watanabe had a relationship with war veteran associations 
(Orr, 1990: 85). 
 
46 The JMPFL was initially named the Japan-Burma Parliamentarians’ Friendship League.   
47 Watanabe was a powerful LDP politician who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs from November 1991 to April 1993 after holding the posts of Minister for Health 
and Welfare, Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Minister for Finance, and Minister for 
International Trade and Industry.   
48 Abe was a powerful LDP politician who served as Minister for Foreign Affairs from November 
1982 to July 1986 after taking the posts of Minister for Agriculture, Chief Cabinet Secretary and 
Minister for International Trade and Industry.  
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(2) Business Sector 
 
Many Japanese companies participated in the Japanese government’s war 
reparations projects and foreign aid projects from the early stages of the post-war era. 
Having been somewhat cautious about expanding the ODA budget for fear of limiting 
domestic policy resources, the Japanese business sector had become generally 
supportive for ODA budget expansion since the 1970s primarily because it recognized 
both the direct and indirect benefits of aid projects for its increasing overseas activities 
(Orr, 1990: 28-29). The Ne Win regime imposed strict restrictions on private business 
activities from the 1960s, so Japanese companies that committed themselves to carrying 
out business in Myanmar regarded the government’s war reparations and ODA projects 
as essential to their business activities. Despite the Ne Win regime’s restrictions, a 
number of individual companies, including construction, trading and consultancy 
companies, participated in ODA-related projects and other business activities in pursuit 
of potential opportunities in the Myanmar economy, even if they were not necessarily 
successful in the end.  
 
(3) NGOs 
 
During this period, most NGOs engaging in the Japan-Myanmar bilateral 
relationship aimed to promote bilateral friendship and exchanges. The Japan-Burma 
Association, founded in 1933 and later to become the Japan-Myanmar Association, is 
the oldest Myanmar lobby organization in Japan. It consists of a number of companies 
operating in Myanmar and has been headed by politicians or former bureaucrats 
(Pongyelar, 2007: 15-17). While some other organizations, including ones for veterans 
dispatched to Myanmar during the Second World War, have promoted bilateral 
friendship, there were few NGOs aiming at advocacy or aid project implementation 
until the 1980s.   
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(4) Media and Public Opinion 
 
Some Japanese media began to report on the problems of Japanese ODA 
projects in the 1980s, criticizing scandals and cases of environmental destruction, 
including ones in Myanmar (See Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan, 1990). 
Until then, Japanese public opinion had been generally positive toward expanding the 
ODA budget primarily based on a superficial understanding of the situation (Orr, 1990: 
25-27). In fact, public opinion had not been focused on Japan’s ODA policy and was not 
informed enough to monitor and assess Japan’s economic assistance during this period.  
 
7. Domestic Policy-Making System 
 
In Japan’s Myanmar policy-making, there was a significant transition from 
relatively coherent policy-making to a more fragmented organizational process in the 
late 1970s. Until then, decisions on critical issues regarding Myanmar, namely war 
reparation negotiations in 1954, war reparation renegotiations in 1963, and ODA 
expansion in the late 1970s seemed to have been taken within a domestic policy-making 
system involving influencial politicians. On the other hand, the management of 
expanding ODA, which was the major part of Japan’s Myanmar policy after the late 
1970s, was dealt with by domestic bureaucratic coordination under the overall policy 
direction of a quantitative expansion of ODA. It is likely that this was due to the 
characteristics of these policy issues and the fragmented nature of Japan’s foreign and 
ODA policy-making, which became more apparent around this period. Once Japan’s 
ODA provision became an issue to be dealt with organizationally, Japan’s ODA was not 
adequately checked nor assessed from the perspective of effectiveness in achieving its 
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policy objectives within the policy-making system.49 
In accordance with the rapid expansion of the ODA budget after the late 1970s, 
Japan’s foreign aid policy-making became an organizational process to adjust the ODA 
budget allocation among recipient countries. This process presumably involved the 
rent-seeking activities of politicians and private companies committed to ODA projects. 
By examining Japan’s aid to Myanmar, Seekins calls such a transition in Japan’s 
policy-making as a ‘kokunaika’ (domesticization) process, which is operated “on the 
basis of closed, though not necessarily unbreachable circles of individuals and groups 
who confer favors upon each other within the framework of long-term, reciprocal 
relationships” (Seekins, 1992: 247). As a result, Japan’s foreign aid policy-making 
became a business-as-usual process rather than a strict assessment process of policy 
objectives and efficacy except in the cases of scandals and other external changes.50 
Since deciding upon a quantitative expansion of economic assistance in the late 
1970s until Myanmar’s serious economic downturn became apparent in the late 1980s, 
there did not seem to be any domestic actor that had the incentive to conduct a serious 
 
49 Still, the impact of Japan’s war reparations and economic assistance seem to be mixed. For 
example, the Baluchaung hydro power plant, the most symbolic project of Japan’s war reparations 
completed in March 1960, has provided a significant portion of electricity to central Myanmar, 
including Yangon, for nearly half a century. The plant was built in Karenni (Kayah) State, a remote 
jungle area with frequent insurgency activities, using around 17 percent of total war reparations 
between 1955 and 1963, together with Nippon KJei and Kajima as major participants from Japan 
(Seekins, 2007: 59-60; Arase, 1995: 30; Rix, 1980: 201-202). On the other hand, the so-called ‘Four 
Industrialization Projects’ (Yon-dai K8gy8ka Purojekuto) have earned a poor reputation (Steinberg, 
2001: 255; Kudo, 1997a). A war reparation project that began in 1962 aimed to support the 
construction of assembly plants for four selected industries including light and heavy vehicles, 
agricultural machinery and electric goods. In contrast to the initial project objectives, those 
industries never became self-sustaining, and as a result four Japanese companies, namely Hino for 
truck assembly, Mazda for automobiles, jeeps and vans, Kubota for farm machinery and Matsushita 
for electrical appliances, continued to supply components until the end of the project in the late 
1980s (Seekins, 2007: 60-61). As a whole, the Ne Win regime did not pay much attention to the 
implementation and evaluation of economic assistance once such aid projects were committed 
(Seekins, 2007: 73-74). Also, there was almost no monitoring of foreign aid projects in Myanmar as 
it had been extremely difficult for intellectuals, journalists and other private actors to raise any voice 
against the government (Seekins, 2007: 73).  
50 Japan’s normalization of ties with the PRC in 1978, for example, became an opportunity to start 
extending ODA to the PRC.  
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assessment and evaluation of Japan’s aid policy. MOFA recognized international 
structural pressures and advocated the necessity to expand the quantity of ODA to 
Myanmar in response to such pressures. METI never had any strong motivation to 
oppose Japan’s ODA disbursement to Myanmar as its own ODA projects could be 
understood as not only a prior investment for Japan’s access to Myanmar’s potential 
market, but also a means to create foreign demand for Japanese companies’ products, 
even if this did not result in any synergetic effects. It was in the late 1980s that MOF 
finally took Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem seriously, which resulted in the ODA 
budget to Myanmar reaching its peak at this time. Such policy-making was mostly 
carried out as a routine process within an administrative framework (Orr, 1990: 12). 
This situation can be described as one of ‘inertia’, in which no actor took any actions to 
strictly assess projects or review policy with regard to economic assistance to Myanmar.  
 
Several features of Japanese foreign aid in combination with factors on the 
Myanmar side ensured that Japan provided continuous economic assistance to Myanmar. 
First of all, the Japanese government operates ‘y8sei-shugi’ or a request-based system in 
providing ODA, selecting its aid projects from a request list submitted by a recipient 
country. This has been officially explained as a system to encourage a recipient 
country’s sense of ownership of a project and to encourage self-help efforts; whereas, in 
fact such project requests were in many cases proposed by Japanese consultant 
companies in coordination with the recipient country’s government (Orr, 1990: 60). This 
system was, to some extent, a product of Japan’s insufficient institutional capacity for 
ODA implementation. As the Japanese government expanded its ODA budget too 
rapidly without building up the necessary human resources for project implementation, 
Japan’s ODA projects could not help but depend heavily on private companies (Orr, 
1990: 28-29). Such insufficient institutional capacity, in combination with the primacy 
of quantitative targets for ODA provision meant that any project evaluation systems 
were left largely undeveloped. Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar was a typical 
99 
 
case of rapid quantitative expansion without having an adequate assessment and 
feedback mechanism within Japan’s ODA implementation system (Kudo, 1997a).  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Japan’s Myanmar policy before 1988 has often been explained by Myanmar 
studies scholars from two perspectives: that of ‘special interests’ and a ‘special 
relationship’. The ‘special interests’ argument points out that Japan’s economic 
assistance to Myanmar was motivated by special interests related to aid projects at the 
micro level. The Mainichi Shimbun, for example, indicated the possible existence of 
Japan’s domestic political-business interests, which could have led to exceptional 
features of the ‘Four Industrialization Projects’ (Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA 
Shuzaihan, 1990: 8-22). By utilizing the concept of a ‘boomerang economy’, Seekins 
hypothetically illustrated the inflation mechanism of the scale of ODA projects which 
was caused by participants’ interest in maximizing profits within a policy-making 
system that had no effective monitoring function to improve the quality of economic 
assistance (Seekins, 2007: 71-74).  
 
Despite the loose assessment mechanism for aid projects and possible existence 
of some special interests in economic assistance, however, such interests do not seem to 
have had much impact on the balance of ODA budgetary allocation among recipient 
countries. Japan’s ODA provision to Myanmar between 1983 and 1987 was US$779 
million. This was far less than that for the PRC (US$2,177 million), Indonesia 
(US$1,433 million), the Philippines (US$1,364 million), Thailand (US$1,307 million) 
and Bangladesh (US$932 million); and almost at the same level as Malaysia (US$777 
million) and India (US$704), followed by Pakistan (US$511 million) and Sri Lanka 
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(US$466).51 Although various interpretations for this data are possible, the amount for 
Myanmar is moderate if Myanmar is regarded as a less-developed Southeast Asian 
country outside ASEAN. More precisely, special interests might have had some impact 
on the formulation, selection or continuation of certain ODA projects, but this only 
became possible under political pressure to spend the expanded ODA budget and only 
within the balance of budgetary allocation formed by administrative coordination.  
 
The ‘special relationship’ argument in terms of bilateral personal and emotional 
ties between Japan and Myanmar has also been raised as a major reason for Japan’s 
economic assistance (Steinberg, 1993: 139). In addition to the pro-Myanmar politicians 
and NGOs mentioned above, there are certainly many Japanese, the so-called 
‘biru-kichi’ (Biruma kichigai, crazy about Burma), who have a strong emotional 
attachment to Myanmar after visiting as diplomats, technical advisors and so on 
(Seekins, 1999b). Rix identifies the Japan-Myanmar relationship as a special 
relationship using the example of Japan’s first untied loan for oil exploration appraisal 
in Myanmar in 1971 (Rix, 1980: 235). Steinberg also describes the emotional bilateral 
ties between Japan and Myanmar in the following way: 
 
The Japanese retained a sentimental attachment to Burma after the war, partly 
because of the trauma and a certain amount of guilt over the era, partly perhaps 
because of the attraction of Burmese Buddhism, and partly because at certain levels 
there was real affection between the Burmese and the Japanese (Steinberg, 2001: 
254). 
 
Nemoto puts even more stress on the bilateral ‘special relationship’ as Japan’s 
“non-rational” motivation for its “extraordinary amounts of aid” (Nemoto, 2007: 
100-103). Many Japanese policy-makers mentioned that the Ne Win regime had shown 
 
51 All figures are calculated from the data of ODA net disbursement in MOFA, Diplomatic 
Bluebook 1988, 1987, 1986, 1985, and 1984.  
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a friendly and accommodative attitude toward Japanese policy-makers, giving priority 
access to Myanmar’s senior leaders and repeatedly glorifying their shared history 
(Tanabe and Nemoto, 2003: 68-69). Whilst some policy-makers certainly had an affinity 
for Myanmar, nonetheless, Diet members’ bilateral friendship leagues and individual 
politicians also advocated ODA provision to many other countries. The Abe faction, for 
instance, apparently influenced economic assistance not only to Myanmar but also to 
South Korea and Thailand, and the Tanaka faction presumably supported aid provision 
to the PRC and Indonesia (Orr, 1990: 23). It can be assumed that the ‘biru-kichi’
bureaucrats did not have as much power in the domestic policy-making system in 
comparison to other countries’ specialists.  
 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the actual ODA budgetary allocation to 
Myanmar was not necessarily excessive, at least in comparative terms. In comparing 
Japan’s ODA to Myanmar with that to Bangladesh, Seekins casts doubt on a shared 
history and personal ties as a dominant factor in Japan’s ODA policy-making (Seekins, 
2007: 74-75). Still, it is possible that the discourse of a ‘special relationship’ or a 
‘pro-Japanese country’ had functioned as a handy rationale for MOFA and other 
advocates in explaining the ODA budget to Myanmar vis-à-vis other domestic 
policy-makers, Diet members and public opinion, none of which had necessarily been 
sensitive to international structural pressures. To sum up, the ‘special relationship’ 
should at best be considered as a supplementary factor in explaining Japan’s foreign aid 
policy to Myanmar, if not just a discourse; even though the ‘special relationship’ had 
arguably been an essential asset for the bilateral diplomatic relationship. 
 
In essence, Japan’s pre-1988 Myanmar policy was generally a response to 
international structural pressures into which the Japanese government increasingly 
reflected its own perceptions of Myanmar’s agendas and surrounding international 
structure. Despite pursuing minimal foreign policy objectives, the Japanese government 
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was increasingly aware of its role as a member of the Western bloc and the only 
developed country in Asia. The Japanese government, hence, came to recognize the 
necessity of supporting the Ne Win regime in order to keep it away from the communist 
bloc and to show Japan’s contribution to international political stability and 
development vis-à-vis Asian developing countries and Western developed countries.  
 
Even so, from the late 1970s, under the overall policy direction of ODA 
expansion, Japan’s foreign aid policy toward Myanmar became a matter to be dealt with 
through organizational processes involving some rent-seeking activities of domestic 
actors. In accordance with the sharp expansion of its ODA budget, Japan’s economic 
assistance to Myanmar was overwhelmed by the inertia of administrative coordination 
in foreign aid policy-making. In other words, Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar 
reflected the political aim of expanding ODA and was conducted in the manner of 
‘business as usual’ without any strict assessment and evaluation. This resulted in a 
situation in which different domestic actors assigned different meanings to economic 
assistance to Myanmar.  
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Chapter 3 
From 1988 to 1996: Default Engagement in the 
Development of the Myanmar Problem 
 
1. Overview 
With this chapter, this thesis begins the main part of the empirical case study; 
Japan’s Myanmar policy in the post-Cold War era. This chapter covers Japan’s 
Myanmar policy from 1988 to 1996. This period began in August 1988 with the ‘8888 
Uprising’, which meant that it was necessary for the Japanese government to deal with 
the development of the Myanmar problem. Responding to Myanmar’s destabilizing 
political situation after the ‘8888 Uprising’ the SPDC headed by Chairman Saw Maung 
declared a military coup d’état on 18 September 1988. Having announced a transitional 
government,52 the SPDC held a general election on 27 May 1990, resulting in a 
landslide victory for the NLD, which gained approximately 60% of the votes and 386 
out of 485 seats. The military government, nonetheless, stayed in power throughout this 
period by emphasizing the necessity to establish a formal constitution before 
transferring power to a new civilian government. By successfully consolidating its 
power after Than Shwe’s succession from Chairman Saw Maung on 23 April 1992, the 
SPDC accelerated economic liberalization and carried out ceasefire negotiations with 
ethnic minority groups. Following the progress of these policies, the SPDC released 
Aung San Suu Kyi from house detention on 10 July 1995.  
 
During this period, the diversifying policy agenda stemming from Myanmar’s 
domestic political turmoil from 1988 to 1990 and international structural transitions at 
 
52 Staying in power for almost five months without any public announcement on future power 
transfer while defining itself as a transitional government, the SPDC finally made it clear in 
February 1989 that a general election would be held in May 1990.   
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the end of the Cold War transformed the costs and benefits for the Japanese government 
in conducting its Myanmar policy. At the international political level, Myanmar had 
gradually lost its strategic significance, especially for Western governments, because of 
the collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia. Whereas the PRC recognized 
Myanmar’s political turmoil as an opportunity to improve its relationship with a 
geopolitically crucial neighbouring country, Western countries were less concerned 
about international political games than in criticizing the SPDC’s lack of democratic 
legitimacy. At the international economic level, the SPDC’s moves toward economic 
liberalization policy were welcomed by transnational companies and many East Asian 
countries, leading to an increase in the amount of imports and foreign investment to 
Myanmar in the mid-1990s. In other words, Myanmar attracted international attention 
as an emerging market with high economic potential in East Asia. At the societal and 
transnational level, on the other hand, the military government retained dominance in 
Myanmar throughout this period even if Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD mobilized 
international pressure, especially from governments and NGOs in Western countries, by 
claiming democratic legitimacy.   
 
The Japanese government had primarily been concerned about the Myanmar 
problem from the perspective of Myanmar’s political stability and economic 
development. In observing Myanmar’s domestic power distribution and social 
instability, Tokyo anticipated that Myanmar’s democratization would be a gradual 
process with various twists and turns, and hence considered that Myanmar’s gradual 
shift to economic liberalization and political democratization was preferable for Japan. 
Although it considered that domestic legitimacy was an essential value to be respected, 
the Japanese government regarded that it was necessary and more realistic to respect 
state sovereignty and try to persuade the SPDC to act for domestic political 
reconciliation and economic development. High-handed foreign interventions, which 
the U.S. and other Western governments had employed, had been regarded as a 
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counterproductive policy measure toward the Myanmar problem by many Japanese 
policy-makers.  
 
The Japanese government, nonetheless, remained in a nuanced engagement 
policy because of international structural pressures, especially from the U.S., as well as 
due to a lack of perceived critical interest in Myanmar. Western countries’ sanctions 
policy and U.S. pressures on Japan’s resumption of economic assistance were certainly 
recognized by Japanese policy-makers as substantial obstacles to reopen ODA 
disbursement. The Japanese government also seemed to perceive Myanmar as having 
less strategic significance around this period due to the decreasing tension of Cold War 
confrontation in the region. However, it presumably considered the Myanmar problem 
as important from the viewpoint of East Asian regional stability and Japan’s 
contribution to it. While it would have been possible for Japan to proactively engage 
with Myanmar if it had substantial interests there, as could be observed in Japan’s 
policy toward the PRC after the Tiananmen Square incident, the Japanese government 
appeared not to perceive enough crucial interests in Myanmar to overcome international 
structural pressures during this period.  
 
Moreover, Japan’s pre-1988 Myanmar policy-making, which had become an 
organizational process of administrative coordination, was transformed into 
bureaucratic politics by Myanmar’s political turmoil from 1988 to 1990. While the 
development of the Myanmar problem transformed the costs and benefits imposed by 
multi-dimensional international structure on Japanese policy-makers and other domestic 
actors, political leaders did not take any distinct initiatives during this period. As a result, 
Japan’s Myanmar policy-making reflected the different interests of concerned 
bureaucrats and politicians, although it was generally coordinated by MOFA based on 
certain shared perceptions within the Japanese government. This made Japan’s 
Myanmar policy into a series of reactions to the development of the Myanmar problem 
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and other governments’ policies towards it. To maintain a good relationship with a 
pro-Japanese Asian country, to seek increasing business opportunities in Myanmar, as 
well as to secure Myanmar’s debt repayment and support existing interests in on-going 
ODA projects seemed to have been, implicitly or explicitly, advocated by Japanese 
policy-makers and domestic actors.  
 
In order to pursue these interests and despite the SPDC’s obvious neglect of 
democratic legitimacy, it was preferable for Japan to persuade the SPDC to employ a 
moderate policy and to take international criticism into account in order to depoliticize 
the Myanmar problem in the international arena. This was in contrast to other options 
such as the sanctions policy of Western governments and the unconditional support 
policy which the PRC began to employ. Although they did not have a substantial impact 
on Japan’s Myanmar policy-making, the emergence of anti-military government groups 
and domestic media reports on Myanmar’s political turmoil somewhat increased the 
domestic costs to the Japanese government of conducting a proactive engagement policy. 
A low-key policy of friendship engagement in the manner of ‘quiet diplomacy’ thus had 
been a preferred policy for the Japanese government, which could retain, at least 
implicitly, domestic support from traditional bilateral friendship groups as well as 
economic engagement groups. By analyzing this process, this chapter describes how the 
Japanese government responded to Myanmar’s changing political situation as well as 
international structural transitions after 1988.    
 
2. Foreign Policy Agenda 
 
The development of the Myanmar problem after the ‘8888 Uprising’ as well as 
the SPDC’s new foreign and economic policy substantially transformed the agenda 
concerning Myanmar after 1988. The development of the Myanmar problem after the 
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‘8888 Uprising’ revealed Myanmar’s domestic agendas of democratic legitimacy and 
human rights protection, which many Western governments particularly focused on. 
Meanwhile, continuous domestic insurgencies by Myanmar’s ethnic minorities and 
other anti-government groups remained as major risks to its political stability, which 
was assumed to have significant implications for regional political stability in East Asia. 
Moreover, emerging non-traditional security issues including narcotics trafficking as 
well as emigrants and refugees had an increasingly serious transnational impact, even 
though they did not attract so much international attention during this period.  
 
In foreign relations, the SPDC attempted to make a policy shift from Ne Win’s 
isolationist foreign policy. Whereas the Ne Win administration kept a distance from the 
U.S., the PRC and the USSR primarily for the avoidance of foreign intervention, the 
SPDC sought foreign assistance in pursuit of its domestic political consolidation and 
economic development after seizing power. As most economic assistance was 
suspended by Western countries after the ‘8888 Uprising’, the SPDC’s efforts to acquire 
assistance had been directed to neighbouring countries, especially the PRC and ASEAN 
members. This means that the SPDC found it beneficial to retain neighbouring 
countries’ political support to counterbalance Western criticism and sought their 
economic assistance to ensure its domestic development, yet it was still cautious about 
excessive dependence on other countries.  
 
The PRC increasingly became a major provider of political support, military 
procurement as well as economic and technical assistance to Myanmar during this 
period. At the same time, the SPDC began to commit to the ASEAN framework for the 
purpose of gaining political and economic support and thereby hedging against the PRC 
(Steinberg, 2001: 237-238). Having participated in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting at Bangkok in July 1994 as the chair’s guest, the SPDC had taken steps toward 
its formal entry into ASEAN, which would eventually take place at the 30th anniversary 
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meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1997.53 At the international political level, Myanmar 
under the Ne Win regime made little substantial impact on the regional political 
structure insofar as it maintained domestic stability, but the SPDC’s policy shift began 
to be recognized by neighbouring countries as having some strategic implications for 
regional power politics.  
 
At the economic level, Ne Win’s economic management not only identified 
Myanmar as a serious concern on the global development agenda but also seriously 
damaged Myanmar’s domestic economy and society. Major donor countries and 
international development agencies had come to recognize Myanmar’s economic 
stagnation and foreign debt accumulation as a serious risk for international development 
assistance. Myanmar’s economic crisis finally reached the point in 1987 that Yangon 
could not help but delay the repayment of its foreign debt and accept the status of 
LLDC at the UN General Assembly. This was in return for preferential treatment in 
foreign aid such as the extension of debt repayments in December 1987. Accordingly, 
by admitting certain failures in economic management, the Ne Win administration 
notified its partial liberalization of agricultural transactions on 1 September 1987. Only 
four days after the announcement, however, the Ne Win administration suddenly 
announced the demonetization of three kinds of banknote, notably the 75, 35 and 25 
kyat, which represented more than 60% of Myanmar’s money circulation. Although it 
was officially explained as a measure to eliminate black market merchants, the 
demonetization policy seriously affected private merchants preparing for the liberalized 
agricultural business and ordinary people who generally preferred to save cash instead 
of using the unreliable banking system (Sakuma, 1993: 113-114).54 These inconsistent 
economic policies fuelled public frustration and anger against the government, leading 
 
53 The SPDC signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1995 and 
retained the status of ASEAN observer in 1996. 
54 Actually, the Ne Win regime demonetized twice before this time: in May 1964 and in November 
1985. Previously the regime exchanged new banknotes in return for demonetized banknotes but did 
not do this at this time except for public officers, pensioners and foreign diplomats (Sakuma, 1993: 
113-114).   
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to the occurrence of the ‘8888 Uprising’.  
 
In order to improve the domestic economic situation, the SPDC began to 
conduct economic reforms, of which trade liberalization and foreign capital introduction 
were the main pillars. For example, from 1988, the SPDC, legalized cross border trade 
by agreeing to open border trade points with Thailand, the PRC, India and Bangladesh, 
resulting in increasing imports from neighbouring countries. As a result, during the 
SPDC’s four year economic plan from FY1992 to FY1995 the Myanmar economy 
achieved 8.2% average GDP growth, which was far higher than its initial target of 5.1% 
(Kudo, 1997b).  
 
Although the SPDC maintained economic liberalization as its basic policy line 
until the late 1990s, Myanmar’s economic growth was short-lived. This was due to 
several reasons. At the real economic level, there had been a widening gap between 
rapidly increasing imports and slower growing exports, which was partly due to the 
weakness of the export industry and partly due to restrictions on agricultural exports 
(Kudo, 2008: 8-13). Prior to 1988, Myanmar had insufficient foreign currency reserves 
to accommodate a rapid increase of short-term imports. This became even more serious 
because the SPDC could only attract limited foreign aid, especially from Western 
countries, most of which suspended economic assistance to Myanmar for normative 
reasons, as will be argued later. In addition, given its own unpopularity and Myanmar’s 
domestic instability, the SPDC could not carry out decisive economic reforms such as 
agricultural export deregulation for fear of causing social destabilization through the 
sacrifice of a stable domestic food supply.  
 
Yet, at least until 1996, Myanmar kept attracting international economic 
interest because of a widespread expectation that Myanmar’s economic potential and 
the SPDC’s liberalization policy would lead to a certain level of economic growth. This 
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might have been partly due to a kind of euphoria, particularly in East Asia, that 
Myanmar would follow the cases of other East Asian developmental states which had 
achieved economic liberalization and growth before then.  
 
The agenda of democratic legitimacy in Myanmar became acute when the 
SPDC ignored the result of the 1990 general election. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
claimed that they were the legitimate government and repeatedly called for direct 
dialogue with the SPDC by making the most of their support from foreign governments 
and domestic public opinion. Retaining control of material capabilities, the military 
government launched an initiative to formulate a new constitution at the National 
Convention,55 which was called for the first time in January 1993, by explaining it as a 
necessary step for the establishment of a civilian government. This separation of 
political power and political legitimacy was the basis of the struggle between the SPDC 
and the NLD.  
 
The SPDC’s clear policy priorities were national unity and stability and the 
problem of democratic legitimacy could only be taken into account insofar as it would 
not harm such prioritized objectives. The SPDC’s basic stance toward the NLD was thus 
rather clear: to oppress NLD activities when they were judged as obstacles to its 
guidance and direction whilst welcoming it to the National Convention as long as NLD 
members obeyed the discussion rules and remained under control. This was simply 
unacceptable for the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Actually, while the release of Aung 
San Suu Kyi from house arrest on 10 July 1995 led to NLD members attending the 
National Convention, which restarted from 28 November 1995 after an intermission, 
they boycotted the discussion after the second day claiming that the SPDC was running 
the convention in an undemocratic way (Nemoto, 1995). In response to this, the SPDC 
 
55 The National Convention originally consisted of 702 delegates appointed by the SPDC on the 
assumption that they represented various domestic groups. Only 15% of these delegates were those 
elected in the 1990 general election (Steinberg, 2001: 81). 
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expelled 86 NLD members from the National Convention, resulting in further political 
tension between the SPDC and the NLD.  
 
With regard to human rights protection, the crackdown of the ‘8888 Uprising’ 
revealed the military government’s cruel response to unarmed civilian protestors, 
resulting in more international attention on Myanmar’s human rights situation. To some 
extent this overlapped with the agenda of democratic legitimacy in terms of the SPDC’s 
repression of the NLD’s political activities, though it was not limited to it. Human rights 
issues in Myanmar varied considerably; from the infringement of political rights 
including freedom of speech, assembly and association to the problems of forced labour, 
censorship, judicial procedures without due process, and property rights violations. In 
ethnic minority areas where insurgency activities continued, the military carried out 
random killings, rapes and forced migration, though the scale of human rights violations 
reportedly decreased in accordance with the ceasefire process with domestic insurgency 
groups (Pedersen, 2008: 7-8). In spite of international and domestic criticism, however, 
the military government generally regarded such human rights violations as necessary 
costs in the process of nation-building and development, which many other countries 
had historically paid.  
 
Myanmar’s domestic insurgencies had been a critical obstacle for the Myanmar 
government to achieve national unity since the end of the Second World War. The SPDC 
moved to make ceasefire agreements with domestic insurgency groups by utilizing both 
carrot and stick methods. These efforts were supplemented by the movement in the late 
1980s of the PRC to end its support for the WFCP’s activities. It was reported in 
January 1996 that all domestic armed combat in Myanmar stopped for the first time 
since independence and that most of the major ethnic minority groups reached a 
ceasefire agreement with the military government (Sekai ShThou, 9 April 1996: 58-59). 
Such efforts for a ceasefire with domestic insurgency groups led to the participation of 
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most ethnic minority groups in the National Convention, even if many of them never 
abandoned their armaments. At the same time, the fact that the military government 
primarily concentrated on dealing with the problem of domestic insurgencies meant that 
most of its political and material capabilities were focused on this purpose, resulting in 
limits to its policy resources for other objectives.  
 
Narcotics trafficking was another very important issue in Myanmar. The 
Golden Triangle region, the border area between Myanmar, Thailand and Laos, was 
recognized as one of the biggest production bases for narcotics in the world.56 Whereas 
the military government conducted public anti-drug campaigns and eradicated poppy 
fields, some insurgency groups or local leaders earned money from narcotics sales or 
taxes mainly for the purpose of building up their weapons (Steinberg, 2001: 215). Such 
an interest system in narcotics production may have been, at least partly, promoted by 
the SPDC’s backstage deals with some ethnic minority groups to guarantee free 
economic activity in their areas, including narcotics production and trade, in return for 
agreeing to a ceasefire (Kudo, 1999: 55). As those narcotics were not only traded within 
Myanmar but also distributed across the borders by transnational networks, other 
countries, especially the U.S. and Thailand, were keen on tackling this problem. 
 
A large number of emigrants and political refugees escaped from Myanmar in 
fear of the authority’s repression, in many cases because of their commitment to 
political activities since the ‘8888 Uprising’. At the same time, there became a growing 
number of refugees due to combat between the military and insurgency groups and due 
to forced relocation by the military. The number of illegal emigrants who sought jobs in 
other countries also increased in accordance with Myanmar’s economic downturn, 
especially after the mid-1990s. The impact of emigrants and refugees was not only 
social and economic but also political because many of them attempted to raise political 
 
56 It was reported that poppy production in Myanmar had tripled from 1987 to 1996, reaching 
50-60% of world production (Kudo, 1999: 54). 
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awareness by lobbying and protesting in other countries (Steinberg, 2001: 245-247).  
 
3. International Structure 
 
The diversified foreign policy agenda regarding the Myanmar problem had a 
complex impact on international and transnational relations. The agendas of democratic 
legitimacy and human rights protection were internationally politicized, especially by 
Western countries. Meanwhile, the SPDC’s attempts to decrease its isolationist foreign 
policy and to open up its domestic economy had changed Myanmar’s international 
position, particularly in regional political and economic relations. Both the SPDC and 
neighbouring countries were worried that Myanmar’s domestic insurgencies would be 
strengthened if the domestic political situation was not calmed down, and that this could 
lead to a possible destabilization of regional political structure. In addition, even if they 
remained relatively unimportant problems, the transnational impact of narcotics 
trafficking as well as emigrants and refugees were recognized by not only neighbouring 
countries but also by the U.S. and other Western countries. This section firstly examines 
other governments’ responses to these changes in Myanmar, followed by an analysis of 
the resulting transformation in international structure surrounding the Myanmar 
problem. This will be done at three levels: the international political level, the 
international economic level, and the societal and transnational level.  
 
Despite being a superpower, the U.S. had only a minimal interest in Myanmar, 
especially after the normalization of relations with the PRC, although the maintenance 
of the power balance in the region remained as a concern (Steinberg, 2001: 241). The 
broad policy priority of the U.S. after the political turmoil in Myanmar was not 
international political and economic relations but rather democracy, human rights and 
narcotics; which Washington primarily pursued by supporting the efforts of Aung San 
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Suu Kyi and the NLD to take power (Pedersen, 2008: 23-24). After the coup d’état in 
1988, the U.S. froze all bilateral economic assistance, banned arms exports and opposed 
any assistance by international financial organizations. Despite a broad consensus 
amongst U.S. policy-makers that the SPDC was an illegitimate government, nonetheless, 
there were certain differences of opinion on how to respond to it: the hard-liners in 
Congress, such as Senator Mitch McConnell, supported isolation of the military 
government by a sanctions policy; whereas the administration sought to acquire 
leverage over it by maintaining direct communication (Pedersen, 2008: 25). A U.S. 
mission led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
Thomas C. Hubbard visited Myanmar in late October 1994 to discuss with the SPDC 
various issues of concern, particularly the narcotics problem (Saito, 1995).  
 
Similar to the U.S., the EU and its member countries emphasised democracy, 
suspending non-humanitarian assistance to the SPDC as well as opposing any assistance 
by international financial institutions. Nonetheless, in 1993, after Than Shwe’s 
succession to the chairman position, the EU attempted to conduct a ‘critical dialogue’ 
with the SPDC which was intended to link the military government’s policy reforms 
with the EU’s political and economic support. This attempt was partly due to signs of 
the SPDC’s policy change and partly due to EU members’ commercial interests in 
Myanmar’s economic growth (Pedersen, 2008: 34-35). In fact, the UK, Germany and 
France were generally hesitant to impose unilateral sanctions on Myanmar. 
 
For both the U.S. and the EU, however, the SPDC’s crackdown on the NLD in 
November 1995 and the subsequent deepening political confrontation between the 
SPDC and the NLD became a turning point in Myanmar policy. The EU’s common 
position on Myanmar was taken for the first time in October 1996, which banned entry 
visas for executive military and government officers and their families in addition to 
confirming the sanctions imposed previously. Yet, at least until 1996, most Western 
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countries were less serious and harsh in actual policy measures than the ones of the later 
period, even if they were highly critical of the SPDC due to its lack of democratic 
legitimacy and poor human rights record. 
 
During this period, ASEAN generally employed a constructive engagement 
policy toward the SPDC primarily because member countries shared the recognition of 
a common interest in regional political stability. On the one hand, the peace process in 
the Indochina Peninsula provided ASEAN with an opportunity to improve regional 
political stability and pursue further economic development. On the other hand, fear of 
the PRC’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia made ASEAN countries recognize the 
necessity to balance the PRC’s influence over CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam) (Ishida, 2008: 209-211). Nonetheless, there was a certain difference of 
perspectives among ASEAN countries in observing Myanmar’s political turmoil. At the 
political level, Indonesia under Suharto and Malaysia under Mahathir vindicated the 
SPDC’s stance based on the concept of ‘Asian values’, while the Philippines and 
Thailand occasionally expressed the significance of democratic values. At the economic 
level, as they were relatively developed countries within ASEAN, Singapore, Malaysia 
and Thailand held substantial interests in Myanmar’s economic liberalization. As a 
result, Malaysia and Indonesia were explicitly supportive of the SPDC and the 
Philippines was generally critical, whereas Singapore and Thailand sought to balance 
their political and economic interests (Ishida, 2008: 204-209). In deciding Myanmar’s 
accession to ASEAN in 1997, Suharto as the chair country’s President was seen to play 
a critical role in repressing cautious opinions within the ASEAN countries at the First 
Informal Summit in November 1996 (Ishida, 2008: 209-213).57 
For the first time since Deng’s reform and opening-up policy, the PRC 
attempted to improve its relationship with Myanmar by reducing its assistance to WFCP 
 
57 On the process of Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN, see Yamakage (2001).  
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insurgency activities. When it finally lost support from the PRC, the WFCP separated 
into four ethnic minority groups in 1989. After that the PRC accelerated political and 
economic exchanges with the SPDC, including Prime Minister Li Peng’s visit to 
Myanmar in 1994, and maintained a strict non-intervention policy based on the ‘Five 
Principles for Peace’ (Bi, 2008: 171). Myanmar was a strategically significant country 
for the PRC. It was a pathway to the Indian Ocean, at the juncture between China, India 
and Southeast Asia, a source of natural resources, an export market especially for 
Yunnan Province, and a field for Chinese companies’ business operations. In fact, 
exports from mainland China to Myanmar expanded from $134 million in 1988 to $618 
million in 1995; whereas imports, of which timber and jewels were the majority, 
remained mostly level reaching $137 million in 1988. Also, it was reported that the PRC 
concluded armament procurement contracts with Myanmar in 1990 and 1994, the total 
amount of which came to $1.6 billion (Saito, 1995). In sum, the PRC quietly 
constructed a deeper relationship with Myanmar even though it was conscious of the 
SPDC’s persistent scepticism toward Beijing; although the PRC was not alone in 
relationship building as ASEAN countries also deepened their relationships with the 
SPDC.  
 
These diverse responses of other governments to Myanmar created a complex 
international structure. At the international political level, the SPDC’s foreign policy 
direction to gain political and economic support from neighbouring countries whilst 
taking care to avoid excessive dependence was successful on the whole. In other words, 
Myanmar’s policy changes did not critically shift the regional political balance, even if 
some ASEAN members were sensitive to the PRC’s growing presence in Southeast Asia. 
On the other hand, the U.S. and other Western countries internationally politicized the 
problems of Myanmar’s democratic legitimacy and human rights situation, 
strengthening the pressure on the military government and those foreign governments 
that supported it. Yet, many neighbouring countries, especially those which advocated 
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‘Asian values’ such as Indonesia and Malaysia, were politically supportive of the 
SPDC’s efforts for nation-building and development. By emphasising international 
politics over values, Western governments could gain the moral high ground and 
credibility for their foreign policy of democracy promotion, whereas Asian governments, 
especially those political leaders advocating ‘Asian values’, could legitimize and 
strengthen their political leadership in the region.  
 
At the international economic level, Myanmar’s trade and investment relations 
with other countries became deeper and more diverse during this period. In East Asia, 
following the rapid economic growth of NIEs and ASEAN countries, the PRC and 
Vietnam, which had been propagating communist ideology, also conducted 
market-based economic reforms which led to economic growth. In the 1980s, this 
regional trend increasingly attracted foreign capital and companies seeking new 
business opportunities in these emerging markets. The SPDC’s economic liberalization 
in the early 1990s coincided with this regional trend of increasing transnational business 
activity and attracted foreign capital and companies from both Asian and Western 
countries. 
 
Although both Western and Asian companies planned foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Myanmar, the amount of FDI from Western countries tended to be larger per 
case because many of them supported natural resource development projects. This was 
in contrast to FDI inflows from Asian countries, which were generally directed at 
smaller scale projects.58 In trade relations, Myanmar increased the amount of both 
imports and exports, particularly with neighbouring countries.59 Foreign economic 
 
58 At the end of October 1995, the top five countries for approved FDI to Myanmar were the UK 
($643.47 million), Singapore ($548.32 million), France ($465.00 million), Thailand ($421.12 
million) and the U.S. ($241.07). Yet, as Asian countries planned a larger number of FDI projects on a 
smaller scale, the country ranking of approved cases of FDI showed a slightly different order: 
Singapore (33), Thailand (29), Hong Kong (17), the UK (17) and the U.S. (14) (Kiryuu and 
Nishizawa, 1996: 85-88).  
59 Myanmar’s major import partners in 1997 were Singapore (24.0%), mainland China (19.4%), 
Thailand (13.8%), Malaysia (12.7%) and Japan (7.2%), which were mostly unchanged from 1990 
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assistance from DAC countries to Myanmar drastically decreased from $332.7 million 
in 1988 to $89.9 million in 1989. With a share of more than 75% of total foreign aid 
from DAC countries to Myanmar between 1988 and 1996, Japan’s economic assistance 
during this period was mainly grant aid for debt relief or humanitarian purposes 
(Seekins, 2007: 62-64). In sum, Myanmar’s foreign economic relationships shifted from 
dependence on Japan’s foreign aid under an interventionist economic policy to a 
deepening of trade and investment relationships with diverse countries under an 
economic liberalization policy which lasted until the mid-1990s.  
 
Societal and transnational relations also revealed a more complex structure. 
The military government was arguably the dominant power in Myanmar in terms of 
material capabilities, even if it did not retain full control over the areas where ethnic 
minority and other anti-government groups committed insurgency activities. The 
SPDC’s success in making ceasefire agreements with insurgency groups in the 
mid-1990s, although fragile and not fully guaranteed, contributed to strengthen its 
power in domestic society. The SPDC had also taken some positive action to solve the 
narcotics problem and, to a lesser degree, to protect human rights in non-political areas. 
These actions, nonetheless, did not provoke much response from Western countries 
primarily because of the SPDC’s lack of democratic legitimacy and its poor profile in 
protecting the human rights of the political opposition.  
 
Despite its claim of democratic legitimacy, the NLD remained a weak 
organization due to the SPDC’s interventions into its activities. The influence of the 
anti-SPDC camp, hence, rested primarily on the people’s support and the capabilities of 
the Western governments. At the same time, Myanmar emigrants and refugees began to 
establish political organizations in other countries to conduct lobbying or other activities 
 
(Kudo, 2006b: Table 2). Myanmar’s major export partners in 1997 were India (19.8%), Singapore 
(14.8%), the U.S. (10.9%), Japan (8.7%), Thailand (7.3%) and mainland China (6.5%) (Kudo, 
2006b: Table 1). 
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in pursuit of Myanmar’s democratization. For example, the National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) headed by Sein Win, Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s cousin, was initially established as a parallel government at the border area on 18 
December 1990. It then moved to Washington in 1992 in order to appeal for democratic 
legitimacy in the U.S. (Pedersen, 2008: 131). Such lobbying activities of transnational 
diaspora groups appeared to strengthen Western countries’ sanctions policies because, 
given their scarce interests in Myanmar, it became difficult for policy-makers in those 
countries to publicly oppose arguments advocating sanctions from a moral perspective.  
 
4. Policy-Makers’ Perceptions 
 
During this period, the Japanese government, particularly MOFA, METI and 
MOF, held largely unchanged perceptions of the Myanmar problem compared to the 
pre-1988 period in that it was felt that as Myanmar was in the process of nation-building 
Japan should encourage Myanmar’s political leaders’ efforts for political and economic 
development. As Myanmar had gradually lost its strategic significance in international 
politics due to the collapse of the Cold War structure in East Asia, Japanese 
policy-makers emphasized somewhat different objectives in their Myanmar policy. 
These included historical bilateral friendship, Myanmar’s economic potential and 
geopolitical importance in the region, the securing of Myanmar’s debt repayment and 
the furtherance of Japan’s international contribution in East Asia.  
 
MOFA was the main initiator of Japan’s Myanmar policy-making during this 
period. From MOFA’s viewpoint, the East Asian political structure was not a rigid 
bipolar system but rather a fragmented power configuration which had existed even 
before the end of the Cold War. Moreover, MOFA considered that the risks for regional 
political stability were not only in inter-governmental relationships but also in the 
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domestic problems of each country. According to a document of the task force for U.S. 
administrative change in 1989 within the AAB of MOFA, which discussed Japan’s 
policy toward Asia and the Japan-U.S. relationship, the confrontation between the two 
military blocs in the Asia-Pacific region was not as clear as that in Europe; the 
perception of what constituted a ‘threat’ to each country’s stability was not uniform, and 
included external threats and those internal to Asia such as economic and ethnic 
problems and the problem of democratic power transfer (MOFA, 6 October 1989). In 
other words, even during the Cold War era, MOFA perceived that most of the conflicts 
in East Asia were rooted in economic and social instability in the process of 
nation-building rather than as a result of the ideological confrontation between Eastern 
and Western blocs. This document further argued that it was necessary to listen patiently 
to Asian countries’ claims so as not to ignore Asian nationalism and national pride, and 
it warned that high-handed approaches did not fit into Asian culture (MOFA, 6 October 
1989). From this perspective, coercive political interventions by the major powers, 
including those by the U.S., were problematic as they could disturb political leaders’ 
efforts for nation-building and development. 
 
At the same time, MOFA did not necessarily perceive any clear and constant 
international constraints in deciding its Myanmar policy during this period. Whilst the 
U.S. appeared to pressure the Japanese government not to provide ODA to the Myanmar 
military government after the ‘8888 Uprising’, some Japanese policy-makers 
presumably anticipated less serious and sustained pressure from the U.S. due to its lack 
of substantial interest in Myanmar, although they might have expected some official 
criticism. This was especially the case on 17 February 1989 when the Japanese 
government recognized the SPDC, believing that it could avoid a critical conflict with 
the U.S. as it was the period of the U.S. presidential inauguration. In addition, when a 
U.S. mission led by Hubbard visited Myanmar in October 1994, many Japanese 
policy-makers expected the U.S. to shift to a more moderate policy line. This 
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expectation led to Japan’s own minor policy shift in 1995, though this was short-lived 
because U.S. pressure on Japan’s engagement policy increasingly strengthened due to 
the worsening relationship between the SPDC and the NLD from late 1995. Besides, 
MOFA did not perceive any urgent security threat or substantial political interest for 
Japan in deciding its Myanmar policy. Rather, MOFA recognized the international 
significance of Myanmar in broader terms in that Myanmar’s stability would benefit the 
whole Western bloc as it is located at the juncture of the influential spheres of the USSR, 
the PRC and Vietnam (MOFA, 6 October 1989). 
 
Meanwhile, MOFA increasingly perceived the politicization of the Myanmar 
problem in multilateral forums as a controversial issue concerning the value placed on 
democracy and human rights in the West and Asia. Since it had become one of the most 
important agenda items in the ASEAN-PMC of 1992 (MOFA, 26 July 1992), the 
Myanmar problem had been recognized by MOFA as an issue on which Western and 
Asian countries held conflicting views. In observing the ASEAN-PMC in July 1993, the 
AAB of MOFA concluded that it was a deep-rooted conflict of opinion stemming from 
differences in conceptions of human rights, geographical proximity, religion and so on 
(MOFA, 30 July 1993). Based on this perception, MOFA recognized the necessity for 
Japan to support Myanmar in multilateral forums in order to involve Myanmar in 
international society’s norms in a friendly manner, whilst at the same time encouraging 
Myanmar to promote political dialogue toward democratization among all domestic 
political actors.    
 
Concerning the Myanmar problem itself, MOFA essentially perceived 
Myanmar’s domestic turmoil in 1988 as a problem in the process of postcolonial 
nation-building and development which many Southeast Asian countries had 
experienced. Whilst it recognized the possibility of regional political instability if 
Myanmar became domestically unstable, MOFA’s emphasis was more on how to 
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support and promote the process of nation-building and development in Myanmar. The 
document of the task force for U.S. administrative change mentioned above noted that, 
whereas it was desirable in the mid- to long-term that Myanmar shift to a more 
democratic and open regime in order to settle the current political instability stemming 
from its economic difficulties, Myanmar could possibly experience an incremental 
process of transition. Therefore, it was necessary to deal with Myanmar calmly by 
leaving the solution to the general opinion of the people in Myanmar and at the same 
time ensure that Myanmar would undergo economic reform, open-up in the mid- to 
long-term, and take a pro-Western foreign policy line (MOFA, 6 October 1989). In 
essence, by taking a statist conception of the international system with the principle of 
non-intervention, MOFA placed its policy priority on Myanmar’s political stability, 
economic liberalization and a pro-Western position.  
 
Whilst not neglecting the significance of democratic legitimacy and human 
rights, MOFA considered democratization as a gradual process with twists and turns 
rather than one of revolutionary change. In fact, MOFA and other Japanese 
policy-makers were generally sympathetic to the ‘8888 Uprising’ and were critical of 
the military government’s brutal response to it. For example, Fujita Masahiro, a First 
Secretary at the Japanese embassy in Myanmar dispatched by METI, posed the question 
as to whether it was necessary for the military government to shoot at civilian 
demonstrators at the time of the ‘8888 Uprising’ (Fujita, 1989: 329). Japanese 
Ambassador Otaka was also highly critical of the military junta’s brutal response to 
unarmed demonstrators and joined the Western ambassadors’ boycott of Myanmar’s 
Independence Day celebrations on 4 January 1989. It was also almost certain that 
Japanese policy-makers considered it essential that the SPDC carry out a free and fair 
general election and subsequently transfer power to a new civilian government at the 
earliest possible timing.  
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Yet, MOFA at the same time held a realistic perspective of Myanmar’s 
domestic situation. As the military held dominant material capabilities and the NLD was 
a weak organization without enough experience of politics and public administration, 
MOFA considered that it was necessary for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to reconcile 
and cooperate with the military government in some way. Hence, MOFA became also 
critical of Aung San Suu Kyi’s highly confrontational stance toward the military 
government before the 1990 general election. According to a paper of the First 
Southeast Asia Division of MOFA written on 22 August 1989, while there seemed to be 
not enough situational evidence to suspect the intention of the military government for 
power transfer, Aung San Suu Kyi’s confrontational attitude heightened the political 
tension, resulting in her house arrest (MOFA, 22 August 1989). This paper even 
mentioned that it was difficult to understand why Aung San Suu Kyi was so 
confrontational in spite of the strong prospect that she could get enough votes in the 
general election to form a new government for democratization. Ambassador Otaka also 
noted that Aung San Suu Kyi behaved in an excessively confrontational and aggressive 
way, while the SPDC’s disqualification of Aung San Suu Kyi as a candidate was also 
problematic because it undercut the meaning of the general election (MOFA, 21 July 
1989). MOFA’s policy priority, therefore, was the encouragement of power transfer to a 
civilian government based on political reconciliation between the military government 
and the NLD. In other words, MOFA considered that democratic legitimacy as a policy 
objective was something to be judged on a case-by-case basis and was to be pursued by 
a gradualist and encouraging approach rather than a high-handed interventionist and 
sanctions based approach.60 
METI’s overall policy interest was more in international economic relations. 
From the mid-1980s, Japanese companies’ investment and business operations in 
 
60 In his book on Myanmar at the time of the ‘8888 Uprising’, First Secretary at the Japanese 
Embassy in Myanmar Fujita also mentioned the debate on whether aid donors should take the value 
of democracy and human rights into account when providing ODA, concluding that it should be 
judged on a case-by-case basis (Fujita, 1989: 187-189). 
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Southeast Asian countries had been increasingly enhanced in response to the yen 
appreciation and Japan-U.S. trade friction. This transformed the characteristics of the 
economic relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia from one of economic 
assistance and trade to a broader economic interdependence including investment, local 
production and other business activities. Accordingly, when Indochina countries also 
moved in the direction of economic liberalization and development, METI attempted to 
promote region-wide economic growth by enhancing inter-governmental cooperation 
and private investment and business operations among Japan and ASEAN and 
Indochina countries.  
 
At the ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting with the Minister for 
International Trade and Industry of Japan (AEM-MITI) in September 1994, Japan took 
a leading role in establishing the Indochina Working Group, which later became the 
CLM (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) Working Group (CLM-WG) in accordance with 
Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN. This met for the first time in March 1995, when the 
CLM-WG aimed at forming a regional framework to promote industrial cooperation 
rather than arguing for specific project formulations. More specifically, the main 
purposes of this working group were the promotion of private investment in the region, 
the formation of an industrial cooperation framework, the enhancement of coordination 
with the private business sector, and the strengthening of economic ties between 
ASEAN and Indochina countries in order to promote Indochina’s economic 
development (Otsuji, 2001: 326-328). From this perspective, it was desirable for METI 
that Myanmar carry out an economic liberalization policy, and thereby be integrated 
into the regional trend of economic development through cross-border investment and 
business operations. In doing so, ODA was not just the only policy measure to promote 
and facilitate business activities in the region. 
 
METI had recognized Myanmar’s economic potential even under the Ne Win 
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regime, which could only be materialized by carrying out economic reforms. As such, 
METI’s interest in a bilateral relationship was in the encouragement of Myanmar’s 
economic liberalization and the promotion of cross-border economic interactions. In 
more practical terms, METI’s role during this period was largely to promote and 
facilitate business sector activities.61 METI was also in charge of the completion of 
several yen loan projects agreed before 1988, including the maintenance of the 
electricity grid in Yangon and the repair of the Baluchaung hydro power plant. These 
projects alone did not have much impact on Myanmar’s business environment or the 
Japanese business sector at the macro level even if they did improve the bilateral 
political relationship and were in the interests of Japanese companies committing to the 
projects. Also, as Myanmar’s foreign economic relations were relatively balanced 
during this period due to deepening trade and investment relationships with ASEAN 
countries, the PRC and India as well as foreign investment from the U.S. and European 
countries, METI did not recognize any urgent or vital interest in Myanmar’s 
inter-governmental political economy. METI thus primarily aimed at promoting and 
facilitating business-level activities in accordance with Myanmar’s move toward 
economic liberalization.  
 
MOF recognized that Myanmar could default which was a risk for the 
credibility and continuity of Japan’s foreign aid policy. While some other recipient 
countries had defaulted and their yen loan disbursement was suspended by Tokyo before 
then, Myanmar was a more serious risk for Japan’s ODA policy due to its far larger debt 
to Japan than other defaulting countries. Hence, MOF resisted committing to further 
ODA projects when Myanmar delayed its debt repayment in 1987 whilst at the same 
time it started to disburse debt relief grants from October 1987. In fact, it was reported 
that MOF and Finance Minister Miyazawa Kiichi considered that it was urgently 
necessary for the military government to improve their economic management 
 
61 This includes the restart of trade insurance and the setting up of a JETRO office in Yangon. 
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(Holloway, 1988: 11). As such, the political turmoil in 1988 became another problem 
for MOF because it was likely to disrupt Myanmar’s financial policy (Orr, 1990: 84). 
After the SPDC seized power, therefore, MOF’s primary objective was to ensure 
Myanmar could repay its debts and avoid defaulting even if this was in the form of debt 
relief grants. MOF was even against continuing with existing yen loan projects unless 
their completion could be guaranteed. These projects included the expansion of Yangon 
Airport and the Baluchaung hydro power plant (Orr, 1990: 84). 
 
Japan’s responses to the Myanmar problem during this period were principally 
based on these three ministries’ perceptions. Whilst there were some cabinet members 
who were interested in Myanmar, their role in policy-making and implementation was 
limited. This was not only because of frequent administrative changes during this period 
but also due to the broad consensus on continuing low-key ‘quiet diplomacy’. For 
example, one of the most powerful pro-Myanmar politicians, Watanabe Michio, while 
serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs from November 
1991 to April 1993 could do no more than send two letters to Myanmar’s Foreign 
Minister encouraging a transfer of power. He did not go against MOFA’s position of 
suspending new yen loans but was more worried that the SPDC would not transfer 
power and would continue to be criticized by international society.  
 
At the international political level, the three ministries did not perceive critical 
structural pressures on Japan’s Myanmar policy during this period due to weakening 
political tensions in East Asia. While the sanctions policy of the U.S. and other Western 
governments was certainly a concern for the Japanese government, it did not become a 
decisive constraining factor in the conduct of Japan’s nuanced engagement policy. It 
was certain that MOFA recognized Myanmar’s significance for regional political 
stability, but it was not decisive enough to shape the direction of Japan’s Myanmar 
policy. In sum, international political structure gave Japan certain room for deciding its 
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Myanmar policy during this period and the Japanese government could basically pursue 
its pragmatic objectives within such room even if it sometimes perceived the necessity 
to make some adjustments, particularly in its relationship with the U.S.  
 
In international economic relations, Japan’s recognition of the SPDC and 
resumption of debt relief grants enabled the Japanese government to maintain the 
credibility and continuity of its ODA policy. Besides, Japan’s resumption of on-going 
ODA projects certainly reduced the losses for Japanese companies working on ODA 
projects that a suspension of ODA funds would bring. Japan’s policy, however, did not 
provide any substantial business opportunities in the early 1990s for Japanese 
companies which attempted to enter the Myanmar market without falling behind other 
countries’ competing companies. The Japanese government’s efforts were directed to 
promote and facilitate cross-border business activities by policy measures other than 
through ODA. Yet, Japan’s policy as a whole did not create business opportunities for 
Japanese companies by improving the business environment in Myanmar; for example, 
by constructing basic infrastructure which was recognized as one of the biggest 
problems when starting up business operations in Myanmar. In sum, Japan’s Myanmar 
policy was consistent with the Japanese government’s concern for the credibility and 
continuity of its ODA policy as well as losses to Japanese companies, even though it did 
not proactively pursue Japan’s economic interests in Myanmar as an emerging market.  
 
Japan’s behaviour during this period was more consistent with Japan’s 
perceptions of the Myanmar problem at a societal level. Japan was consistently cautious 
not to be seen by the military government as a foreign power intervening in Myanmar 
when it encouraged economic reforms or the early transfer of power. This presumably 
stemmed from a realistic assessment of Myanmar’s domestic distribution of power and 
the gradualist and state developmental perspective of the Japanese government. It is 
almost certain that the Japanese government linked this perception at a societal and 
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transnational level with its own setting of national interests at other levels. Yet, Japan’s 
engagement was mostly in line with its preference to support and encourage Myanmar’s 
domestic political and economic development in a gradual manner. In other words, 
Japan’s behaviour during this period indicates that the Japanese government primarily 
observed the Myanmar problem from the perspective of a local power balance at the 
societal and transnational level, and at the same time it paid attention to the international 
economic and political level in calculating the costs and benefits of its policy. 
 
5. Resource Mobilization 
 
The political turmoil in Myanmar from 1988 to 1990 revealed the military 
government’s lack of democratic legitimacy and its infringement of human rights. This 
series of events formed different political groups amongst Japan’s politicians and 
domestic society concerning the Myanmar problem. Yet, despite the increase of critical 
voices against the government’s Myanmar policy, the Japanese government could retain 
enough domestic support to continue its low-key friendship engagement policy. On the 
one hand, it was difficult even for traditionally pro-Myanmar politicians to explicitly 
advocate and legitimize full engagement in light of the SPDC’s neglect of the results of 
the 1990 general election. Also, although companies with on-going ODA projects 
lobbied for the completion of those projects, the Japanese business sector as a whole did 
not have very many existing interests in Myanmar. In other words, while having eagerly 
surveyed business possibilities during this period, the economic interests of the 
Japanese business sector in Myanmar remained as future opportunities that should be 
assessed in the light of economic rationality, including considerations of risk to each 
company’s international reputation.  
 
On the other hand, a number of gradually emerging political groups supporting 
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Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratization of Myanmar were in a weaker position in 
the domestic policy-making system. The emergence of the Diet Members’ League for 
the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi in response to the appeals of Myanmar immigrants 
and their supporters certainly increased the domestic cost of the government’s 
engagement policy. Also, domestic media reports on Myanmar ODA scandals and on 
Myanmar’s political turmoil conveyed the image of an evil military oppression of Aung 
San Suu Kyi and created suspicion in the public of Japan’s policy toward Myanmar. The 
Japanese government, nonetheless, did not appear to be substantially influenced by 
these domestic trends or it could be seen as minimizing domestic political controversy 
by continuing its ‘quiet diplomacy’ in coordination with mainstream domestic groups. 
These were supportive of the engagement policy on the grounds of the bilateral 
historical relationship, Myanmar’s strategic and economic significance, and Japan’s 
international role in East Asia.   
 
(1) The Diet and Politicians 
 
In the Diet, some critical questions against the government’s policy toward 
Myanmar were raised by SDPJ members after the ‘8888 Uprising’. These concerned not 
only Japan’s responses to Myanmar’s political turmoil including Japan’s recognition of 
the government in February 1989, but also media reports on the failure of ODA policy 
in bringing about Myanmar’s economic development as well as the suspicion of 
Myanmar’s diversion of ODA funds for military use. 62  From the early 1990s, 
politicians from the SDPJ and various other parties asked questions about Myanmar to 
the government,63 although those debates in the Diet had only a minimal influence on 
 
62 For example, Kubota Manae’s questions at the Cabinet Committee in the House of Councilors on 
11 October 1988 and at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Councilors on 17 April 1990, 
Yatabe Osamu’s questions at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Councilors on 28 March 
1989 and on 20 June 1989, and Shiga Kazuo’s questions at the Cabinet Committee in the House of 
Representatives on 27 March 1990 and on 29 May 1990.  
63 For example, K8meit8 member Azuma Shozo’s questions at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the 
House of Representatives on 21 May 1993 and on 7 February 1995, LDP member Kato Koichi’s 
questions at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 10 November 1993 
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the government’s policy-making they were of concern to bureaucrats. In terms of 
political parties, the LDP remained generally supportive of governmental policy during 
this period. Since the collapse of the 1955 system, the LDP needed to form a coalition 
administration in order to be the ruling party. Especially during the period of the 
LDP-SDPJ-NPS coalition administration, both the SDPJ and the NPS, which were led 
by Takemura Masayoshi and Hatoyama Yukio, tended to be critical of the government’s 
engagement policy (Sugishita, 1999: 406-407).64 In the end, however, such party level 
dynamics presumably had little substantial effect on the government’s policy direction. 
Instead, a more significant impact of such party dynamics was in the form of frequent 
changes in cabinet members, which made it more difficult for the Japanese government 
to take more decisive action toward the Myanmar problem.  
 
Traditional pro-Myanmar politicians, who in many cases were members of the 
JMPFL, were generally sympathetic to the military government, and presumably played 
a certain role in the Japan-Myanmar relationship during this period. According to one 
report, Abe Shintaro and Watanabe Michio, who were members of the JMPFL and had a 
close relationship with war veterans’ associations, became a source of pressure for the 
Japanese government in deciding to recognise Myanmar’s government in February 1989 
(Holloway, 1989: 21). The SPDC’s refusal to accept the result of the 1990 general 
election, however, was apparently unexpected even for these politicians and placed 
them in a difficult position. Watanabe visited Myanmar on 30 August 1990 to meet Saw 
Maung, advocating the early transfer of power and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi 
(Seekins, 2007: 103). The JMPFL itself underwent a transformation. It had been a 
 
and at the Budget Committee on 27 January 1995, New Frontier Party (NFP) member Eda Satsuki’s 
question at the second section meeting of the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives on 
21 February 1995, NPS member Mizuno Seiichi’s question at the Audit Committee in the House of 
Councilors on 5 December 1995, and DPJ member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 5 December 1996. The NFP in particular asked 
questions frequently in the mid-1990s. 
64 SDPJ member Hosaka Nobuto stated that he debated the resumption of ODA disbursement for the 
Yangon airport project with the LDP during the period of the LDP-SDPJ-NPS coalition government. 
See Hosaka’s question at the second section meeting of the Audit and Administration Oversight 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 20 April 2000. 
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platform for pro-Myanmar politicians, including influential LDP members, before the 
early 1990s but it increasingly became a group for non-LDP politicians because of the 
realignment of political parties and the retirement of senior politicians in the early 
1990s.65 
In the mid-1990s, there was a move by a number of LDP politicians to form a 
political group to promote economic engagement with Myanmar and to distance itself 
from the JMPFL. Kato Koichi, an influential center-left LDP politician, became 
interested in the Myanmar problem from the perspective of initiating Japan’s original 
policy for the promotion of democratization and development in Asia.66 The grandson 
of Kishi Nobusuke, Abe Shinzo visited Myanmar in 1983 as a secretariat to his father 
Abe Shintaro, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time. Abe Shinzo became a 
sympathetic supporter of Myanmar and initiated a visit of younger LDP members, 
including Shiozaki Yasuhisa and Ishihara Nobuteru, to Myanmar in the mid-1990s. 
Subsequently, the Kochikai faction which included Kato and Koga Makoto, who had a 
close relationship with a war veterans’ association, as well as younger LDP members 
who had visited Myanmar established another Diet members’ league named the 
JMPEPL.  
 
In contrast, some influential LDP politicians became critical of the SPDC and 
formed a bipartisan group of politicians in support of Aung San Suu Kyi. The Diet 
Members’ League for the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi was organized in October 1994 
 
65 For example, Chairman Ozawa Tatsuo left the LDP to establish the Shinseito Party with Ozawa 
Ichiro, Hata Tsutomu and others in June 1993, whereas both Abe Shintaro and Watanabe Michio had 
left the political arena well before the mid-1990s.  
66 Kato Koichi regarded the Myanmar problem as one of democratization and human rights issues in 
Asia including Russia’s domestic turmoil and China’s Tiananmen Square incident. Yet recognizing 
its low importance in political and economic terms in the international arena, Kato considered that 
the Myanmar problem should be dealt with as a significant agenda item in Japan’s Asian policy in 
the post-Cambodia era. By advocating the concept of a ‘soft democratic path,’ Kato argued Japan 
should encourage the SPDC’s efforts for democratization in a gradual and step-by-step manner (see 
Kato’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 10 November 
1993).  
132 
 
in response to an appeal by the Burmese Association in Japan (BAIJ) and other 
Myanmar residents in Japan. In accordance with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in 
July 1995, it was reorganized into the DMLSDM, which consisted of nearly 100 Diet 
members at this time (Tanabe, 1996: 156). This Diet members’ league was a bipartisan 
group and included members from most of the major political parties; it was initiated by 
a powerful LDP member Koshugi Takashi as well as opposition party leaders such as 
Doi Takako in the SDPJ, Hatoyama in the NPS, and Okuda Keiwa in the Japan Renewal 
Party (YS, 16 October 1994). Despite their critical voices against the SPDC, the 
members of this group did not necessarily advocate a sanctions policy. Hatoyama, the 
secretary general of the DMLSDM at that time, reported that employing economic 
assistance rather than sanctions as the main policy tool made sense for Japan which 
retained no offensive military force (AS, 12 July 1996).  
 
(2) Business Sector 
 
There were two reactions within the Japanese business sector to Myanmar’s 
changing situation. One was related to Japan’s remaining ODA projects which had 
already been agreed before 1988 but were not yet completed. As those ODA projects 
were suspended due to the worsening situation in Myanmar since the ‘8888 Uprising’ 
and were not resumed until February 1989, Japanese companies involved in such 
projects began to worry about the waste of their previous investment (AS, 28 December 
1989). On 25 January 1989, the JBA sent a petition with the names of 12 companies to 
MOFA, urging the Japanese government to recognize the SPDC and resume ODA 
provision (Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan, 1990: 23-25; AS, 16 March 
1989). Although the Japanese government decided to provide ODA for on-going yen 
loan projects on a case-by-case basis after recognizing the military government on 17 
February 1989, some major remaining yen loan projects, including the Yangon Airport 
expansion project and the Baluchaung hydro power plant project, were suspended. 
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Therefore, the related companies continued to ask not only the Japanese government 
and politicians but also the Myanmar government to carry out these yen loan projects.  
 
The second reaction was related to new business opportunities created by the 
SPDC’s economic reforms in the early 1990s. Having been largely restricted in their 
private business operations by the Ne Win regime, a number of Japanese companies in 
various sectors started to survey the feasibility of doing business in Myanmar in 
response to the SPDC’s economic liberalization. While infrastructure building and 
natural resource development were considered as having the most potential, other 
sectors such as finance, manufacturing, tourism and real estate were also interested in 
Myanmar as an emerging market. In June 1994, the Keidanren sent an economic survey 
mission to Myanmar and Bangladesh led by Marubeni Chairman Haruna Kazuo, 
followed by the setting up of the Myanmar Study Group chaired by Haruna in February 
1995 (Keidanren, 1995c). On 15 December 1995, this study group issued a policy 
recommendation from a business perspective to both the Japanese and Myanmar 
governments (Keidanren, 1995a).67 The JCCI also strengthened its relationship with the 
Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI), 
leading to the establishment of the Japan-Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Business Cooperation Committee (JMCCIBCC) in March 1998 (Tokyo Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, unknown).  
 
Some Japanese business leaders at this time, including the Executive Director 
of Itochu Corp., Takahara Tomoo, who served as the chair of the JMCCIBC, were war 
veterans sent to Myanmar during the Second World War and, thus, had a kind of 
emotional attachment to Myanmar.68 It is doubtful, however, that such emotional 
 
67 This policy recommendation was conveyed not only to the Japanese government but also to the 
Myanmar government at the Myanmar Economy Symposium co-organized by the Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) of the UN and the Japanese government on 29 
January 1996 (Keidanren, 1996a). 
68  See the MEMI website on Takahara’s relationship with Myanmar available at 
http://www.memi.gr.jp/essay/index.html (accessed 6 February 2010). 
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factors had a substantial influence on the actual investment and business activities of 
private Japanese companies. In fact, Japanese companies were so cautious in the 
business feasibility survey that Myanmar’s government officers and businesspeople 
described Japanese companies as ‘NATO’; an abbreviation for ‘No Action Talking 
Only’ (Kato, 1995: 201-203). In short, whereas the Japanese business sector attempted 
to strengthen personal and business relationships with Myanmar in response to the 
SPDC’s economic liberalization such moves were mostly aimed at finding new business 
opportunities from the viewpoint of economic rationality, even if some business leaders’ 
behaviours were partly motivated by a personal attachment to Myanmar. 69  The 
Japanese business sector was generally supportive of the government’s engagement 
policy and wished to provide new yen loan provision primarily for the purpose of 
getting new business in addition to the implementation of remaining yen loan projects 
(Keidanren, 1996b).70 
(3) NGOs 
 
Some NGOs promoting Japan-Myanmar bilateral friendship asked the military 
government to take more moderate measures against public protests at the time of the 
‘8888 Uprising’. For example, two emissaries of the Burma Economic Development 
Forum, a group of Japanese businesspeople and academics chaired by LDP politician 
Hayashi Yoshiro,71 reportedly met with Aung Gyi in January 1988 and urged economic 
 
69 As examples of actual business activities, Daiwa Securities agreed with the SPDC on assisting to 
set up the first stock exchange in Myanmar in late 1994, Mitsui and Co., Ltd. agreed to build the 
Mingaladon Industrial Park near Yangon airport in February 1996, and All Nippon Airways opened 
direct flights between Kansai International Airport in Osaka and Yangon in July 1996. Also, Mitsui 
and Co., Ltd. joined the so-called ‘three-in-one project’ to construct a pipeline and other facilities 
related to the off-shore Yadana Natural Gas Field with Unocal and Total, which concluded a 
memorandum of understanding in April 1996, and Nippon Oil joined the project to develop the 
off-shore Yetagun Natural Gas Field with Premier Oil, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, Petronas, 
and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). See Seekins (2007: 119). 
70 For a Japanese business perspective on Myanmar at this period, see Kato (1995), which was 
written by an official of Marubeni Corp. 
71 Having served as Minister for Finance from December 1992 to August 1993, Hayashi later 
became chairman of the DMLSDM.  
135 
 
reform (Holloway, 1988). On the other hand, war veterans’ associations were supportive 
of the Japanese government’s recognition of the SPDC. This may have been in order to 
continue their annual trip to Myanmar for the consolation of spirits (Holloway, 1989: 
21). In general, traditional pro-Myanmar NGOs supported the SPDC and Japan’s 
engagement with it, though many of them were also concerned about Myanmar’s 
domestic situation and wished to recover political stability. 
 
As in many Western countries, non-governmental movements by Myanmar 
residents and their Japanese supporters began to be organized in Japan. Some residents 
had been in Japan before the ‘8888 Uprising’ and others had escaped from Myanmar 
due to their support for the NLD or their commitment to the ‘8888 Uprising. The BAIJ, 
established in September 1988 by 150 members, was the first such political organization 
in accordance with the ‘8888 Uprising’ (Nemoto, 2007: 106). Such movements pushed 
the Japanese government to recognize the status of Myanmar immigrants as refugees 
and to support Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD by not providing economic assistance to 
the SPDC. Actually, the BAIJ and other Myanmar residents directly appealed to 
politicians who subsequently formed the Diet Members’ League for the Release of Aung 
San Suu Kyi (Tanabe, 1996: 156). Those movements and organizations generally 
remained small and fragmented in Japan and did not substantially influence Japanese 
governmental policy toward Myanmar. Some humanitarian NGOs also began to operate 
in Myanmar during this period but remained relatively small in scale. 
 
(4) Media and Public Opinion 
 
During this phase, there were two periods when the Myanmar problem 
received a large amount of coverage in the Japanese media: from 1988 to 1990 and in 
the mid-1990s. From 1988 to 1990, in combination with the failure of Japan’s massive 
economic assistance to develop the Myanmar economy (MS, 11 June 1989) and the 
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suspected diversion of ODA funds for military use (AS, 22 May 1989), Myanmar’s 
political turmoil fuelled the debate as to whether Japan should assist authoritarian 
regimes who infringed human rights. In their editorial comments, the Asahi and 
Mainichi newspapers were critical of the Japanese government’s engagement policy 
toward the SPDC from the perspective of promoting Myanmar’s democratization and 
development (MS, 16 November 1990; AS, 20 February 1989). In 1990, the Mainichi 
also published a book on Japan’s ODA, using Myanmar as one of the case studies. The 
book argued that Japan’s ODA disbursement to Myanmar failed to assist 
industrialization, was of limited benefit to the general public, was questionable in the 
rationale of the resumption of ODA in February 1989, and was suspected of being used 
for military purposes (Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan, 1990: 8-36).72 
Also, two Japanese TV stations, NHK and TBS broadcast programmes to introduce 
Aung San Suu Kyi as a pro-democracy leader (Seekins, 2007: 109-110).  
 
In the mid-1990s, there were contrasting views among the Japanese media 
regarding Japan’s role in the Myanmar problem. By recognizing the release of Aung 
San Suu Kyi in July 1995 as a successful result of Japan’s engagement, the Yomiuri 
newspaper proposed the maintenance of Japan’s original way of assistance for 
democracy and human rights promotion from a long-term perspective (YS, 15 July 
1995). On the other hand, the Mainichi argued in May 1996 that Japan’s ‘sunshine 
policy’ to promote democratization through direct communications with the military 
government was at a turning point because of the authority’s detention of a number of 
NLD members (MS, 24 May 1996). In general, the Yomiuri and Sankei tended to 
emphasize Myanmar’s geopolitical significance and the necessary evil aspect of the 
authoritarian regime in the process of economic development and democratization. 
Public opinion as a whole seemed to pay little attention to the Myanmar problem even if 
 
72 The Nikkei also produced a special issue covering the ODA problem including Japan’s ODA to 
Myanmar, pointing out the inevitability of considering ODA’s political influence but not taking a 
clear stance on Myanmar ODA (NS, 30 September 1988). 
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it was generally sympathetic to Aung San Suu Kyi and the pro-democracy movement.   
 
6. Domestic Policy-Making System 
 
During this period, Japan’s policy-making was dominated by MOFA-initiated 
low levels of coordination among concerned bureaucrats and politicians. Ministerial 
level cabinet members neither visited Myanmar to contact the military government nor 
exercised any distinctive leadership in policy-making. This resulted in Japan’s Myanmar 
policy being a compromise among different interests and concerns held by influential 
policy-making actors, though it was basically consistent with the Japanese government’s 
shared perception of the Myanmar problem. Even when giving governmental 
recognition to the SPDC, the Japanese government made an opportunistic compromise 
to fill the gap between its default plan to resume ODA in response to Myanmar’s 
transfer of power in accordance with the results of a general election in early 1989 and 
the SPDC’s plan to hold a general election in May 1990, rather than making a strategic 
decision from the perspective of international political considerations. This also meant 
that the Japanese government preferred not to politicize the Myanmar problem and 
conducted low-key ‘quiet diplomacy’ in order not to be trapped into international 
political games. As a result, Japan’s policy toward Myanmar during this period was 
largely a reactive and risk-averse one.  
 
In response to Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem different opinions 
emerged within the Japanese government even before 1988. This debate was linked with 
LLDC accumulated debt problems, which became one of the main agenda items at the 
G7 summit and other multilateral forums. At the Toronto Summit, Prime Minister 
Takeshita announced that approximately 680 billion yen would be made available for 
Japan’s LLDC debt relief plan, of which approximately 300 billion yen was for 
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Myanmar (CS, 21 June 1988). The Japanese government had already hesitated to issue 
an exchange of notes for new yen loan projects when Myanmar’s arrears in debt 
repayment became apparent in 1986, and postponed the exchange of notes for FY1986 
yen loan projects until September 1987. The Japanese government suspended the 
exchange of notes for any new yen loan projects from FY1987 and suspended yen loan 
disbursement in February 1988 due to the delay in Myanmar’s debt repayment. Despite 
the Japanese government’s recommendation, the military government continued to 
refuse to consult with the Paris Club and was unwilling to carry out an economic 
restructuring program formulated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in return 
for the rescheduling of loans (AS, 28 September 1988b).  
 
Even if the Ne Win regime delayed debt repayments, MOFA was reportedly 
planning to provide further yen loans to Myanmar, which finally accepted LLDC status 
in December 1987 (CS, 11 April 1988). In view of Japan’s fiscal policy, MOF had been 
cautious about extending further yen loans to Myanmar while at the same time it 
recognized the necessity of ensuring Myanmar’s debt repayments. When Myanmar’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Tin visited Tokyo, Finance Minister Miyazawa seemed to 
put more emphasis on encouraging Tun Tin to plan and implement economic reforms 
(Holloway, 1988).73 Prime Minister Takeshita and Foreign Minister Uno did not pledge 
any new yen loans but mentioned their willingness to consider it (NS, 26 April 1988; 
AS, 22 April 1988). This gap in the direction of ODA policy toward Myanmar between 
MOF and MOFA seemed to continue even after the ‘8888 Uprising’ and subsequent 
political turmoil in Myanmar. 
 
The Japanese government’s suspension of ODA disbursement at the time of the 
‘8888 Uprising’ was primarily because of practical difficulties in continuing ODA 
 
73 According to Steinberg, Tokyo made an ‘unprecedented’ warning in March 1988, mentioning the 
possibility of cutting its foreign aid if Yangon did not carry out economic reforms, which “led Ne 
Win in the last days of the BSPP to advocate the abandonment of socialism and the opening to the 
private sector” (Steinberg, 2001: 256). 
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projects under Myanmar’s unstable situation rather than for any political or moral 
reasons. According to an executive official of MOFA, this was because of Japan’s 
consideration that foreign intervention should be avoided (AS, 9 September 1988). In 
fact, the Japanese government expressed its willingness to provide emergency aid 
through international organizations if the authorities in Myanmar were ready to accept it 
(AS, 9 September 1988). In other words, Tokyo initially considered the suspension of 
ODA as a tentative measure until the Myanmar authority recovered social order and 
stability, and it issued official statements notifying that economic assistance would not 
be resumed without an improvement in political and economic conditions (Seekins, 
2007: 94). 
 
Although the establishment of the SPDC posed the issue of governmental 
recognition to the Japanese government, Japanese policy-makers generally considered 
that governmental recognition and ODA resumption were a matter of timing. This was 
primarily because it was broadly presumed that the SPDC was going to hold a general 
election in April 1989, though the SPDC did not confirm the schedule until February 
1989 (Fujita, 1989: 349-351). Actually, it was already reported in October 1988 that the 
Japanese government recognised the SPDC as the only authority which could restore 
order in Myanmar, and it considered that governmental recognition and ODA 
resumption were a matter of timing which should be judged by the restoration of social 
order and the implementation of a general election (AS, 25 October 1988; NS, 11 
October 1988). In late December 1988, according to one report, the Japanese embassy 
in Myanmar mentioned that the stance to grant governmental recognition after the 
establishment of a new administration based on the results of a democratic election was 
unchanged (AS, 28 December 1988). Moreover, at a Cabinet meeting on 13 January 
1989, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Obuchi Keizo reported the cancellation of 927 
million yen of grant aid agreed in July 1988 with Myanmar as FY1988 aid projects (NS, 
13 January 1989). This could indicate that the Japanese government was not rushing to 
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disburse new grant aid, at least in the short-term, at this time.  
 
The Japanese embassy in Myanmar, in response to the worsening situation, 
took diplomatic action to pressure the SPDC to restrain from brutal behaviour against 
civilians in anti-government demonstrations. On 27 September 1988, Japanese 
Ambassador Otaka Hiroshi, the husband of the JBA Chairperson, and an upper house 
member Yamaguchi Yoshiko met with Ohn Gyaw, a senior officer in the Myanmar 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and proposed that Myanmar should avoid further bloodshed 
and find a peaceful and democratic political solution that reflected the general will of 
the people (Seekins, 2007: 94-95; AS, 28 September 1988a). In addition, on 4 January 
1989, Ambassador Otaka boycotted the Independence Day celebrations of the SPDC in 
line with the ambassadors of Western countries.  
 
The Japanese government, however, was faced with a problem when the SPDC 
finally announced its plan in February 1989 to hold a general election in May 1990.74 It 
had already become unrealistic to hold an election in May of 1989.75 For those 
prioritizing Japan’s encouragement of an early transfer of power in Myanmar, it was 
desirable to recognize the Myanmar government after the general election in order to 
encourage the military government to transfer power to a new civilian government. The 
Japanese embassy in Myanmar was not optimistic about whether the SPDC would 
actually conduct a free and fair election and whether it would transfer power even if an 
anti-government faction were to win the election. On 4 October 1988, Ambassador 
Otaka wrote that one of the primary purposes of the military junta was to ensure the 
safety of the Ne Win group and, hence, it remained uncertain whether the military 
 
74 Some Japanese policy-makers seemed to be highly concerned with the schedule of the general 
election. According to one report, an unofficial mission including a METI official visited Yangon in 
early February 1989 without giving notice to the Japanese embassy in Myanmar. On 10 February, at 
a meeting with the members, Ohn Gyaw said that the SPDC would have the election by June 1990, 
even though the SPDC’s formal announcement was on 16 February, one day before Japan’s 
recognition of the SPDC (Holloway, 1989: 22).  
75 In general, it is very difficult to hold an election in the rainy season in Myanmar, which is usually 
from June to October.  
141 
 
would transfer power without much resistance if the NLD won the general election 
(MOFA, 4 October 1988).76 He was also conscious about the effect of Japan’s foreign 
aid policy, mentioning that the suspension of economic assistance from the Western bloc, 
including Japan, prevented the military junta from conducting any obvious or major 
fraudulent activities for the general election as the military junta understood that the 
resumption of Japan’s economic assistance would be judged by the implementation of a 
free and fair general election (MOFA, 25 October 1988).77 
From a legal perspective, however, the SPDC could be judged to have fulfilled 
the legal requirements for governmental recognition. In fact, this was MOFA’s official 
rationale when giving governmental recognition to the SPDC on 17 February 1989. 
Because the Japanese government employed a dual recognition system, in which 
sovereign state recognition and governmental recognition should be dealt with as 
different diplomatic procedures, it was necessary for the Japanese government to 
recognize the SPDC in order to establish a formal diplomatic relationship. Under this 
system, governmental recognition should be judged by the authority’s effective control 
over its territory and its will to respect international laws and agreements. According to 
MOFA, the SPDC could be regarded as having fulfilled these two conditions by 
February 1989 (AS, 17 February 1989a). This rationale, however, did not fully explain 
why MOFA decided to proceed with governmental recognition at this time, even if it 
was the apparent basis of the Japanese government’s decision.  
 
Instead, there are other factors that the Japanese government thought necessary 
to take into account. These factors, which emerged because of the delay in Myanmar’s 
 
76 Later on, Otaka also noted that there seemed to be a practical consideration from the authority 
that even if an anti-government faction achieved a landslide victory in the general election, it would 
be fine insofar as the military maintained its coherence to secure the lives and wealth of the Ne Win 
group (MOFA, 22 November 1988). In the end, the direction of Myanmar’s domestic politics after 
the general election seemed to be highly uncertain even for him at that time. 
77 Otaka also predicted that the military government would increasingly realize the necessity of 
foreign assistance, particularly Japan’s commodity loans, to solve the problem of a foreign currency 
shortage caused by trade liberalization (MOFA, 15 November 1988). 
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general election, might have been more significant in deciding governmental 
recognition at this time. The first factor was other countries’ behaviour in relation to the 
SPDC. On the one hand, the PRC, the USSR, South Korea and some ASEAN countries 
had recognized the SPDC by February 1989, and were starting to strengthen their 
relationships with Myanmar. On the other hand, Western countries were critical of the 
SPDC and, according to some scholars, Washington put considerable pressure on the 
Japanese government not to resume ODA disbursement except for humanitarian aid 
(Seekins, 2007: 97; Steinberg, 2001: 256). Yet, the Japanese government could possibly 
have anticipated less serious pressure from the U.S. in early 1989 regarding the partial 
resumption of ODA as it was the period of the U.S. presidential inauguration. In 
addition, MOFA justified Japan’s recognition of the SPDC and claimed that it would not 
be internationally problematic as the U.S. had also started to make official contacts with 
the SPDC (AS, 17 February 1989a).78 
The second factor affecting Japan’s decision to recognize the SPDC was 
Myanmar’s accumulated debt which created a problem for Japan’s ODA policy. 
Although the Japanese government had decided to grant approximately 300 billion yen 
of debt relief for Myanmar, it was necessary to secure the repayment from Myanmar in 
order to provide debt relief grants.79 In addition, MOF at this time was highly negative 
towards the disbursement of yen loans for remaining ODA projects in Myanmar without 
the prospect of their completion. This meant that it was preferable for MOFA to secure 
debt repayments from the SPDC by establishing a formal diplomatic relationship in 
order to retain yen loan disbursement as an available foreign policy option.80 Needless 
to say, Myanmar’s default as a result of the continuation of domestic turmoil and the 
 
78 Because of the difference in its governmental recognition system from Japan, the U.S. did not 
need to recognize the SPDC in establishing a formal diplomatic relationship (Holloway, 1989: 20). 
79 The Japanese government at this period conducted debt relief by disbursing debt relief grants 
which were equal to the amount of debt repayment from the recipient country rather than by simply 
cancelling the debt.  
80 Although it might be possible for the Japanese government to make a political decision to 
disburse yen loans to Myanmar without debt repayment, it would carry a huge political cost for 
MOFA or other policy-makers who would promote it.  
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suspension of foreign aid was the worst scenario not only for MOF but also for other 
ministries (Orr, 1990: 86). 
 
The third factor was the remaining ODA projects which were suspended 
because of the ‘8888 Uprising’ and subsequent unstable situation. According to one 
report, 19 yen loan projects (with pledges of up to 125.8 billion yen and having already 
disbursed 24.2 billion yen), six grant aid projects (with pledges of up to 9.1 billion yen 
and having already disbursed 3.7 billion yen), and two technical cooperation projects 
were on-going in February 1989 (AS, 17 February 1989b). As such, Japanese aid related 
institutions and companies committed to these on-going ODA projects started to worry 
that the previous investment for those projects might be wasted if the project sites were 
abandoned without any maintenance measures (AS, 28 December 1988). 81  The 
Japanese government, including MOFA and METI, recognized the necessity to provide 
economic assistance for such projects in order to avoid wasting previous investment as 
the SPDC did not have any resources to continue those projects by itself. The Japanese 
government also seemed to recognize the increasing demand for ODA resumption from 
Japanese companies committed to those projects not only through the JBA petition but 
also on other occasions of contact between the two sides.82 
The last factor consisted of a number of political issues that emerged in relation 
to the problems caused by the absence of a formal diplomatic relationship.83 In one case 
the members of two war veterans’ associations were prohibited from visiting Myanmar 
for the annual consolation of spirits for those who had died in Myanmar during the war. 
 
81 In the petition to the Japanese government issued in late January 1989, the JBA listed 19 major 
suspended projects including both yen loans and grant aid up to approximately 37 billion yen (AS, 
16 March 1989). The list presumably reflected the priorities for those companies.  
82 Still, the direct impact of the JBA petition itself might have been not so substantial. The JBA 
Chairperson and Upper House member Yamaguchi commented to the Mainichi newspaper that, even 
though they had sent a petition, such an early recognition of the SPDC was unexpected because she 
thought that governmental recognition would be given after a democratic general election in 
Myanmar (Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ODA Shuzaihan, 1990: 25).  
83 MOFA used the excuse every time Japanese officials contacted SPDC officials that it did not 
mean to grant governmental recognition until 17 February 1989. 
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According to one report, the war veterans’ associations attempted to push the Japanese 
government to recognize the SPDC through LDP members who had a close relationship 
with those associations, particularly Watanabe Michio and Abe ShintarJ (Holloway, 
1989: 21). Another case was upon the occasion of the funeral ceremony of the Showa 
Emperor, who had passed away on 7 January 1989. Japan initially considered that it was 
inappropriate to send a formal invitation to Myanmar for the funeral ceremony, which 
was scheduled on 24 February. Yet, the Chairman of the SPDC, Saw Maung, sent a 
condolence telegram to the Japanese government in late January 1989, in response to 
which some LDP politicians expressed their worry that it would be a problem to reject 
the SPDC’s formal attendance at the ceremony as Myanmar had an historically close 
relationship with Japan (AS, 17 February 1989a; NS, 26 January 1989). Regardless of 
whether this was opportunistic reasoning or not, it seems certain that MOFA was under 
political pressure from LDP members who had a strong relationship with the SPDC and 
from Japanese companies involved in Myanmar ODA projects.  
 
At the same time, MOFA was reportedly determined not to consider pledging 
to provide new yen loans to Myanmar at all (AS, 16 March 1989). Also, in deciding on 
a case-by-case basis, the Japanese government limited ODA resumption to remaining 
yen loan projects which were relatively small in scale and advanced in schedule. In 
other words, the Japanese government could claim that it was possible to encourage the 
SPDC’s actual implementation of a general election and subsequent transfer of power 
by indicating the possibility of further yen loan disbursement. In the end, MOFA 
probably judged that it was a compromise to give governmental recognition at this time 
and partially reopen ODA on a case-by-case basis when considering the delayed 
schedule of Myanmar’s general election and other emerging factors for the Japanese 
government.  
 
Because the SPDC did not transfer power after the 1990 general election, the 
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Japanese government was in deadlock. Whereas the Japanese government still 
considered engagement was the most practical policy option for encouraging 
Myanmar’s political and economic development, the SPDC’s obvious neglect of the 
result of the 1990 general election made it extremely difficult to legitimize support for 
the SPDC. In particular, the NAB of MOFA became more concerned with the U.S. 
response in deciding the disbursement of economic assistance. On the other hand, there 
was no particular actor within the Japanese government who advocated a sanctions 
policy towards the SPDC in line with Western governments. As such, MOFA retained a 
‘wait-and-see’ position to find an opportunity to justify further engagement with the 
military government and through various channels it repeatedly attempted to persuade 
the SPDC to transfer power to a civilian government as early as possible.84 This 
attitude stemmed partly from the fact that the SPDC kept claiming it as a temporary 
government that was only staying in power until the establishment of a new government 
based on a formal constitution. It was also probably because peace building in 
Cambodia was a higher priority for the Japanese government, particularly for MOFA, 
and at that stage the Myanmar problem was recognized as an issue that should be solved 
by its own citizens based on the principle of non-intervention.  
 
When it became apparent in the mid-1990s that the SPDC had reached 
ceasefire agreements with many ethnic minority groups and had implemented economic 
reforms, Japanese policy-makers perceived this as a chance to upgrade the relationship 
with Myanmar. Primarily in taking Myanmar’s improving economic and business 
environment into account, METI decided to reopen trade insurance on cross-border 
trade with Myanmar on 2 May 1995. This had previously been suspended because of 
 
84 For example, Foreign Minister Watanabe sent a letter to Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw, 
advising Myanamar to behave in such a way so as to be recognized by international society and 
expressing Japan’s wish to reopen ODA if the situation allowed (see Watanabe’s response to Kubota 
Manae’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Councilors on 7 April 1992). 
Also, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi and Watanabe each sent a letter to Chairman Than Shwe and 
Ohn Gyaw on 28 April 1992, soon after Than Shwe’s succession to the Chairman position on 23 
April, advising them to schedule democratization as early as possible (see Watanabe’s response to 
Aida Chouei’s question at the Audit Committee in the House of Councilors on 25 May 1992). 
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Myanmar’s political and economic turmoil and its debt repayment delay since 1988 
(Keidanren, 1995b). In March 1995, MOFA also decided to provide 1 billion yen of 
grant aid which was aimed at producing food instead of narcotics. This move was 
presumably motivated by MOFA’s prediction after Hubbard’s visit to Myanmar in late 
1994 that the U.S. would soften its attitude toward the SPDC and would not complain 
about a project which would contribute to reduce narcotics production.  
 
Subsequently, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 10 July 1995 provided 
MOFA with an opportunity to make a slight modification in its official ODA policy. 
MOFA also decided to disburse 1.625 billion yen of grant aid for the Institute of 
Nursing in Yangon in 1995. Around this period, MOFA planned to reopen all remaining 
yen loan projects in accordance with the improvement in Myanmar’s domestic situation, 
and prepared for a field survey of those projects. Yet, the heightening confrontation 
between the SPDC and the NLD from late 1995 as well as U.S. pressure on Japan’s 
resumption of ODA prevented MOFA from starting the remaining yen loan projects. In 
order to seek an understanding of U.S. policy-makers, Director of the First Southeast 
Asia Division of MOFA Matsutomi Shigeo visited the White House, the State 
Department, and the Congress, and met with some journalists in Washington to explain 
Japan’s policy shift toward Myanmar (Mann, 8 January 1996). Yet, this resulted in 
Washington’s strong and persistent criticism against the SPDC and Japan’s engagement 
with it. In mid-May 1996, after observing the situation in Myanmar for a while, and as a 
result of discussion among senior officers of the Economic Cooperation Bureau (ECB) 
and the AAB regarding regression in democratization in Myanmar, MOFA reportedly 
decided not to resume the disbursement of yen loans to Myanmar (AS, 12 July 1996). 
 
Taken as a whole, Japan’s decision-making during this period can be 
understood as bureaucratic politics reacting to changes in Myanmar’s political situation 
and U.S. policies in response to this. The Japanese government did not make any 
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distinctive policy initiatives but remained in a wait-and-see position in order to seek 
opportunities to bring its ODA policy back to a normal status. The only occasion on 
which the Japanese government made a somewhat politically controversial decision was 
when it granted governmental recognition to the SPDC. Yet, that decision was also a 
practical reaction to various factors that the Japanese government had to take into 
account because of Myanmar’s delayed general election.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
A structural level analysis would suggest that there were several fairly rational 
policy options for the Japanese government during this period. One of the most likely 
options for Japan should have been a sanctions approach keeping in line with the U.S. 
and other Western countries, especially after the 1990 general election. When 
considering its decreasing geopolitical significance and scarce economic interest in 
Myanmar, there should have been little rationale to create a source of conflict with the 
U.S. On the other hand, if Japan’s focus was to protect its national interests by 
maintaining a close relationship with a pro-Japanese regime in Asia and seeking 
economic interests in an emerging market, then the most likely option for Japan should 
have been an unconditional support approach to the SPDC and a comprehensive 
resumption of ODA. After the Tiananmen Square incident, for example, Japan’s 
response toward the PRC was more proactive in that it engaged with an authoritarian 
regime that was being criticized by Western countries for its infringement of human 
rights. When considering that Myanmar had little significance for the U.S. and the 
receding Cold War tension in the region, it should have been easier for Japan to employ 
this policy option compared to the previous era, even if it resulted in criticism from 
Western countries. After all, however, neither of these two options became Japan’s 
actual policy toward Myanmar during this period. A unit level of analysis can help 
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reveal the reasons. 
 
From the Japanese government’s perspective, Myanmar was in the process of 
postcolonial political and economic development and, thus, Japan should support and 
encourage Myanmar’s political leaders’ efforts for such development based on the 
principle of non-intervention. This collective perception held by most Japanese 
policy-makers regarding the Myanmar problem and the social and transnational level 
structure meant that a sanctions policy in line with Western governments was not a 
potential policy option for the Japanese government. On the other hand, there were three 
reasons that the Japanese government did not act more proactively, either through 
unconditional support, friendship engagement or critical engagement. These were 
international structural pressures, especially from the U.S., scarce critical interest in 
Myanmar, and domestic bureaucratic politics. These factors made Japan’s engagement 
policy highly reactive to the development of the Myanmar problem. Bureaucratic 
politics emerged in Japan’s Myanmar policy-making not only because of the pre-1988 
policy-making which had become an organizational process but also because of policy 
tradeoffs imposed by the transforming multi-dimensional international structure which 
had surrounded Japan’s Myanmar policy since 1988.  
 
An international structural perspective can explain that, whereas different 
dimensions of international structure surrounding Japan’s Myanmar policy offered 
different incentives, the Japanese government seemed to combine its shared perceptions 
of social and transnational structure with changing incentives and constraints in 
international economic and political structure. In sum, Japan’s low-key and reactive 
friendship engagement during this period was a product of bureaucratic coordination 
among Japanese policy-makers and politicians, which focused on different structural 
and opportunistic incentives, and which in turn was based on certain shared perceptions 
of the Myanmar problem and the surrounding social and transnational structure.  
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Chapter 4 
From 1997 to 2004: Leaders’ Initiatives from 
Friendship to Critical Engagement 
 
1. Overview 
This chapter examines Japan’s Myanmar policy from 1997 to 2004, when the 
Japanese government behaved somewhat proactively vis-à-vis the Myanmar problem. 
After attempting to improve its relationship with Western countries, the SPDC gradually 
became focused on relations with neighbouring countries in the face of the sanctions 
policy of the U.S. and the EU during this period. At the same time, Myanmar’s 
economic stagnation in the late 1990s increased the necessity for the SPDC to acquire 
economic assistance from foreign countries. In doing so, the SPDC seemed to target 
Japan and ASEAN members as essential in its diplomatic efforts so as not to depend 
excessively on the PRC, which was actively strengthening its political and economic 
ties with the SPDC. In terms of economic policy, a rapid increase in imports and a lack 
of foreign currency made the SPDC realize the urgency of improving governmental 
control over private economic and trade activities. Having already been weakened by 
the Asian Financial Crisis, cross-border trade and investment were further shrunk by the 
reverse of SPDC economic policy from liberalization to state control. Natural gas 
exports to Thailand from 2001, however, saved the SPDC from serious economic 
difficulties by providing foreign currency which enabled the SPDC to offset most of its 
trade deficit in the early 2000s and to steadily increase its foreign currency reserves 
(Kudo, 2008: 13). This meant that foreign economic assistance was less urgent for the 
SPDC and it became more confident to employ an isolationist and uncompromising 
attitude toward other countries.    
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While the basic picture of Myanmar’s domestic agenda was mostly unchanged, 
differences in policy direction within the SPDC emerged during this period. Whereas 
Than Shwe and his close confidant Vice-Chairman Maung Aye maintained hard-line 
isolationist ideas, Khin Nyunt advocated a more moderate pragmatic direction. He 
restarted political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and attempted to improve 
relationships with neighbouring and Western countries. However, there was no 
substantial reconciliation between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi or the NLD. The 
latter two’s political movements in appealing to the general public and international 
society were seen as unacceptable by the SPDC’s hard-liners who cyclically carried out 
brutal oppression against them which resulted in international criticism of the SPDC. 
Domestic political stagnation and persistent international criticism presumably 
weakened the position of moderate pragmatists led by Khin Nyunt, who was finally 
ousted in October 2004. In other words, there was almost no change in terms of 
Myanmar’s democratic legitimacy, although it is possible to claim some improvement 
of human rights in the non-political arena. Domestic insurgency activities of ethnic 
minority groups remained relatively moderate due to the combination of ceasefire 
negotiations initiated by Khin Nyunt and the increase in military operations in ethnic 
minority areas from the early 1990s. The SPDC paid less attention to problems of 
migration and refugees which became more and more serious during this period, but 
they did have some success in containing drug trafficking. 
 
In terms of international political structure, the deepening tension between the 
SPDC and the NLD from late 1995 led to further criticism and sanctions from Western 
countries. On the other hand, ASEAN was generally supportive of Myanmar under the 
SPDC rule, which gained ASEAN membership in 1997, although the Asian Financial 
Crisis undercut ASEAN leaders’ political standing in supporting the SPDC based on 
‘Asian values’ arguments. The PRC deepened its relationship with the SPDC by holding 
frequent bilateral meetings among senior leaders as well as providing substantial 
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material support. These events affected international economic structure as well. 
Western companies were increasingly restrained from investing in Myanmar both for 
fear of risking their reputations and due to the sanctions policy; and, capital flows from 
ASEAN countries’ public and private sectors to Myanmar also showed a drastic decline, 
primarily due to the Asian Financial Crisis. As a result, the PRC became the dominant 
economic partner for Myanmar during this period. However, because it earned foreign 
currency from natural gas exports to Thailand from 2001, the SPDC could avoid an 
economic crisis and hedge against excessive dependence on the PRC. At the societal 
and transnational level, despite the unchanged picture of a separation of political power 
and legitimacy, the SPDC’s de facto control over the country increased due to its 
successful oppression of the NLD’s political activities and the maintenance of ceasefire 
agreements with ethnic minority groups. 
 
During this period, many Japanese policy-makers saw the necessity to conduct 
a more proactive policy toward Myanmar although their motivations were diverse. This 
was largely because in the late 1990s the Myanmar problem became increasingly 
politicized as a controversial international problem. In observing Myanmar’s domestic 
power configuration and political deadlock from the mid-1990s, the consensus among 
many Japanese policy-makers was that the SPDC would continue to rule and therefore 
the most practical measure for addressing the Myanmar problem was to push leaders in 
both camps to achieve pragmatic political reconciliation and cooperation for future 
political and economic development. The Western governments’ sanctions policy was, 
therefore, regarded as a counterproductive measure for Myanmar’s political and 
economic development. This was why a sanctions policy was not an option for most 
Japanese policy-makers in spite of the increasing structural costs of continuing with the 
engagement policy, especially in terms of the Japan–U.S. relationship.  
 
From the mid-1990s, the debate on Japan’s Myanmar policy direction was 
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heightened among Japanese policy-makers in accordance with the development of the 
Myanmar problem and transitions in international structure. On the one hand, this was 
linked with different perceptions of the power and policy objectives of three countries 
or groups of countries: the U.S. had become increasingly unconstrained as the only 
superpower; the PRC had increased its presence in Southeast Asia; and, ASEAN had 
become an overarching regional framework but was seriously damaged by the Asian 
Financial Crisis. On the other hand, the debate was related to different identifications of 
Japan’s national interests in the Myanmar problem and what policy means should be 
used to pursue them. When observing Japan’s actual policy implementation, in the end, 
the Japanese government employed proactive engagement primarily in order to pursue 
its pragmatic objectives and at the same time to deal with the costs and benefits imposed 
by the changing international structure. In fact, in spite of friction with U.S. policy 
towards Myanmar, the Japanese government never altered its engagement policy during 
this period. The Japanese government did not provide enough support for the SPDC to 
counterbalance the PRC’s increasing influence, but did keep raising Myanmar’s 
domestic issues in bilateral talks even though this resulted in the SPDC expressing 
disappointment toward Japan. In other words, Japan’s policy implementation indicated 
that ‘China threat’ arguments regarding the Myanmar problem remained as part of the 
political discourse or were at least an indirect objective which would only be achieved 
after changing Myanmar’s domestic situation. Still, there was a transition in Japan’s 
policy during this period in its approach to the Myanmar problem. The Hashimoto, 
Obuchi and Mori administrations maintained a default friendship engagement policy 
based on their belief in the SPDC’s goodwill for political and economic development as 
well as an historical bilateral friendship. However, the Koizumi administration 
exercised a more critical form of engagement which aimed to develop a rule-based 
political system in Southeast Asia and to utilize economic assistance and other policy 
measures as leverage against the SPDC.  
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In terms of domestic resource mobilization, senior political leaders’ initiatives 
certainly enabled the Japanese government to take a more proactive stance, while at the 
same time an increase in domestic actors’ participation in the decision-making process 
gave more room for such actors to carry out rent-seeking activities. Some politicians, 
for example, influenced the decision-making process of ODA provision by advocating 
more support for the SPDC on the grounds of a ‘China threat’ argument and an 
authoritarian developmental perspective on the Myanmar problem. Senior leaders in the 
cabinet, particularly the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, also became 
more involved in the domestic policy-making process during this period. In other words, 
Japan’s Myanmar policy-making seemed to shift from one of bureaucratic politics to 
one of political leadership even if the political leaders still largely depended on the 
bureaucracy for policy planning and coordination.   
 
2. Foreign Policy Agenda 
 
Myanmar’s deadlock in the mid-1990s in terms of its domestic political 
dialogue and its economic stagnation in the late-1990s caused the SPDC to modify its 
foreign policy on both political and economic issues. As mentioned above, there were 
emerging differences in direction within the SPDC. While Than Shwe and Maung Aye 
held hard-line interventionist views, Khin Nyunt and other moderate pragmatists 
initiated positive actions to promote political talks with the NLD and ethnic minority 
groups and to improve relationships with other countries. Although Khin Nyunt pursued 
this policy direction until his ouster in October 2004, the political standing of moderate 
pragmatists was weakened by various factors. These included the unsuccessful domestic 
political reconciliation, the start of natural gas exports which decreased SPDC 
dependence on foreign assistance, the hard-liners’ oppression of domestic opponents, 
and the resulting increased sanctions by Western governments. These political dynamics 
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within the SPDC were reflected in its foreign and economic policy transitions during 
this period. However, Myanmar’s domestic problems, mainly consisting of the issues of 
political legitimacy, human rights protection, domestic insurgencies, drug trafficking, 
and migration and refugees, were fundamentally unchanged and remained as significant 
political issues.  
 
In its foreign policy, the SPDC made diplomatic efforts to improve its position 
in international society as well as to gain political and economic support from other 
countries. Khin Nyunt, who attended many bilateral and multilateral meetings as 
Myanmar’s representative during this period, played a crucial role in such efforts. In the 
first place, the SPDC even attempted, in vain, to improve its image in the U.S. by 
contracting U.S. advertisement agencies. In recognizing the difficulties in improving its 
relationships with Western countries, the SPDC’s efforts became more focused on 
neighbouring countries. Although it successfully deepened its relationship with the PRC 
in terms of frequent exchanges between leaders and the acquisition of material and 
non-material support, the SPDC could not satisfactorily improve relationships with 
Japan and ASEAN as its domestic political deadlock became an increasingly critical 
obstacle. In the end, Khin Nyunt, who had initiated the international cooperation policy 
line, was ousted in October 2004, leading to the SPDC’s return to an isolationist and 
uncompromising foreign policy line.  
 
In economic policy, the SPDC was primarily motivated by the necessity to 
respond to the domestic economic downturn and diminishing foreign currency reserves. 
This led to a combination of diplomatic efforts to gain foreign economic assistance and 
an interventionist economic policy to tighten control over private economic activities so 
as to avoid further economic and social instability. While Myanmar’s economic growth 
had already stagnated before then, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 was a further 
trigger for Myanmar’s serious economic downturn by causing a shrinking of foreign 
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companies’ investment and business operations.85 Responding to this, in November 
1997, the SPDC formed the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) headed by Maung Aye, 
which became the central agency to strengthen state control over trade and other private 
business activities. The TPC actually functioned well in reducing foreign currency 
outflows by imposing trade and financial regulations. At the same time, the export of 
natural gas, which provided foreign currency to the SPDC from 2001, largely decreased 
the constraints on the SPDC’s economic and fiscal management. As a result, there 
emerged a peculiar sustainability in the Myanmar economy from the early 2000s, in 
which the SPDC could maintain general macro-economic stability even though the 
Myanmar economy itself was stagnating (Kudo, 2008: 20-23).   
 
The agenda of democratic legitimacy in Myanmar showed minimal substantial 
changes during this period. For Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, almost the only 
leverage that they had against the SPDC was support from the general public and 
international society based on their political legitimacy; whilst the hard-liners within the 
SPDC repeatedly and brutally cracked down on the NLD’s political activities based on 
their material capabilities. Despite this, there emerged a move toward a good-faith 
political dialogue initiated by Khin Nyunt. Somewhat paradoxically, this started after 
Aung San Suu Kyi’s house detention on 23 September 2000 following her 
‘stay-in-the-car’ protest against the SPDC’s blockage of her departure from Yangon to 
rural areas for a political campaign. Whilst leading to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi 
on 6 May 2002, however, this dialogue again met deadlock after the ‘Depayin incident’ 
on 30 May 2003, the SPDC-sponsored attack of Aung San Suu Kyi’s group on its way 
to conduct a political campaign in a rural area. The political dialogue finally ended after 
the ouster of Khin Nyunt, who had still sought to continue dialogue with Aung San Suu 
Kyi even after the Depayin incident, resulting in the SPDC’s further uncompromising 
attitude toward political opposition.       
 
85 For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on the Myanmar economy, see 
Nishizawa (2000).  
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While the hard-liners oppressed the domestic political opposition, the moderate 
pragmatists made efforts to respond to international criticism of human rights 
infringements. In the late-1990s, for example, the SPDC accepted Australia’s proposal 
for dialogue and cooperation with the Australian Agency for International Development 
on the agenda of human rights protection. In addition, the SPDC took action on some 
issues including prison conditions and forced labour (Pedersen, 2008: 8) and from time 
to time announced that it would release members of the NLD. These attempts were not 
appealing enough to satisfy many international critics, and the agenda of human rights 
protection was repeatedly raised in the international arena, especially by Western 
governments and NGOs. In fact, there was little fundamental improvement in 
Myanmar’s human rights situation, especially in political rights and rights for ethnic 
minorities.  
 
Domestic insurgency activities were generally moderate during this period due 
to the preservation of ceasefire agreements between the SPDC and the major ethnic 
minority groups. The exception was the KNU which continued its armed struggle 
against the SPDC in the border area with Thailand. Although it was internationally 
significant, the issue of drug trafficking was less politicized during this period, partly 
because the SPDC took some measures to address the problem and partly because 
international society focused more on democratic legitimacy and human rights 
protection. Whilst the problems of migration and refugees became more and more 
serious, the SPDC almost completely neglected them throughout the period.  
 
In sum, a difference of policy directions within the SPDC emerged during this 
period. While the hard-liners continued their oppressive and interventionist stance in 
order to maintain domestic stability, the moderate pragmatists attempted to 
accommodate domestic opposition and international critics and thereby to improve 
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Myanmar’s relationships with other countries. However, the political standing of the 
moderate pragmatists was never strong enough to bring about visible and substantial 
change in Myanmar’s domestic problems. This led to divided perceptions from other 
governments about Myanmar. Most Western governments focused on the stagnating or 
worsening situation regarding democratic legitimacy and human rights protection, 
whereas Japan and ASEAN recognized the moderate pragmatists’ policy initiatives as 
essential opportunities to change Myanmar’s domestic situation. As a result, the 
different responses of other governments to Myanmar, in combination with exogenous 
changes in international structure, led to a transformation of international structure 
surrounding the Myanmar problem during this period.  
 
3. International Structure 
 
During this period, as Western countries, ASEAN and the PRC pursued 
different policy directions toward Myanmar, there emerged four significant transitions 
in international political and economic structure which affected the Myanmar problem. 
Firstly, being the only superpower in terms of material capabilities, the U.S. 
strengthened its sanctions policy in an uncompromising manner from the mid-1990s, 
resulting in a decrease in its ability to change the SPDC’s direction through negotiation 
and persuasion. Although in a somewhat different manner, the EU and other Western 
governments also gradually strengthened sanctions. The one exception was Australia’s 
attempt at critical engagement in the late 1990s. Secondly, ASEAN became an 
overarching regional framework involving all Southeast Asian countries but the Asian 
Financial Crisis seriously damaged regional economic and social stability, leading to 
significant changes in ASEAN’s political landscape such as the 1998 stepping down of 
one of ASEAN’s political icons, Indonesian President Suharto. Thirdly, by achieving 
rapid economic growth under its reform and opening-up policy as well as improving its 
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relationships with neighbouring countries under its good-neighbour policy, the PRC 
expanded its presence across Southeast Asia, including Myanmar. Finally, the UN 
became more involved in the Myanmar problem after the appointment of the former 
Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail as the UN secretary-general’s special envoy to 
Myanmar. He attempted more proactive mediation whilst having already played a 
certain role especially in regard to human rights protection since the ‘8888 Uprising’. 
These transitions caused substantial changes in international structure surrounding the 
Myanmar problem in combination with changes in the Myanmar problem itself.    
 
Voices advocating sanctions became dominant in the U.S. Congress and 
administration from 1997, when the second Clinton administration appointed Madeleine 
Albright as Secretary of State, Sandy Berger as head of the National Security Council, 
and Bill Richardson as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, all of whom explicitly supported 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Albright had particularly strong personal sympathy for Aung San 
Suu Kyi since meeting her as the U.S. ambassador to the UN in 1995 (Albright, 2003: 
200-202). In an executive order on 20 May 1997, President Clinton announced the 
prohibition of all new investments from the U.S. to Myanmar except for trade and 
service contracts or non-profit humanitarian assistance. Although he did not explain 
under what conditions the investment ban would be removed, Clinton urged the SPDC 
“to lift restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi and the political opposition, to respect the 
rights of free expression, assembly and association, and to undertake dialogue that 
includes leaders of the NLD and the ethnic minorities and deals with the future of 
Burma” in his statement to Congress (quoted in Pedersen, 2008: 30). Here, the stance of 
Congress and the administration became much closer in carrying out a sanctions policy 
in an uncompromising manner.  
 
Despite several attempts in Congress as well as in the administration, the U.S. 
restrained from taking any further sanction measures until the early 2000s. In July 2002, 
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there were signs of improvement when Kyaw Thein, then head of the military 
intelligence’s Department of Ethnic Affairs and Drugs, was the first high-ranked 
Myanmar officer in more than five years to visit Washington. Yet, this did not lead to 
any further improvements since the U.S. sanctions were renewed by the annual decision 
on certification in January 2003 mainly because of strong support in Congress. In 
addition, in response to the Depayin incident, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy 
Act of 2003 enabled the U.S. to enact further sanctions including import bans and 
freezing of the assets of the SPDC and its officers in the U.S. This meant that U.S. 
sanctions against the SPDC became one of the most comprehensive sanctions policies 
against any regime in the world.  
 
The EU also strengthened its initial October 1996 sanctions policy toward 
Myanmar even if it emphasized more targeted sanctions in considering the impact on 
Myanmar’s humanitarian situation. Responding to the claim from the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) on forced labour in Myanmar, the EU 
suspended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for Myanmar’s industrial and 
agricultural products in early 1997. Whilst largely symbolic, this policy was the first 
case in which the EU linked the human rights of workers with a trade policy measure. 
From around this period, the EU clearly shifted to a sanctions policy line. The 
government change in the UK after the election in May 1997 accelerated this shift 
because the new Labour Party administration unilaterally employed further sanctions 
against the SPDC as a part of its human rights diplomacy. While the UK and some other 
countries advocated more comprehensive sanctions, the EU strengthened only targeted 
sanction measures including a visa ban, an assets freeze and an arms embargo in a 
step-by-step manner during this period (Pedersen, 2008: 37-39). In fact, in 1999, the EU 
held talks with the SPDC when dispatching its ‘Troika’ missions to Myanmar, even if 
this did not bring any change to its sanctions policy. 
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Whereas most other Western countries such as Switzerland, Norway and 
Canada basically took a similar position to the EU, Australia was one country which 
employed a slightly different policy toward the military government. Despite keeping in 
line with the U.S. and the EU in challenging the SPDC in the UN and other 
international forums, Australia openly refused to isolate it in international society by a 
sanctions policy, insisting that the human rights situation in Myanmar would be best 
improved by a direct and critical dialogue with the military government. In fact, the 
Australian Agency for International Development worked directly with Myanmar 
governmental agencies on human rights and humanitarian issues from the late 1990s, 
although it brought few substantial changes to Myanmar’s domestic situation.   
 
ASEAN found it necessary to deal with the Myanmar problem as an internal 
agenda item after Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN in July 1997 and it was faced with 
serious political and economic challenges caused by the Asian Financial Crisis in the 
same year. Both factors substantially influenced ASEAN’s commitment to the Myanmar 
problem. Firstly, and as the most direct result of the Asian Financial Crisis, ASEAN’s 
previously rapid economic growth stagnated and ASEAN countries no longer had the 
resources to support Myanmar. This economic stagnation also revealed the problems of 
authoritarian developmental states, discrediting the rationale of ‘Asian values’ 
arguments which were frequently utilized to legitimize the SPDC’s rule in Myanmar. 
Secondly, the influence of three of ASEAN’s iconic political leaders was scaled back 
during this period. Following Thai Prime Minister Chavalit’s resignation on 6 
November 1997, Indonesia’s President Suharto, who had been the major advocate of 
Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN, stepped down after 32 years in power on 19 May 
1998. The political presence of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir also declined, 
especially after a political struggle with Deputy Prime Minister Anwar, who was ousted 
and then arrested in 1998. These events weakened ASEAN leaders’ voices in advocating 
‘Asian values’ for supporting Myanmar in international society. Lastly, the involvement 
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of Myanmar and other Indochina countries in ASEAN became an opportunity for 
ASEAN to reconsider its basic principles, particularly that of non-intervention on issues 
with cross-border impacts. At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1998, Thailand’s 
Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan proposed to shift to a flexible engagement policy, 
which would enable ASEAN to discuss members’ domestic issues that had cross-border 
implications. Despite this meeting not reaching a consensus, it certainly fuelled a debate 
on the reconsideration of the principle of non-intervention within ASEAN during this 
period.86 
In dealing with the Myanmar problem, amongst the ASEAN leaders, in 
coordination with Razali, Mahathir attempted to play a mediation role in the early 2000s. 
When visiting Myanmar as ASEAN’s representative in January 2001, Mahathir asked 
Than Shwe to carry out a general election in a few years’ time. Responding to this, the 
Myanmar Foreign Minister organized a free discussion among ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers in which the process of political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
NLD was revealed. Subsequently, Mahathir visited Myanmar again along with 300 
businesspeople in August 2002. However, due to the deadlock in Myanmar’s domestic 
political dialogue and the Depayin incident, Mahathir’s initiatives did not bring about 
any meaningful improvement in Myanmar’s political situation.  
 
After the Depayin incident, Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin, who had been 
attempting to strengthen pragmatic ties with Myanmar in a bilateral relationship, began 
one specific initiative. Whilst urging the SPDC to release Aung San Suu Kyi, Thaksin 
also insisted that U.S. economic sanctions were harmful to the Myanmar economy and a 
transition time should be given to Myanmar. On 24 July 2003, Thaksin proposed a 
 
86 For example, it was agreed at the ASEAN Informal Summit on 28 November 1999 that the 
ASEAN Troika consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the present, past and future chairs would be 
formed on an ad hoc basis if necessary to address urgent and important regional, political and 
security issues and situations. On ASEAN’s reconsideration of the principle of non-intervention, see 
Yamakage (2001). 
162 
 
roadmap toward Myanmar’s democratization by 2006; and subsequently on 30 August, 
Khin Nyunt, the newly appointed Prime Minister, announced his own seven-step 
roadmap toward ‘disciplined democracy’, but it did not mention either a specific 
schedule or the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. In response, the Thai government initiated 
the so-called ‘Bangkok process.’ The first meeting, on 15 December 2003, was attended 
by a number of European and neighbouring Asian countries, in which Myanmar’s 
Foreign Minister Win Aung announced the holding of a 2004 National Convention to 
formulate a new constitution. However, only six days prior to the second meeting which 
was scheduled on 29-30 April 2004, the SPDC suddenly cancelled its attendance. 
Thereafter, due to the ouster of Foreign Minister Win Aung on 18 August and of Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt on 19 October, the Bangkok process initiated by Thaksin was also 
deadlocked.  
 
The Myanmar problem also became a source of conflict between the EU and 
ASEAN during this period. Having failed to prevent ASEAN from recognizing 
Myanmar’s membership in 1997, the EU insisted on the exclusion of Myanmar from 
inter-regional dialogues. As ASEAN refused to accept this in bloc-to-bloc meetings, the 
ASEAN-EU Ministerial and Joint Cooperation Committee meetings were cancelled for 
a number of years after Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN. This led to a political crisis in 
the inter-regional cooperation framework (Takano, 2001: 158-160). Myanmar was also 
a source of conflict at the ASEM, which was formed in March 1996 for the purposes of 
dialogue between ASEAN+3 and the EU. As the EU refused to accept the attendance of 
the Myanmar representative to the ASEM, the attendance of not only Myanmar but also 
Laos and Cambodia was delayed until 2004. After East European countries joined the 
EU in 2004, ASEAN insisted that their attendance to the ASEM could not be accepted 
without the attendance of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In the end, the EU and 
ASEAN reached a compromise in which Myanmar’s Foreign Minister-level 
representative, instead of a Prime Minister-level representative, would attend the ASEM 
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in October 2004. 
 
The PRC, on the other hand, successfully deepened its relationship with the 
SPDC throughout this period. The SPDC was an important target for the PRC’s 
good-neighbour policy; not only because of the necessity of confidence-building with a 
neighbouring country but also because of Myanmar’s geopolitical significance, 
abundant natural resources and economic potential. The PRC, for instance, concluded a 
new economic cooperation agreement and announced a 70 million yen loan to Myanmar 
in March 1997 (Green, 2001: 183). The China-Myanmar relationship was further 
strengthened when the SPDC faced serious economic difficulties in the late 1990s. In 
fact, exchanges between the political leaders of the two countries significantly increased 
after 2000, leading to various agreements on bilateral cooperation especially in 
economic areas (Bi, 2008: 172-175). As a result, despite the SPDC’s tightening control 
over trade activities, the amount of trade between the PRC and Myanmar increased in 
the early 2000s. FDI from the PRC also expanded, particularly in natural resource 
development projects.  
 
The UN also played a significant role during this period in regard to human 
rights and humanitarian issues, especially through functional activities at the level of 
UN specialized agencies. Having been appointed as the UN Secretary-General’s special 
envoy to Myanmar in April 2000, the former Malaysian diplomat Razali initiated 
contact with both the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi, leading to a dialogue between the 
two camps after Aung San Suu Kyi’s house detention in September 2000. Despite the 
release of Aun San Suu Kyi in May 2002, however, Razali’s mediation efforts became 
moribund due to the stagnation of political dialogue between the two sides. After the 
SPDC repeatedly refused Razali permission to visit Myanmar for more than two years 
he resigned in January 2006. The International Labour Organization (ILO) became 
particularly critical of the SPDC during this period due to the issue of forced labour in 
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Myanmar and the SPDC’s uncooperative attitude to ILO activities. In 2000, the ILO 
adopted an unprecedented resolution requesting all ILO constituencies including 
governments, employers and workers to reconsider their relationship with the SPDC 
(Pedersen, 2008: 42-43).  
 
As a result of these changing behaviours of the main actors, international 
structure surrounding the Myanmar problem underwent significant change. Whilst it 
was dominant globally and regionally in the late 1990s, the U.S. exerted less leverage 
over the SPDC because of its uncompromising sanctions policy and few efforts at 
negotiation and persuasion. ASEAN’s position in international structure also weakened 
after the late 1990s. ASEAN continued to support Myanmar in international society, but 
decreased its capability and credibility in dealing with the Myanmar problem because of 
the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis and its failure to play a mediation role during 
this period. This also made ASEAN leaders less confident and determined in supporting 
the SPDC based on authoritarian developmental state arguments. In the meantime, as an 
emerging regional power, the PRC successfully deepened political and economic ties 
with the SPDC by employing a good-neighbour policy. As such, the SPDC regarded the 
PRC as its most significant supporter but was still highly cautious about being 
excessively dependent on it.  
 
In terms of international economic structure, Myanmar’s trade and investment 
relations with Western countries shrank in accordance with the West stepping up its 
sanctions policy. At the same time, FDI from ASEAN countries also decreased because 
of the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, while from 2001 natural gas exports to 
Thailand provided foreign currency to the Myanmar government. The gas exports 
enabled the SPDC to avoid excessive dependence on the PRC, which had became a 
dominant economic partner for Myanmar in both trade and investment relationships. On 
the whole, however, Myanmar’s economic liberalization and deepening foreign 
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economic relations stagnated in the late 1990s, which made the SPDC less vulnerable to 
foreign economic relations as long as it could maintain domestic economic and social 
stability. In other words, by putting a low priority on economic growth, the SPDC could 
increase its autonomy in foreign economic relations even if trade and investment 
relationships with neighbouring countries, particularly the PRC, and foreign currency 
inflows from Thailand were vital for its economic management.   
 
In contrast to international economic structure, societal and transnational 
structure remained largely unchanged during this period. The SPDC consolidated its 
dominance in terms of material capabilities over the domestic opposition whereas the 
NLD led by Aung San Suu Kyi maintained its democratic legitimacy stemming from the 
result of the 1990 election. Ethnic minority groups also generally scaled down their 
material capabilities, though still retaining a significant amount, due to the SPDC’s 
successful military operations and ceasefire negotiations. Although the organizations of 
Myanmar nationals and their supporters in other countries became well organized in 
lobbying activities, the decreasing leverage of Western governments over the SPDC 
eventually meant a decreasing leverage for the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi via such 
organizations. 
 
4. Policy-Makers’ Perceptions  
 
While the basic perceptions of the three main ministries playing major roles in 
Myanmar policy-making were largely unchanged from the previous period, the 
development of the Myanmar problem into a more controversial international one 
changed the costs and benefits imposed by international structure on Japan in order to 
maintain its default engagement policy. Essentially, it was necessary for the Japanese 
government to deal with three major changes in international political and economic 
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structure: the U.S. as the only superpower strengthening an ideological sanctions policy 
toward Myanmar; the PRC as a growing power which had increased its presence in 
Myanmar; and, ASEAN which involved all Southeast Asian countries including 
Myanmar but seriously suffered as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis. Kawashima 
Yutaka, a MOFA executive officer during this period,87 observed that there was a 
Myanmar policy debate in Japan between ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ throughout the 1990s. 
‘Idealists’, on the one hand, opposed the provision of economic assistance as it would 
support the oppressive military government. ‘Realists’, on the other hand, advocated 
supporting the SPDC in order to maintain friendship with a pro-Japanese country, to 
avoid isolating Myanmar, which would give the PRC a chance to increase its presence 
there, as well as to critique the double standards in Western governments’ human rights 
diplomacy, which applied a strict standard to those countries in which they did not have 
substantial interests (Kawashima, 2003: 121-122). 88  In accordance with the 
politicization of the Myanmar problem in the international arena, Japanese political 
leaders began to regard it as one of most important Southeast Asian issues in Japan’s 
foreign policy-making. In fact, the most distinctive change in the Japanese government 
during this period was that cabinet members began to initiate Myanmar policy-making. 
This, on the one hand, enabled the Japanese government to conduct Myanmar policy in 
a more decisive manner but, on the other hand, put Japan’s Myanmar policy under the 
more direct influence of leaders’ perceptions of the Myanmar problem.  
 
It was under the Hashimoto administration after 11 January 1996 that senior 
leaders began to initiate Myanmar policy-making. The basic perception of those leaders 
of Myanmar was not substantially different from that of MOFA. In accordance with the 
development of the Myanmar problem and transitions in international structure in an 
 
87 Kawashima served as Director General of the Asian Affairs Bureau from 1994 to 1995, Director 
General of the Foreign Policy Bureau from August 1995 to August 1997, and Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs from August 1999 to August 2001.  
88 In arguing on the debate between ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’, Kawashima seemed to imply that Japan 
employed a policy direction closer to the former position during the 1990s, even though he did not 
explicitly mention it (Kawashima, 2003: 121-122).  
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unfavourable direction for Japan’s default engagement policy, leaders recognized the 
necessity of responding to international structural constraints in pursuit of pragmatic 
objectives for Japan’s Myanmar policy. At a personal level, Prime Minister Hashimoto 
Ryutaro had been interested in Myanmar since his visit for the recovery of the remains 
of dead soldiers as Vice-Minister for Health and Welfare during 1970-71. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Obuchi, who succeeded Hashimoto on 30 July 1998, was also more 
active in Myanmar policy-making. Having been Cabinet Secretary and acting Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Obuchi had engaged in Myanmar policy when Japan gave 
governmental recognition to the SPDC and invited its representative to the Showa 
Emperor’s funeral ceremony in early 1989. Hashimoto and Obuchi’s relationships with 
war veterans’ associations presumably had some influence on their attitude toward 
Myanmar as well.  
 
In terms of a general foreign policy direction, both Hashimoto and Obuchi 
promoted an autonomous Asian policy for Japan, especially after the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997. Since ASEAN’s involvement of Myanmar and Indochina countries as 
well as the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis, they became more proactive in 
supporting ASEAN’s stability and balanced development. This was closely related to 
their concerns about Japan’s changing strategic environment in the post-Cold War era. 
These concerns included the changing Japan-U.S. relationship as the security treaty was 
redefined and trade disputes occurred and the PRC’s increasing presence in Southeast 
Asia which could undermine Japan’s position if it simply followed U.S. policy. 
Myanmar was increasingly perceived as a significant agenda item in this context.89 
Both Hashimoto and Obuchi were critical of the U.S. sanctions approach toward 
Myanmar, which they saw as a case of double standards of U.S. human rights 
diplomacy which only applied to those countries in which the U.S. had little substantial 
 
89 In December 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto had already revealed the perception that the Thai 
currency crisis had a cross-border impact on Myanmar and other regions. See Prime Minister 
Hashimoto’s response to LDP member Miyazawa Kiichi’s question at the Budget Committee in the 
House of Representatives on 1 December 1997. 
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interest. They were also anxious about the PRC’s proactive support for the SPDC, 
which they saw as weakening the traditional Japan-Myanmar friendship, placing 
Myanmar under PRC influence, and decreasing SPDC efforts at nation-building and 
development. From this perspective, they attempted to conduct friendship engagement 
in a proactive manner whilst dealing with changing international structure in order to 
maintain Japan’s pragmatic objectives to support and encourage Myanmar political 
leaders’ efforts for political and economic development.  
 
The Mori administration, which lasted about a year, maintained a similar 
position to previous ones. Then the Koizumi administration, which came into power on 
26 April 2001, also conducted a proactive foreign policy toward Myanmar, although it 
seemed to be based on a slightly different perspective. The Koizumi government’s 
overall foreign policy direction was to strengthen its relationship with the George W. 
Bush administration, particularly after 9/11, thereby retaining certain free space in 
Japan’s Asian policy with the support of the U.S. At the same time, Prime Minister 
Koizumi was less sympathetic to the SPDC than his predecessors; in his meetings with 
SPDC leaders he more bluntly urged them to promote the domestic democratization 
process.90 Former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Tanaka Hitoshi initiated Japan’s 
Myanmar policy in coordination with Koizumi during this period. He explained that 
Japan’s position toward Myanmar was a proactive commitment to construct a 
‘rule-based society’ in East Asia rather than a pursuit of international strategic interests, 
which was clearly different from both the U.S. sanctions policy and the PRC’s 
unconditional support of the SPDC. In doing so, according to Tanaka, Japan’s primary 
international concern was to support ASEAN’s efforts to solve the Myanmar problem as 
an internal issue rather than focusing on Japan’s relationships with the U.S. or the PRC. 
In rejecting LDP member Iwanaga Mineichi’s suggestion to provide unconditional 
support for Myanmar for the purpose of counterbalancing the PRC, Minister for Foreign 
 
90 Koizumi had been a member of the DMLSDM even if he was not particularly proactive in the 
league’s activities. 
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Affairs Kawaguchi Yoriko also emphasized the significance of Myanmar’s mid- and 
long-term development and democratization.91 According to Kawaguchi, Japan’s policy 
priorities toward Myanmar consisted of three pillars: democratization, economic 
liberalization and social stability.92 This did not necessarily mean that the Japanese 
government had substantially reoriented its foreign policy direction or actual policy 
implementation in relation to Myanmar. The Koizumi administration’s perspective, 
however, was apparently much closer to one of critical engagement than Japan’s default 
engagement based on historical bilateral friendship, even if its primary objective 
remained the pragmatic promotion of Myanmar’s political and economic development.  
 
MOFA remained in a position to coordinate Myanmar policy-making within 
the Japanese government during this period, though the politicization of the Myanmar 
problem and the participation of an increasing number of domestic actors sometimes 
made it difficult for MOFA to control the policy-making process. MOFA’s basic 
perception of the Myanmar problem itself had been largely unchanged from the 
previous period whereas its perception of the international political and economic 
structure had gradually changed. In MOFA, there were growing concerns about the gap 
with the U.S. concerning strategic objectives and approaches toward East Asia, as well 
as concerns about the PRC’s growing presence which could decrease Japan’s prestige in 
the region. In addition, upon observing ASEAN’s involvement of Indochina countries 
and Myanmar, MOFA considered Japan’s new role from the mid-1990s was to bridge 
the ASEAN6 countries and the four newly acceding countries and to support a balanced 
development of Southeast Asian countries. The Asian Financial Crisis also made it 
necessary for MOFA to provide support for ASEAN to overcome the economic crisis 
and strengthen its cooperation framework, which would eventually enhance the 
partnership with ASEAN countries and enable Japan to maintain its presence in East 
 
91 See Kawaguchi’s response to LDP member Iwanaga Mineichi’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 11 June 2004.  
92 See Kawaguchi’s response to DPJ member Ito Eisei’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in the House of Representatives on 13 June 2003.  
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Asia.   
 
Specifically regarding Myanmar, there emerged some different considerations 
within MOFA on both the policy measures to change the Myanmar problem and how to 
respond to the costs and benefits imposed by international structure. In order to 
encourage change in Myanmar, for example, Yamaguchi Yoichi, who served as Japanese 
ambassador to Myanmar from December 1995 to January 1998, explicitly advocated 
providing maximum assistance to the SPDC as the best way to support Myanmar’s 
authoritarian developmental direction. Based on the assumption of SPDC goodwill for 
economic development and future democratization, he believed, this would thereby 
promote the historical bilateral relationship and distance Japan from Western double 
standards, (Yamaguchi, 1999: 1-120). 93  While Yamaguchi was the most explicit 
advocate of positive support for the SPDC, it was almost impossible for MOFA to 
employ sanctions, which were consistently regarded as a counterproductive measure to 
the Myanmar problem. At a more practical level, however, there was a sceptical view as 
to the effectiveness of limited ODA provision, including the Yangon airport and 
Baluchaung hydro power plant projects, in changing the SPDC’s attitude toward 
domestic political reconciliation. During this period, therefore, MOFA kept searching 
for an effective and practical approach to change Myanmar’s domestic political and 
economic situation. As such, MOFA perceived Khin Nyunt’s initiative for domestic 
political reconciliation and international cooperation as an essential opportunity to make 
a positive change to the Myanmar problem, and to which the Japanese government 
should provide necessary support.   
 
Responding to the changing international structure, there was concern within 
MOFA about causing friction with the U.S. if Japan were to engage proactively with the 
SPDC, particularly in combination with economic assistance for non-humanitarian 
 
93 Yamaguchi seemed to have played a proactive role in mobilizing domestic actors when deciding 
ODA disbursement for the Yangon airport project in early 1998 (Yamaguchi, 1999: 127-135).  
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purposes. In considering the promotion of Japan’s partnership with ASEAN and its 
international prestige in East Asia, nonetheless, it was necessary for MOFA to deal 
seriously with the Myanmar problem, which had increasingly become a controversial 
agenda item for ASEAN, not only in its relationships with Western countries but also in 
maintaining its own stability and credibility since the late 1990s. The SPDC’s 
strengthening ties with the PRC since the late 1980s were also perceived as a challenge 
for Japan’s default engagement policy by some MOFA officials because the PRC’s 
unconditional support would undermine Japan’s historical bilateral friendship and its 
efforts to encourage the SPDC to move toward domestic political reconciliation. Despite 
these changes in MOFA’s perception of international structure, however, the 
continuation of the engagement policy line was the only practical direction for MOFA in 
order to tame structural pressures and to pursue the most desirable outcome for Japan’s 
future international relations in a gradual manner. In other words, MOFA considered 
that an engagement policy line was the most balanced direction in hedging against all 
the major concerns connected to the U.S., ASEAN and the PRC. In the end, it was also 
the most preferable policy to actually change Myanmar positively and to earn maximum 
interest in international relations.    
 
For METI, which had been attempting to promote and facilitate business-level 
interactions, it was still desirable that Myanmar move toward a liberal economy in order 
to achieve economic growth which could provide Japanese companies with promising 
business opportunities. Myanmar’s economic downturn in the late 1990s and 
subsequent backslide to an interventionist economic policy became a major concern for 
METI. At the same time, METI officials worried about the international political 
economy because Myanmar’s economic stagnation in the late 1990s apparently 
accelerated its excessive dependence on the PRC’s economy and assistance.94 Yet, due 
to political difficulties in expanding economic assistance to Myanmar, METI was faced 
 
94 This, on the other hand, seemed to enable some METI officers to utilize the ‘China threat’ 
discourse within Japanese policy circles as a tool to mobilize domestic support. 
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with limited policy options. As such, METI searched for other policy options which 
could change Myanmar’s economic situation while at the same time making efforts to 
implement the on-going yen loan projects that METI was in charge of.95 At a political 
level, METI officials initiated Minister for International Trade and Industry Fukaya 
Takashi’s visit to Myanmar in May 2000 to attend the ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers’ 
Meeting at Yangon, and to meet Khin Nyunt. At a more practical level, METI officials 
acted positively for Prime Minister Obuchi’s proposal to Than Shwe in November 1999 
of the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural Adjustment of the Myanmar 
Economy.  
 
MOF still considered Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem as a major risk for 
the credibility of its ODA policy. As Myanmar had already delayed debt repayment 
again in late 1997,96 MOF became even more reluctant to disburse yen loans without 
the prospect of project completion and debt repayment. Increasing the amount of debts 
had caused some controversy in discussion on debt relief to developing countries at the 
G8 summit and other multilateral forums, so it was less problematic for MOF to provide 
grant aid rather than yen loans with little prospect of repayment. In fact, while 
disbursing yen loans to the Yangon airport project in 1998, the Japanese government 
pledged economic assistance for the Baluchaung hydro power plant project. This was 
originally a yen loan project but became a grant aid project in April 2001. In addition, 
right after this pledge, the Japanese government also notified the SPDC of the 
cancellation of all remaining yen loan projects as part of a re-examination of its overall 
ODA policy. These moves presumably reflected MOF’s concern of the impact of the 
Myanmar problem on the credibility of its ODA policy.  
 
95 Whereas the Baluchaung hydro power plant project continued as a limited grant aid project after 
an exchange of notes in May 2002, other remaining ODA projects that METI was in charge of were 
cancelled in 2001. 
96 See Director General of Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA Ohshima’s response to DPJ 
member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives 
on 28 November 1997. 
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On the whole, whereas the three main ministries still retained substantial 
influence over Japan’s Myanmar policy-making, the politicization of the Myanmar 
problem in the international arena made Japan’s political leaders recognize the necessity 
of conducting a more proactive Myanmar policy. Yet, the Japanese government’s 
primary concern remained the encouragement of Myanmar’s gradual and realistic 
development, which stemmed from its pragmatic perspective of Myanmar rather than a 
strategic one. While it recognized tougher constraints imposed by international structure 
in pursuing this pragmatic objective, the Japanese government still considered that an 
engagement policy was the most balanced and preferable line to follow, even if it was 
based on optimistic assumptions. Although the arguments over the ‘China threat’ or 
Japan’s autonomous Asian policy were certainly concerns of many Japanese 
policy-makers, in the end such concerns never altered Japan’s pragmatic objectives and 
engagement policy line toward Myanmar. Despite the diversification of concerns and 
discourse on Myanmar policy, therefore, the Japanese government’s policy shift was 
couched in terms of how to approach change in Myanmar: Hashimoto and Obuchi 
promoted a default engagement policy based on an historical bilateral friendship and an 
authoritarian developmental perspective, while Koizumi was closer to a critical 
engagement policy in pushing the SPDC toward domestic political reconciliation.    
 
5. Resource Mobilization 
 
The international politicization of the Myanmar problem heightened domestic 
debate about Japan’s Myanmar policy in combination with debates on Japan’s overall 
Asian policy direction in the post-Cold War era. Among politicians, whilst the JMPFL 
and those with personal friendships with the Myanmar military government gradually 
lost influence, the consensus to continue an engagement policy line was largely 
maintained among mainstream politicians, even if some emphasized the historical 
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bilateral friendship or authoritarian developmental perspective and others inclined to a 
more critical engagement line. At the same time, the politicization of the Myanmar 
problem within Japan’s policy-making system presumably provided a certain amount of 
room for some domestic actors to play rent-seeking games in regard to ODA 
disbursements. During this period, emerging discourses including the ‘China threat’ and 
Japan’s autonomous Asian policy became stronger in Japan’s general foreign policy 
debates, and these discourses functioned to legitimize the governmental engagement 
policy toward Myanmar and mobilize domestic support for it. While the DMLSDM and 
related pro-democracy actors increased their critical voice against governmental policy, 
they were not necessarily coherent or decisive enough to promote a sanctions policy as 
an alternative. Even the mainstream politicians within this camp were apparently 
pursuing a line of critical engagement, which, at its core, was not too far from the 
government direction.   
 
(1) The Diet and Politicians 
 
In the Diet, the Myanmar problem was repeatedly, if not intensively, raised as a 
discussion issue at the committee level, especially when the Japanese government had 
to decide on internationally controversial ODA provision. Some Diet members with a 
particular interest in Myanmar raised questions at the Diet from various viewpoints. In 
fact, there were critical voices against the government’s engagement policy and 
controversial ODA provision even within the LDP. A younger LDP politician Kono Taro, 
for example, was highly critical of the ODA provision to both the Yangon airport project 
and the Baluchaung hydro power plant project, raising questions about the Japanese 
government’s rationale for resuming ODA for those projects.97 At the same time, some 
members of the DPJ, which had increased its presence in the Diet as the largest 
 
97 See Kono’s questions at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 1 
April 1998 and on 1 June 2001. 
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opposition party during this period, were also interested in the Myanmar problem.98 In 
July-August 2001, for example, DPJ member Suto Nobuhiko actually visited the site of 
the Baluchaung hydro power plant. On 6 June 2001, he had previously issued a 
shitsumon shuisho, or an official questionnaire to the government through the Diet, in 
order to ask about various concerns of the project. He subsequently shifted to a positive 
stance toward the project in his field report to the DPJ.99 As a whole, however, political 
dynamics in the Diet did not have a substantial influence on the government’s Myanmar 
policy-making, even if it did somewhat increase the cost of implementing controversial 
ODA provision.  
 
Political party-level dynamics had relatively more impact on Japan’s Myanmar 
policy. The LDP needed to pay certain attention to its coalition partners in the 
LDP-SDP-NPS coalition government, although it eventually collapsed in June 1998. 
Many leaders in the SDP and the NPS, such as Doi Takako, Takemura Masayoshi and 
Hatoyama Yukio emphasized the value for Japan of promoting Myanmar’s 
democratization, and therefore maintained a critical stance against ODA provision to 
Myanmar if there was no progress in the democratization process. The SDP and the 
NPS were negative about the government’s yen loan provision to the Yangon airport 
project, and refused to approve it at an extraordinary policy coordination meeting 
among the ruling parties on 26 February 1998 (MS, 27 February 1998). This certainly 
increased the political cost to the Japanese government of carrying out its policy, even if 
it did not become a critical obstacle in Myanmar policy-making under the political 
initiatives of Hashimoto and Obuchi. In deciding and implementing the Baluchaung 
hydro power plant project, on the other hand, politics within the LDP certainly did 
 
98 A DPJ member Fujita Yukihisa, for example, repeatedly raised questions on Myanmar policy. See 
Fujita’s questions at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 5 December 
1996, 16 April and 28 November 1997.  
99 See the DPJ’s website available at http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=2687 (accessed 3 February 
2010). Suto’s shitsumon shuisho and the government’s answer are also available on the website of 
the House of Representatives at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_shitsumon.htm
(accessed 23 February 2010). 
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become an obstacle. Although Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Yohei acknowledged 
Japan’s willingness to implement the project in April 2001, the implementation process 
became stuck at the discussion stage of the LDP Special Committee on External 
Economic Cooperation. This was reportedly due to rent-seeking activities competing 
over the acceptance of order of the project among foreign policy tribes (AS, 8 May 
2002). In fact, the Special Committee reportedly allowed the project to be implemented 
only after the resignation of Chairman Suzuki Muneo in early 2002. This could be at 
least partly because, as was revealed around this period, the scandals of MOFA and 
foreign policy tribes, including Suzuki, substantially weakened the power of those 
foreign policy tribes (AS, 8 May 2002).    
 
In terms of individual politicians, there emerged another politicians’ group 
engaged in Myanmar policy-making which was explicitly supportive to the SPDC. In 
June 1998, the PLSMG chaired by Muto Kabun100 was formed with the participation of 
about 30 LDP politicians (AS, 5 June 1998). Muto became especially proactive in 
support of the SPDC after his leave from the cabinet in September 1997.101 According 
to a book based on an interview with Muto by a local newspaper, the Gifu Shimbun,
Muto ‘prepared’ ODA provision for the Yangon airport project by ‘negotiating with 
MOFA’ before visiting Myanmar; that is, Muto pledged ODA provision to Khin Nyunt 
even before the Japanese government’s formal decision in February 1998 (Gifu 
Shimbunsha, 2008: 250). In response to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley’s 
criticism of Japan’s ODA to the Yangon airport project, Muto emphasized Japan’s 
intention to prevent regional destabilization and threats to India which could be caused 
 
100 Muto served as Director-General of the Management and Cooperation Agency from November 
1996 to September 1997, Minister for Foreign Affairs from April to August 1993, Minister for 
International Trade and Industry from February to December 1990, and Minister for Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries before deeply committing himself to Myanmar policy-making. 
101 According to a book based on the Gifu Shimbun’s interview with Muto, his commitment to 
Myanmar was motivated by Japanese Ambassador to Thailand Fujii Hiroaki’s request that he visit 
Myanmar when serving as Director-General of the Management and Cooperation Agency (Gifu 
Shimbunsha, 2008: 249), although this did not necessarily explain his political motivation. Just as a 
note, Fujii left the position of Japanese ambassador to Thailand in January 1994 before Muto served 
as Director-General of the Management and Cooperation Agency.  
177 
 
by the PRC’s increasing influence through economic and military assistance to 
Myanmar (Gifu Shimbunsha, 2008: 250-251). He also insisted that Western countries 
should understand Myanmar’s difficulty in maintaining social stability which stemmed 
from the historical burden of the colonial-era; while at the same time he mentioned the 
necessity for the SPDC to realize that further yen loan disbursement by Japan depended 
on the progress of democratization (YS, 24 March 1998). Muto may also have 
contributed to Japan’s decision to disburse ODA to the Baluchaung hydro power plant 
project, even though he had decided to stop contributing to Myanmar policy-making 
ever since Khin Nyunt’s ouster in October 2004, which was seen as a sign of lost 
momentum in finding a solution to the Myanmar problem (Gifu Shimbunsha, 2008: 
252).  
 
The JMPEPL was supportive of the government’s engagement policy. Kato 
Koichi was the Secretary-General of the LDP from October 1995 to July 1998, and in 
1996 initiated an assistance project in the Kokang region of Shan State to eradicate 
poppy cultivation by substituting it for the Japanese soba or buckwheat plant.102 Whilst 
the JMPEPL consisted of many mainstream LDP politicians, Kato’s declining political 
power in the early 2000s meant that the JMPEPL lost one of the main drivers of its 
activities, even if Koga and other LDP politicians, especially those in the Kochikai 
faction, maintained the organization.  
 
Meanwhile, the DMLSDM kept urging the Japanese government to play a 
constructive role in Myanmar’s democratization, raising a critical voice against the 
government providing ODA without any substantial progress in Myanmar’s domestic 
political situation. For example, on 27 February 1998, the DMLSDM issued a statement 
which required the Japanese government to make clear its stance on urging Myanmar’s 
 
102 This project was succeeded by the Association for Drug and Poverty Eradication in Asia, a 
non-profit organization established in 2005. See the association’s website available at http://www.
geocities.jp/npoadpea/about.htm (accessed 4 February 2010). 
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democratization and to consider the progress of democratization as a precondition for 
Japan’s economic assistance to Myanmar.103 Subsequently when Aung San Suu Kyi 
was released from house detention in May 2002, the DMLSDM made a statement 
valuing the SPDC decision to release her and the contributions of related actors 
including Razali and the Japanese government.104 These statements indicate that, 
despite advocating the significance of Myanmar’s democratization, the DMLSDM 
encouraged the Japanese government to utilize economic assistance as leverage against 
the SPDC rather than imposing sanctions.  
 
While it increasingly consisted of non-mainstream politicians, the JMPFL 
continued to support the SPDC and explicitly advocated Japan’s unconditional 
assistance; mainly from the viewpoints of historical bilateral friendship, an authoritarian 
developmental perspective, and antagonism towards Western double standards. 
Watanabe Hideo and Nishimura Shingo were especially active in this group. Being an 
NFP member at the time, Nishimura praised the Japanese government’s decision of 
ODA resumption for the Yangon airport project even before the formal decision had 
been made. Nishimura believed that Japan held a responsibility for the project’s 
completion and it would continue the positive relationship with a historically 
pro-Japanese country.105 
(2) Business Sector 
 
In spite of Myanmar’s economic downturn, the Japanese business sector still 
wanted to deepen its relationship with the SPDC as well as exploit business 
 
103  See the BurmaInfo’s website available at http://www.burmainfo.org/oda/pdburma0.html
(accessed 22 August 2008). 
104 See the BurmaInfo’s website available at http://www.burmainfo.org/article/article.php?mode
=2& articleid=234 (accessed 4 February 2010). 
105 See Nishimura’s question at the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives on 27 
February 1998. Nishimura was an explicit supporter of the SPDC, visiting Myanmar frequently and 
expressing his opinion on his blog.  
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opportunities in Myanmar. In the late 1990s, the Keidanren upgraded the Myanmar 
Study Group into the Myanmar Economic Committee, which was chaired by Marubeni 
Corp. President and CEO Toriumi Iwao. In cooperation with Myanmar’s counterpart, it 
established the Japan-Myanmar Joint Economic Committee (JMJEC) chaired by 
Toriumi and SPDC minister David O. Abel (Keidanren, 1998).106 On the occasion of 
the third committee meeting on 6 and 7 December 1999, which was held right after 
former Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to Myanmar, Toriumi and other business 
leaders met with Than Shwe and other SPDC leaders to discuss Myanmar’s business 
environment (Keidanren, 2000). With the establishment of the JMCCIBCC by the JCCI 
and the UMFCCI in March 1998,107  Japanese business leaders’ activities in the 
Japan-Myanmar relationship seemed to peak in the late 1990s.  
 
Individual Japanese companies had also been active in finding new business, 
especially since the mid-1990s. Myanmar’s economic downturn and the SPDC’s 
interventionist response to it from the late 1990s, however, certainly worsened 
Myanmar’s business environment for many Japanese companies. In addition, the 
Western governments’ sanctions policy as well as public opinion critical of the SPDC in 
Western countries increasingly meant that Japanese companies operating in those 
countries ran some risk to their reputations. As a result, many Japanese companies 
gradually retreated from Myanmar from the late 1990s. For some companies which had 
already made initial investments in Myanmar, it became necessary to carry out debt 
collection, which ironically turned into a major raison d’être for the Myanmar branches 
of those companies.  
 
106 The JMJEC held the second conference at Yangon in May 1998 and the third conference at 
Yangon in December 2000 (Keidanren, 2000; 1998).   
107 See the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s website available at http://www.tokyo-cci.
or.jp/support_m/kokusai/kaigi/kaigi18.html (accessed 11 August 2008). The JMCCIBCC was later 
integrated into the Greater Mekong Sub-region Business Study Group in May 2002, which aimed at 
conducting research on the region including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and the 
Yunnan Province of the PRC. 
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Japanese companies committed to remaining ODA projects kept lobbying for 
the resumption of economic assistance. When the Japanese government adopted a 
‘wait-and-see’ position in late 1995 instead of moving toward the resumption of 
remaining ODA projects these companies strengthened their lobbying activities. 
Myanmar’s worsening economic performance and business environment from the late 
1990s heightened the necessity of ODA resumption for the managers of these 
companies. In response they not only lobbied the Japanese government and concerned 
politicians but even the SPDC, including their advice in 1997 for the SPDC to send a 
request letter of yen loan resumption for the Yangon airport project to the Japanese 
government.  
 
(3) NGOs 
 
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) played a unique role in the 
Japan-Myanmar relationship during this period. Having originated as one of the 
foundations established by the Nippon Foundation,108 which is currently chaired by 
Sasakawa Yoichi, 109  the SPF has conducted international activities as a 
non-governmental organization since its foundation in 1987. The SPF began to engage 
in Myanmar through the Sasakawa Southeast Asia Cooperation Fund (SSACF), which 
was established in 1992.110 The SSACF recognized the necessity to include Myanmar 
in its operational scope from the beginning and from 1995 formed various projects 
based on four directions: inviting Myanmar to seminars on the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) as preparation for Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN; issuing policy 
recommendations for Myanmar’s domestic economic structural reform; deepening 
 
108 Established by a political activist, Sasakawa Ryoichi, the Nippon Foundation is a unique 
foundation which is partly funded by the revenue of the publicly-operated motor-boat race business 
based on the Motorboat Racing Act.  
109 Sasakawa Yoichi is the third son of Sasakawa Ryoichi.  
110 The SSACF was established as a one region specific foundation under the SPF due to the 
recognition of the necessity to strengthen its activities to support Indochina countries’ reform and 
development in observing their moves toward economic development from the late 1980s. The 
SSACF retained 4 billion yen of contributions from the Nippon Foundation. 
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Myanmar’s understanding of the ASEAN security framework; and, providing 
opportunities for political dialogue between the military government and the democracy 
camp (Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2003: 21-24).111 Presumably by utilizing Chairman 
of the Nippon Foundation Sasakawa Yohei’s personal connections, the SPF also 
coordinated former Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to Myanmar in December 1999, as 
well as former Prime Minister Mori’s visit in April 2003 in its attempts to promote 
public diplomacy and to contribute to a breakthrough in Myanmar’s political deadlock.  
 
Some bilateral friendship organizations also established or expanded their 
activities during this period. One of the biggest Japan-Myanmar friendship 
organizations, the Japan-Myanmar Cultural Association, which was originally formed 
by around 2,000 war veterans, was renamed the Japan-Myanmar Friendship Association 
(JMFA) in 1997 through the efforts of Tsukamoto Koichi, a war veteran and the owner 
of Wacoal Corp., who wanted to carry out lobbying activities in support of the 
engagement policy line toward Myanmar (Pongyelar, 2007: 17). In addition, in late 
1999, the MEMI, which was originally formed as the research section of Trans Techno., 
Co. Ltd. in 1996, became a non-profit organization with METI support for the purpose 
of conducting various research and information provision on Myanmar.112 At the same 
time, two non-profit organizations were established with the participation of former 
Japanese Ambassador to Myanmar Yamaguchi during this period: the AMCWA in 2000 
and TCM in 2003.113 These organizations appeared to have close relationships and 
personal connections with some pro-engagement politicians, former bureaucrats and 
business leaders.  
 
111 The SPF not only carried out functional cooperation projects in Myanmar but also organized 
conferences and symposiums in Japan and the U.S. in order to deepen understanding of the 
Myanmar problem (SPF, 2004; 2002).  
112 See the MEMI website available at http://www.memi.gr.jp/about_memi/index.html (accessed 5 
February 2010). 
113 See the AMCWA website available at http://amcwa.org/ and the TCM website available at 
http://www.consul-myanmar.com/ (both accessed 5 February 2010). 
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Rengo was another organization which began to be engaged in the Myanmar 
problem. In line with the commitment of the ILO and international trade unions to 
Myanmar, Rengo recognized Myanmar as a significant agenda item in its international 
activities. Rengo’s basic stance was that the Japanese government should freeze ODA 
until all political prisoners were released and Myanmar’s democratization was 
achieved.114 In May 2001, for instance, Rengo appealed to MOFA not to provide ODA 
to the Baluchaung hydro power plant project; this was in line with the ILO’s 
unprecedented call for a re-examination of the relationship with Myanmar in 2000 as 
well as an ILO report on forced labour related to the project.115 Rengo’s activities 
seemed to be closely linked with the organizations of Myanmar residents in Japan and 
Japanese supporters. Established in 2000, the BOJ was financially supported by Rengo 
and provided information and intellectual contributions to it (Nemoto, 2007: 106-107). 
The main objective of the BOJ was to become an umbrella organization of the groups of 
Myanmar residents in Japan which remained generally small and fragmented but were 
raising critical voices against Japan’s engagement policy. In addition, Myanmar 
residents in Japan and Japanese supporters carried out a number of cooperative activities 
which led to the establishment of an NGO called the PFB. The major link of these 
organizations with Japan’s policy-making, if any, was in their lobbying of politicians, 
especially of the members of the DMLSDM and those who were politically backed by 
Rengo.116 
Some humanitarian NGOs were established and expanded their activities in 
Myanmar during this period. While the SPDC’s return to an interventionist policy 
 
114  See Rengo’s website available at http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/kokusai/burma/index.html
(accessed 5 February 2010). 
115 See DPJ member Tani Hiroyuki’s question at the Audit Committee in the House of Councilors on 
11 December 2001. 
116 Some of these organizations also played an advocacy role by, for instance, providing information 
on their websites and organizing public symposiums. Mekong Watch, for example, invited MOFA’s 
Director of the First Southeast Asia Division Takahashi Taeko and DPJ member Suto Nobuhiko as 
speakers to its public symposium on Japan’s ODA and investment to Myanmar (Mekong Watch, 
2001).   
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direction generally strengthened restrictions on the activities of humanitarian aid 
organizations, some Japanese humanitarian NGOs, such as the BAJ and the Association 
of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA), remained in Myanmar and continued their 
activities.117 
(4) Media and Public Opinion 
 
The Japanese government’s decision to disburse yen loans to the Yangon 
airport project in early 1998 fuelled the debate on Myanmar policy among Japanese 
daily newspapers. The Sankei supported the government’s decision as an appropriate 
measure because postcolonial countries in the process of nation-building tended to 
experience twists and turns on the path to democratization. The Sankei also mentioned 
three reasons for Japan to consider more substantial assistance toward Myanmar: to 
maintain its relationship with a pro-Japanese country that had joined ASEAN; to 
promote private investment; and, to respond to the SPDC’s strengthening relationship 
with the PRC (SS, 27 February 1998). The Yomiuri observed that the Japanese 
government’s decision to resume yen loans was directly motivated by the SPDC’s move 
to alienate Japan, arguing that the government should explicitly explain Japan’s strategic 
objective not to push Myanmar toward the PRC, and its original diplomatic approach to 
maintain direct contacts with both the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi (YS, 6 March 
1998). The Mainichi emphasized Japan’s frustration against the U.S. ‘double standard’ 
toward human rights in deciding to employ an autonomous policy direction alternative 
to ‘cooperation with the U.S.’; yet it concluded that Japan needed to make clear the 
backbone of its autonomous policy (MS, 8 March 1998). The Asahi more explicitly 
criticized the government’s timing of the resumption of yen loans when there seemed to 
be no change in Myanmar’s domestic situation, insisting that yen loans should be used 
as diplomatic leverage to change the SPDC’s attitude toward dialogue with the 
 
117 On the BAJ’s activities in Myanmar, see Araishi (2009). 
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democratic camp (AS, 27 February 1998).  
 
Compared to the case of yen loan provision to the Yangon airport project, the 
decision to disburse grant aid for the Baluchaung hydro power plant attracted less 
attention from Japanese newspapers. Before the government’s decision, the Sankei was 
suspicious that the PRC had indirectly provided economic assistance to the Baluchaung 
hydro power plant via Yugoslavia when Yugoslavia decided to repair the plant as an 
assistance project in December 2000 (SS, 22 December 2000; 19 December 2000). This 
argument seemed to be utilized by some bureaucrats and politicians as a rationale to 
extend ODA to Baluchaung in order to counterbalance the PRC’s growing influence 
over Myanmar. The Mainichi was cautious about the government’s ODA provision but 
it did not explicitly criticize it, pointing out that the Japanese government should 
increase transparency in implementing grant aid projects (MS, 8 May 2002).  
 
6. Domestic Policy-Making System 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of Japan’s policy-making during this period 
was the way in which senior political leaders interacted with bureaucrats and other 
politicians and domestic actors. In accordance with the international politicization of the 
Myanmar problem, Japan’s senior political leaders recognized the necessity to take 
initiatives in dealing with the Myanmar problem. In decision-making of ODA provision, 
in which the Diet and political parties had a relatively large amount of room for official 
and unofficial participation, political leaders’ initiatives also allowed some freedom for 
domestic actors to play rent-seeking games by connecting their interests with the 
leaders’ objectives. In making decisions about the direction of bilateral official contacts 
and other non-budgetary measures, in which the Japanese government generally had 
more autonomy in relation to other domestic actors, there was a shift in relationships 
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and coalitions amongst leaders and ministries. In both cases, however, Japan’s Myanmar 
policy-making involved the initiatives of its political leaders, thereby enabling the 
Japanese government to carry out a more proactive engagement policy during this 
period.  
 
Whereas it hesitated to restart the remaining ODA projects because of 
Myanmar’s worsening political situation from late 1995, the Japanese government did 
seek opportunities to improve Myanmar’s domestic situation and foreign relations, 
which would remove obstacles in the way of a friendly relationship between the two 
countries. Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN was considered as one such opportunity for 
Prime Minister Hashimoto and Minister for Foreign Affairs Obuchi who began to take 
policy initiatives in a cautious manner. During a visit to ASEAN countries in January 
1997, Hashimoto expressed to ASEAN leaders that Japan would appreciate Myanmar’s 
accession to ASEAN as it would give Myanmar an incentive to act within international 
norms, whilst it “should not present a smokescreen to the autocratic rule back home” 
(MOFA, 1997a; 1997b). Obuchi had planned to visit Myanmar in March 1997, 
presumably for the purpose of conveying a similar message to the SPDC, though it was 
not realized in the end. 118  Subsequently, in response to the formal decision of 
Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN, Director of Cabinet Councilors’ Office on External 
Affairs Hirabayashi Hiroshi was dispatched to Myanmar in June 1997 to convey 
Hashimoto’s letter to the SPDC, which mentioned the significance of promoting 
democratization and improving the human rights situation.119 At a meeting with Khin 
Nyunt, he expressed concern for Myanmar’s isolated position in international society 
and asked Myanmar to avoid inviting international criticism so as not to make an 
obstacle for Japan’s cooperation with the SPDC. He also urged the SPDC to promote 
 
118 See Obuchi’s response to DPJ member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 28 November 1997. 
119 See Director General of Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA Ohshima’s response to DPJ 
member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives 
on 28 November 1997. 
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democratization and ensure dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi (Hirabayashi, 2008). Yet, 
the Japanese government was still cautious about its executive leaders having direct 
contact in this period. According to one report, even though the SPDC strongly 
requested a bilateral meeting at the informal ASEAN summit meeting in December 
1997, the Japanese government declined, ostensibly due to a lack of time (MS, 12 
January 1998).  
 
The Japanese government moved to extend yen loans to the Yangon airport 
project during this period, although the project was limited to safety purposes. In late 
1997, the Japanese government reportedly considered fully disbursing yen loans for the 
initial Yangon airport extension project agreed before 1988 (AS, 1 March 1998). 
According to one report, this was directly motivated by SPDC signs of alienation 
towards Japan and its strengthening of ties with the PRC, although, in 1997, it had 
requested the Japanese government to resume ODA provision to the Yangon airport 
project by limiting the project to safety purpose (YS, 6 March 1998).120 Regardless of 
whether this was an SPDC diplomatic tactic or not, the Japanese government recognized 
the necessity of providing economic assistance in order to maintain the historical 
bilateral friendship as well as to avoid Myanmar’s isolation which would result in an 
expansion of the PRC’s presence. In deciding this policy, however, there were worries 
in the Japanese government, particularly within MOFA, about possible friction with the 
U.S. The Clinton administration, especially Secretary of State Albright, had become 
extremely critical of the SPDC since the mid-1990s, expressing a concern that Japan’s 
yen loans would send the wrong message to the SPDC. The Japanese government, 
therefore, limited the Yangon airport project to safety purposes and reduced the scale of 
the project to approximately 10% of the one originally agreed so as to claim it was 
humanitarian assistance. 121  In addition, according to one report, the Japanese 
 
120 See Director General of Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA Ohshima’s response to LDP 
member Hase Hiroshi’s question at the Investigation Committee on International Problems in the 
House of Councilors on 27 February 1998. 
121 A 27.1 billion yen loan for the Yangon airport project was agreed from 1984 to 1986 and 
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government waited to disburse yen loans for some time after January 1998 for the 
purpose of maintaining a positive Japan-U.S. relationship at that time (AS, 1 March 
1998). In the end, the Japanese government notified the SPDC in February 1998 that it 
would provide limited yen loans for the Yangon airport project.  
 
Subsequently, the Japanese government attempted to make the most of this 
ODA provision. When notifying Japan’s decision to resume partial yen loans to the 
Yangon airport project, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Komura 
Masahiko mentioned that the situation did not allow for the full implementation of the 
Yangon airport extension project or for the disbursement of new yen loans because of 
Myanmar’s stagnating democratization process and delay in debt repayment (MS, 29 
March 1998). In addition, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Haraguchi Koichi was 
dispatched to Myanmar in late May 1998 for the purpose of conveying Hashimoto’s 
letter to Khin Nyunt. Hashimoto emphasized that the yen loan disbursement to Yangon 
airport was a big decision for the Japanese government and he urged Myanmar to push 
forward the democratization process and improve the human rights situation. This 
indicates that Hashimoto and Obuchi expected the SPDC to show positive moves on the 
issues of democratization and human rights protection in response to Japan’s yen loan 
provision. In other words, their intention was to make a change in the Myanmar 
problem based on bilateral mutual confidence rather than utilizing economic assistance 
disbursement for political leverage against the SPDC.  
 
With little progress in the Myanmar problem despite Japan’s ODA provision, 
there were another series of diplomatic actions under the Obuchi administration from 30 
July 1998. In his capacity as a former Prime Minister, Hashimoto scheduled a visit to 
 
approximately 4 billion yen was disbursed by 1988. The decision in early 1998 was to provide a 2.5 
billion yen loan only for the safety part of the original project plan. See Director General of 
Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA Ohshima’s response to LDP member Hase Hiroshi’s 
question at the Investigation Committee on International Problems in the House of Councilors on 27 
February 1998. 
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Myanmar in December 1999 in response to a request from Sasakawa Yohei, the 
President of the Nippon Foundation. In parallel with this move, Obuchi decided to have 
an executive-level meeting for the first time in 15 years with Chairman Than Shwe at 
the ASEAN summit meeting at Singapore in November 1999. At this meeting, Obuchi 
proposed to set up a bilateral policy dialogue among government officers, academics 
and other intellectuals for the purpose of issuing policy recommendations for 
Myanmar’s economic structural adjustment. Having been agreed by Than Shwe, this 
proposal led to the launch of the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural Adjustment 
of the Myanmar Economy. After five workshops among the joint taskforce members 
from June 2000 to December 2002, a report was formulated with policy 
recommendations on the Myanmar economy.   
 
The Baluchaung hydro power plant was another politically controversial 
project which reached an exchange of notes during this period, after Japanese 
policy-makers and concerned companies had actively advocated for its implementation, 
especially since the mid-1990s. As there was little improvement in Myanmar’s domestic 
political situation, nevertheless, the Japanese government hesitated to implement the 
project.122 However, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar Razali 
Ismail’s mediation initiative to promote a political dialogue between the SPDC and 
Aung San Suu Kyi, which began in October 2000, was an opportunity for the Japanese 
government to consider implementation. In December 2000, it was reported in Japan 
that the SPDC had agreed with the Yugoslavian government that Yugoslavia would 
carry out the restoration of the Baluchaung hydro power plant, which the Sankei 
suspected to be the PRC’s proxy assistance (SS, 19 December 2000; 22 December 
2000). Moreover, the Japanese government probably expected that the new U.S. 
administration under Bush would take a more moderate stance toward the SPDC. 
 
122 According to a newspaper report based on an interview with Muto Kabun, although it was 
decided to carry out Prime Minister Obuchi’s initiative, this project could not be implemented 
because of pressure from the U.S. Department of State (SS, 22 December 2000). 
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Following these moves, in April 2001, which was near the end of the Mori 
administration, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Yohei notified Myanmar’s Vice 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Khin Maung Win of Japan’s intention to implement a 
limited repair of the Baluchaung hydro power plant as a three-year grant aid project 
totalling 3-3.5 billion yen.123 The Japanese government made three compromises to the 
original project plan in the process of deciding the ODA provision: limiting the project 
to minimal repairs; providing grant aid rather than yen loans; and, dividing the project 
into three terms in order to observe the progress of Myanmar’s domestic political 
reconciliation. At the same time, the Japanese government also decided to cancel all six 
remaining ODA projects, which came to around 10 billion yen (SS, 18 June 2001). 
Although these decisions were part of the Japanese government’s re-examination of its 
overall ODA policy that was initiated by MOF rather than a specific policy toward 
Myanmar, they finally cleared the issue for the Japanese government of the remaining 
ODA projects in Myanmar.124 
Despite dispatching two technical survey missions in August and November 
2001, the new Koizumi government delayed the exchange of notes for this project until 
10 May 2002 for several reasons. Firstly, the restart of political dialogue between the 
SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi apparently had no substantial outcome until early 2002. 
Actually, the exchange of notes was finally carried out in May 2002 after the SPDC’s 
release of Aung San Suu Kyi after 19 months of house detention. Secondly, Aung San 
Suu Kyi was critical of Japan’s ODA provision to the Baluchaung hydro power plant. 
The President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and former Vice-Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Owada Hisashi met with Aung San Suu Kyi at Yangon on 17 August 
2001 for the purpose of asking for her understanding of Japan’s intention in ODA 
disbursement (NS, 18 August 2001). Subsequently, she mentioned around the time of 
 
123 See Minister for Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi Yoriko’s response to DPJ member Suto Nobuhiko’s 
question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 24 April 2002. 
124 This, however, seemed to have a negative impact on Than Shwe’s stance toward Japan in 
combination with the delayed implementation of the Baluchaung hydro power plant project.  
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her release that humanitarian aid which would directly benefit people’s lives was 
acceptable insofar as it was transparent enough not to provide any special interest to the 
authority (MS, 8 May 2002). Thirdly, the U.S. also maintained a critical stance 
regarding Japan’s ODA disbursement. In May 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell mentioned in Congress that the U.S. government suggested that Japan’s aid for 
the Baluchaung hydro power plant was “not a proper investment to be made at this time 
with this regime” (AFP, 17 May 2001). Lastly, as mentioned above, the project could 
not be implemented due to a breakdown in discussions at the LDP Special Committee 
on External Economic Cooperation (AS, 8 May 2002).  
 
The Koizumi administration also began to conduct a proactive engagement 
policy so as to promote Myanmar’s domestic political reconciliation. From late 2001 it 
utilized the implementation of the Baluchaung hydro power plant project as leverage 
against the SPDC. Bilateral dialogues concerning economic policy recommendations 
proposed through the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural Adjustment of the 
Myanmar Economy, which had already finished the drafting process of the final report 
by spring 2002, were also utilized as a tool to encourage SPDC policy reform in 
combination with arguments showing Japan’s possible support for it. The Japanese 
government actually considered providing some kind of support to the SPDC in return 
for economic structural reforms because it recognized that the SPDC would not 
implement the policy recommendations without Japan’s substantial support.  
 
Prime Minister Koizumi held a meeting with Than Shwe on 5 November 2001 
at the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in Brunei Darussalam (MOFA, 2001). He also 
discussed Myanmar’s domestic political issues in talks with Malaysia’s Prime Minister 
Mahathir and Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin during his visit to ASEAN countries in 
January 2002.125 It was on 10 May 2002, right after the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, 
 
125 See Prime Minister Koizumi’s response to DPJ member Kinoshita Atsushi’s question at the Audit 
and Administration Oversight Committee in the House of Representatives on 8 May 2002. 
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that the Japanese government finally conducted the exchange of notes with the SPDC 
on the Baluchaung hydro power plant project.126 Subsequently, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Kawaguchi visited Myanmar in August 2002 for the first time in 19 years as 
Japan’s Foreign Minister. He called for the leaders of both camps “to advance ‘policy 
dialogue in humanitarian areas’ and to develop this to ‘political dialogue’”, mentioning 
Japan’s willingness to support specific projects if those projects were agreed as a result 
of the dialogue between them (MOFA, 2002b).127 Prime Minister Koizumi again met 
with Prime Minister Than Shwe on the sidelines of the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in 
Phnom Penh on 5 November 2002 (MOFA, 2002a). In order to push the SPDC to 
implement the policy recommendations of the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for 
Structural Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy, the Japanese government explained its 
decision to grant 273.5 billion yen of debt relief, including the principal and interest, at 
the last workshop on 22 December 2002 (AS, 23 December 2002).128 The Japanese 
government also hosted a UN organized conference on the Myanmar problem in 
February 2003 in Tokyo.129 In addition, former Prime Minister Mori visited Myanmar 
for three days from 29 April 2003 to convey Prime Minister Koizumi’s letter to Than 
Shwe as well as to encourage the SPDC to promote both the democratization process 
and economic reform, including implementation of the economic policy package 
recommended in the final report of the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural 
Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy (Chugoku Shimbun, 27 April 2003). Japan’s 
attempts to make a positive change toward Myanmar’s political and economic 
development, however, became stuck due to the Depayin incident on 30 May 2003.  
 
126 On MOFA’s official rationale for this ODA disbursement, see MOFA (2002c). In the end, 
however, the Baluchaung hydro power plant project was suspended midway due to the occurrence of 
the Depayin incident in May 2003.  
127 See Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA Yabunaka Mitoji’s 
response to Ohbuchi Kinuko’s question at the Fiscal and Finance Committee in the House of 
Councilors on 26 March 2003. 
128 This, however, seemed to be not as much as the SPDC expected for Japan’s assistance in 
implementing policy recommendations, even though the clearance of delinquent debt was considered 
as a necessary requirement for Japan’s future yen loan disbursement.    
129 See Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA Yabunaka Mitoji’s 
response to Ohbuchi Kinuko’s question at the Fiscal and Finance Committee in the House of 
Councilors on 26 March 2003. 
192 
 
Even after the Depayin incident, the Japanese government still sought 
opportunities to recover the situation. Prime Minister Koizumi met with Myanmar’s 
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt when attending the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in October 
2003, expressing Japan’s worry about Myanmar’s democratization and Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s situation.130 Despite suspending aid after the Depayin incident, the Japanese 
government decided to resume general grant aids for humanitarian purposes in January 
2004 (Foresight, March 2004). The Japanese government also moved to settle the 
problem of Myanmar’s attendance at the ASEM in 2004, about which a political conflict 
had occurred between the EU and ASEAN, by proposing a compromise to admit 
Myanmar at Foreign Minister-level attendance instead of Prime Minister-level (Ishida, 
2008: 224-225). The Japanese government, however, regarded the ouster of Khin Nyunt 
as a sign of fading hopes for Myanmar’s positive development; at least in the short-term. 
In more practical terms, as Khin Nyunt had been the SPDC’s main contact person in 
bilateral dialogues, the Japanese government found it highly difficult to hold 
constructive bilateral talks with the SPDC after he left.  
 
From the perspective of Japan’s policy-making system, three characteristics of 
the decision-making process of providing ODA to Myanmar during this period can be 
identified. Firstly, decisions were largely initiated by senior Japanese political leaders. 
In the case of the Yangon airport project, Obuchi played a leading role in the 
decision-making process of this yen loan disbursement and Secretary-General of the 
LDP Kato proactively supported it in persuading the ruling parties to agree; SDP, NPS 
and even some LDP members opposed the yen loans disbursement, but Obuchi 
persuaded them by saying that he would explain Japan’s stance to win the U.S. 
government’s understanding. Obuchi discussed the Myanmar problem at a meeting with 
 
130 See Deputy Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau of MOFA Saiki Akitaka’s 
response to Shimabuku Soko’s question at the Special Committee on International Terrorism 
Prevention and Japan’s Cooperation and Assistance Activities and Related Matters in the House of 
Councilors on 8 October 2003.  
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U.S. Secretary of State Albright in 1997, explaining Japan’s willingness to carry out the 
Yangon airport project for humanitarian purposes.131 When considering that the SPDC 
had delayed debt repayments to Japan at that time, which remained at more than 400 
billion yen, this policy-making could be understood as a political decision rather than as 
a result of the bureaucratic process.132 In the case of the Baluchaung hydro power plant 
project, the Mori administration followed the previous administrations’ default 
engagement policy line, seeking an opportunity to make a change to the Myanmar 
problem. Razali’s mediation efforts in Myanmar’s domestic political reconciliation were, 
hence, considered as another opportunity. By emphasizing the significance of the start 
of dialogue between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi’s camp, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Kono Yohei expressed willingness to support Razali’s mediation initiative by 
making the most of Japan’s position to be able to talk with both sides.133 
Secondly, MOFA was somewhat ambivalent about these decisions but at least 
did not seem to strongly resist them. In the case of the Yangon airport project some 
MOFA officials recognized the necessity to take action. This was for the purpose of 
supporting the SPDC’s efforts toward domestic nation-building and development which 
in turn would strengthen the historical bilateral friendship; and there was a need to 
respond to the changing costs and benefits imposed by international structure. On the 
other hand, some MOFA officials, including both those in charge of North American 
and Myanmar affairs, were apparently negative to this decision because of the predicted 
international repercussions, especially from the U.S. government. They also saw little 
prospect for a positive SPDC response to limited ODA resumption. In the end, however, 
MOFA generally moved in line with Obuchi’s and other political leaders’ initiatives. In 
 
131 See Obuchi’s response to DPJ member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 28 November 1997. 
132 See Director General of Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA Ohshima’s response to DPJ 
member Fujita Yukihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives 
on 28 November 1997. 
133 See Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono’s response to DPJ member Kinoshita Atsushi’s question at 
the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 8 November 2000. 
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the case of the Baluchaung hydro power plant project, in spite of ambivalent internal 
opinions, MOFA held certain hopes for Razali’s mediation efforts and were willing to 
support them (YS, 26 May 2001).134 Razali’s indication that Japan’s assistance would 
be supportive to his mediation role presumably made MOFA’s executive officials feel 
relatively confident about the ODA provision. Having previously been in charge of the 
implementation of the project, some active and former METI officials were also largely 
proactive toward ODA provision. 
 
Thirdly, individual politicians and concerned companies had also been actively 
lobbying for ODA resumption to the two projects since the previous period. They 
successfully connected with political leaders’ initiatives for supporting Myanmar’s 
nation-building and development. These two projects were given particular importance 
among all the on-going yen loan projects by concerned Japanese companies. Thus, for 
instance, in 1997 Japanese companies involved in the Yangon airport project advised the 
SPDC to request the Japanese government to resume ODA extension to the project. 
Also, there seemed to be some rent-seeking activities in deciding and implementing the 
ODA provision to Baluchaung. When considering that the ODA disbursements became 
possible only after the initiatives of Japanese political leaders, however, this factor 
should be considered only as a supportive rather than a main factor in Japan’s 
policy-making system.  
 
Japan’s decision-making about the direction of bilateral official contacts and 
other non-budgetary measures was also involved in the political leaders’ initiatives but 
showed slightly different characteristics from ODA provision. Firstly, it seems to be 
certain that Hashimoto and Obuchi as well as Koizumi and Kawaguchi initiated direct 
contact with Myanmar’s political leaders. This was particularly the case in November 
 
134 According to a report, a MOFA executive officer legitimated this ODA disbursement as strategic 
assistance, which was rare among Japan’s foreign assistance, for the purpose of promoting 
Myanmar’s political dialogue by the ‘sunshine policy’ (AS, 5 June 2001). 
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1999 when Obuchi held a meeting with Than Shwe, the first senior leaders’ meeting in 
15 years. It seemed that the offer of a meeting from the SPDC came not only through 
the official diplomatic route but also through unofficial ones, and in responding to this 
the Kantei initiated the decision to go ahead with the meeting. This was despite the fact 
that MOFA was not necessarily positive to a high-level contact which could result in 
pledging yet more ODA without any prospect of positive change in Myanmar.   
 
Secondly, the idea of the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural 
Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy appeared to come from a broader policy 
community. A source of this idea was the so-called ‘Ishikawa Project’ in Vietnam after 
1995 which was a case in which Japan provided policy advice and assistance for the 
recipient country’s economic structural reform. Some of the Ishikawa Project supporters, 
not only in the government but also outside, wanted to set up a similar policy dialogue 
with the Myanmar government. Another source was the World Bank’s attempt to issue a 
formal report from 1998-99 on the Myanmar economy including policy 
recommendations, but this was not published due to the SPDC’s disagreement about the 
content. With this in mind, MOFA recognized that a bilateral economic survey and 
dialogue could be an alternative possible policy measure. For MOFA, which had 
worried about the possibility that Obuchi would pledge ODA disbursement at the 
meeting with Than Shwe, the proposal of an economic policy dialogue was more 
acceptable as an alternative measure to bring about change in Myanmar. While the exact 
source to Obuchi remains unclear, the Kantei seems to have consulted about Obuchi’s 
proposal to Than Shwe not only with MOFA but also other actors before the meeting in 
November 1999.  
 
Lastly, in the early 2000s, MOFA played a proactive role in diplomatic efforts 
to change the Myanmar problem by closely cooperating with Koizumi and other senior 
political leaders. It was MOFA that initiated the implementation of the Japan-Myanmar 
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Cooperation for Structural Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy after Deputy 
Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Kono Masaharu’s visit to 
Myanmar in March 2000.135 Especially in the final stage of the project, MOFA 
attempted to utilize it as a tool to push the SPDC toward Myanmar’s political and 
economic development. In coordination with the SPF’s arrangements, during former 
Prime Minister Mori’s visit to Myanmar in April 2003, MOFA made him encourage the 
SPDC to implement the policy recommendations. MOFA’s proactive role based on a 
close relationship with political leaders, therefore, could be recognized as a distinctive 
characteristic of Myanmar policy-making during this period. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
During this period, there was little substantial change in the basic picture of the 
Myanmar problem despite the attempts of Khin Nyunt and other moderate pragmatists 
in the SPDC to promote domestic political reconciliation and an international 
cooperation policy line. Also, there emerged some significant changes in international 
political and economic structure surrounding the Myanmar problem. Such international 
structural changes, nonetheless, did not alter Japan’s primary objective in Myanmar 
policy-making, which was to make practical and gradual changes toward Myanmar’s 
political and economic development. This was partly because the fundamentally 
unchanged societal and transnational structure meant that the Japanese government 
considered it was necessary and more realistic to persuade the SPDC to take actions for 
gradual political and economic development rather than employ a radical approach. 
From this viewpoint, Khin Nyunt’s policy initiatives and Razali’s mediation efforts 
during this period were regarded by the Japanese government as hopeful ways to bring 
 
135 Accordingly, METI and MOF assigned their officials at deputy director-general level to the 
project and a number of academics and intellectuals, including those who were committed to the 
Ishikawa Project, were also appointed as members of the taskforce. Around 30 Japanese delegates 
attended the first workshop at Yangon in June 2000 (YS, 26 June 2000). 
197 
 
about positive change in Myanmar.  
 
At the same time, the international politicization of the Myanmar problem, 
particularly from the mid-1990s, made Japan’s senior political leaders recognize the 
necessity of taking initiatives in Japan’s Myanmar policy-making. From Japanese 
policy-makers’ viewpoints, there were several common concerns in international 
structural changes during this period. Firstly, in shaping its Asian policy, the Japanese 
government needed to re-examine how to deal with the U.S., which had become the 
only superpower but was paying less attention to Asian affairs. Specifically on 
Myanmar, the U.S. strengthened a high-handed sanctions approach in an even more 
uncompromising manner, which was recognized as a counterproductive measure on 
Myanmar’s political and economic development by the Japanese government. Secondly, 
the PRC’s growing influence in East Asia with its successful conduct of a good 
neighbour policy became a worry for many Japanese policy-makers. As the PRC 
provided unconditional support to the SPDC, the Japanese government was 
apprehensive that it would undermine the historical Japan-Myanmar friendship as well 
as Japan’s efforts to make a positive change to Myanmar’s domestic situation. Thirdly, 
the Japanese government was concerned that the Asian Financial Crisis would harm the 
political stability and development of ASEAN, which was becoming an overarching 
regional framework in Southeast Asia. As Myanmar’s economy experienced a serious 
downturn in the late 1990s, the Japanese government recognized the Myanmar problem 
as one of the major risks for ASEAN’s stability and development.  
 
The question for the Japanese government, therefore, was how to deal with the 
costs and benefits imposed by international political and economic structure in pursuing 
the primary objective in its Myanmar policy. Hashimoto and Obuchi chose a proactive 
commitment to a default engagement policy line based on historical bilateral friendship. 
In their view, it enabled Japan to pursue an autonomous Asian policy in contrast to the 
198 
 
counterproductive U.S. policy, and it supported ASEAN’s stability and development as 
an Asian partner and thereby hedged against the PRC’s growing presence in the region. 
Moreover, the Japanese government considered that by conducting a proactive 
engagement policy which could succeed in changing Myanmar’s situation Japan would 
be able to increase its international prestige. Koizumi, on the other hand, slightly shifted 
to a critical engagement line by more clearly utilizing economic assistance as leverage 
against the SPDC. This was in combination with Razali’s mediation attempts and the 
policy recommendations suggested by the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural 
Adjustment of the Myanmar Economy, which was perceived as a clearly different 
direction from the PRC’s unconditional support or the U.S. sanctions policy. Based on a 
close relationship with the U.S., the Koizumi administration dealt with the Myanmar 
problem as a major issue for the development of the Southeast Asian regional political 
system. From the Japanese government’s viewpoint, making progress in Myanmar was, 
again, a measure to increase Japan’s prestige in the international arena. In the end, an 
engagement policy line was regarded as the most balanced and preferable policy line for 
the Japanese government in dealing with international structural changes surrounding 
Myanmar.  
 
In terms of domestic resource mobilization, a wider range of domestic actors 
began to participate in Japan’s Myanmar policy-making. Especially when deciding 
internationally controversial ODA disbursements, the Japanese government experienced 
some difficulties in its relations with coalition partners and individual politicians 
carrying out rent-seeking activities. In addition, domestic discourse on Myanmar policy 
showed a broad spectrum from unconditional support to a pro-sanctions policy direction. 
Mainstream policy-making actors, however, basically supported the engagement policy 
line with some wanting to critically engage with Myanmar and some advocating more 
support based on historical friendship. Arguments about the ‘China threat’ or Japan’s 
prestige in East Asia, regardless of which actors actually held them as their primary 
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motivation, functioned rather well in mobilizing the support of a broad range of 
domestic actors for the government’s proactive engagement with Myanmar.  
 
Japan’s domestic policy-making showed a shift from bureaucratic politics to 
one of senior political leaders’ initiatives. All Prime Ministers from Hashimoto to 
Koizumi appeared to participate in Myanmar policy-making more proactively than in 
the previous period. On the one hand, it enabled some domestic actors to conduct 
rent-seeking activities in the decision-making process of ODA disbursements. On the 
other hand, the Japanese government could conduct an engagement policy in a more 
proactive manner because of their political leaders’ commitment to a Myanmar policy. 
Particularly in the early 2000s, a close coordination between these political leaders and 
MOFA enabled a series of relatively intensive diplomatic efforts.   
 
To sum up, the international politicization of the Myanmar problem and 
changes in international structure forced Japan’s senior political leaders to become more 
involved in Myanmar policy-making. Yet, it did not alter the Japanese government’s 
primary objective to make gradual and practical changes toward Myanmar’s political 
and economic development. Rather, proactive engagement was considered as the most 
balanced and preferable way for the Japanese government to pursue its pragmatic 
objectives within the costs and benefits imposed by the changing international political 
and economic structure. Still, it is noteworthy that the Koizumi administration 
conducted a proactive Myanmar policy in pursuit of developing a political system in 
Southeast Asia based on a close relationship with the U.S.; whilst the previous 
administrations pursued an autonomous Myanmar policy which emphasized bilateral 
friendship and the necessary evil of the SPDC’s authoritarian rule based on the 
discourse of an Asian developmental state model. In the end, Japan’s proactive 
engagement policy would have been the most preferable option for the Japanese 
government if it had led to any positive changes in the Myanmar problem during this 
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period; however, in reality this never happened.  
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Chapter 5 
From 2005 to 2008: Passive but Persistent Engagement 
 
1. Overview 
This chapter covers the period from 2005 to 2008, when Japan’s Myanmar 
policy experienced a serious difficulty due to the SPDC’s accelerated isolationist and 
authoritarian direction after the ouster of Khin Nyunt in October 2004. During this 
period, the SPDC became more determined to pursue its own roadmap toward 
‘disciplined democracy’ without paying much attention to domestic political 
reconciliation. This was primarily because the SPDC became more confident not only 
about the preservation of domestic stability but also about its enhanced invulnerability 
to Western countries’ criticism and sanctions policy. In fact, the SPDC put less effort 
into gaining political and economic assistance even from Japan and ASEAN, focusing 
more on constructing pragmatic and cooperative relationships with the PRC and other 
less problematic countries. The SPDC prioritized the maintenance of domestic social 
and economic stability by strengthening its interventionist economic policy, which 
became a policy option largely because of foreign currency earnings from natural gas 
exports to Thailand and the PRC’s material support. Accordingly, Myanmar’s domestic 
problems remained unsettled, with some of them becoming even more serious, though 
the SPDC prevented them from becoming sources of social instability by consolidating 
its power over domestic opposition including the pro-democracy camp and ethnic 
minority groups.  
 
Consequently, other governments did not reorient their basic policy directions 
but rather made them even more structuralized. After the Depayin incident in May 2003, 
the Bush administration went further toward a comprehensive sanctions policy despite 
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having supposedly taken a more moderate stance toward Myanmar than the previous 
Clinton administration. In addition, the U.S. and other Western countries’ efforts to 
politicize the Myanmar problem at multilateral forums, especially at the UN Security 
Council, put substantial pressure on ASEAN and Japan. Due to the SPDC’s successful 
maintenance of general macro-economic stability, however, the U.S. comprehensive 
sanctions rather undercut its leverage against the SPDC. Meanwhile, ASEAN found it 
increasingly difficult to deal with the Myanmar problem especially since the Bangkok 
process initiated by Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin stalled. In fact, by recognizing 
its limitations in meaningfully influencing Myanmar’s domestic situation, ASEAN 
attempted to coordinate closely with the UN in order to involve other related 
governments in dealing with the Myanmar problem. The PRC, on the other hand, 
further deepened its political and economic ties with Myanmar based on a close 
relationship with the SPDC and its substantial material support. Some other countries 
including India, Russia and North Korea also constructed pragmatic and cooperative 
relationships with the SPDC albeit in a low-key manner and with limited scope. The 
SPDC also consolidated its rule and control of societal and transnational structure. 
Although they had enhanced their activities globally, transnational pro-democracy 
networks had little influence on the SPDC primarily because Western governments had 
lost leverage over it.  
 
The Japanese government faced serious difficulties in pursuing its pragmatic 
objective to make a positive change in the Myanmar problem after the Depayin incident 
and the ouster of Khin Nyunt. On the one hand, the Depayin incident disillusioned 
many Japanese policy-makers of the possibility of change in Myanmar problem by 
raising doubts about the SPDC’s sincerity toward domestic political reconciliation and 
the maintenance of the Japan-Myanmar bilateral friendship. On the other hand, the 
disappearance of Khin Nyunt from the SPDC meant that the Japanese government lost 
an essential contact who had recognized the significance of international coordination, 
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thus it became necessary to deal with a military government which showed a further 
uncompromising posture. Whilst still generally regarding an engagement policy as the 
only pragmatic policy line for Myanmar’s political and economic development, the 
Japanese government moved reluctantly from proactive engagement to a ‘wait-and-see’ 
position.  
 
At the same time, the Japanese government needed to deal with increasing 
pressure from the U.S. and other Western countries. This was especially true at the UN 
Security Council where since 2005 the Myanmar problem had begun to be discussed in 
response to the proposal of the U.S. and the UK for Myanmar to be a formal agenda 
item for the Security Council. While still regarding sanctions as a counterproductive 
measure to deal with Myanmar, the Japanese government, as a non-permanent council 
member, could not protest against making the Myanmar problem a formal agenda item, 
especially when faced with U.S. pressure to approve its proposal. After voting for the 
proposal on 15 September 2006, the Japanese government began to utilize the discourse 
of ‘taiwa to atsuryoku’ (talk and pressure), which was originally created for the purpose 
of describing Japan’s tougher stance toward North Korea. However, these changes did 
not appear to mean any substantial reorientation of Japan’s pragmatic objective or its 
engagement approach toward the Myanmar problem. The Japanese government showed 
a risk-averse posture during this period, and waited for signs of improvement in both the 
Myanmar problem itself and the international structural environment, which would 
enable Japan to get back to more proactive engagement.   
 
The Japanese government also experienced some transitions in its domestic 
resource mobilization during this period. Firstly, due to the declining short-term 
prospect of any substantial increase in Japan’s ODA disbursement, rent-seekers’ 
activities within the policy-making system were largely curtailed. Secondly, many 
Japanese companies, especially the larger ones, accelerated downsizing in Myanmar 
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because of serious difficulties in finding and continuing business as well as the 
increasing risk to their reputation in Western markets. Thirdly, the DMLSDM and 
pro-democracy groups enhanced their activities in response to internationally 
controversial incidents in Myanmar and some of them even called for sanctions. This 
was in contrast to many pro-engagement groups which became hesitant to act positively 
due to the weakening bilateral political friendship and the worsening image of the 
SPDC within domestic society. Fourthly, the authoritarian developmental state image of 
the SPDC gradually lost its credibility in Japan and was replaced by the image of a 
dictatorship, especially after the Myanmar authority’s shooting of Japanese journalist 
Nagai Kenji in September 2007. These factors made it more difficult for the Japanese 
government to mobilize domestic support for a proactive engagement policy, although 
this was not crucial as many mainstream politicians still supported the engagement 
policy line, either in a friendly or in a critical manner. 
 
Within Japan’s domestic policy-making process, the Myanmar problem 
remained as one of the most important agenda items in Southeast Asian affairs. Japan’s 
senior political leaders, thus, were kept informed about the development of the 
Myanmar problem though they did not make any distinct initiatives in Myanmar 
policy-making due to both pragmatic and structural difficulties. Frequent changes of 
cabinet members also prevented senior leaders from making any continuous political 
initiatives in Myanmar policy. Besides, METI’s and MOF’s decreasing stake in 
Myanmar policy made the policy-making system within the Japanese government less 
fragmented than in the previous period. As a result, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making 
generally rested on the coordination of MOFA, which largely adopted a low-profile and 
risk-averse posture during this period.   
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2. Foreign Policy Agenda 
 
After the ouster of Khin Nyunt in October 2004, the SPDC clearly returned to 
an isolationist foreign policy as well as an interventionist economic policy. The SPDC 
maintained its authoritarian rule and domestic macro-economic stability, even though 
there were mass protests in September 2007 which occurred at least partly due to 
failures in economic management in the mid-2000s. Regarding the agenda of 
democratic legitimacy, the SPDC became more decisive in pursuing its own roadmap 
toward ‘disciplined democracy’ instead of seeking domestic political reconciliation. 
Whilst Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD continued their political activities in appealing 
to the general public and international society, their political influence was restrained by 
the SPDC’s oppression and its decreasing vulnerability to external factors, particularly 
the Western governments’ sanctions policy. The SPDC also consolidated its control over 
the territory including the border areas which were once sites of frequent insurgency 
activities of ethnic minority groups. During this period, however, Myanmar’s 
humanitarian situation worsened in some aspects, particularly in the border areas and 
for refugees and displaced persons. Yet, the SPDC was highly reluctant to accommodate 
international advice and assistance, let alone criticism, which would have a negative 
impact on its rule and domestic stability even at the time of the Cyclone Nargis disaster 
in April-May 2008.  
 
In foreign policy, the SPDC accelerated its isolationist foreign policy direction 
despite maintaining a good relationship with the PRC and searching for pragmatic 
cooperation with other less problematic countries. Whilst concerned about the Western 
governments’ sanctions policy and its impact on Myanmar’s neighbouring countries’ 
policies, the SPDC made minimal efforts to improve its relationship with the West. In 
addition, the SPDC put less emphasis on retaining material and non-material support 
from Japan and ASEAN countries than in the previous period. In other words, the SPDC 
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became much less willing to pay costs in retaining external support, especially 
concerning the issues of democratization and human rights protection, and thus focused 
on developing pragmatic and cooperative relationships with the PRC and other 
countries such as India, Russia and North Korea.  
 
In economic policy, the SPDC became more confident about carrying out an 
interventionist economic policy primarily because its economic capacity was enhanced 
by natural gas exports to Thailand and deepening economic ties with the PRC. Yet, 
despite preserving domestic macro-economic stability, the Myanmar economy 
experienced some difficulties including a run on private banks in February 2003 as well 
as an increase in energy and food prices in the mid-2000s. This resulted in heightening 
public frustration and was at least partly a cause of the mass movement in September 
2007. Actually, the U.S. import ban on products made in Myanmar in response to the 
Depayin incident damaged Myanmar’s garment industry, which had been rapidly 
growing as a major exporter since the late 1990s, even though the ban did not have 
much impact on the SPDC’s rule (Kudo, 2006a: 25-26). In the end, it rather contributed 
to making the Myanmar economy less vulnerable in the U.S. market. On the whole, the 
SPDC could maintain general macro-economic stability during this period in spite of 
the fiscal burdens of the capital relocation from Yangon to Naypyidaw from the summer 
of 2003 and the extremely high proportion of military spending in government 
expenditure.   
 
Concerning democratic legitimacy, the SPDC showed almost no interest in 
reconciliation with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and pushed forward its seven-step 
roadmap toward ‘disciplined democracy’ in a decisive manner. From 2004, the SPDC 
intermittently held the National Convention in order to finalize the process of 
formulating a new constitution as one step in its roadmap. In doing so, the SPDC did 
not care about the absence of the NLD and again placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house 
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arrest after the Depayin incident. It also put efforts into coming to an agreement with 
major ethnic minority groups. In September 2007, a domestic mass movement spread 
not only among the general public but also Buddhist monks, who had previously strictly 
avoided any political activities. The SPDC responded oppressively, again showing its 
will and capability of preserving domestic rule by coercion as well as pushing forward 
its own roadmap. After discussing the new constitution at the National Convention, the 
SPDC held a constitutional referendum on 10 May 2008, though it was postponed until 
24 May in areas hit by Cyclone Nargis. This officially resulted in a turnout of more than 
98% with more than 92% approval. This indicated that, while it ended its extralegal 
status by transferring power to a civilian government, the SPDC intended to preserve 
and institutionalize the military’s control over the government through the new 
constitution. In other words, the SPDC focused on establishing formal legal legitimacy 
and maintaining domestic stability but paid almost no attention to gain democratic 
legitimacy in the eyes of international critics and the domestic opposition.   
 
In terms of human rights, the SPDC became even more indifferent to 
international criticism after the downfall of the moderate pragmatists within the SPDC. 
The military’s presence was expanding in the border areas where many ethnic minority 
residents lived. It was necessary for the military to sustain its organization and build up 
local infrastructure by itself as it did not have sufficient financial support from the 
government. This resulted in forced labour and other compulsory contributions 
(Pedersen, 2008: 8). Human rights, especially political rights, were also restricted by the 
SPDC which prioritized the preservation of domestic political stability over human 
rights protection or international coordination.  
 
In dealing with domestic insurgencies, the SPDC had steadily consolidated its 
control over the territory based on increased material capabilities and the enforcement 
of ceasefire agreements with all the major ethnic minority groups except for the KNU. 
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The KNU was the only major ethnic minority group that continued fighting against the 
SPDC but gradually lost its capability to carry on an armed struggle (Pedersen, 2008: 6). 
In other words, the SPDC successfully maintained its territorial integrity if not national 
political unity, and retained the participation of the major ethnic minority groups except 
for the KNU in the SPDC-led process toward ‘disciplined democracy’, even if this was 
based on power and interests rather than legitimacy. Meanwhile, the problems of 
migration and refugees became increasingly serious in the border area with Thailand. 
Because the SPDC had strengthened its military operations in the Karen State since 
2006, a number of Karen people became displaced persons in Eastern Myanmar or 
refugees in other countries, especially in Thailand; though the SPDC officially regarded 
Karen refugees as voluntary emigrants for economic reasons. 136  Cyclone Nargis 
highlighted the humanitarian problems in Myanmar. According to one SPDC officer, 
around 78,000 people died, 56,000 people went missing, 20,000 people were injured 
and 1,169,000 people were severely affected when Cyclone Nargis hit South Western 
Myanmar on 2 and 3 May 2008 (Myanmar Focus, 2008: 3). What is more, the SPDC’s 
response to this disaster invited widespread international criticism due to its belated 
actions for disaster relief, its initial negative stance to accept foreign personnel for 
disaster relief, and that it conducted the constitutional referendum in spite of the 
disaster.     
 
In sum, the SPDC became more determined to pursue its domestic political 
objective by consolidating its power over the domestic opposition and by reducing its 
vulnerability to the pressures of international critics. At the same time, as it strengthened 
its isolationist foreign policy and interventionist economic policy, the SPDC dealt with 
Myanmar’s domestic problems primarily by coercion and oppression rather than by 
 
136 Although it is difficult to capture the actual number, the Thailand Burma Border Consortium 
(TBBC), an NGO supporting refugees and displaced persons at the border area, estimated that, at the 
end of 2008, around 500,000 were internally displaced in Eastern Myanmar and around 150,000 
were staying in refugee camps in Thailand. See the TBBC’s Programme Report July-December 2008 
available at http://www.tbbc.org/resources/2008-6-mth-rpt-jul-dec.pdf (accessed 22 March 2010). 
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negotiation and political reconciliation. As a result, the Myanmar problem became a 
further controversial issue in the international arena but, ironically, the more that 
Western governments and other actors were explicitly critical of the SPDC the more 
difficult it became to influence its behaviour. In addition, the SPDC’s pursuit of 
domestic stability by force further worsened the domestic humanitarian situation as well 
as the situation of refugees and displaced persons, which came to be often raised as 
significant problems within international society.  
 
3. International Structure 
 
The SPDC’s obviously oppressive and uncompromising responses to domestic 
problems, particularly since the Depayin incident, invited more widespread criticism of 
the SPDC by international society. Having carried out a comprehensive sanctions policy 
against the SPDC, the U.S. attempted to change the SPDC’s attitude toward 
democratization and human rights protection by pressuring Japan and ASEAN countries 
as well as utilizing the UN Security Council in cooperation with other Western 
governments. As a result, while generally maintaining an engagement policy toward 
Myanmar, ASEAN countries increasingly recognized Myanmar as an annoying internal 
problem which would decrease ASEAN’s unity and credibility as a regional political 
framework. The PRC, on the other hand, further developed its close ties with the SPDC, 
through strengthening political and economic interactions as well as providing material 
and non-material support. To a lesser degree, Thailand, India, Russia and North Korea 
also constructed cooperative relationships which enabled the SPDC to hedge against 
excessive dependence on the PRC as well as preventing its complete isolation in foreign 
relations. In terms of societal and transnational structure, the SPDC’s increased material 
capabilities further enhanced its primacy over the NLD and ethnic minority groups. 
Myanmar nationals and their supporters in other countries expanded their organizations 
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and constructed transnational networks but did not have any effective leverage against 
the SPDC in the end. From the SPDC’s viewpoint, these international structural changes 
meant that its vulnerability to international criticism and pressures had been largely 
reduced not only by constructing pragmatic and cooperative relationships with the PRC, 
Thailand and other countries but also by consolidating its power in societal and 
transnational structure. 
 
The U.S. and other Western countries attempted to strengthen pressure on the 
SPDC despite having less leverage against it during this period. The U.S., which had 
employed a comprehensive sanctions policy in response to the Depayin incident, moved 
to place further international pressure on the SPDC by utilizing the UN Security 
Council and influencing those countries having a close relationship with Myanmar, 
including Japan and ASEAN countries. For example, the U.S made clear that it was 
unacceptable for Myanmar to act as ASEAN’s chair country and this would have a 
negative impact on the U.S.-ASEAN relationship. Essentially, the U.S. regarded 
Myanmar as a test case to judge which countries shared its values and standards on the 
issues of democracy and human rights protection.137 From 2005, the U.S. began to 
make efforts to discuss the Myanmar problem at the UN Security Council, at least partly 
for the purpose of involving the PRC, the SPDC’s major supporter, into international 
efforts to address the problem (Pedersen, 2008: 42-43). Having succeeded in including 
Myanmar as a formal agenda item by majority vote on 15 September 2006; however, at 
the UN Security Council in January 2007 the U.S. could not retain the approval of 
Security Council members for its proposal of a resolution urging the SPDC to take 
action for domestic political reconciliation, democratization and human rights protection. 
Whereas the EU as a whole maintained a ‘smart’ sanctions policy, the UK and some 
 
137 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice included Myanmar in six examples of ‘outposts of tyranny’ 
within a submission to the U.S. Congress in 2005, explicitly labeling it as one of the main countries 
infringing the values of democracy and human rights. President Bush also raised Myanmar as an 
example of a country without freedom in his State of the Union speech in January 2006, as well as 
an example of a country of tyranny when reaffirming the Bush doctrine in March 2006.  
211 
 
other members became proactive in pressuring the SPDC in line with the U.S. The UK 
Labour government, which had been facing strong domestic pressures to impose a 
unilateral investment ban, acted with the U.S. government in making the Myanmar 
problem a formal agenda item for the UN Security Council.  
 
In response to Myanmar’s protest movement in September 2007 and the 
SPDC’s forced constitutional referendum after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, the U.S. 
further heightened its criticism of the SPDC.138 Many Western governments also 
pressured the SPDC to accept foreign personnel for disaster relief after Cyclone Nargis. 
In the end, however, neither the U.S. nor the EU could exercise any effective influence 
on the SPDC’s attitude toward democratization and human rights protection. As a result, 
the U.S. administration began considering more practical approaches such as forming a 
multilateral framework for Myanmar involving the PRC and other related countries, yet 
it did not take any distinctive actions during this period.139 
For ASEAN, the Myanmar problem became an increasingly annoying issue for 
its own management and development as a regional political framework. Although 
Myanmar was to be ASEAN’s chair country from late 2006, there emerged a number of 
increasing voices from Western governments and from within ASEAN itself demanding 
that Myanmar should not be given the chair. For instance, the ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus (AIPMC), which was established in November 
2004 by parliamentary members of ASEAN countries insisting on Myanmar’s 
democratization, urged Myanmar not to take the chair’s role. In the end, this issue was 
settled by Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win’s announcement in July 2005 to excuse 
 
138 Since around this period, First Lady Laura Bush also began to commit herself to the Myanmar 
problem, visiting Myanmar refugees in the border area of Thailand in August 2007 as well as 
making statements to criticize the SPDC’s oppressive rule especially after the mass movement in 
September 2007.  
139 Michael Green, who advocated a multilateral approach toward the Myanmar problem, was 
named by Bush as special representative and policy coordinator for Myanmar in November 2008. 
On Green’s idea of a multilateral approach toward Myanmar, see Green and Mitchell (2007).  
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Myanmar from the role of chair country. In addition, from the mid-2000s Myanmar 
became a major problem in ASEAN’s move to formulate the ASEAN Charter because it 
was regarded as a test case of ASEAN’s credibility in addressing internal problems. In 
November 2005, ASEAN countries formally agreed on the intention to draft an ASEAN 
Charter as part of the process toward the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 
2020, and decided to sign the ASEAN Charter at the ASEAN summit meeting in 
November 2007. In this process, however, ASEAN recognized the Myanmar problem as 
a serious dilemma which would, on the one hand, sacrifice its unity if it intervened too 
much in Myanmar’s domestic affairs but, on the other hand, decrease its credibility if it 
were unable to address the problem appropriately. In the end, despite including 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law as its fundamental principles, ASEAN 
decided not to modify the fundamental principle of non-intervention and 
consensus-based decision-making in the ASEAN Charter, even though it did agree on 
the establishment of an institution dealing with internal human rights issues.  
 
In dealing with the Myanmar problem itself, some ASEAN political leaders 
took action even if this did not produce any significant outcome. Thailand’s Prime 
Minister Thaksin promoted pragmatic cooperation with Myanmar and initiated the 
Bangkok process after the Depayin incident, but he became less active in taking further 
initiatives after the ouster of Khin Nyunt in October 2004. Instead, at the ASEAN 
summit meeting in December 2005, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Syed Hamid proposed 
to dispatch a mission to monitor the progress of Myanmar’s democratization. 
Myanmar’s Prime Minister Soe Win mentioned an invitation, however, Syed Hamid 
could not realize his visit to Myanmar until late March 2006 nor could he meet Aung 
San Suu Kyi or Than Shwe during his stay. Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono also 
visited Myanmar in early March 2006, explaining to Than Shwe Indonesia’s experience 
of democratization and proposing assistance and advice on Myanmar’s path to 
democracy, yet this too ended in vain.  
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Responding to Myanmar’s domestic mass protests, ASEAN attempted to 
involve major related countries in its efforts to engage with the SPDC in coordination 
with the UN. ASEAN held a special ministerial meeting at the UN Headquarters in New 
York after the mass movement started, issuing an extraordinarily strong statement on 
Myanmar’s domestic situation on 29 September. Subsequently, Singapore as the chair 
country moved to retain the assistance and cooperation of the PRC, India and Japan in 
the ASEAN-UN diplomatic efforts to settle Myanmar’s domestic situation and 
attempted to set up a reporting session of the Undersecretary-General of the UN Ibrahim 
Gambari on Myanmar affairs at the EAS. Gambari’s report was not realized because of 
Myanmar Prime Minister Thein Sein’s strong opposition and so ASEAN did not take 
any coordinated action other than issuing the chair’s statement on Myanmar at the 
ASEAN summit meeting in November 2007.  
 
ASEAN sought to cooperate closely with the UN and to involve major related 
countries in dealing with the disaster of Cyclone Nargis, thereby playing a coordination 
role in international society. At the special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 19 
May 2008, ASEAN decided to initiate the distribution of emergency materials as well as 
call on the SPDC to accept foreign personnel for disaster relief. Subsequently, ASEAN 
and the UN jointly organized a pledging conference for Myanmar’s cyclone disaster in 
Yangon on 25 May, at which it was also decided to form the Tripartite Core Group 
consisting of the Myanmar government, ASEAN and UN agencies for the purpose of 
coordination among the three and assistance for Myanmar’s rehabilitation plan. After 
the conference, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan also expressed the idea of 
launching a humanitarian task force consisting of 24 members from all the ASEAN 
countries and the ASEAN Secretariat. Overall, having recognized its own limits in 
influencing the SPDC, especially in terms of democracy and human rights protection, 
ASEAN sought closer cooperation with the UN and the involvement of major related 
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countries in dealing with Myanmar.   
 
The PRC, on the other hand, further strengthened its pragmatic ties with the 
SPDC, although it did appear to become somewhat uncomfortable in being criticized for 
its support of the SPDC’s oppressive rule, especially after the occurrence of Myanmar’s 
mass protest movement in September 2007. The PRC government successfully 
maintained its close political relationship with the SPDC based on frequent exchanges 
of senior leaders during this period.140 The PRC also provided economic assistance and 
concessional loans, particularly for Myanmar’s infrastructure projects in which Chinese 
companies and workers participated. These included hydro power plant construction 
which was an urgent necessity for the SPDC in expanding its electricity capacity and 
keeping energy prices low to preserve social stability. The PRC also sought energy 
resources from Myanmar and set up access routes to the Indian Ocean and to India and 
Southeast Asian countries, presumably for economic and military reasons. Chinese 
energy companies gained the mining rights in a number of prospecting areas in 
Myanmar’s offshore gas field, especially from the mid-2000s, and CNPC exchanged a 
memorandum of understanding with MOGE in February 2006 on pipeline construction 
from Rakhine State, a state in Western Myanmar facing the offshore Shwe gas field, to 
Yunnan Province in the PRC. Even so, the PRC was apparently somewhat annoyed by 
SPDC oppression of demonstrators in September 2007 and, thus, urged the SPDC to 
show self-restraint, presumably because if it did not this would lead to international 
criticism of the PRC’s support for the SPDC and in turn of the PRC’s own domestic 
human rights issues. This is more or less what actually happened prior to the Beijing 
Olympic Games in 2008. While refusing to pass any formal resolution at the UN 
Security Council or to violate the principle of non-intervention in Myanmar’s domestic 
issues, the PRC recognized its stake in managing the Myanmar problem properly and 
 
140 When Myanmar’s Prime Minister Soe Win visited the PRC in February 2006, for example, both 
governments agreed on bilateral cooperation in electricity power plant construction and the 
development of various natural resources. 
215 
 
avoiding any excessive politicization in the international arena.  
 
Other countries also constructed pragmatic and cooperative relationships with 
the SPDC. Having carried out its ‘Look East’ policy since 1992, India sought to 
improve its relationships with ASEAN countries including Myanmar in a number of 
pragmatic areas.141 India seemed to have several major motivations to improve its 
relationship with the SPDC: to retain cooperation for addressing domestic 
anti-governmental movements at the border area with Myanmar; to seek access to 
Myanmar’s natural resources and agricultural products; to set up a gateway to Southeast 
Asian and Chinese markets; and, to hedge against the PRC’s growing presence over 
Myanmar. The Indian government, however, made relatively low-key and limited 
efforts for strengthening the bilateral relationship, especially when compared to the PRC, 
mainly because of its ambivalence and lack of urgency in doing so in spite of 
international controversy. North Korea normalized its relationship with Myanmar in 
April 2007, agreeing on military equipment procurement to Myanmar in return for food 
provision. Russia also agreed with the SPDC on the joint construction of a research 
centre for nuclear energy development in Myanmar in May 2007.  
 
The UN continued attempting to assist Myanmar’s domestic political 
reconciliation. After Razali resigned the position as the UN Secretary-General’s special 
envoy to Myanmar in January 2006, the UN Undersecretary-General Ibrahim Gambari 
began to take over the mediation role in representing the UN Secretary-General. 
Gambari held meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi and Than Shwe when visiting Myanmar 
in May 2006, but was unable to meet Than Shwe during his next visit in November 
 
141 India agreed on creating a free trade area with ASEAN as well as joining the TAC in 2003. In 
addition, both Myanmar and India are members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral 
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a sub-regional cooperation framework among 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand originally established in June 
1997, as well as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) to increase functional cooperation in 
tourism, culture, education and transportation among Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand 
and Vietnam established in November 2000.  
216 
 
2006. In between these two official trips, Gambari visited a number of ASEAN 
countries, India, the PRC and Japan to ask for their support. Gambari also visited 
Myanmar several times after Myanmar’s mass protests in September 2007, yet 
apparently without producing any significant outcome. The UN also acted in response 
to the disaster of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. On 10 May, the UN announced an 
estimated $187 million of necessary assistance through the consolidated appeal process 
(CAP) in cooperation with NGOs and then organized a pledging conference for disaster 
relief in coordination with ASEAN on 25 May. In addition, during his visit to Myanmar 
on 22-23 May, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon persuaded Than Shwe to accept 
international assistance personnel. 
 
At the same time, the UN Security Council became the arena of an 
international political game over Myanmar due to the attempts since 2005 of the U.S. 
and the UK to raise it as a formal agenda item. After approving an informal briefing on 
Myanmar by Gambari in December 2005, the UN Security Council decided to make the 
Myanmar problem a formal agenda item on 15 September 2006 with ten votes in favour 
versus four opposed and one abstention: the PRC, Russia, Congo and Qatar voted 
against, while Japan and the Philippines approved. In January 2007, however, the 
proposal of a resolution urging the SPDC to move toward domestic political 
reconciliation, democratization and human rights protection was disapproved at the UN 
Security Council due to the vetoes of the PRC and Russia, which refused to regard 
Myanmar as a threat to international peace and security, which was the mandate of the 
UN Security Council. Subsequently, the UN Security Council discussed Myanmar as an 
urgent agenda item in response to Myanmar’s mass movement, resulting in adopting the 
President’s statement on 11 October 2007. Yet without passing any formal resolution, 
this series of discussions at the UN Security Council put direct and indirect pressure on 
related countries’ positions toward Myanmar as well as requiring the UN to commit to 
the Myanmar problem, including the formal requirement for the UN Secretariat to 
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provide regular reports on Myanmar to the Security Council. Having exercised their 
veto over the proposal of a formal resolution in January 2007, in the end the PRC and 
Russia also regarded the UN Secretary-General’s mediation activities for Myanmar’s 
domestic political reconciliation as a more appropriate approach to the problem 
(Pedersen, 2008: 43-44).   
 
In terms of international political structure, the efforts of the U.S. and other 
Western governments to pressurise the SPDC increased the costs for Japan and ASEAN 
countries in providing political support to the SPDC. Moreover, ASEAN became 
disillusioned with the SPDC’s sincerity for domestic political reconciliation and human 
rights protection as well as its own ability to influence the SPDC’s policy direction. 
Meanwhile, the PRC kept providing material and non-material support for the SPDC 
even if it was uncomfortable about the increasing number of international accusations 
against it. The SPDC’s pragmatic and cooperative relationships with other countries 
including India, Russia and North Korea contributed, at least to some extent, to hedge 
against its isolation in international relations as well as excessive dependence on the 
PRC. In the end, the SPDC successfully decreased its vulnerability to international 
criticism and sanctions in accordance with its reducing dependence on unfriendly 
countries and tighter grip over the domestic economy and society.    
 
In terms of international economic structure, the SPDC also became less 
vulnerable to Western governments’ economic sanctions. In fact, the U.S. 
comprehensive sanctions policy after the Depayin incident ironically enhanced the 
autonomy of the Myanmar economy, which absorbed the shock of the rapid decline in 
garment exports due to the U.S. trade ban. The SPDC’s interventionist economic policy 
and Myanmar’s unimproved business environment, together with international criticism 
of the SPDC which increased the risk to the reputations of transnational companies 
doing business in Myanmar, resulted in a low level of Myanmar’s cross-border 
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economic interactions. Yet, the SPDC could earn foreign currency by natural resource 
exports, especially natural gas to Thailand, and it could maintain trade and investment 
relationships with the PRC and other neighbouring countries. By putting a low priority 
on economic growth, in the end the SPDC could maintain general macro-economic 
stability by managing economic relations with neighbouring and friendly countries even 
if it still worried about excessive dependence on the PRC.    
 
In societal and transnational structure, the SPDC further strengthened its 
dominance of the local power configuration by expanding its military capability and 
consolidating its control over the territory. The NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi had less 
leverage over the SPDC not only because of the SPDC’s oppression but also because 
Western governments had less leverage over the SPDC. Although it was largely 
unsupportive of the SPDC, Myanmar’s general public could not change the SPDC’s 
policy direction in spite of conducting a large-scale mass movement in September 2007, 
which even involved many Buddhist monks. Transnational networks of Myanmar 
nationals and their supporters in other countries continued to protest against the SPDC 
and urged other governments not to support it. They became stronger and more 
widespread though their leverage against the SPDC had largely decreased in parallel 
with Western governments’ declining influence.  
 
4. Policy-Makers’ Perceptions 
 
During this period, Japan’s senior political leaders became less proactive in 
Myanmar policy-making even though they were still being informed about the 
development of the Myanmar problem and were involved in decision-making due to its 
increasing international political controversy. METI still recognized Myanmar’s 
economic potential in the mid- to long-term and that it could provide business 
219 
 
opportunities for certain industries such as garment manufacturing and natural resources, 
but it acknowledged that significant short-term prospects for the improvement of 
Myanmar’s economic and business environment had been lost. MOF also held little 
stake in Myanmar policy-making because ODA provision beyond small-scale 
humanitarian projects was not considered as a serious policy option during this period 
as Myanmar’s accumulated debt problems still remained as one of MOF’s concerns. As 
such, the making of Myanmar policy within the Japanese government largely rested on 
MOFA’s coordination during this period.  
 
MOFA also recognized difficulties in dealing with the SPDC because Khin 
Nyunt’s ouster in October 2004 meant that the Japanese government had lost the main 
contact person among SPDC leaders who had positively dealt with democracy and 
human rights protection in response to assistance and advice from international society. 
The Depayin incident also made it clear that the SPDC could easily take action which 
would harm Japan-Myanmar’s bilateral friendship and decrease Japan’s efforts for 
Myanmar’s political and economic development. In addition, MOFA perceived tougher 
international structural constraints in continuing the engagement policy line, especially 
at the UN Security Council, at which the U.S. and the UK had moved from 2005 to 
make the Myanmar problem a formal agenda item. Whilst basically negative to their 
proposal, on 15 September 2006, the Japanese government decided to vote for it from 
both pragmatic and strategic considerations. On the whole, the Japanese government 
under MOFA’s coordination generally reverted to a wait-and-see position in relation to 
the Myanmar problem, yet it still regarded the engagement policy as the most desirable 
and only practical approach for Myanmar’s political and economic development. At the 
same time, however, the Japanese government was still willing to play a proactive role 
when it recognized an opportunity to make a positive change without little structural 
cost, as observed in its response to the Cyclone Nargis disaster in May 2008.  
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Among Japan’s senior leaders, some were motivated to play a role in the 
Myanmar problem. Whereas the Koizumi administration became less proactive in its 
Myanmar policy, especially after late 2004, Abe Shinzo, who was appointed as the 
Chief Cabinet secretary of the third Koizumi Cabinet in October 2005 and who later 
served as Prime Minister from September 2006 to September 2007, had a personal 
attachment to Myanmar ever since his visit to Myanmar in 1983 as his father’s 
secretariat.142 Whilst propagating ‘value oriented diplomacy’, Abe apparently preferred 
to adopt a friendship engagement policy rather than shift to a sanctions approach. After 
becoming Prime Minister in September 2007, Fukuda Yasuo attempted to promote 
‘ky8mei gaik8’ (synergy diplomacy) which aimed at synergizing the Japan-U.S. alliance 
and Japan’s Asian policy as well as conducting a proactive Asian policy. As the 
Myanmar problem was recognized as a test case for ‘ky8mei gaik8’ by the Bush 
administration (MS, 25 November 2007), Fukuda was seemingly willing to play a 
mediation role between the U.S. and the SPDC, particularly when the SPDC was highly 
reluctant to accept foreign personnel for disaster relief activities after Cyclone Nargis in 
May 2008.  
 
Aso Taro, who served as Prime Minister from September 2008 to September 
2008 and Foreign Minister from October 2005 to August 2007, also committed to an 
engagement policy line toward Myanmar despite having advocated ‘value oriented 
diplomacy’ with Abe and propagating the associated concept of ‘the arc of freedom and 
prosperity’, which aimed at promoting cooperation with those countries achieving or 
moving toward political freedom and economic growth in the outer rim of the Eurasian 
continent.143 He mentioned in the Diet that the Western governments’ sanctions policy 
 
142 Abe Shinzo’s wife, Akie, mentioned her husband’s sympathy to Myanmar in a magazine article. 
Around October 2005, she started up a project to construct school buildings in developing Asian 
countries by utilizing an organization under the Diet members’ group for constructing schools for 
Asian children chaired by her husband. He suggested that she could select Myanmar as the first site 
in mentioning that Myanmar was a pro-Japanese and good country, and they should assist such a 
country though Western governments had been suspending economic assistance to it (Abe, 2006: 
112-113).   
143 On ‘value oriented diplomacy’ and the concept of ‘the arc of freedom and prosperity’, see 
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excessively symbolized the issue of Aung San Suu Kyi and that Japan and ASEAN 
should take another approach whilst considering the strategic significance of 
Myanmar.144 He also denied the effectiveness of pressure without talk pointing out the 
significance of utilizing neighbouring countries which had more personal connections 
with SPDC leaders than Japan or the U.S.145 
MOFA found it more difficult to deal with Myanmar, especially after the ouster 
of Khin Nyunt in October 2004 who was the primary contact person among the SPDC 
leaders, and the one who seemed most willing to reflect Japan’s advice into the SPDC’s 
policy direction. The Depayin incident also made it clear to MOFA, especially for those 
who held the conception of default friendship engagement, that the SPDC could easily 
ruin the efforts for Myanmar’s political and economic development that the Japanese 
government made in spite of international and domestic pressures against it. MOFA also 
recognized that the SPDC’s pragmatic and cooperative relationships with the PRC and 
other friendly countries made it less necessary to accept Japan’s assistance in return for 
taking its advice. Consequently, voices emerged even within MOFA to regard Myanmar 
as a dictatorship similar to North Korea and thus should be dealt with by putting more 
pressure on it. Despite still recognizing that an engagement policy line was the only 
practical way to bringing about positive change in Myanmar, therefore, MOFA became 
less willing to conduct proactive engagement without any sign of improvement to the 
Myanmar problem.  
 
At the same time, MOFA perceived even tougher constraints on Japan’s 
engagement policy imposed by international structure during this period. Washington’s 
pressure on Tokyo to vote for its proposal to make the Myanmar problem a formal 
 
MOFA’s website uploading the record of Aso’s speech on 30 November 2006, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html (accessed 4 March 2010). 
144 See Aso’s response to DPJ member Nagashima Akihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 6 June 2007. 
145 See Aso’s response to DPJ member Nagashima Akihisa’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 13 December 2006. 
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agenda item at the UN Security Council was the most obvious and direct one. Although 
it was basically against the proposal, in the end MOFA decided to approve it in 
September 2006. This was presumably because, given little prospect for any 
improvement in the Myanmar problem, the costs to resist the U.S. demand for  
approval outweighed the benefits, especially when considering that such approval did 
not mean that Japan would have to support any actual resolutions calling for sanctions 
against the SPDC. Despite this, MOFA still maintained its general perception that 
Japan’s policy direction should be different from the U.S. sanctions policy, even in 
observing the escalation of U.S. criticism and sanctions against the SPDC. In 
legitimizing its adherence to an engagement policy from structural viewpoints, some 
MOFA officials emphasized the necessity to respond to the PRC’s growing influence so 
that it would not undermine Japan’s presence; while others advocated the significance of 
supporting ASEAN’s efforts to solve the Myanmar problem as an internal agenda in 
developing itself as a regional political framework. Regardless of its rationales, MOFA 
as a whole still considered that an engagement policy line was the most preferable 
policy vis-à-vis Myanmar in spite of facing tougher structural pressures as well as 
propagating the concepts of ‘value oriented diplomacy’ and ‘the arc of freedom and 
prosperity’ under Foreign Minister Aso.146 
Meanwhile, in responding to the substantial difficulty in bringing about 
positive change in the Myanmar problem in the short-term, MOFA attempted to make 
two minor shifts in its Myanmar policy. One was a shift in policy discourse from ‘kanyo 
seisaku’ (engagement policy) to ‘taiwa to atsuryoku’ (talk and pressure), which was 
originally used for describing Japan’s policy toward North Korea. Some MOFA officials 
began to use the latter term ever since Japan’s approval to make the Myanmar problem a 
formal agenda item at the UN Security Council in September 2006. It was not used as a 
 
146 Those advocating the concept of the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ within MOFA seemed to 
consider Japan’s engagement policy in relation to Myanmar as an exception in order to bring a 
change toward Myanmar’s freedom and prosperity as well as to counterbalance the PRC. 
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phrase to explain Japan’s policy shift but rather as a more precise phrase to describe the 
policy that Japan had already been taking in dealing with Myanmar. When describing 
Japan’s Myanmar policy as ‘taiwa to atsuryoku’ at a seminar organized by the SPF, 
MOFA’s Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator Maruyama Ichiro emphasized the necessity 
to engage with Myanmar and to continue humanitarian assistance. He also pointed out 
that Japan’s basic tasks were to support Gambari and cooperate with international 
society, especially ASEAN; tasks which showed no apparent substantial difference from 
the explanation of ‘kanyo seisaku’ (SPF, 2008: 37).   
 
The other shift in policy was MOFA’s emphasis on humanitarian assistance as a 
foreign policy measure. Whilst having been primarily focused on inter-governmental 
political dialogues and ODA provision in its Myanmar policy, MOFA increasingly 
recognized that humanitarian assistance, especially through international organizations 
and humanitarian NGOs, was a policy measure that could have a small but steady 
long-term influence on Myanmar’s situation given the limited prospects for a positive 
change in the short-term. Humanitarian assistance was also considered as a less 
problematic measure because the Japanese government could claim it as Japan’s 
assistance toward the Myanmar people in a bilateral political relationship while at the 
same time circumvent international and domestic criticism as a supporter of an 
oppressive government. The Cyclone Nargis disaster became an occasion for the 
Japanese government to conduct intensive humanitarian assistance in an exceptional 
emergency case. The Japanese government decided to provide around 107 million yen 
of material support, some of which was distributed through the Japan Platform, a system 
providing emergency relief through a partnership among Japanese NGOs, business 
sectors, the government, media and other actors, as well as up to $10 million of 
emergency aid, which was implemented in cooperation with international organizations.  
 
While not necessarily being a policy shift initiated by MOFA, Japan’s policy 
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toward Myanmar refugees could have also indicated the Japanese government’s 
decoupling of inter-governmental political relationships with humanitarian policy. On 
the one hand, from the mid-2000s, the Japanese government began issuing an increasing 
number of refugee status and residence permissions out of humanitarian 
considerations,147 although this would be primarily because of a re-examination of the 
refugee recognition procedure that was carried out by the Immigration Bureau of the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). On the other hand, from September 2007, the Japanese 
government set up discussions on third country resettlement, particularly in regard to 
Myanmar refugees in Thailand, and accelerated the policy-making process after 
receiving a request for cooperation from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
Antonio Guterres in November 2007.148 This led to the Japanese government’s decision 
in February 2008 to accept tens of Myanmar refugees in Thailand in the coming year as 
Japan’s first case of third country resettlement. This was coordinated by a number of 
related ministries including MOJ and MOFA, which reflected the fragmented nature of 
Japan’s immigration policy-making system. Yet, these shifts in Japan’s stance toward 
Myanmar refugees could be recognized as a part of the institutionalization of Japan’s 
humanitarian policy and its decoupling from inter-governmental political relationships.  
 
METI perceived the declining prospects for Myanmar’s economic 
liberalization and growth as well as the limited business opportunities for Japanese 
companies in the short-term. What was more, METI did not have many policy options 
for Myanmar because the Japan-Myanmar Cooperation for Structural Adjustment of the 
Myanmar Economy ended without being implemented by the SPDC and the 
Baluchaung hydro power plant project was suspended after the Depayin incident. 
 
147 Despite having some fluctuations, the number of recognized refugee status and residence 
permissions for humanitarian consideration rapidly increased from 24 in 2004 to 143 in 2005 and 
even came up to 417 in 2008. See MOJ’s website available at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS /090130
-1-1.pdf (accessed 26 March 2010). 
148 See Minister for Justice Hatoyama Kunio’s response to DPJ member Nakagawa Masaharu’s 
question at the Budget Committee in the House of the Representatives on 13 February 2008. He also 
expressed his willingness to initiate the policy-making process as Minister for Justice.  
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Myanmar still attracted the attention of some Japanese companies in specific areas such 
as garment manufacturing due to increasing costs in other East Asian production bases, 
as well as natural resource development in accordance with the growing price of natural 
resources in the world market since the mid-2000s. Myanmar’s business environment 
was, however, generally not attractive enough for many Japanese companies to set up 
new operations and, thus, METI recognized that there was less necessity to conduct a 
proactive policy during this period.    
 
MOF, which had been primarily concerned with the credibility of Japan’s ODA 
policy, also held a minimal stake in Myanmar policy. As the Japanese government 
cancelled all on-going yen loan projects for Myanmar in 2001 and new yen loan 
disbursement was not a serious policy option, almost the only concern for MOF was 
Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem, which had already been recognized as being 
extremely difficult to solve in the short-term. MOF, hence, was unwilling to play any 
significant role in Myanmar policy-making during this period.  
 
On the whole, Japan’s Myanmar policy during this period was mostly 
coordinated by MOFA in cooperation with political leaders operating under the general 
consensus of maintaining an engagement policy line in a low-key manner. Although 
some of Japan’s senior political leaders had a personal attachment to Myanmar or were 
motivated to pursue an autonomous Asian policy, they were generally reluctant to 
conduct a proactive policy not only because of practical difficulties in making positive 
changes to the Myanmar problem, but also because of the increasing costs imposed by 
international structure in conducting proactive engagement. As METI and MOF held a 
lesser stake in Myanmar policy than in the previous period, there were fewer difficulties 
for MOFA to coordinate its policy direction within the Japanese government. The 
Japanese government, therefore, generally preferred a wait-and-see position and to deal 
with the development of the Myanmar problem in a reactive and risk-averse manner 
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during this period.  
 
5. Resource Mobilization 
 
Among Japanese politicians and other domestic actors, since the ouster of Khin 
Nyunt in October 2004, there were few who explicitly advocated providing more 
support for the SPDC. Because of the cancellation of all remaining yen loan projects 
and the lack of serious discussion on new ODA provision to Myanmar other than 
relatively small-scale humanitarian assistance, the room for rent-seeking activities 
within the Myanmar policy-making system also diminished. Besides, except for some 
specific industries, the Japanese business sector had few short-term prospects for 
business operations in Myanmar. On the other hand, the DMLSDM and other 
pro-democracy organizations enhanced their activities in response to the domestic mass 
protest movement in September 2007 and other politically controversial incidents in 
Myanmar. Many mainstream politicians, both within the DMLSDM and outside, 
however, still maintained their stance that the Japanese government should move more 
proactively rather than simply advocating a sanctions policy. The shooting of journalist 
Nagai in September 2007, in combination with the SPDC oppression of the protests, 
spread the image within Japanese society of Myanmar as a dictatorship; an image which 
often overlapped with North Korea. This made it politically more difficult, if not 
impossible, for the Japanese government to retain domestic support for conducting 
proactive engagement.  
 
(1) The Diet and Politicians 
 
In the Diet, there was some discussion on Myanmar policy, especially after 
Myanmar’s domestic protests and the death of Japanese journalist Nagai in September 
227 
 
2007. Some members of the DPJ, the largest opposition party, raised questions on 
Myanmar policy at the Diet from diverse perspectives. Right before the mass movement 
in Myanmar, Nagashima Akihisa agreed with Foreign Minister Aso that Japan should 
take an original approach toward Myanmar, which was different from the Western 
sanctions policy, from both pragmatic and strategic perspectives.149 After the shooting 
incident of journalist Nagai, an original member of the DMLSDM Hatoyama Yukio 
criticized the government’s slow response to the Myanmar problem, claiming that Japan 
was an exceptional country which could play a bridging role between the military 
government and Aung San Suu Kyi.150 Suematsu Yoshinori, the DMLSDM’s secretary 
general during this period, suggested asking for the PRC’s cooperation and the 
employment of targeted sanctions in order to address the issue of Nagai’s death.151 He 
also proposed supporting Gambari’s mediation efforts, if necessary by forming a 
multilateral framework on the Myanmar problem, and to assist Myanmar’s 
pro-democracy camp and Myanmar refugees and displaced persons in the border 
area.152 After a field trip to Myanmar to assist NGO activities for rural development, 
education and healthcare, DPJ member Haraguchi Kazuhiro emphasized the 
significance of grassroots educational activities which would help people out of poverty 
and inform them about democracy.153 
The SDP was critical of the government’s engagement policy and explicitly 
advocated sanction measures. Teruya Kantoku proposed to pressure the SPDC in 
various ways including sanction measures in order to support the September 2007 mass 
 
149 See Nagashima’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 6 
June 2007. 
150 See Hatoyama’s question at the plenary session of the House of Representatives on 3 October 
2007. 
151 Another DPJ member Inuzuka Tadashi also advocated considering targeted sanctions, not in 
response to the shooting incident but to pressure the SPDC to promote democratization and human 
rights protection. See Inuzuka’s question at the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense in the 
House of Councilors on 8 April 2008. 
152 See Suematsu’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 21 
April 2008. 
153 See Haraguchi’s question at the National Security Committee in the House of Representatives on 
19 October 2007. 
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struggle for democracy.154 In order to promote Myanmar’s democratization, the SDP 
Chief and DMLSDM member Fukushima Mizuho advocated the suspension of both 
existing and any new economic assistance for humanitarian purposes as well as selling 
off the Japanese government’s share of a joint venture company for oil and natural gas 
development.155 Kondo Masamichi raised a question on the appropriateness of two 
recipients of Japan’s humanitarian assistance, namely the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (USDA), a civilian political organization supported by the 
Myanmar military and suspected of involvement in the Depayin incident, and the 
Maternal Children Welfare Association, which was chaired by Myanmar Prime Minister 
Thein Sein’s wife.156 
From September 2007, Diet member Suzuki Muneo, who had left the LDP in 
March 2002, also became explicitly critical of Japan’s Myanmar policy. He began to 
issue a number of shitsumon shuisho on Myanmar policy after the shooting of journalist 
Nagai, criticizing the government’s continuation of humanitarian assistance and 
advocating sanction measures in dealing with the SPDC’s insincerity toward addressing 
the incident.157 These critical questions at the Diet discussions were not a substantial 
constraint on the government’s engagement policy line although they did increase 
pressure on the government.    
 
At the political level, the PLSMG had been highly proactive from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s, but during this period no longer remained as committed to 
Myanmar policy-making. On the other hand, the JMPEPL continued its activities as the 
main LDP-based Diet members’ league for Japan-Myanmar bilateral friendship. 
 
154 See Teruya’s question at the plenary session of the House of Representatives on 4 October 2007. 
155 See Fukushima’s question at the plenary session of the House of Councilors on 5 October 2007. 
156 See Kondo’s question at the Special Committee of the House of Councilors on Official 
Development Assistance and Related Matters on 14 November 2007. 
157 Suzuki issued more than 20 shitsumon shuisho on Myanmar policy from September 2007 to the 
end of 2008; not only on the shooting incident of journalist Nagai but also Japan’s response to the 
disaster of Cyclone Nargis and so on. See shitsumon shuisho and the government’s answers available 
at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_shitsumon.htm (accessed 23 February 2010). 
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However, since Kato Koichi lost political power no-one within the JMPEPL was 
apparently willing to take any outstanding political initiative in Myanmar 
policy-making. The JMPEPL, thus, generally acted for the Japan-Myanmar relationship 
in a manner of ‘business-as-usual’ rather than making any distinctive activities, although 
it did provide financial support for the disaster relief of Cyclone Nargis.   
 
On the other hand, as a bipartisan group that included powerful Diet members 
in both ruling and opposition parties, the DMLSDM became more active in raising its 
voice against the government’s responses to the Myanmar problem. For instance, it 
issued a statement which was conveyed to Foreign Minister Aso in June 2006 that 
supported the UN Security Council proposal to discuss Myanmar as a formal agenda 
item and asked Japan to play a proactive role.158 The DMLSDM also had information 
exchanges with other countries’ policy-makers as well as transnational pro-democracy 
networks including the AIPMC. The DMLSDM held a general meeting to respond to 
the mass protests in Myanmar and the shooting of journalist Nagai, deciding to act in 
order to meet with Gambari and issuing a Diet resolution on 24 October 2007 to make 
Japan’s stance clear.159 
Despite becoming non-mainstream politicians during this period, some JMPFL 
members kept supporting the SPDC and advocated Japan’s more proactive assistance to 
it. For example, Watanabe Hideo, Nishimura Shingo and Matsushita Shinpei visited 
Myanmar to observe the situation after the disaster of Cyclone Nargis in July 2008.160 
However, although the JMPFL was the oldest Diet members’ league it had largely lost 
its historical personal connections with the SPDC and seemed to have even fewer 
 
158 See the DMLSDM Secretary General and DPJ member Suematsu Yoshinori’s website available 
at http://www.y-sue.net/activity/2006j/0619.html (accessed 8 September 2008). 
159 See the DMLSDM Secretary General and DPJ member Suematsu Yoshinori’s website available 
at http://www.y-sue.net/activity/2007j/1024.html (accessed 8 September 2008). The DMLSDM’s 
meeting with Gambari was actually held on 26 October 2007.  
160 See the JMPFL Secretary General Nishimura Shingo’s website available at http://www.n- shingo.
com/katudou2/20080712.html (accessed 23 March 2010). 
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contacts with SPDC leaders since the ouster of Khin Nyunt and other moderate 
pragmatists.  
 
In the end, many mainstream politicians still supported the engagement policy 
line, albeit critically, while those advocating a default engagement based on historical 
friendship became much weaker and more hesitant to raise their voices publicly. At the 
same time, especially after the journalist Nagai was killed, there emerged more voices, 
even if these voices were still in the minority, urging the Japanese government to put 
stronger pressure on the SPDC by even taking sanction measures. Although there were 
no critical obstacles to its engagement policy line from the Diet and politicians, the 
Japanese government did recognize increasing pressure from some Diet members for 
even the disbursement of small-scale humanitarian assistance.  
 
(2) Business Sector 
 
The Japanese business sector as a whole had already given up any short-term 
prospects for Myanmar’s economic growth or promising business opportunities. In fact, 
the Keidanren and other business organizations became inactive in the Japan-Myanmar 
relationship and many Japanese companies withdrew or downsized their business 
operations whilst some of them still maintained their Myanmar branches. As the 
Japanese government had already cancelled all remaining yen loan projects, moreover, 
ODA-related businesses were no longer prospective opportunities for Japanese 
companies, at least in the short-term, except for the ones related to small-scale 
humanitarian assistance projects. Even so, Myanmar attracted some specific industrial 
sectors. Garment manufacturing and other light industries, for example, began to be 
interested in Myanmar as a potential production base because of increasing production 
costs in other East Asian countries such as Vietnam and coastal China. The rising 
international price of raw materials in the world market around this period also 
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enhanced the attraction of natural resource development in Myanmar. Yet, because of 
various difficulties in conducting operations in Myanmar, including the SPDC’s 
interventionist economic policy and Myanmar’s unimproved business environment and 
increasing reputation risk in committing to Myanmar, the activities of Japanese 
companies remained limited in scope and small in scale. As a whole, the Japanese 
business sector generally kept a wait-and-see position in parallel with the Japanese 
government during this period.161 
(3) NGOs 
 
Bilateral friendship NGOs continued their activities despite, in some cases, 
having difficulties in maintaining contacts with the SPDC, especially after the ouster of 
Khin Nyunt and Japan’s approval to include the Myanmar problem as a formal agenda 
item at the UN Security Council. The Meeting of Myanmar Related Group was 
established in late 2006 in order to strengthen cooperation and information exchange 
between six Myanmar related non-governmental groups. These groups consisted of the 
JMFA, the JMA, the MEMI, the AMCWA, TCM and the Myanmar-Japan Tourism 
Promotion Committee (MJTC) who all aimed at a Japan-Myanmar exchange promotion 
in April 2007.162 The SPF had played a unique role in the Japan-Myanmar political 
relationship in the previous period and now became focused on functional cooperation 
projects for Myanmar rather than seeking to conduct active ‘public diplomacy’. This 
was presumably because it perceived less room to play a meaningful role in the bilateral 
political relationship during this period.163 
161 Still, Japanese companies’ commitment could be observed, for instance, in 311.85 million yen of 
financial and material assistance provided by Keidanren member companies to the disaster areas of 
Cyclone Nargis on 13 June 2008 (Keidanren, 2008). 
162 See TCM’s website on the establishment of the MMRG available at http://www.consul-myanmar.
com/myanmar%20kanrendantai.html (accessed 5 February 2010). 
163 The SPF still attempted to draw sporadic attention to the Myanmar problem among Japanese 
policy-makers by, for example, organizing a study group on Myanmar with LDP member Sakurai 
Ikuzo (SPF, 2006). The SPF also organized a seminar in Tokyo in November 2007 on Myanmar after 
the mass movement (SPF, 2008). 
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In contrast, pro-democracy NGOs became more appealing to the government, 
politicians and the general public. They responded more proactively, in particular to the 
SPDC’s crackdown on the protest movement and the consequent shooting of journalist 
Nagai in September 2007, as well as the forced constitutional referendum during the 
disaster of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. In coordination with other organizations and 
groups, including the DMLSDM, Rengo organized public meetings about Myanmar in 
Tokyo on 11 November 2007 and on 6 April 2008, urging Myanmar’s democratization 
and appealing to the Japanese general public.164 In another example, four NGOs, 
namely Mekong Watch, the BPF, Human Rights Now and the Nagoya NGO Center, 
jointly raised the issue of Japan’s ODA policy toward Myanmar at a MOFA consultative 
meeting with NGOs on ODA policy on 16 November 2007, at which anti-SPDC 
Myanmar nationals in Japan also attended.165 Although they remained generally small 
and fragmented, pro-democracy NGOs could enhance their voices and activities in 
parallel with the widening and strengthening international reactions to the SPDC’s 
oppressive and uncompromising rule in Myanmar.   
 
Many of those humanitarian NGOs which had been operating in Myanmar 
continued their activities in spite of increasing difficulties in accordance with the 
SPDC’s accelerating isolationist and interventionist policy direction. According to a 
Japanese NGO staff member, those NGOs operating in Myanmar were convinced that 
the presence of foreign personnel for humanitarian assistance constrained the authorities 
from carrying out obvious human rights infringement. The disaster of Cyclone Nargis 
provided humanitarian NGOs, especially those working as members of the Japan 
Platform, with an opportunity to play a significant role in implementing Japan’s 
 
164 See Rengo’s website available at http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/kokusai/news/20071111.html and 
http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/kokusai/news/20080406.html (accessed 15 March 2010). 
165  See MOFA’s website on the second ODA policy consultative meeting of the FY2007 
NGO-MOFA periodical consultative meeting available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/
shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/oda_seikyo_07_2.html (accessed 31 March 2010). 
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assistance. For instance, 10,000 galvanized sheets provided by Japanese company 
AEON were distributed by NGOs in coordination with the Japan Platform to be used for 
repairing buildings such as schools and hospitals (Myanmar Focus, 2008: 7). Through 
disaster relief and rehabilitation after Cyclone Nargis, the Japan Platform provided up to 
970 million yen of humanitarian assistance with the participation of a number of 
humanitarian NGOs.166 
(4) Media and Public Opinion 
 
In observing the SPDC’s responses to mass protest and the Cyclone Nargis 
disaster, Japanese daily newspapers generally became more critical of the SPDC, 
proposing that the Japanese government should play a proactive role in dealing with 
Myanmar. The Asahi and Mainichi even began to suggest sanctions would pressure the 
SPDC. Before the mass movement began in September 2007, the Yomiuri emphasized 
the necessity for the Japanese government of providing indirect support for ASEAN’s 
independent efforts for Myanmar’s democratization (YS, 7 December 2005). The 
Yomiuri also expressed concern that competition between the PRC and India in assisting 
the SPDC prevented Myanmar from progressing to democratization, and it encouraged 
the Japanese government to guide Myanmar toward international cooperation and 
stabilization (YS, 11 June 2006). Responding to Myanmar’s mass movement and the 
shooting incident of journalist Nagai, the Asahi proposed Japan’s more active 
commitment to Myanmar’s peace and democratization process including a 
re-examination of economic assistance, consideration of sanction measures, 
encouragement of a proactive role for the PRC, and an increase of acceptance and 
support for Myanmar refugees (AS, 9 October 2007; 29 September 2007b). The 
Mainichi also criticized the SPDC’s oppression against the domestic mass movement as 
well as the shooting of journalist Nagai, urging the Japanese government to raise its 
 
166 See the Japan Platform’s Summary Report on Myanmar Cyclone Nargis Program available at 
http://www.japanplatform.org/area_works/myanmar/doc/myanmar_s.pdf (accessed 4 April 2010).  
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voice for sanctions and to involve the PRC in internationally coordinated pressure on 
Myanmar (MS, 29 September 2007; 28 September 2007). Meanwhile, the Yomiuri noted 
the necessity for Japan to contribute to settle Myanmar’s domestic situation, yet without 
specifying actual measures (YS, 28 September 2007). Concerning disaster relief 
activities after Cyclone Nargis, the Asahi suggested that Japan play a leading role by 
dispatching Foreign Minister Komura to Myanmar and ASEAN countries in order to 
persuade the SPDC to accept foreign personnel and to encourage the PRC to contribute 
to disaster relief (AS, 13 May 2008). The Sankei was also critical of the SPDC’s 
ignorance of people’s lives (SS, 9 May 2008). The Yomiuri mentioned the necessity for 
the SPDC to distribute disaster relief materials and for Japan to provide careful 
assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis (YS, 28 May 2008).  
 
6. Domestic Policy-Making System 
 
During this period, there were three main occasions when the Japanese 
government needed to respond to exogenously raised issues related to the Myanmar 
problem. The first occasion was the U.S.-led proposal to make the Myanmar problem a 
formal agenda item at the UN Security Council, which was finally brought to a vote on 
15 September 2006. The second occasion was Myanmar’s mass movement and the 
shooting of journalist Nagai in September 2007. And the last occasion was the disaster 
of Cyclone Nargis and the constitutional referendum forcibly conducted at that time in 
April-May 2008. On all occasions, Japan’s senior political leaders were not particularly 
proactive within the policy-making system; although they were kept informed about the 
development of the Myanmar problem. They generally moved reactively in line with 
MOFA’s coordination not only because of their fading hopes for making any positive 
change to the Myanmar problem but also because of tougher pressures, particularly 
from the U.S. The frequent change in Prime Minister and cabinet members, in addition, 
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also made it difficult to make any consistent political initiatives in Myanmar 
policy-making. At the same time, METI and MOF played a minimal role within the 
policy-making system because they had no major stake in Myanmar, at least in the 
short-term. As a result, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making during this period rested more 
on MOFA’s organizational process rather than political initiatives, which made the 
Japanese government adopt a risk-averse posture and a reactive behavioural pattern to 
the development of the Myanmar problem.    
 
The Japanese government’s decision to vote for the U.S.-led proposal to make 
the Myanmar problem a formal agenda item at the UN Security Council on 15 
September 2006 appeared to have been made within MOFA and authorized by senior 
political leaders. While it had lost any short-term prospects for an improvement in 
Myanmar’s domestic situation since the Depayin incident and the ouster of Khin Nyunt, 
the Japanese government was still waiting for an opportunity to make a positive change 
in Myanmar and it maintained a supportive stance for the SPDC in the international 
arena, although at bilateral talks it more bluntly demanded action on democratization 
and human rights protection. The Japanese government, thus, continued high-level 
bilateral contacts such as Machimura’s meeting with Myanmar’s Foreign Minister in 
April 2005 and Koizumi’s talk with Than Shwe at the Asian-African Summit in April 
2005.167 At the meeting with Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win on 10 December 
2005, Foreign Minister Aso mentioned that, whilst it wished to maintain dialogue on 
Myanmar’s democratization, it might become difficult for Japan to help Myanmar if 
there was no improvement on the Myanmar side (MOFA, 2005).  
 
When the U.S. and the UK raised the Myanmar problem at the UN Security 
Council in December 2005, the Japanese government initially showed a somewhat 
negative stance to the idea (CS, 3 December 2005). Subsequently when the U.S. 
 
167 Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win also visited Japan in May 2005. 
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initiated another informal discussion on making Myanmar a formal agenda item in June 
2006, the Japanese government was under direct pressure from the White House to 
support the U.S. In the end, as the U.S.-led proposal was brought to a vote at the 
Security Council on 15 September 2006, the Japanese government moved to approve it, 
presumably taking U.S. pressure into account and acknowledging the declining 
short-term prospects for Myanmar’s political and economic development (MS, 16 
September 2006). Foreign Minister Aso actually admitted this shift in Japan’s stance, 
explaining that Japan did oppose the proposal at informal discussions but finally 
decided to vote for it.168 This decision was made after a consensus among executive 
MOFA officials who consulted with Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo and Prime 
Minister Koizumi, who then gave authorization to the decision under the condition that 
the approval did not mean Japan’s support for any future resolution on the Myanmar 
problem at the UN Security Council.  
 
The second time that the government had to respond to the Myanmar problem 
because of external circumstances came around the time of the establishment of the 
Fukuda administration on 26 September 2007, when the large-scale mass movement and 
subsequent shooting of Japanese journalist Nagai occurred. The Japanese government 
seemingly decided to react moderately under MOFA’s coordination even though the 
shooting incident caused domestic criticism of the government’s inability to either make 
a positive change to the Myanmar problem or to force the SPDC to address the incident 
adequately. Regarding Nagai’s death, the Japanese government actually attempted to 
deal with it as a practical bilateral issue rather than politicizing it in a broader context. 
Initially, Prime Minister Fukuda adopted a cautious stance noting that sanctions were 
not the best policy at that stage; however, Foreign Minister Komura, who was in the 
U.S., mentioned that a stronger measure could become a policy option depending on the 
response of the Myanmar government (AS, 29 September 2007a). Subsequently, 
 
168 See Nagashima’s question at the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives on 6 
June 2007. 
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however, Komura stated that Japan should encourage Myanmar’s democratization in 
cooperation with ASEAN and the UN, including the Security Council, without 
suspending humanitarian assistance.169 In practice, whilst it announced on 16 October 
that it would not sign an exchange of notes for a humanitarian assistance project for 
Myanmar’s human resource development in response to the SPDC’s crackdown on the 
domestic mass movement, the Japanese government continued limited humanitarian 
assistance provision for Myanmar without suspending it entirely.  
 
On the issue of Myanmar’s democratization and the SPDC’s oppression of the 
mass movement, the Japanese government repeatedly expressed concern about 
Myanmar’s domestic situation and urged the SPDC to show self-restraint and to restart 
political dialogue with the pro-democracy camp. Komura, for example, met with 
Myanmar’s Foreign Minister Nyan Win at the UN Headquarters on 28 September, 
urging an improvement of Myanmar’s domestic situation. In a pre-planned visit from 30 
September, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Yabunaka Mitoji discussed the shooting 
of journalist Nagai and Myanmar’s democratization at meetings with Myanmar’s 
executive officials (MOFA, 2007a). Later, the Japanese government held various 
bilateral dialogues among senior leaders, raising the issues of both Myanmar’s 
democratization and the shooting incident.170 
At the same time, the Japanese government also sought cooperation with other 
governments as well as the UN Secretariat. On visiting Japan as a part of his trip to 
related countries in late October 2007, Gambari agreed to cooperate closely on the 
Myanmar problem with the Japanese government at meetings with Fukuda, Komura, 
and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Uno Osamu as well as Yabunaka.171 Gambari 
 
169 See Komura’s response to LDP member Tanigaki’s question at the Budget Committee in the 
House of the Representatives on 9 October 2007.  
170 See MOFA’s website on the Myanmar’s situation in relation to domestic demonstrations and the 
Japanese government’s responses available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/myanmar/josei.html
(accessed 4 April 2010). 
171  See MOFA’s website on Gambari’s visit to Japan in October 2007 available at 
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visited Japan again in late February 2008, holding meetings with Komura, Kimura, 
newly appointed Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yabunaka, and his successor Sasae 
Ken’ichiro.172 Also, the Myanmar problem became an issue of discussion at the 
Japan-U.S. summit meeting on 16 November, in which President Bush expressed his 
expectation for Japan to play a role in Myanmar’s democratization (MS, 25 November 
2007; SS, 18 November 2007). In addition, Fukuda revealed that he had asked the 
PRC’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to cooperate in settling Myanmar’s domestic 
turmoil.173 Komura also noted that Japan had a deep discussion on the Myanmar 
problem with the PRC, straightforwardly requesting the PRC to influence the SPDC 
toward Myanmar’s democratization.174 
The Japanese government decided to treat the shooting of journalist Nagai as a 
practical bilateral issue rather than politicize it in a broader context, despite mounting 
domestic criticism against the government’s insufficient pressure on the SPDC. At the 
bilateral meetings, Japan always urged the SPDC to conduct a proper investigation and 
address the incident appropriately. Nyan Win apologised for the death of the Japanese 
journalist in response to Komura’s demand for a full account of the incident at the 
bilateral Foreign Ministers’ meeting at the UN Headquarters on 28 September (MOFA, 
2007b). After that, the Japanese government urged the SPDC for a full account of the 
incident on various occasions, including at several meetings between Komura and Nyan 
Win and at Fukuda’s meeting with Prime Minister Thein Sein on 21 November. 
Responding to DPJ member Suematsu Yoshinori’s proposal to ask for the PRC’s 
cooperation or to employ targeted sanctions in order to address the incident 
appropriately, however, Komura made it clear that the issue should be solved through 
 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/yojin/arc_07/0710_un.html (accessed 4 April 2010). 
172  See MOFA’s website on Gambari’s visit to Japan in February 2008 available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/yojin/arc_08/0802_un.html (accessed 4 April 2010). 
173 See Fukuda’s response to DPJ member Hatoyama’s question at the plenary session of the House 
of Representatives on 3 October 2007.  
174 See Komura’s response to DPJ member Suematsu Yoshinori’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 11 April 2008.  
239 
 
bilateral talks rather than by asking for the cooperation of other countries or by 
employing targeted sanctions.175 
The third occasion of externally motivated responses to Myanmar was after the 
disaster of Cyclone Nargis and the SPDC’s forced implementation of the constitutional 
referendum. The Japanese government continued its moderate responses under MOFA’s 
coordination based on a broad consensus among MOFA and political leaders that Japan 
should not only maintain the engagement policy but also make a contribution to disaster 
relief as an international humanitarian issue. Responding to the disaster of Cyclone 
Nargis, the Japanese government decided to provide around 107 million yen of material 
support as emergency assistance in early May, as well as up to $10 million of 
emergency aid which would be implemented in cooperation with international 
organizations on 9 May.176 In addition, Fukuda sent a letter to Than Shwe, noting 
Japan’s readiness to dispatch an emergency medical team and encouraging the SPDC to 
accept foreign assistance and aid teams (MOFA, 2008c). Senior Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Kimura Hitoshi also visited Myanmar on 17-18 May, encouraging 
Foreign Minister Nyan Win and other Myanmar leaders to accept foreign personnel for 
disaster relief, followed by Komura’s conveying of the same message to Myanmar’s 
Ambassador to Japan Hla Myint on 20 May.177 At the pledging conference organized 
by the UN and ASEAN on 25 May, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Uno Osamu 
pledged to dispatch an investigation team for medical disaster relief, a team to survey 
sunken ships, and a survey team for rehabilitation and reconstruction when the situation 
 
175 See Komura’s response to DPJ member Suematsu Yoshinori’s question at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives on 21 April 2008. 
176 See Komura’s response to DPJ member Inuzuka’s question at the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defense in the House of Councilors on 15 May 2008. Later on, the Japanese government also 
decided $13.1 million of rehabilitation assistance through international organizations as a part of a 
FY2008 supplementary budget approved in March 2009 (MOFA, 2009). 
177 Komura revealed that the Japanese government encouraged the SPDC to accept the activities of 
foreign personnel for emergency relief through various channels including Fukuda’s letter to Than 
Shwe. See Komura’s response to SDP member Uchiyama Tokushin’s question at the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defense in the House of Councilors on 13 May 2008. 
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allowed (MOFA, 2008b).178 
The Japanese government also made efforts for the international coordination 
of emergency assistance for Myanmar as well as encouraging the SPDC to accept 
foreign personnel for disaster relief. Komura mentioned that he agreed with U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte, Australia’s Foreign Minister Smith and 
Thailand’s Foreign Minister Noppadon to persuade the SPDC to accept foreign 
personnel for emergency aid.179 In addition, Fukuda sought cooperation with the PRC 
in persuading the SPDC to accept foreign personnel, while at the same time 
emphasizing the necessity for the UN to actively engage on this issue (The Washington 
Post, 18 May 2008; 11 May 2008).  
 
In dealing with the SPDC’s constitutional referendum, the Japanese 
government proposed to the SPDC that it accept foreign observers for the referendum 
and actually dispatched three officers of the Japanese Embassy in Myanmar (MOFA, 
2008d). After the constitutional referendum took place, the Japanese government 
continued to encourage the SPDC to progress the democratization process by involving 
all the relevant parties and restarting dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi. At the bilateral 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 22 July, Komura conveyed this message on Myanmar’s 
democratization in addition to the discussions on Cyclone Nargis disaster relief and the 
shooting incident of journalist Nagai (MOFA, 2008a). Overall, the Japanese 
government’s response to the disaster of Cyclone Nargis and the constitutional 
referendum was decided through Japan’s conventional modus operandi without any 
outstanding policy initiatives or distinctive policy debates within the government.  
 
178 This was in addition to up to $10 million of emergency aid mentioned above as Japan’s 
contribution to the cyclone disaster relief. 
179 See Komura’s response to DPJ member Inuzuka’s question at the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defense in the House of Councilors on 15 May 2008. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
After the Depayin incident and the ouster of Khin Nyunt, the SPDC began to 
decisively pursue its seven step roadmap to ‘disciplined democracy’ by oppressing 
domestic opposition and reducing its vulnerability to international pressure. This, on the 
one hand, made the Japanese government largely disillusioned with the SPDC’s 
sincerity toward domestic political reconciliation and, on the other hand, meant that the 
Japanese government had lost the main contact person who had at least shown an 
understanding toward international voices and willingness to take an international 
cooperation line within the SPDC. The Japanese government came to recognize the 
decreasing effectiveness of its proactive engagement, at least in the short-term, given 
the SPDC’s decreased need for Japan’s assistance. The Japanese government, therefore, 
largely settled in a wait-and-see position toward the Myanmar problem. Yet, the 
Japanese government at the same time still maintained its primary policy objective to 
encourage Myanmar’s political and economic development, and was seeking an 
opportunity to bring about positive change to the Myanmar problem. In pursuing this, 
the Japanese government essentially considered an engagement policy line as the only 
practical approach toward the SPDC given its further consolidated material capabilities 
vis-à-vis domestic opposition in societal and transnational structure.   
 
At the same time, the Japanese government needed to deal with a changing 
international structural environment which became even more unfavourable for Japan. 
After the Depayin incident, the U.S. and other Western governments attempted to 
further pressure the SPDC by utilizing the UN Security Council as well as exercising 
influence on related governments, especially Japan and ASEAN countries. In contrast, 
other countries such as the PRC, Thailand, India, Russia and North Korea had 
constructed pragmatic and cooperative relationships with the SPDC, which presumably 
made it less necessary for the SPDC to respond to Japan’s engagement policy. The 
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toughest moment for this policy was when Japan came under direct pressure from the 
U.S. to vote for its proposal to make the Myanmar problem a formal agenda item at the 
UN Security Council. In the end, with the consideration that it did not guarantee Japan’s 
approval for any future resolution at the council, the Japanese government decided to 
approve the proposal because it recognized more costs than benefits in pragmatic and 
structural terms in resisting U.S. pressure. Yet, the Japanese government still regarded 
an engagement policy line as the most preferable policy toward Myanmar in achieving 
its pragmatic objective. In pursuit of this policy line the Japanese government adopted a 
low-key and risk-averse posture. It also emphasized its coordination with ASEAN and 
the UN in considering its decreasing connections and leverage in relation to the SPDC 
and its preference to avoid excessive costs imposed by international structure. When it 
gradually became apparent that Western governments had significantly lost their 
leverage against the SPDC, the Japanese government showed some willingness to play a 
bridging role, especially in response to the disaster of Cyclone Nargis.  
 
In domestic resource mobilization, the Japanese government did not have any 
critical obstacles in continuing its low-key engagement policy as mainstream politicians 
continued their support despite facing growing pressures and criticisms of the 
government’s apparent appeasement policy, with some politicians even advocating 
sanctions against the SPDC. On the one hand, those politicians and NGOs supporting 
more assistance to the SPDC generally became less proactive and outspoken in 
Myanmar policy-making, although they did still continue their practical activities. Also, 
the Japanese business sector had largely lost its short-term prospects for business 
operations in Myanmar, not only due to the SPDC’s interventionist economic policy and 
Myanmar’s unimproved business environment but also to the growing possibility of 
damage to its reputation in connection with Myanmar. On the other hand, 
non-mainstream politicians and pro-democracy NGOs came to explicitly advocate 
sanctions against the SPDC, especially after Myanmar’s mass movement and the 
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shooting of journalist Nagai in September 2007. In the end, however, whilst it became 
politically more difficult to resume economic assistance beyond small-scale 
humanitarian assistance without any sign of improvement in Myanmar’s domestic 
problems, the Japanese government could retain enough political support to play a role 
in changing Myanmar positively by engaging with Myanmar’s political leaders and 
dealing with Myanmar’s humanitarian problems in some way.   
 
Japan’s Myanmar policy-making during this period was mostly coordinated by 
MOFA due to the lack of senior leaders’ initiatives and other ministries’ proactive 
participation. Some Japanese political leaders held a personal attachment or motivation 
to conduct an original policy toward Myanmar, but pragmatic and strategic difficulties 
for Japan in conducting proactive engagement with Myanmar and frequent changes of 
Prime Minister and cabinet members prevented them from carrying out any consistent 
political initiatives. At the same time, METI and MOF played a minimal role within the 
policy-making system because they had lost their stake in Myanmar policy, at least in 
the short-term. As a result, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making was largely carried out by 
MOFA’s organizational responses to the development of the Myanmar problem based on 
its low-key and risk-averse posture.  
 
To sum up, the Depayin incident and the ouster of Khin Nyunt forced the 
Japanese government to recognize the SPDC’s insincerity toward domestic political 
reconciliation and international coordination as well as Japan’s decreasing connections 
and leverage over the SPDC. In addition, the transitions in international structure 
surrounding the Myanmar problem worsened the strategic costs and benefits for the 
Japanese government in conducting a proactive engagement policy. The Japanese 
government, however, still considered that an engagement policy line was the only 
practical policy to bring about a positive change in Myanmar as well as the most 
preferable policy in terms of its expected outcome in international structure. Insofar as it 
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remained in low-key engagement, the government’s domestic resource mobilization did 
not pose any critical obstacle whereas domestic policy-making made it easier for MOFA 
to respond to the development of the Myanmar problem based on its practical 
coordination. The Japanese government, therefore, kept seeking opportunities to make a 
positive change to Myanmar’s political and economic development by maintaining an 
engagement policy line during this period.   
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Conclusion 
 
1. Overview 
 
This thesis has examined Japan’s Myanmar policy in four periods: pre-1988, 
1988-1996, 1997-2004, and 2005-2008, by applying the analytical framework of 
neoclassical realism. Then, what can be found from this empirical case study? What can 
the empirical findings of this thesis tell us about the current academic debate on Japan’s 
foreign policy? And, what sort of implications does this empirical case study have for 
the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, especially in regard to Japan’s foreign 
policy analysis? This chapter firstly summarizes this thesis’s empirical findings about 
Japan’s Myanmar policy and, secondly, after examining the plausibility of major 
existing arguments on Japan’s foreign policy and Myanmar policy and discussing their 
consistency with the empirical findings, proposes ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a 
new model of Japan’s foreign policy. Thirdly, this chapter examines the implications of 
this thesis’s empirical study to the applicability and efficacy of the analytical framework 
of neoclassical realism, especially regarding Japan’s foreign policy analysis, and its 
necessary operationalization in analyzing a state’s policy toward general foreign policy 
agendas. Lastly, future research questions are suggested at the end of this chapter. 
 
2. Empirical Findings 
Since its independence, Myanmar has had little impact on the traditional 
international security environment or the global power balance, even if it has had some 
effect on regional power configurations and global political discussions about values. 
The Myanmar problem since the ‘8888 Uprising’ consisted of multiple foreign policy 
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agendas ranging from inter-governmental political and economic relationships to 
democratic legitimacy, human rights protection, nation-building and domestic 
insurgencies as well as other human security issues. Other states and relevant non-state 
actors, hence, identified the foreign policy agenda of the Myanmar problem in different 
ways, placing different priorities and setting different policy objectives and measures. 
These actors’ policy responses consequently formulated the multi-dimensional 
international structure surrounding the Myanmar problem, setting up structural costs 
and benefits for Japan’s Myanmar policy.   
 
Such a structural environment was certainly the dominant concern for the 
Japanese government in calculating the costs and benefits of its Myanmar policy. 
Japan’s policy objectives and measures regarding Myanmar, nevertheless, cannot be 
primarily assumed as its only rational responses to international political structure 
despite the assumptions of structural realists. Japan’s persistent adherence to an 
engagement policy was essentially sustained by a broad consensus within the Japanese 
government and mainstream politicians that an engagement policy line was the most 
practical and preferable approach toward the Myanmar problem based on their 
understanding about the nature of this problem and the status of societal and 
transnational structure. Whilst making some compromises with the changing costs and 
benefits of an engagement policy imposed by international political and economic 
structure, therefore, the Japanese government has maintained its pragmatic objectives 
and engagement approach toward the Myanmar problem throughout two decades since 
1988.  
 
Still, the mode of Japan’s engagement policy somewhat changed from time to 
time in accordance not only with shifts in Japanese policy-makers’ perceptions but also 
with the government’s resource mobilization and domestic policy-making system. 
Japanese policy-makers’ recognition of the changing international political and 
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economic structure since the late 1990s was certainly a major trigger for Japan to begin 
to conduct a somewhat proactive engagement policy toward Myanmar. Hashimoto and 
Obuchi attempted to work against the U.S. sanctions policy as well as to cooperate with 
ASEAN which was in the process of integration and development, thereby hedging 
against the PRC’s increasing presence in the region. The Koizumi administration’s 
critical engagement was partly motivated by the objective of enhancing the partnership 
with ASEAN and supporting its development as a regional political framework based on 
Japan’s close relationship with the U.S. at that time. The Japanese government’s 
reversal to low-key engagement from 2004 was accelerated, if not primarily motivated, 
by its perception of tougher international structural constraints.    
 
The government’s resource mobilization had a relatively minor but still 
significant impact on the government’s conduct of an engagement policy. The Japanese 
government basically succeeded in retaining political support from mainstream 
politicians who promoted Japan’s playing of a proactive role in the Myanmar problem 
through an engagement policy and bilateral friendship politicians who advocated more 
support for the military government, even if these politicians gradually lost their 
political power. This, nonetheless, in turn made some room for those domestic actors 
who could formally or informally participate in Myanmar policy-making, including 
bilateral friendship politicians and NGOs as well as Japanese companies committed to 
Myanmar business, to achieve their objectives and interests under the government’s 
direction of Myanmar policy. On the other hand, although they did not have any 
substantial influence on the government, those domestic actors who were critical of the 
government’s engagement policy gradually increased their voice within domestic 
society, coming to bring some indirect pressure on the government.  
 
Shifts in the domestic policy-making system also had a certain influence on the 
mode of the government’s engagement policy. Japan’s ODA policy toward Myanmar in 
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the pre-1988 period increasingly became a structuralized organizational process 
involving a limited number of concerned policy-makers and domestic actors without 
any effective policy evaluation. Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem and domestic 
political turmoil changed Japan’s Myanmar policy-making into a bureaucratic political 
process involving some conflicts of interest, and with MOFA playing a coordination 
role. The political initiatives of Hashimoto and Obuchi from the late 1990s marked the 
beginning of the Japanese government’s conduct of proactive engagement in a more 
decisive manner involving a range of domestic actors who were supportive of an 
engagement policy. On the other hand, Koizumi’s commitment to a more critical 
approach toward the SPDC was generally based on close coordination between MOFA 
and senior political leaders. After the Depayin incident and the ouster of Khin Nyunt, 
MOFA’s coordination of Myanmar policy-making based on a consensus with senior 
political leaders about basic policy direction and the declining commitment of other 
ministries and domestic actors holding a stake in the bilateral friendship made it easier 
for the Japanese government to revert to a low-key stance toward the Myanmar 
problem.  
 
(1) Foreign Policy Agenda 
 
The foreign policy agenda of the Myanmar problem was drastically 
transformed due to a series of events in Myanmar from 1988 to 1990. The Myanmar 
military government generally maintained its isolationist foreign policy and 
interventionist economic policy except for the short period of economic liberalization 
from the early to late 1990s, even if internal differences of opinion between hardliners 
and moderate pragmatists continued until the early 2000s. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s 
domestic political turmoil from 1988 to 1990 created a separation of political power, 
which was held by the SPDC, from political legitimacy, which was won by the NLD 
and Aung San Suu Kyi as a result of the 1990 election. In addition, the military 
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government’s brutal responses to public protests exposed the obvious infringements of 
human rights to international society, and became another trigger for the Myanmar 
problem to become politicized, particularly by Western countries. On the other hand, the 
military government was continuously concerned with the agenda of nation-building 
and social stability, putting much effort into settling the domestic insurgency activities 
of ethnic minority and other groups. However, having successfully reached ceasefire 
agreements by negotiation and coercion by the late 1990s with all the major ethnic 
minority groups except the KNU, the ethnic minority issue remained a potential 
destabilization factor for the SPDC in the process of Myanmar’s nation-building and 
development. Moreover, while making conscious efforts to deal with narcotics 
trafficking, especially from the mid-1990s, the SPDC paid little attention to the 
domestic humanitarian situation, particularly migration and refugees. Myanmar’s 
domestic mass movement in September 2007 at least partly stemmed from public 
frustration against worsening living standards, while the military’s strengthening of 
operations in the border areas, especially from the mid-2000s, seemed to substantially 
worsen the situation of refugees and displaced persons.  
 
(2) International Structure 
 
International structure surrounding the Myanmar problem was transformed not 
only by the development of the Myanmar problem itself but also by changes in other 
actors’ power and policies. At the level of international political structure, the U.S. had 
little substantial interest in Myanmar from the 1970s in accordance with decreasing 
Cold War tension in East Asia. Subsequently, as it became the only superpower in the 
post-Cold War era, the U.S. accelerated its sanctions approach based on the values of 
democracy and human rights protection, especially after the establishment of the second 
Clinton administration in 1997. Having admitted Myanmar’s membership in 1997, 
ASEAN experienced the Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent economic stagnation 
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from 1997, which undercut its political ability to support the SPDC based on an ‘Asian 
values’ argument. Especially from the mid-2000s, ASEAN consciously sought to 
coordinate closely with the UN as well as to retain the support of major related 
countries because it recognized its inability to have a crucial influence on Myanmar’s 
domestic agenda. Having already attempted to improve its relationship with the 
Myanmar military government by reducing its support for the WFCP’s insurgency 
activities in Myanmar, the PRC constructed a pragmatic and cooperative relationship 
with the SPDC after it took power. The PRC’s close political ties with the SPDC 
became particularly strong from the late 1990s, when ASEAN countries generally 
became more hesitant to provide unconditional political support for the SPDC. Other 
countries including India, Russia and North Korea also constructed cooperative 
relationships with the SPDC, yet in a low-key manner and with limited scope.     
 
At the level of international economic structure, because of the military 
government’s continuation of an interventionist economic policy despite the short-term 
attempt at economic liberalization in the early to mid-1990s, Myanmar’s foreign 
economic relations remained generally weak and narrow in actual terms. It was Japan 
and, to a lesser degree, West Germany that provided a significant amount of economic 
assistance for the military government when it faced serious difficulties in domestic 
economic management in the early 1970s. Yet, Myanmar’s domestic political turmoil 
from 1988 to 1990 substantially decreased foreign economic assistance, mostly from 
Japan and Western countries. As a result of the SPDC’s reform and opening-up policy 
direction from the early 1990s, Myanmar’s foreign trade and investment relations 
deepened in a relatively balanced manner until the late 1990s. The Asian Financial 
Crisis and Western governments’ sanctions policy line, however, substantially damaged 
Myanmar’s foreign economic relations further constraining the SPDC’s economic 
management which was already experiencing difficulty due to running out of foreign 
currency. However, the SPDC could successfully enhance its capacity to preserve 
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domestic macro-economic stability by earning foreign currency in return for natural gas 
exports to Thailand as well as by deepening economic ties with neighbouring countries, 
especially with the PRC. This substantially decreased the SPDC’s vulnerability to the 
Western governments’ sanctions policy even if it made the SPDC anxious about its 
excessive dependence on the PRC.   
 
At the level of societal and transnational structure, the military government 
basically maintained its dominance in material capabilities while domestic insurgency 
activities prevented it from consolidating its power over the territory during the Cold 
War era. Besides, Myanmar’s political turmoil from 1988 to 1990 separated domestic 
material power, which was dominated by the SPDC, and political legitimacy, which was 
won by the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi as a result of the 1990 general election. 
Subsequently, by exercising both negotiation and coercion, the SPDC reached ceasefire 
agreements with all major ethnic minority groups except the KNU by the late 1990s. 
Moreover, the SPDC retained further control of the territory by military operations in 
the border areas, particularly from the mid-2000s. The NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi 
continued their political activities appealing to the general public and international 
society throughout the period. Myanmar nationals and their supporters in other 
countries constructed transnational networks acting for Myanmar’s democratization and 
human rights protection which had a certain impact on the U.S. and other Western 
governments’ Myanmar policy. Given the SPDC’s successful oppression of domestic 
opposition, however, the actual influence of those activities on the SPDC’s behaviour 
primarily rested on Western governments’ leverage against the SPDC, which 
substantially decreased from the early 2000s.  
 
(3) Policy-Makers’ Perceptions 
 
This series of transitions concerning the foreign policy agenda of the Myanmar 
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problem as well as the international structure surrounding it set the structural costs and 
benefits for Japan’s Myanmar policy. Japanese policy-makers generally perceived 
post-war Myanmar as a country in the process of postcolonial nation-building and 
development which had a lot in common with many other Southeast Asian countries. As 
a defeated imperial country in the Second World War as well being the only developed 
country in East Asia belonging to the Western bloc in the post-war period, many 
Japanese policy-makers considered that Japan should respect Myanmar’s state 
sovereignty and political leaders’ efforts for nation-building and development. This 
would promote regional political stability and economic development as well as 
establish its international political standing without causing bilateral friction. This was 
also a rationale based on a realistic observation of Myanmar’s domestic power 
configuration, in which the military government was the only actor retaining enough 
capabilities to preserve social stability, even if it was threatened by domestic insurgency 
activities from time to time.  
 
Japanese policy-makers’ basic perceptions of Myanmar were largely 
unchanged, at least until the early 2000s. Given the SPDC’s domination of material 
capabilities after the 1990 general election, Japanese policy-makers regarded the most 
practical policy direction was to engage with the SPDC so as to encourage gradual 
political and economic reforms based upon the preservation of Myanmar’s social 
stability in a friendly manner. Having already recognized Myanmar’s economic 
stagnation and accumulated debt problem in the late 1980s, many Japanese 
policy-makers assumed Myanmar would follow the Asian developmental state model, 
which could be observed in many other Southeast Asian countries, by promoting 
economic reform and liberalization. Despite certainly admitting the significance of the 
value of democracy and human rights protection, many Japanese policy-makers 
regarded it as something to be pursued in a gradual and pragmatic manner, which should 
not be enforced by what they saw as foreign governments’ high-handed sanctions 
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approach.  
 
The development of Myanmar’s domestic situation by the early 2000s, 
nonetheless, gradually made Japanese policy-makers recognize the increasing difficulty 
of making a positive change to Myanmar’s political and economic development. In this 
process, while the Hashimoto and Obuchi administrations emphasized assistance and 
advice in the conduct of proactive friendship engagement with Myanmar, the Koizumi 
administration took a more critical stance against the SPDC, yet still remaining in a 
proactive engagement process. The Depayin incident and replacement of Khin Nyunt 
certainly made Japanese policy-makers disillusioned with the SPDC’s sincerity 
regarding domestic political reconciliation and the Japan-Myanmar bilateral friendship, 
as well as it meant losing a vital contact person within the SPDC who was willing to 
take an international coordination policy line. Many Japanese policy-makers still shared 
a strong conviction that a sanctions policy toward the SPDC was a counterproductive 
approach and, thus, Japan should remain in an engagement policy line in pursuit of its 
pragmatic objective to make a gradual change toward Myanmar’s political and 
economic development, even if it had little prospect in the short-term.  
 
Based on such perceptions of the Myanmar problem, Japanese policy-makers 
assessed the costs and benefits of its engagement policy imposed by three dimensions of 
international structure. Since the 1970s, when Japan began to expand its economic 
assistance toward Myanmar, Japan’s engagement policy toward Myanmar had never 
been critically challenged by international structural pressures. Instead, Japanese 
policy-makers regarded Myanmar’s domestic instability as a risk to regional political 
stability and that it could promote communism expansion, and so legitimized its 
massive economic assistance as Japan’s contribution to the Western bloc and response 
to the North-South problem, and that it enhanced the promotion of bilateral friendship 
with Asian countries. After Myanmar’s domestic political turmoil from 1988 to 1990, 
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however, Japanese policy-makers perceived increasing pressures, if still relatively 
moderate, especially from the U.S. and other Western countries accusing Japan’s 
engagement policy of neglecting the value of democracy and human rights protection. 
In observing neighbouring countries’ deepening relationships with the SPDC, 
nonetheless, some Japanese policy-makers considered it not only necessary but also less 
difficult to continue its engagement policy toward the SPDC in a low-key manner in 
both political and economic terms.  
 
After the Asian Financial Crisis and the escalation of the U.S. sanctions 
approach from the late 1990s, many Japanese policy-makers, including some senior 
political leaders, perceived a more urgent necessity to conduct proactive engagement 
toward the SPDC for the purpose of countering the high-handed U.S. approach to Asia 
as well as supporting ASEAN’s development as a regional political framework, thereby 
hedging against the PRC’s growing presence in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, the 
Koizumi administration, which adopted a more critical stance against the SPDC, shifted 
its emphasis to strengthening the partnership with ASEAN so as to build-up its internal 
problem-solving ability based upon Japan’s improved relationship with the U.S. at that 
time. In the mid-2000s, however, Japanese policy-makers perceived tougher pressures 
from the U.S., especially at the UN Security Council, to join its efforts to strengthen 
international pressure on the SPDC. In combination with the declining prospect of 
bringing about positive change in Myanmar and its loosening connections and leverage 
with the SPDC, Japanese policy-makers reluctantly admitted that a less problematic 
policy was to adopt a low-key and risk-averse posture as well as to emphasize 
coordination with ASEAN and the UN in dealing with the Myanmar problem.     
 
(4) Resource Mobilization 
 
The Japanese government’s domestic resource mobilization also had some 
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impact on the mode of Japan’s engagement policy because domestic actors’ power and 
interests within the Myanmar policy-making system were largely transformed and 
required the government, at least on some occasions, to take them into account and to 
compromise with them. In the pre-1988 era, the government’s default engagement 
policy was supported by pro-Myanmar politicians and bilateral friendship organizations 
as well as Japanese companies carrying out business in Myanmar, and was almost 
unchecked by other domestic actors. It was from the late 1980s, when Myanmar’s 
accumulated debt problem became serious and domestic political turmoil occurred, that 
some Japanese newspapers began to raise questions about Japan’s massive economic 
assistance to Myanmar. It was also at this time that a bipartisan Diet members’ league 
for Myanmar’s democratization was established as well as non-governmental 
pro-democracy organizations of Myanmar residents and their supporters in Japan. These 
domestic voices criticizing the government’s Myanmar policy, however, remained 
generally weak and fragmented.  
 
From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, when the Japanese government 
conducted a proactive engagement policy toward Myanmar, the politicization of the 
Myanmar problem fuelled a domestic debate on Myanmar policy as well increased the  
range of domestic actors participating in Myanmar policy-making. Especially in 
deciding aid provision for larger-scale ODA projects, it was necessary for the Japanese 
government to coordinate and compromise with coalition partners and other domestic 
actors carrying out rent-seeking activities within the policy-making system despite that 
system being initiated by senior political leaders. The Depayin incident and the ouster of 
Khin Nyunt, however, caused many domestic actors advocating an engagement policy 
based on bilateral friendship to lose their power and motivation within Myanmar 
policy-making. On the other hand, although they had relatively minor power within 
Myanmar policy-making, domestic pro-democracy politicians and NGOs strengthened 
their critical voice against the SPDC and the government’s engagement policy toward it, 
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and some even advocated putting further pressure on the SPDC through sanction 
measures. Still, many mainstream politicians in the end supported the Japanese 
government’s engagement policy line, even if they urged it to play a more proactive role 
in a critical manner.    
 
(5) Domestic Policy-Making System 
 
Japan’s domestic policy-making also certainly had a significant impact on the 
mode that the Japanese government decided and implemented in its engagement policy 
with Myanmar. In the pre-1988 era, while Japan’s decision to re-negotiate war 
reparations and to expand ODA provision was made at an executive level, the 
government’s default engagement policy became increasingly structuralized and was 
carried out through an organizational process in a manner of ‘business-as-usual’ until 
the late 1980s. Within this structuralized domestic policy-making of default engagement, 
there were essentially no conflicts of interest among related domestic actors, including 
related ministries, bilateral friendship politicians and NGOs, as well as Japanese 
companies working in Myanmar. Yet, both Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem and 
political turmoil in the late 1980s posed a serious challenge to this structuralized default 
engagement by causing conflicts of interest among domestic actors, leading to the 
formulation of certain bureaucratic politics within Myanmar policy-making. Until the 
late 1990s, therefore, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making revealed both conflicts and 
coordination among concerned policy-makers and domestic actors. Even so, this 
resulted in a consensus that without senior political leaders’ initiatives Japan should 
remain in a low-key and risk-averse posture toward the development of the Myanmar 
problem.  
 
After the Asian Financial Crisis and the strengthening U.S. sanctions policy in 
the late 1990s, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making began to involve senior political 
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leaders’ initiatives, making the policy more coherent even if it was still necessary to 
compromise with concerned policy-makers and domestic actors on some occasions. 
Whilst the Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori administrations carried out information 
exchanges with a wider range of domestic actors, the Koizumi administration’s 
Myanmar policy was decided and conducted based on closer coordination between 
senior political leaders and MOFA. Since the Depayin incident and the ouster of Khin 
Nyunt, nonetheless, not only related ministries but also senior political leaders largely 
lost their stake and motivation to play a proactive role in Myanmar policy-making. 
Japan’s Myanmar policy, therefore, was conducted primarily by MOFA’s coordination 
based on its organizational responses to the development of the Myanmar problem, 
resulting in a low-key and risk-averse posture even though some senior political leaders 
continued to seek opportunities to take other initiatives.   
 
3. Implications for Japan’s Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
Based on the empirical findings discussed above, this section examines the 
plausibility of the major conventional arguments on Japan’s foreign policy in general 
and Myanmar policy in particular, namely ‘reactive state’, ‘mercantile realism’, 
‘reluctant realism’, ‘adaptive state’, ‘grand strategic reorientation’, ‘special relationship’ 
and ‘special interests’. By doing so, this section concludes that each of these arguments 
has shortcomings in explaining Japan’s Myanmar policy, leading to the introduction in 
the next section of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ as a new model of Japan’s foreign 
policy.  
 
(1) ‘Reactive State’ 
 
Some Japanese policy-makers, especially some MOFA officials, had certainly 
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been concerned about negative U.S. responses to Japan’s behaviour regarding the 
Myanmar problem. This led the Japanese government to be hesitant to resume 
large-scale economic assistance, especially during the period from the ‘8888 Uprising’ 
to the late 1990s. At the same time, Japan’s Myanmar policy-making revealed the 
features of bureaucratic politics during this period, which, at least to some extent, 
prevented the Japanese government from adopting a proactive policy toward the 
Myanmar problem. In this regard, the ‘reactive state’ model seems to have some validity 
in explaining Japan’s low-key responses toward the development of the Myanmar 
problem from 1988 to 1996. Moreover, the U.S. government consciously attempted to 
influence Japan’s Myanmar policy on some occasions and actually succeeded in, for 
example, making Tokyo approve the U.S. proposal to raise the Myanmar problem as a 
formal agenda item at the UN Security Council in September 2006. In the end, however, 
the U.S. could have never altered the Japanese government’s pragmatic objective in 
making a gradual change toward Myanmar’s political and economic development nor 
could it have forced Tokyo to shift from an engagement approach to a sanctions 
approach. Rather, the Japanese government, especially from the late 1990s, consciously 
worked against the U.S. sanctions approach because of its counterproductive effect on 
the Myanmar problem. The Japanese government assessed the structural costs and 
benefits in pursuing its pragmatic objectives and, if necessary, adjusted the mode of its 
engagement policy rather than set its foreign policy goal in response to U.S. pressure. 
The ‘reactive state’ model, therefore, has less plausibility in providing a comprehensive 
explanation of Japan’s Myanmar policy in the post-Cold War era.  
 
(2) ‘Mercantile Realism’ 
 
Many Japanese policy-makers recognized Myanmar’s economic and natural 
resources potential, and continuously sought opportunities to unfold the potential of the 
Myanmar economy by encouraging the military government to undertake an economic 
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reform and liberalization policy. The military government’s interventionist economic 
policy and Myanmar’s unimproved business environment, nonetheless, largely 
prevented Myanmar from achieving economic development. In the pre-1988 period, 
whilst providing some ODA-related business opportunities for Japanese companies, 
Japan’s massive economic assistance never resulted in the cultivating of substantial 
economic interests or of retaining a supply of vital natural resources from Myanmar at 
the macro level. In fact, the Japanese government did not disburse ODA primarily for 
mercantile objectives but rather for broader objectives including Japan’s promotion of 
bilateral friendships with Asian countries, its contribution to the U.S. Cold War strategy, 
and to deal with the North-South problem. It certainly considered ODA as seed money 
for future economic interests, but this should be regarded as a supplemental objective. 
In the post-1988 period, some Japanese policy-makers were concerned about Japanese 
companies’ losses due to the suspension of on-going ODA projects; these policy-makers 
also wanted to support Japanese companies’ business operations in response to the 
SPDC’s economic liberalization policy in the early 1990s. However, as it was concerned 
about Myanmar’s accumulated debt problem from the late 1980s, the Japanese 
government’s economic policy toward Myanmar emphasized the encouragement of the 
SPDC’s economic liberalization as well as the promotion and facilitation of private 
business activities. In the end, there seems to be little evidence to claim that Japan’s 
mercantile interests, rather than its pragmatic objective to promote Myanmar’s gradual 
political and economic development, was the primary objective of Japan’s Myanmar 
policy throughout the period.  
 
(3) ‘Reluctant Realism’ 
 
Especially after the Asian Financial Crisis and the acceleration of the U.S. 
sanctions policy, the Japanese government recognized the transitions in international 
structure surrounding the Myanmar problem and started attempts at proactive 
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engagement with Myanmar. In other words, it could be argued that the Japanese 
government consciously pursued an autonomous foreign policy toward Myanmar, 
which was clearly different from the U.S. sanctions approach. In addition, many 
Japanese policy-makers occasionally expressed concerns about the PRC’s growing 
presence in Myanmar and some explicitly advocated more support for the SPDC so as 
to counterbalance the PRC. It should also be noted that such discourses had functioned 
as a rationale for some Japanese policy-makers in explaining the necessity of an 
engagement policy in relation to the U.S. government as well as in asking for political 
support for an engagement policy to the domestic actors who were advocating ‘China 
threat’ arguments.  
 
However, there seems not to be sufficient evidence to conclude that Japan’s 
Myanmar policy was primarily motivated by balance-of-power considerations or 
relative gain in relation to the PRC. In terms of policy implementation, on the one hand, 
Japan’s Myanmar policy had been far too weak and indirect to counterbalance the 
PRC’s deepening relationship with the SPDC. The Japanese government should have 
taken a policy line closer to unconditional support for the SPDC if it really did prioritize 
counterbalancing the PRC, as some Japanese politicians had actually advocated. To put 
this in another way, when considering Japan’s adherence to an engagement policy 
throughout the period and its slight shift to a critical engagement policy toward the 
SPDC from the 2000s after the circulation of ‘China threat’ arguments, it is unlikely that 
the Japanese government would have conducted a Myanmar policy substantially 
different from the actual one even with or without the China factor.  
 
On the other hand, even among Japanese policy-makers, there were different 
views concerning the strategic objectives for Japan’s Myanmar policy: some 
emphasized the necessity to respond to the PRC’s growing influence and some to 
balance the U.S. sanctions approach, while others advocated strengthening Japan’s 
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partnership with ASEAN so as to enhance ASEAN’s problem-solving ability as a 
regional political framework. In fact, it seemed that Japanese policy-makers’ emphasis 
among these three strategic objectives slightly shifted from time to time. Particularly 
concerning the China factor, despite the circulation of ‘China threat’ arguments 
Japanese policy-makers did not reach a consensus about what counterbalancing the PRC 
over the Myanmar problem exactly meant and why it was an essential objective for 
Japan. In fact, while at least having partly responded to the SPDC’s move to get closer 
to the PRC, the Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori administrations at best aimed at hedging 
against the PRC’s growing presence in Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN 
rather than directly counterbalancing the PRC. In sum, the ‘reluctant realism’ argument 
has some validity in explaining Japan’s conscious pursuit of an autonomous Myanmar 
policy that was different from the U.S. sanctions approach and the PRC’s unconditional 
support approach, while it is not plausible enough in overemphasizing Japan’s 
counterbalancing against the PRC and missing Japan’s original perception and 
pragmatic objective for the Myanmar problem as well as its recognition of ASEAN’s 
increasing significance.  
 
(4) ‘Adaptive State’ 
 
The ‘adaptive state’ would be a relatively more plausible conception in 
explaining Japan’s Myanmar policy than other conventional arguments yet it still has 
some shortcomings. The empirical study of Japan’s Myanmar policy suggests that Japan 
has a relatively coherent set of policy objectives toward the Myanmar problem while 
pursuing them by making compromises with international structural pressures. In 
addition, the Japanese government preferred to promote Myanmar’s economic reforms 
and liberalization as well as cooperate with the UN secretary-general and special envoy, 
both of which can be understood as examples of Japan’s pragmatic liberalism. The 
Japanese government’s perception of a regional political system, however, seems to be 
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primarily based on a statist perspective and the primacy of political stability, which 
should be comprehended as its positive preference to maintain a sovereign state system 
within a region of weak nation-states with many social risk factors rather than its 
passive adaptation to existing political structure. The distinctive feature of Japan’s 
Myanmar policy, and probably its Southeast Asian policy in general, seems to be a 
pragmatic combination of a statist perspective for a regional political system and an 
evolutionary perspective for the regional trend of economic liberalization and private 
sector-led integration. In addition, the ‘adaptive state’ is ambiguous in its explanation of 
when Japan becomes adaptive to structural pressures, when Japan proactively pursues 
liberal objectives, and why these happen.   
 
(5) ‘Grand Strategic Reorientation’ 
 
The transitions in international structure surrounding Japan’s Myanmar policy 
from the late 1990s certainly fuelled a political debate in Japan on its foreign policy 
direction, especially from the viewpoint of post-Cold War Japan’s relationships with the 
U.S. and Asia. Actually, the spectrum of domestic discourses on Japan’s Myanmar 
policy from a sanctions approach, a critical engagement approach, a friendship 
engagement approach to an unconditional support approach are somewhat overlapping, 
if not perfectly matching, with the one of the grand strategic discourses that Samuels 
suggests from ‘pacifists’, ‘middle power internationalists’, ‘normal nation-alists’ to 
‘neoautonomists’. 180  In actual Myanmar policy-making, however, mainstream 
politicians basically supported either a critical or a friendship engagement approach and 
other options never became serious policy options within the Japanese government, 
especially after the late 1990s. In other words, whilst the transitions in international 
 
180 Most SDP members who can be categorized as ‘pacifists’ generally supported a sanctions 
approach while many right-wing statists who can be categorized as ‘neoautonomists’ tended to 
support an unconditional support approach. Some confusion can be observed in two other categories 
because the basic conceptions of ‘normal nation-alists’ and ‘middle power internationalists’ do not 
give a clear direction to Myanmar policy. Amongst ‘normal nation-alists’ pursuing political prestige, 
for example, Koizumi promoted critical engagement while Abe supported friendship engagement.    
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structure certainly diversified Japanese policy-makers’ perceptions of structural 
pressures, mainstream politicians debated their pragmatic objectives for Myanmar 
policy within a relatively small band of policy options.  
 
(6) ‘Special Relationship’ 
 
In the pre-1988 period, bilateral friendship politicians and other policy-makers 
engaging in the Japan-Myanmar relationship, at least subjectively maintained their 
friendships with Myanmar political leaders based on an historical bilateral relationship, 
thus more or less supporting Japan’s ODA provision to Myanmar in the domestic 
policy-making system inasmuch to other Asian countries with deep historical 
relationships. There seemed to be, however, little evidence that such a special 
relationship substantially increased the amount of Japan’s assistance to Myanmar in the 
pre-1988 period in comparison to amounts to other Asian developing countries. Besides, 
most bilateral friendship politicians and other domestic elites with direct historical 
memories, including war veteran business people, had retired or lost political power by 
the mid-1990s. It is, therefore, too far to claim that Japan’s Myanmar policy was 
primarily motivated by bilateral special relationships among political and business elites 
throughout the post-1988 period.   
 
It is, nonetheless, true that many Japanese politicians and other policy-makers 
often described Myanmar as a pro-Japan friendly country, raising it as a rationale for 
Japan’s commitment to the Myanmar problem. In fact, Hashimoto and Obuchi’s 
initiatives of proactive engagement seemed to be at least partly motivated by an 
embedded assumption that the SPDC would respond positively to Japan’s efforts to 
support Myanmar based on bilateral friendship and mutual confidence, which would in 
turn lead to a promotion of Myanmar’s involvement in international cooperation 
frameworks and its transition to economic liberalization and subsequent 
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democratization. Yet, the same embedded assumption can be observed in Japan’s default 
engagement policy toward many other East Asian countries. What is more, such a 
discourse among Japanese politicians and other policy-makers had at best functioned in 
combination with other substantial objectives and in many cases been utilized to gain 
wider support for an engagement policy among Japanese policy-makers and other 
domestic actors.181 In the end, there seems to be little evidence that the Japanese 
government was primarily motivated by an inter-governmental special relationship in its 
conduct of Myanmar policy, especially from the mid-1990s.  
 
(7) ‘Special Interests’ 
 
Japan’s massive economic assistance to Myanmar in the pre-1988 period 
resulted in the development of ODA-related political and business interests, even if it 
did not have wider synergistic effects on Japanese business activities in Myanmar due to 
the military government’s interventionist economic policy and Myanmar’s unimproved 
business environment. The Japanese government’s suspension of economic assistance 
after the ‘8888 Uprising’, especially of on-going yen loan projects, certainly harmed 
established political and economic interests. Consequently, lobbying and rent-seeking 
activities of those who held established interests and those who were later involved in 
Myanmar policy-making emerged. Such activities presumably influenced the Japanese 
government’s decision to resume some on-going ODA projects in February 1989 as well 
as its selection of policy measures to disburse internationally controversial economic 
assistance including the Yangon airport project and the Baluchaung hydro power plant 
project. It is, however, implausible to regard special interests as the primary motivation 
behind Japan’s ODA policy toward Myanmar, especially when considering that the 
decisions concerning ODA provision to the Yangon airport project and the Baluchaung 
 
181  This, however, does not discount the fact that many Japanese people engaging in the 
Japan-Myanmar relationship actually held a certain attachment to the Myanmar people and society, 
probably to a larger extent than was the case with other Asian countries.  
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hydro power plant project were only made after senior political leaders undertook 
political initiatives which seemed to be triggered by the development of the Myanmar 
problem and transformations of international structure. It is also noteworthy that special 
interests arguments cannot explain the Japanese government’s adherence to an 
engagement policy line in spite of the declining prospects for business in Myanmar after 
the late 1990s and the cancellation of remaining yen loan projects in 2001. As a whole, 
special interests seemed not to have shaped or overridden the government’s basic policy 
direction but, if anything, were incorporated into that direction.    
 
4. ‘Problem-Driven Pragmatism’ as a New Model 
 
In the case of Japan’s post-1988 Myanmar policy, international structure posed 
critical tradeoffs to Japan’s foreign policy toward the Myanmar problem. When 
observing the costs and benefits imposed by the multi-dimensional international 
structure Japan could have theoretically chosen any of three options: an engagement 
approach, an unconditional support approach or a sanctions approach. The primary 
reason that Japan adhered to an engagement policy for more than two decades was 
because of the Japanese government’s perception that the Myanmar problem was 
essentially a transitional one of an Asian postcolonial country moving toward 
nation-building and development. In other words, Japan certainly attempted to achieve a 
long-term, pragmatic objective in its conduct of Myanmar policy. The development of 
the Myanmar problem, meanwhile, caused transitions in the multi-dimensional 
international structure, thereby shifting the mode of Japan’s engagement policy on some 
occasions. This was because Japanese policy-makers pragmatically assessed the costs 
and benefits of implementing an engagement policy and made necessary efforts to 
minimize negative reflections of structural pressures by adjusting the mode of its 
engagement policy. 
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At the domestic level, Japan’s Myanmar policy was conducted based on a 
shared perception among Japanese policy-makers that the most practical and preferable 
policy line toward the Myanmar problem was an engagement approach aiming to bring 
about a gradual change in Myanmar’s political and economic development which would 
eventually contribute to regional stability and progress. Yet, Japan’s actual 
policy-making was not carried out in a deductive manner but as a series of responses to 
events with regard to the Myanmar problem. This was primarily because Japanese 
policy-makers generally preferred a low-key and risk-averse policy for Myanmar except 
when they perceived the necessity to respond urgently, which was the strongest 
incentive for them to promote difficult decision-making within the domestic 
policy-making system. The period between 1997 and 2004 was certainly a time when 
senior political leaders perceived an urgent necessity to respond to the development of 
the Myanmar problem in pursuit of their pragmatic objectives.    
 
This characteristic can be generalized into a model of Japan’s foreign policy, 
which this thesis calls ‘problem-driven pragmatism’. ‘Problem-driven pragmatism’ 
refers to a state’s behavioural pattern to take actions for practical problem-solving in 
pursuit of incremental and pragmatic improvements in concrete problems while at the 
same time making necessary compromises with structural pressures and existing 
systems. Whilst structural realism assumes that a state makes consistent and rational 
responses to international political structure, ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ explains the 
dynamic process in which a state makes a series of problem-specific responses by 
calculating the costs and benefits imposed by multiple dimensions of international 
structure. 
 
In analyzing Japan’s foreign policy, structural realist perspectives often have 
difficulty in explaining Japan’s specific foreign policies, leading to the conclusion that 
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Japan is a ‘non-strategic’ or even ‘paralyzed’ country. ‘Problem-driven pragmatism’ 
suggests that this is because Japan’s foreign policy-making is at least subjectively 
motivated by concrete problems that Japan has to address, and Japan practically 
examines available policy options to solve problems based on its long-term pragmatic 
objectives. In so doing, Japan evaluates the costs and benefits of each policy option 
which are imposed by multiple dimensions of international structure. This sometimes 
leads to Japan’s apparently inconsistent behaviour even though Japan holds relatively 
coherent perceptions of international structure; Japan generally has a conservative 
perspective for international political structure and an evolutionary perspective for 
international economic development and multilateral frameworks. This is why Japan 
generally prefers to pursue its pragmatic objectives by employing a quiet rule-based 
approach so as to minimize the risk of international political controversy, whilst taking 
decisive policy initiatives when recognizing concrete problems which demand an urgent 
policy response from Japan.  
 
In the conduct of its Southeast Asian policy, post-war Japan was highly aware 
of the risk that domestic problems of Southeast Asian countries would destabilize the 
regional political system. Japan thus showed a tendency to deal with those problems by 
prioritizing regional political stability and gradual development based on a statist 
perspective, assessing local power configurations realistically, and preferring to take an 
engagement approach in order to bring about incremental and pragmatic improvements 
to arising problems. In so doing, Japan made necessary compromises with the 
constraints of international political and economic structure. Particularly in the 
post-Cold War era, it became necessary for Japan to deal with three major factors in 
international political structure: the U.S. as a global power and Japan’s most significant 
ally; ASEAN as a materially weaker but politically important regional entity in the 
process of development; and, the PRC as a growing power increasing its presence in 
East Asia. Within international economic structure, post-Cold War Japan needed to pay 
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attention to the U.S., ASEAN and the PRC while at the same time recognizing that 
region-wide economic liberalization and private sector-led integration were essential 
trends which Japan should promote and take advantage of.   
 
Japan’s ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ is to some extent sustained by its 
domestic policy-making system. In the post-war era, the bureaucracy has primarily 
coordinated Japan’s foreign policy-making even if some senior political leaders 
undertook their own initiatives in a limited number of foreign policy agendas. It has 
been recently argued that, in accordance with the dilution of Japan’s iron triangle, a 
wider range of domestic actors were allowed room to formulate a policy coalition 
alternative to the traditional foreign policy circle. However, it is extremely difficult to 
circumvent bureaucratic coordination of Japan’s foreign policy-making process, 
especially when Japan substantially reorients its foreign policy direction. This is to a 
large extent because the identification of foreign policy agendas, the gathering of related 
information, and the examination of available policy options are all principally based on 
bottom-up input from the bureaucracy. This makes Japan’s policy-making process 
essentially problem-driven; an urgent necessity to address concrete problems is the 
strongest motivation for Japan to change its policy direction in a pragmatic manner 
within the policy-making system. While some senior political leaders initiated specific 
foreign policies which affected the decisiveness of Japan’s foreign policy 
implementation, there are still few political leaders and other domestic actors who can 
set the foreign policy agenda by themselves or override information and policy options 
suggested by bureaucrats.  
 
From a structural realist perspective, such a characteristic of Japan’s foreign 
policy can be regarded as an essentially reactive or non-strategic behavioural pattern. 
Yet, ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ is in fact consistent with the basic premise of 
defensive realism in terms of a state taking necessary action to ensure its security in a 
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less-assertive manner within the constraints of international political structure. The 
focus of this model is to explain the way in which a state pursues diverse policy 
objectives by making pragmatic compromises with existing multi-dimensional 
international structure. In other words, without exclusively focusing on international 
political structure, a ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ state assesses the costs and benefits 
of available policy options with regards to a foreign policy problem and practically 
adjusts its policy direction in accordance with the development of the problem and 
transitions in multiple dimensions of international structure.  
 
How far, then, can the model of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ be generalized to 
Japan’s foreign policy and Southeast Asian policy in particular? The focus of this model 
is to explain Japan’s behavioural pattern of taking external actions to practically solve 
concrete problems by making necessary compromises with structural pressures and 
existing systems. This basic pattern can be observed in many cases of Japan’s foreign 
policy. Even in the area of security policy, Japan shows this pattern in its low-key and 
risk-averse approach toward expanding the role of the SDF in response to a series of 
problems in the post-Cold War era (Samuels, 2007: 87-89). While it is necessary to be 
further tested through more empirical studies, ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ can be 
understood as a model applicable to a wide range of Japan’s foreign policies. If so, the 
next question would be what kind of pragmatic objectives is Japan pursuing within 
current international structure with its behavioural pattern of ‘problem-driven 
pragmatism’?  
 
This thesis suggests that Japan generally prefers to make practical incremental 
improvements to concrete problems based on a conservative assessment of international 
political structure and an evolutionary perspective on international economic 
development and multilateral frameworks. Especially in its Southeast Asian policy, 
post-war Japan perceived that many Asian postcolonial countries were in the process of 
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nation-building and development and thus it was necessary to maintain regional 
political stability based on respect for state sovereignty and political leaders’ efforts. 
This led to Japan’s general preference for encouraging gradual and practical 
improvements in Asian countries’ domestic problems by employing an engagement 
approach in inter-governmental relationships. Japan’s friendship engagement in 
combination with economic assistance provision during the Cold War era was largely 
consistent with Japan’s strategic objectives, including its contribution to the U.S. Cold 
War strategy, its response to the North-South problem in East Asia, as well as the 
necessity to reconstruct mutual confidence with Asian countries and to promote its 
economic security and interests. Moreover, such a policy direction functioned well 
domestically in terms of accommodating the domestic interests of bilateral friendship 
politicians and the business sector insofar as recipient countries did not cause 
substantial political and social problems. 
 
As an example, in the post-war era, Japan perceived that Indonesian President 
Sukarno’s provocative and communism-inclined external attitude in the early to 
mid-1960s stemmed from his weak power base in Indonesia, which was in the process 
of nation-building and development. Japan, thus, provided support to him in order to 
prevent Indonesia from being drawn into the PRC’s sphere of influence despite the 
Western governments’ antipathy to Sukarno. In response to the subsequent coup d’etat 
and Suharto’s takeover of power in the mid-1960s, Japan swiftly moved to provide 
support for Suharto based on its assessment of his consolidation of domestic political 
power. In a comparable example, Japan observed the Vietnam War primarily as a 
product of Vietnam’s political leaders’ aspirations for independence and nation-building 
rather than as part of a transnational communist movement; a lesser consideration was 
the domino effect of the establishment of communist Vietnam in international political 
structure. This led to Japan’s reluctance to provide proactive support to U.S. military 
operations as well as its prompt moves regarding normalization and economic 
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cooperation with communist Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam War.  
 
In the post-Cold War era, nonetheless, there seems to have been a gradual shift 
in Japan’s pragmatic objectives, at least in some aspects, in response to concrete 
problems emerging in East Asia. During the collapse of the Cold War structure, by 
realistically assessing the local power configurations in Cambodia, at a peace 
conference in Tokyo in June 1990 Japan proposed to agree on power sharing among 
major local factions to settle the Cambodian conflict. In addition, in a similar case to 
that of the Myanmar policy, Japan maintained an engagement policy toward Iran’s 
authoritarian rule presumably for the purpose of bringing about gradual and practical 
changes despite the hard-line U.S. policy. From the 1970s, Japan conducted an 
engagement policy to promote the PRC’s international coordination and economic 
liberalization policy and the maintenance of domestic stability; on the other hand, 
especially from the late 1990s, Japan perceived both opportunities and threats in the 
PRC’s growing political and economic presence and did not stick exclusively to an 
engagement policy line. Moreover, despite some attempts to engage with North Korea 
in the post-Cold War era, Japan gradually shifted its policy to one of ‘talk and pressure’ 
probably in pursuit of a security and nationalist agenda, especially from the early 2000s.  
 
This shift in pragmatic objectives suggests that Japan is no longer exclusively 
pursuing friendship engagement based on its traditional perspective of international 
structure in East Asia. Yet, Japan’s policy shift has remained a pragmatic and 
incremental one in order to deal with specific emerging problems in the region. In other 
words, Japan’s conservative perception of regional political stability as well as its 
evolutionary perspective on economic progress and multilateral frameworks 
development seems to be largely unchanged. Thus, Japan still pursues its pragmatic 
objectives in response to concrete problems in a practical and incremental manner based 
on its examination of the costs and benefits imposed by multi-dimensional international 
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structure. More specifically, the model of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’ indicates that 
Japan’s shifts in its policy toward the PRC and North Korea, among others, are 
primarily because of Japan’s changing perception of the nature of identified problems; 
and yet, Japan’s behavioural transitions still stem from its problem-specific assessment 
of tradeoffs that undergo a problem-responsive practical process. This needs to be 
further examined by detailed empirical case studies.  
 
5. Theoretical Implications for the Neoclassical Realism 
Framework 
 
This thesis has examined the applicability and explanatory power of 
neoclassical realism with regard to Japan’s foreign policy. The empirical study of 
Japan’s Myanmar policy demonstrates neoclassical realism’s strength in providing a 
consistent explanation to the question as to why Japan employed a particular direction 
of foreign policy in comparison to other theories of foreign policy analysis.  
 
From a structural realism perspective, it is difficult to judge which particular 
policy approach among three main theoretical policy options was the most rational one 
for the Japanese government: a sanctions approach, an unconditional support approach 
or an engagement approach. A sanctions approach would have certainly harmed Japan’s 
bilateral political and economic interests as well as Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia 
while it would probably have resulted in less friction with the U.S. and other Western 
governments. Especially from the early 2000s, a limited sanctions approach should have 
become a more possible policy option for the Japanese government when considering 
its minimal political and economic interest in the Japan-Myanmar relationship.  
 
An unconditional support approach, on the other hand, would have maximized 
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Japan’s bilateral political and economic interests as well as Japan’s prestige in the 
region if it had resulted in Myanmar’s economic development and international 
cooperation policy, as could be more or less observed with Japan’s China policy after 
the Tiananmen Square incident. If the Japanese government had been seriously 
concerned with its relative gain against the PRC, this approach should have been the 
best possible policy option throughout the period. In taking this approach, however, 
Japan would have obviously invited international criticism and pressure from the U.S. 
and other Western governments.  
 
While supposedly a more moderate approach compared to the two other 
approaches, especially when considering short-term international structural pressures, it 
could be predicted that an engagement approach would be criticized as lukewarm and 
damaging to bilateral friendships and Japan’s international prestige, especially if it did 
not bring about any positive change to the Myanmar problem. It is, therefore, difficult to 
explain Japan’s adherence to an engagement policy only from the perspective of 
structural realism which assumes a state’s rational responses to the costs and benefits 
imposed by international power configuration.  
 
The empirical study of Japan’s Myanmar policy suggests that domestic factors, 
namely domestic norms, domestic actors’ interests and the domestic policy-making 
system, do not shape a state’s foreign policy independently despite innenpolitik theories’ 
assumption of the primacy of these factors. Japan’s Myanmar policy can be understood 
as a policy within the boundaries of limited rationality that neoclassical realists assume 
to be given by international structure. The empirical study implies that domestic norms, 
which a ‘special relationship’ argument points out, become a significant factor when 
they are shared by relevant policy-makers and actually reflected in identifying foreign 
policy agendas, perceiving international structure, and consequently formulating a 
state’s foreign policy. Similarly, the empirical study suggests that domestic actors’ 
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specific interests, which a ‘special interests’ argument emphasizes, become a significant 
factor when they are connected with policy-makers’ policy direction and accordingly 
reflected in the process of foreign policy-making. In addition, the result of this thesis’s 
empirical study shows that Japan’s domestic policy-making system, particularly the 
existence of senior political leaders’ commitment and the mode of interactions among 
domestic actors, affects the consistency and decisiveness of foreign policy 
implementation while not directly shaping the foreign policy direction itself.  
 
The implications mentioned above suggest that neoclassical realism can make 
up for the shortcomings of other theories of foreign policy analysis and provide a more 
persuasive explanation for Japan’s foreign policy. The empirical study shows that 
international structure sets up basic conditions for a state’s conduct of foreign policy by 
generating the costs and benefits of a state’s external actions or inactions; while a state’s 
policy-makers interpret information about foreign policy agendas, set policy objectives, 
assess the costs and benefits imposed by international structure, and decide a state’s 
foreign policy through their interactions within the policy-making system. Especially 
when a state faces considerable ambiguity in policy outcomes or tradeoffs among 
multiple policy options which are apparently rational enough, it is necessary for a state’s 
policy-makers to choose a policy based on their own perceptions or to address 
differences of opinion among them, resulting in taking a particular course of responses 
toward the foreign policy agenda of concern. This does not mean that there is no 
possibility that a state may employ a policy beyond the boundaries of limited rationality 
that neoclassical realism assumes, as innenpolitik theories claim, especially when 
limited and unclear information about international structure prevents policy-makers 
from identifying a rational policy. Insofar as having sufficient information about the 
status of international structure, however, it is more likely for a state’s policy-makers to 
respond to structural pressures in a fairly rational way, especially when they are directly 
linked with a state’s traditional security environment.  
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However, there is a possibility that such structural pressures do not reveal the 
single policy option that a state should take as the only rational policy because of the 
ambiguity of policy outcomes or tradeoffs among multiple policy options, especially 
concerning foreign policy agendas which have less direct linkage with urgent traditional 
security and thus are less relevant to the primacy of international political structure. 
Then, where do such ambiguities of policy outcomes or tradeoffs among multiple policy 
options come from? The empirical study of Japan’s Myanmar policy suggests that the 
existence of multiple foreign policy agendas and political games on multiple dimensions 
of international structure can cause critical tradeoffs among different agenda items and 
different dimensions of international structure as well as ambiguity in policy outcomes 
stemming from multiple effects of a state’s foreign policy.  
 
In the case of Japan’s Myanmar policy, there were three factors that broadened 
the room that policy-makers had for interpretation and calculation in deciding a foreign 
policy direction. Firstly, the Myanmar problem, especially after the 1990 general 
election, consisted of multiple foreign policy agendas in response to which other 
countries set different policy priorities. This is largely because Myanmar never posed a 
serious traditional security threat to any other country and thus other countries 
responded to the Myanmar problem by identifying different foreign policy agendas in 
Myanmar and setting different priorities among them. Whereas Western governments, 
which had minimal political and economic interest in Myanmar, perceived the Myanmar 
problem as a challenge to the values of democracy and human rights, Japanese 
policy-makers generally regarded it as a problem in the process of nation-building and 
development. They also recognized the implications for regional political stability and 
development and placed priority on policies which encouraged Myanmar’s gradual 
political and economic development.  
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Secondly, being an aggregate of multiple foreign policy agendas, the Myanmar 
problem allowed policy-makers to place it along different dimensions of international 
structure, leading to certain perception gaps among policy-makers regarding their 
understanding of the status of international structure. Insofar as assuming the primacy of 
international political structure which directly affects a state’s traditional security or 
external power balance, policy-makers tend to neglect or at most give secondary 
significance to other dimensions of international structure. Yet, if policy-makers are 
allowed to consider not only international political structure but also other dimensions 
of international structure, then there can be some room for policy-makers to evaluate the 
tradeoffs in costs and benefits imposed by multiple dimensions of international structure. 
In fact, in formulating their Myanmar policy, Japanese policy-makers paid attention to 
three dimensions of international structure: international political structure; international 
economic structure; and, societal and transnational structure, being particularly 
conscious of the military government’s dominant material power in societal and 
transnational structure. The assessment of multi-dimensional international structure can 
also be a source of perception gaps regarding structural pressures among a state’s 
policy-makers, leading to differences of opinion in policy objectives and measures.    
 
Thirdly, for Japanese policy-makers, the outcomes of its foreign policy toward 
the Myanmar problem were largely ambiguous because it caused multiple effects; direct 
effects on the Japan-Myanmar bilateral relationship and its relationships with other 
countries and also possible impacts on the development of the Myanmar problem itself 
which would, in turn, transform the international structure surrounding the Myanmar 
problem. Japan’s proactive engagement with controversial ODA provision from the late 
1990s was a risky policy choice as it could only result in international and domestic 
criticism without necessarily leading to a positive response from Myanmar’s political 
leaders. Japanese political leaders, however, held an expectation that the SPDC would 
respond positively to Japan’s efforts based on bilateral friendship and its sincerity 
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toward political and economic development. Instead they worried that Japan’s presence 
in the region would be diminished if it did not formulate an autonomous policy toward 
the Myanmar problem.      
 
In sum, the existence of multiple foreign policy agendas, multiple dimensions 
of international structure and ambiguity in policy outcomes, which can often be 
observed in general foreign policy agendas, can make it necessary for a state’s 
policy-makers to interpret the costs and benefits imposed by international structure, 
predict policy outcomes and deal with crucial tradeoffs based on their own perceptions 
as well as address possible differences of opinion among them. In fact, the most 
challenging task of this thesis was to apply neoclassical realism, which is generally used 
to explain a state’s ‘grand strategy’ or foreign policy toward security and high-politics 
issues, to a state’s foreign policy regarding general foreign policy agendas, which have 
little impact on a state’s traditional security or surrounding material power balance but 
still pose a significant challenge to a state’s foreign policy. In such cases, even if 
international structural incentives are relatively clear, a state’s policy-makers have some 
room for interpretation and calculation in identifying foreign policy agendas, setting 
policy objectives, evaluating structural costs and benefits and predicting policy 
outcomes. This thesis, therefore, suggests that in operationalizing the framework of 
neoclassical realism for analyzing a state’s policy toward a general foreign policy 
agenda, especially when having less direct linkage with urgent traditional security, it is 
necessary to examine multiple foreign policy agendas and multiple dimensions of 
international structure as well as policy-makers’ perceptions of them so as not to ignore 
the critical tradeoffs among the costs and benefits and ambiguity in policy outcomes 
which a state’s policy-makers face. 
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6. Future Research Questions 
 
This thesis has analyzed the case of Japan’s Myanmar policy in the post-Cold 
War era in order to provide empirical grounds for the study of Japan’s Myanmar policy, 
contributing to the debates on post-Cold War Japan’s foreign policy, particularly 
Southeast Asian policy, as well as extracting implications for the applicability of 
neoclassical realism to Japan’s foreign policy analysis. Yet, this thesis’s contribution to 
the debate on Japan’s foreign policy has an obvious limitation in examining only one 
case study. Also, Japan’s relatively minor interest in its relationship with Myanmar 
could possibly make this thesis’s empirical study ineffective in testing the relative 
significance of Japan’s pragmatic objectives to other more substantial interests in 
traditional or economic security agendas. However, the thesis does provide credible 
evidence that Japan’s foreign policy reveals a behavioural pattern of ‘problem-driven 
pragmatism’ and is basically guided by Japan’s conservative perceptions of regional 
political stability as well as its evolutionary perspective on international economic 
progress and multilateral frameworks development.  
 
It is, therefore, indispensable to test other cases of Japan’s foreign policy in 
order to examine the plausibility of the model of ‘problem-driven pragmatism’. Japan’s 
general perceptions of multi-dimensional international structure and its pragmatic 
objectives in dealing with domestic problems may be observed in its policy toward 
Cambodia and Iran as well as Japan’s emphasis on non-traditional security or human 
security, especially in its Southeast Asian policy. It is also necessary to examine how far 
Japan’s behavioural pattern to take actions for practical problem-solving in pursuit of 
pragmatic improvements in concrete problems by making necessary compromises with 
structural pressures and existing systems could be observed in the conduct of Japan’s 
foreign policy. This problem-response behavioural pattern based on its practical 
assessment of the costs and benefits could possibly be found even in Japan’s foreign 
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policy toward the PRC and North Korea, which are directly linked with Japan’s urgent 
security interests.  
 
The essence of the theoretical implications extracted from this thesis is that, 
whereas the analytical framework of neoclassical realism is applicable to Japan’s 
foreign policy studies, it is necessary for analyzing a state’s policy toward general 
foreign policy agendas, especially ones with less direct links with urgent traditional 
security, to comprehend policy-makers’ perceptions of specific foreign policy agendas 
and multi-dimensional international structure. This is because, if there is considerable 
ambiguity in policy outcomes, policy-makers need to deal with critical tradeoffs in 
choosing a foreign policy option imposed by multi-dimensional international structure 
and to predict foreign policy outcomes based on their own perceptions, leading to the 
employment of a foreign policy which cannot be automatically presumed from the basic 
premise of structural realism. It is, however, still necessary to draw up further empirical 
cases of Japan’s and other states’ foreign policy which can be better explained by the 
neoclassical realism framework compared to the frameworks of structural realism, 
institutionalism and innenpolitik theories.   
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